PRESENT: All the Justices
WILLIAM P. JENKINS, SR., ET AL.
v. Record No. 021993 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN
June 6, 2003
BAY HOUSE ASSOCIATES, L.P.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY
Harry T. Taliaferro, III, Judge
This appeal involves a challenge to a decree in which the
chancellor held that a plaintiff, who owns property lying
beneath a pond opening to the Chesapeake Bay, also owns the
waters of the pond. The chancellor enjoined certain owners of
land abutting the pond from trespassing on the pond's waters and
from placing piers or other structures reaching into the water.
The dispositive issue before us is whether this holding and the
award of injunctive relief were permitted under the allegations
and prayers for relief in the plaintiff's pleadings.
We state the evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, Bay House Associates, L.P. (Bay House), the
prevailing party in the trial court. City of Richmond v. Holt,
264 Va. 101, 103, 563 S.E.2d 690, 691 (2002); Tashman v. Gibbs,
263 Va. 65, 68, 556 S.E.2d 772, 774 (2002). In April 1998, Bay
House acquired by deed a 78.5-acre tract of land submerged
beneath the waters of Gaskins Pond, a naturally occurring "salt
pond" in Northumberland County.
Bay House's predecessors in title acquired the submerged
land by deed from Claude A. Swanson, in his capacity as Governor
of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in February 1909. At that
time, the pond was completely separated from the waters of the
Chesapeake Bay by a small strip of land, or isthmus, on the
pond's eastern border. However, in recent years, a narrow
"opening" in the isthmus has created an "outlet" connecting the
waters of the pond to the waters of the Chesapeake Bay.
Since this opening was created, several owners of land
adjoining the pond have constructed piers extending from their
property into the pond that are affixed to Bay House's
underlying land. In August 1998, George B. Little, a partner of
Bay House, sent a letter to one of these adjoining landowners,
William P. Jenkins, Sr., alleging that Jenkins had trespassed on
Bay House's property by erecting a pier that was secured to the
pond bed. In the letter, Little requested that Jenkins "remove
all but the floating portion of [his] pier immediately." Little
informed Jenkins that if he did not comply with Little's
request, Little would seek an injunction prohibiting him from
trespassing "on any portion of the bottom of Gaskins Pond."
Jenkins did not comply with Little's demand.
In December 1998, Bay House's counsel sent letters to four
other property owners whose land abuts the pond, advising them
that Bay House owned "the land beneath Gaskins Pond" and that
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Bay House had "not given permission to anyone to construct a
dock on its property." Bay House informed the property owners
that it would request injunctive relief if they did not remove
their docks from Bay House's land by a certain date. None of
these property owners complied with Bay House's request.
Bay House filed a bill of complaint in the circuit court
against Jenkins and the four other property owners
(collectively, the defendants). The bill of complaint alleged,
among other things, that Bay House owned the "submerged land
lying beneath the waters of Gaskins Pond" and that the
defendants' failure to remove their docks from Bay House's
"land" constituted acts of trespass. Bay House requested that
the chancellor order the defendants to remove their docks and
enjoin the defendants "from trespassing on the land of Bay House
by constructing or causing to be constructed, or by placing or
causing to be placed any thing on the land of Bay House." Bay
House also asked that the chancellor grant "such other, further
and general relief as the nature of the case may warrant or to
equity shall seem meet."
At an ore tenus hearing, Bay House presented expert
testimony from three witnesses who addressed various issues,
including the question whether the pond had become a navigable
body of water that could be traversed by boats entering and
exiting the pond's opening to the Bay. The defendants did not
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present any evidence to the chancellor. However, they argued,
among other things, that they had riparian rights to use the
waters and pond bed once the pond became open to the Bay.
The chancellor held that Bay House has "a fee simple
ownership in the bed and waters of Gaskins Pond," and that the
water opening between the pond and the Bay "did not in any way
diminish" Bay House's ownership interest. Further holding that
the defendants did not have any right to use the bed or waters
of the pond, the chancellor enjoined the defendants from
"trespasses upon the bed and waters of Gaskins Pond" and
directed them to disassemble and remove their piers from the
pond.
In their appeal, the defendants do not challenge the
portion of the chancellor's decree holding that Bay House owns
the land beneath the pond and is entitled to an injunction
prohibiting the defendants from trespassing on Bay House's land.
Instead, the defendants argue that the chancellor erred in
awarding Bay House relief not requested in its pleadings by
holding that Bay House owns the pond's waters and by enjoining
the defendants from constructing or retaining any piers in those
waters. The defendants observe that Bay House's bill of
complaint, including its prayer for specific relief, asserted
only an exclusive right to use the land beneath the pond, not
the pond's waters. Thus, the defendants contend that Bay
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House's bill of complaint did not provide them notice that they
needed to defend their claimed right to use those waters, and
that the disputed portion of the chancellor's decree was
rendered without any allegations in the pleadings supporting
such relief.
In response, Bay House argues that the portion of the
chancellor's decree enjoining the defendants from use of the
pond's waters was proper because this relief was "not
inconsistent" with the specific relief Bay House requested
concerning the defendants' trespass on Bay House's land. Bay
House asserts that, therefore, its prayer for general relief
permitted the chancellor to award the additional unrequested
relief regarding use of the pond's waters. We disagree with Bay
House's arguments.
A litigant's pleadings are as essential as his proof, and a
court may not award particular relief unless it is substantially
in accord with the case asserted in those pleadings. Brooks v.
Bankson, 248 Va. 197, 206, 445 S.E.2d 473, 478 (1994); Gwinn v.
Collier, 247 Va. 479, 484, 443 S.E.2d 161, 164 (1994); Ted
Lansing Supply Co. v. Royal Aluminum & Constr. Corp., 221 Va.
1139, 1141, 277 S.E.2d 228, 229 (1981). Thus, a court is not
permitted to enter a decree or judgment order based on facts not
alleged or on a right not pleaded and claimed. Hensley v.
Dreyer, 247 Va. 25, 30, 439 S.E.2d 372, 375 (1994); Harrell v.
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Woodson, 233 Va. 117, 121, 353 S.E.2d 770, 773 (1987); Ted
Lansing Supply Co., 221 Va. at 1141, 277 S.E.2d at 229; see
Ainslie v. Inman, 265 Va. 347, 356, 577 S.E.2d 246, 251 (2003);
Smith v. Sink, 247 Va. 423, 425, 442 S.E.2d 646, 647 (1994).
The rationale supporting this basic rule is plain. As we
have stated, "[e]very litigant is entitled to be told by his
adversary in plain and explicit language what is his ground of
complaint or defense. . . . The issues in a case are made by
the pleadings, and not by the testimony of witnesses or other
evidence." Ted Lansing Supply Co., 221 Va. at 1141, 277 S.E.2d
at 230 (quoting Potts v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 165 Va. 196,
207, 181 S.E. 521, 525 (1935)).
The pleadings in the present case did not contain any
assertions that the defendants committed a trespass on waters
owned by Bay House. Instead, Bay House's bill of complaint
alleged only that Bay House owned the land beneath the pond, and
that the defendants had committed acts of trespass by affixing
their piers to Bay House's submerged land. In accordance with
these facts alleged, Bay House requested that the defendants be
enjoined from such trespasses on "the land of Bay House."
Based on these allegations, the case pleaded by Bay House
was limited strictly to its ownership of the land and to the
defendants' encroachment on that land. The total absence from
these pleadings of any claim that Bay House owned the pond's
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waters and that the defendants were committing a continuing
trespass thereon precluded the chancellor from determining
ownership of the waters and from imposing a remedy based on such
facts not alleged. See Sink, 247 Va. at 425, 442 S.E.2d at 647;
Hensley, 247 Va. at 30, 439 S.E.2d at 375; Harrell, 233 Va. at
121, 353 S.E.2d at 773.
The chancellor's contrary decision permitted Bay House to
obtain relief without providing the defendants notice in the
bill of complaint of any claim regarding their use of the pond's
waters. This absence of notice in the pleadings was especially
detrimental to the defendants because their right to use the
pond's waters rested on the issue whether the waters were
navigable, and the defendants bore the burden of proof on that
issue. See Boerner v. McCallister, 197 Va. 169, 175, 89 S.E.2d
23, 27 (1955). Thus, the defendants were placed in the
untenable position of bearing the burden of proof on an issue
that Bay House did not identify in its pleadings.
We also find no merit in Bay House's assertion that its
general prayer for relief permitted the chancellor to issue an
injunction regarding the defendants' use of the pond's waters.
When a party prays for both special and general relief and no
relief may be granted under the special prayer, a court of
equity may grant proper relief under the general prayer that is
consistent with the case stated in the bill of complaint.
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Johnson v. Buzzard Island Shooting Club, Inc., 232 Va. 32, 36,
348 S.E.2d 220, 222 (1986); Winston v. Winston, 144 Va. 848,
858-59, 130 S.E. 784, 787 (1925); see Sink, 247 Va. at 425, 442
S.E.2d at 648; Wright v. Castles, 232 Va. 218, 222, 349 S.E.2d
125, 128 (1986). However, a general prayer will support relief
only for those matters placed in controversy by the pleadings
and, thus, any relief granted must be supported by allegations
of material facts in the pleadings that will sustain such
relief. See Johnson, 232 Va. at 36, 348 S.E.2d at 222; Parks v.
Wiltbank, 177 Va. 461, 465-66, 14 S.E.2d 281, 282 (1941); Dobie
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 164 Va. 464, 475, 180 S.E. 289, 293
(1935). This rule reflects the principle that although the
power of an equity court is broad, that power does not permit a
court to adjudicate claims that the parties have not asserted.
See Sink, 247 Va. at 425, 442 S.E.2d at 647.
Here, the failure of Bay House's pleadings to put ownership
of the pond's waters at issue, or to allege a trespass to those
waters by the defendants, placed these issues beyond the reach
of Bay House's general prayer for relief. Therefore, the
absence of such charges and facts from the bill of complaint
excluded those issues from the scope of the relief that the
chancellor was permitted to consider. Accordingly, we hold that
under the particular pleadings in this case, the chancellor
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erred in awarding Bay House any relief regarding the pond's
waters and the defendants' use of those waters.
For these reasons, we will affirm that portion of the
chancellor's decree holding that Bay House owns the bed of
Gaskins Pond and enjoining the defendants from trespassing on
the pond bed. We will reverse the portion of the decree 1)
holding that Bay House owns the pond's waters; 2) enjoining the
defendants from future construction of piers or other structures
in those waters and from other further trespasses to the pond's
waters; and 3) directing the removal of existing piers and
structures that do not touch the pond bed. We will enter final
judgment in the case.
Affirmed in part,
reversed in part,
and final judgment.
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