Present: All the Justices
S. VANCE WILKINS, SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES, ET AL.
v. Record No. 021003 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY
November 1, 2002
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR WEST, ET AL.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SALEM
Richard C. Pattisall, Judge
Article II, § 6 of the Constitution of Virginia provides:
Members of the House of Representatives of the
United States and members of the Senate and of the
House of Delegates of the General Assembly shall be
elected from electoral districts established by the
General Assembly. Every electoral district shall
be composed of contiguous and compact territory and
shall be so constituted as to give, as nearly as is
practicable, representation in proportion to the
population of the district. The General Assembly
shall reapportion the Commonwealth into electoral
districts in accordance with this section in the
year 1971 and every ten years thereafter.
The official 2000 United States census data showed that
Virginia's population had grown 14.4% over the previous decade,
from 6,187,350 residents in 1990, to 7,078,515 in 2000. The
data also showed that the population growth in Northern
Virginia and suburban areas of the state was greater than in
other areas of the state. Some of the central cities and rural
areas of the Commonwealth had experienced a decrease in
population. To comply with Article II, § 6 the Virginia
General Assembly was required to enact new electoral districts
in 2001.
After receiving the 2000 census data, the General Assembly
enacted Senate Bill 1 (SB 1) and House Bill 1 (HB 1) creating
new electoral districts for the Virginia General Assembly. The
bills were signed by the Governor on April 21, 2001 and
subsequently submitted to the Attorney General of the United
States for pre-clearance as required by the Voting Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 through 1974(e) (2000), (VRA). On June 15,
2001 and July 9, 2001, respectively, HB 1 and SB 1 received
pre-clearance from the Attorney General.
This litigation was initiated by a Bill of Complaint filed
on June 26, 2001 by 46 complainants against the Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, Acting Attorney General, Secretary of the
State Board of Elections, and six members of the General
Assembly. 1 An amended bill of complaint was filed on August
10, 2001. Count I alleged that House of Delegates Districts
49, 63, 69, 70, 71, 74, 75, 77, 80, 89, 90, 92, and 95, and
Senate Districts 2, 5, 9, 16, and 18, were "designed with the
avowed, race-based goal of maximizing the number of minority
voters" in violation of Article I, §§ 1 and 11 of the
Constitution of Virginia. Count II asserted that the pairing
of incumbent female legislators in SB 1 and HB 1 intentionally
1
The Lt. Governor was never served with process and the
trial court granted the defendant legislators' motion to quash
service of process on them. The Acting Attorney General was
dismissed as a defendant.
2
"disproportionately increase[d] the odds against re-election of
certain Democratic female legislators" in violation of Article
I, §§ 1 and 11 of the Constitution of Virginia. Count III
asserted that the legislative redistricting plans
unconstitutionally discriminated against Virginia voters on the
basis of political viewpoint by disproportionately pairing
incumbent Democratic legislators. In Count IV, the
complainants asserted that 17 House Districts and 9 Senate
Districts were not comprised of "contiguous and compact
territory" as mandated by Article II, § 6 of the Constitution
of Virginia. Finally, in Count V, the complainants charged
that the districts were unequal on the basis of population
because the Commonwealth did not use statistically adjusted
census figures in violation of Article I, §§ 1 and 11 of the
Constitution of Virginia.
Prior to trial, the defendants filed various motions to
dismiss and a motion for change of venue. The trial court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss Count V but denied
the motions requesting dismissal on the basis of standing and
for a change of venue. A three-day, ore tenus hearing was held
in September 2001. Following presentation of the complainants'
evidence, the trial court granted the defendants' motion to
strike Counts II and III. The claims of racial gerrymandering
and non-compact and non-contiguous election districts contained
3
in Counts I and IV were submitted to the trial court for
determination.
The trial court filed its amended written opinion on March
13, 2002. Applying a definition of contiguous that required
reasonable internal access, the trial court concluded that
Senate Districts 1, 2, and 6, along with House Districts 74,
91, and 100, did not satisfy the contiguous and compactness
requirements of Article II, § 6 of the Constitution of
Virginia. The trial court made no finding regarding challenged
Senate Districts 3 and 4 because no evidence was introduced
relating to those districts. The court found that the
remaining districts challenged in Count IV reasonably complied
with the requirements of Article II, § 6 as interpreted by this
Court in Jamerson v. Womack, 244 Va. 506, 423 S.E.2d 180
(1992). 2
The trial court struck as unconstitutional House Districts
62, 69, 70, 71, 74, 77, 80, 89, 90, 91, 92, and 95, and Senate
2
A number of discrepancies exist regarding the challenged
districts and the holdings of the trial court. In its amended
opinion the trial court listed House District 75 as a district
challenged by complainants as not compact and contiguous,
although District 75 was not listed in Count IV of the amended
Bill of Complaint. The trial court found that District 75 did
not violate Article II, § 6. Similarly the complainants
challenged House District 79, but the trial court did not
identify that district as a challenged district in Count IV
and made no ruling on the district. Finally, the trial court
held Senate District 6 in violation of Article II, § 6
4
Districts 2, 5, 9, 13, 16, and 18. 3 The trial court held that
those districts violated Article I, §§ 1 and 11 because
the General Assembly of Virginia has subordinated
traditional redistricting principles to race in
drawing district lines. The Court having found that
race was the predominate factor in drawing district
lines has applied strict scrutiny to determine if
race was necessary to further some compelling state
interest and in all of the challenged districts,
with the exception of those previously mentioned,
the Commonwealth has failed to show that the
electoral districts for the House of Delegates or
Senate achieve any compelling state interest or
action that it is narrowly tailored to fit such
interest.
Based on these findings, the trial court enjoined the
defendants from conducting any elections under HB 1 or SB 1
until the General Assembly enacted, and the Governor signed,
legislation establishing "new redistricting statutes for the
House of Delegates and the Senate Districts that abide by all
of the requirements of the Constitution of the United States
and Constitution of Virginia, specifically adhering to Article
I, § 1, Article I, § 11, and Article II, § 6, and the other
laws of the Commonwealth . . . ." The trial court also ordered
that "an election to elect representatives from each new
although the amended Bill of Complaint did not claim such a
violation.
3
The trial court stated in its amended opinion that
Senate District 13 and House Districts 62, 64, 83, and 91 were
challenged as racially gerrymandered. These districts were
not listed in the amended Bill of Complaint as violating
Article I, § 11. The trial court struck District 91, upheld
District 64, and made no ruling on District 83 on this issue.
5
electoral district enacted for the House of Delegates be
conducted in 2002, as provided by law, to take office as
members of the House of Delegates upon convening of the 2003
session of the General Assembly of Virginia." The trial court
denied the defendants' motion for a stay pending appeal.
The defendants filed a notice of appeal, a petition for
appeal, a motion for expedited appeal, a motion for a stay of
the trial court's order pending appeal, and a petition for a
writ of prohibition. We granted the defendants' petition for
appeal and motion for stay pending appeal. 4
On appeal, the defendants raise eight assignments of
error. The first three assignments address the substantive
findings of the trial court in this matter: (1) whether the
complainants lacked standing to pursue the litigation; (2)
whether certain districts met the constitutional requirement of
compactness and contiguity; and (3) whether certain districts
were racially gerrymandered. These issues, in our view, are
dispositive of this appeal.
I. STANDING
The defendants argue that the trial court should have
dismissed the bill of complaint because the complainants failed
4
Governor Mark R. Warner was substituted for former
Governor James Gilmore, III, by order entered April 12, 2002
pursuant to Rule 2:16. Governor Warner withdrew as an
6
to establish that they had standing to pursue the claims
asserted. Relying on this Court's precedent, the defendants
maintain that standing to challenge an electoral district
should not be inferred solely from residency in that district.
Rather, the defendants argue, standing requires "a personal
stake in the outcome" of the litigation. Cupp v. Board of
Supervisors, 227 Va. 580, 589, 318 S.E.2d 407, 411 (1984)
(emphasis deleted). Merely advancing a public right or
redressing a public injury cannot confer standing on a
complainant. Virginia Beach Beautification Comm'n v. Board of
Zoning Appeals, 231 Va. 415, 419, 344 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1986).
Thus, the defendants assert that to establish standing, the
complainants were required to show that they suffered racial,
gender, or political discrimination, and, if the injury was
racial in nature, the complainant had the burden of
establishing his or her race.
Because proof of residency was the only evidence produced
by the complainants relative to standing, the defendants argue
that the trial court erred in not granting their motion to
dismiss the amended bill of complaint for lack of standing.
The defendants further assert that the trial court erred in
failing to dismiss the complainants' challenges to four House
appellant and participated in the appeal of this case as an
amicus curiae on behalf of the complainant-appellees.
7
districts and three Senate districts because none of the
complainants resided in those districts.
The complainants contend that proof of residency in a
particular district is sufficient to establish standing to
challenge actions in other districts as well as the district of
residence.
Standing to maintain a challenge to redistricting
legislation is an issue of first impression in this
Commonwealth. In our previous redistricting cases, we recited
the status of the various complainants, but we did not address
the elements required to establish standing to maintain such an
action. Wilkins v. Davis, 205 Va. 803, 139 S.E.2d 849 (1965);
Davis v. Dusch, 205 Va. 676, 139 S.E.2d 25 (1964); Brown v.
Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105 (1932). The complainants
here, while acknowledging that the issue of standing in this
case is one of state jurisprudence, suggest that we adopt the
standing principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995), for cases involving
challenges to redistricting legislation.
The plaintiffs in Hays challenged Louisiana's
congressional redistricting statute, asserting it was racially
gerrymandered in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The challenge was directed at
District 4 of the plan but the plaintiffs were residents of
8
District 5. The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs
did not have standing to maintain the challenge because
standing requires the plaintiff to show that he or she has
suffered an " 'injury in fact' – an invasion of a legally
protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."
Hays, 515 U.S. at 743 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). And, in an equal protection claim,
only "'those persons who are personally denied equal treatment'
by the challenged discriminatory conduct," suffer such injury.
Hays, 515 at 743-44 (citations omitted). Thus, the Supreme
Court rejected the proposition that any citizen of a state
would have standing to challenge a redistricting statute on an
equal protection claim regardless of whether such citizen was
personally denied equal treatment.
Recognizing that demonstration of a particularized injury
in the racial gerrymandering context may be difficult, the
Supreme Court concluded that an inference of particularized
injury was created for a plaintiff who resides in a racially
gerrymandered district because such resident "has been denied
equal treatment because of the legislature's reliance on racial
criteria . . . ." Id. at 745. This inference vests the
resident of the district with standing in federal court to
challenge the use of racial classification in creating that
9
district. A person who does not live in such a district does
not suffer such harm and is not entitled to the inference of
harm, but may establish standing nevertheless, if he or she
produces specific evidence to show individualized injury
resulting from racial classifications. "Unless such evidence
is present, that plaintiff would be asserting only a
generalized grievance against governmental conduct of which he
or she does not approve." Id.
Like federal standing jurisprudence, our requirement that
a complainant show a particularized injury applies to claims of
racial gerrymandering under Article I, §§ 1 and 11 of the
Constitution of Virginia. While specific evidence of personal
harm in the redistricting context may be difficult to show, we
agree that residents of a racially gerrymandered electoral
district "suffer the special representational harms racial
classifications can cause in the voting context." Id.
Accordingly, we, like the federal courts, will consider proof
of residency in an alleged racially gerrymandered district as
sufficient to establish standing to challenge that district
without further proof of personalized injury. Standing can
also be shown by a non-resident of the district who produces
specific evidence of a particularized injury arising from the
alleged racial gerrymandering.
10
While this standard was developed in the context of racial
gerrymandering claims, we believe the same standard is
appropriate to establish standing for allegations that
electoral districts violate the compactness and contiguous
requirements of Article II, § 6 of the Constitution of
Virginia. If a district fails to meet the compactness and
contiguous requirements, residents of that district are
directly affected by the legislature's failure to comply with
the Constitution of Virginia. In the absence of residency in a
challenged district, a complainant can establish standing only
by showing a particularized injury.
The complainants claim that any citizen of the
Commonwealth has standing to challenge any district based on
violations of Article I, §§ 1 and 11 or Article II, § 6 because
an unconstitutional configuration of one district may have an
impact on the drawing of all other districts. We reject this
rationale as a basis for establishing standing. It is true
that if a district must be reconfigured, another district or
districts will be affected; however, this fact does not give
rise to any inference that every district will be affected, or
that such effect will have a constitutional impact on every
citizen. Furthermore, any attempt to identify in this forum
which district or districts will be affected by legislative
action in reconfiguring the districts is entirely speculative.
11
The fact that a putative complainant's district may be affected
is insufficient to establish the particularized injury required
for standing in a redistricting case.
Applying these principles to the record in this case, we
conclude that the trial court erred in denying the defendants'
motion to dismiss those claims challenging electoral districts
in which no complainant resides and no evidence of injury to
non-resident complainants was produced. Specifically, the
trial court had no jurisdiction to consider claims against
Senate Districts 1, 6, and 13, and House Districts 62, 83, 91,
and 100. Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of the trial
court with regard to those districts and will not consider them
further. 5
II. COMPACT AND CONTIGUOUS DISTRICTS
Article II, § 6 of the Constitution of Virginia requires
that electoral districts adopted by the General Assembly be
"composed of contiguous and compact territory." The trial
court held that the contiguity requirement included a
reasonable opportunity for travel within the district. The
trial court also determined that it was not bound by the
expert's testimony regarding compactness, and it concluded that
it was the court's responsibility to "examine each district in
12
context of its geographical form and structure in relation to
other portions of the district . . . ." Of the districts which
complainants had standing to challenge, Senate District 2 and
House District 74 were found by the trial court to violate the
requirements of Article II, § 6 with regard to compactness and
contiguity.
A. Standard of Review
The defendants argue that the trial court erred because it
did not review the legislative action using the "fairly
debatable standard" utilized in Jamerson v. Womack, 244 Va.
506, 423 S.E.2d 180 (1992), and because it construed contiguity
by water to include convenience of travel within the district.
The complainants respond that the trial court correctly found
that contiguity required a reasonable opportunity for access
within the district, and under the standards developed in
Jamerson, the trial court correctly held that the districts in
question were plainly repugnant to the Constitution.
In Jamerson, the complainants asserted that two electoral
districts in the 1991 Senate redistricting plan did not comply
with the compactness requirement of Article II, § 6. In
resolving the issue, we recited the principles applicable to
our review of legislative determinations. First, legislation
5
In light of this holding we do not address whether the
trial court properly considered Senate District 6 in the
13
is entitled to a "strong presumption of validity" and will be
invalidated by the courts only if it clearly violates a
constitutional provision. Id. at 510, 423 S.E.2d at 182.
"[O]nly where the statute in issue is 'plainly repugnant' to a
constitutional provision will we declare it null and void."
Id.(citations omitted).
When the constitutionality of a statute depends on facts,
the determination of those facts by the legislature can be set
aside if it is clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or wholly
unwarranted. If the evidence offered in support of the facts
in issue would lead objective and reasonable persons to reach
different conclusions, the legislative determination is
considered fairly debatable and such a determination must be
upheld by the courts. Id. at 509-10, 423 S.E.2d at 182.
Although Jamerson involved a challenge to the constitutional
requirement of compactness only, these principles are equally
applicable to the current challenge to the requirement of
contiguity.
We also note, as we did in Jamerson, that Article II, § 6
speaks in mandatory terms, stating that electoral districts
"shall be" compact and contiguous. This directive, however,
does not override all other elements pertinent to designing
electoral districts. In making reapportionment decisions, the
absence of a challenge to that district by the complainants.
14
General Assembly is required to satisfy a number of state and
federal constitutional and statutory provisions in addition to
designing districts that are compact and contiguous. To do
this requires the General Assembly to exercise its discretion
in reconciling these often competing criteria. Id. at 511, 423
S.E.2d at 182-83.
Finally, any purpose that may underlie the design of an
electoral district, while relevant to challenges under other
portions of the Constitution of Virginia as discussed below, is
not determinative in a challenge based on Article II, § 6.
Determinations of contiguity and compactness, as we said in
Jamerson, are limited to consideration of the district from a
spatial perspective, id. at 514, 423 S.E.2d at 184, taking into
consideration the other factors which a legislative body must
balance in designing a district.
In summary, if the validity of the legislature's
reconciliation of various criteria is fairly debatable and not
clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or wholly unwarranted, neither
the court below nor this Court can conclude that the resulting
electoral district fails to comply with the compactness and
contiguous requirements of Article II, § 6. We now apply these
principles to Senate District 2 and House District 74.
B. Senate District 2
15
Senate District 2 is comprised of part of the City of
Hampton, part of the City of Newport News, one precinct of the
City of Suffolk, and one precinct of the City of Portsmouth.
The Portsmouth-Suffolk portion of the district is separated
from the Hampton-Newport News portion by the Hampton Roads body
of water. Travel by motor vehicle between the two portions of
the district is possible by driving four to five miles on the
Hampton Roads Beltway, Interstate Highway I-664.
The trial court first determined that, to meet the
constitutional requirement of contiguity, land masses within a
district that are separated by water must provide for every
part of the district to be accessible "to all other parts of
the district without having to travel into a second district."
We have not previously considered the elements which may
be required to meet the state constitutional mandate of
contiguity. Clearly, a district that contained two sections
completely severed by another land mass would not meet this
constitutional requirement. Moreover, no one disputes that the
geography and population of this Commonwealth necessitate that
some electoral districts include water, and that land masses
separated by water may nevertheless satisfy the contiguity
requirement in certain circumstances.
The trial court's requirement that there be a bridge,
road, or ferry allowing full internal access to all parts of
16
the district is a requirement grounded in the theory that
residents of the district need to have physical access to other
parts of the district. However, such physical access is not
necessary for exercising the right to vote, does not impact
otherwise intact communities of interest, and, in today's world
of mass media and technology, is not necessary for
communication among the residents of the district or between
such residents and their elected representative.
As indicated above, the General Assembly must balance a
number of competing constitutional and statutory factors when
designing electoral districts. In addition, traditional
redistricting elements not contained in the statute, such as
preservation of existing districts, incumbency, voting
behavior, and communities of interest, are also legitimate
legislative considerations. Id. at 512-14, 423 S.E.2d at 183-
84. While ease of travel within a district is a factor to
consider when resolving issues of compactness and contiguity,
resting the constitutional test of contiguity solely on
physical access within the district imposes an artificial
requirement which reflects neither the actual need of the
residents of the district nor the panoply of factors which must
be considered by the General Assembly in the design of a
district. Short of an intervening land mass totally severing
two sections of an electoral district, there is no per se test
17
for the constitutional requirement of contiguity. Each
district must be examined separately.
In this case, the trial court found that Senate District 2
failed the constitutional requirement of contiguity, not
because there was no access between the two portions of the
district, but because the access was unreasonable. The trial
court cites no record evidence supporting its position that the
travel required was unreasonable and our review of the record
shows none.
Similarly, the trial court held that the four or five
mile separation across water rendered the district non-compact
without any further explanation or discussion of evidence
supporting this conclusion. The trial court did note,
however, that "there was no testimony that any particular
district was unacceptably non-compact according to either of
the measures applied by the experts." 6
In our view, the evidence in this record does not rise to
a level of proof implicating application of the fairly
debatable standard. And it is wholly insufficient to support
6
Complainants' expert Dr. Lublin, and defendants' expert
Dr. Webster, both utilized the Reoch/Geographic Dispersion
Method and the Polsby-Popper/Perimeter Compactness Method as
objective measures of compactness. The former measures the
level of compactness by determining the ratio of the area of
the district to the smallest circle that can be superimposed
over the district. The latter computes a ratio based on the
18
a conclusion that Senate District 2 clearly violates or is
plainly repugnant to the compactness and contiguity
requirements of Article II, § 6. Accordingly, we will reverse
the trial court's judgment in that regard.
C. House District 74
The trial court also concluded that House District 74
violated the compactness requirement of Article II, § 6 of the
Constitution of Virginia because a 20-mile long stretch of
land connected the northern portion of the district in Henrico
County to the City of Hopewell, the southern portion of the
district. Using its definition of constitutional contiguity,
the trial court also found that District 74 violated Article
II, § 6 because the City of Hopewell precincts were separated
from the remainder of the district by the James River. No
tunnel, road, or bridge connects this portion of the district
with the remainder of the district and travel through other
districts is required to access the remainder of District 74
from the Hopewell precincts.
In Jamerson, we considered two electoral districts each
covering significantly greater area than House District 74.
We held that the manner in which the General Assembly
reconciled the compactness requirement with the other factors
area of the district compared to a circle that equals the
length of the perimeter of the district.
19
which had to be addressed in creating new electoral districts
was not clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or wholly unwarranted.
Even though reasonable persons may have configured the
district differently in reconciling the various redistricting
factors, applying the fairly debatable standard, we concluded
that the choice of the General Assembly in reconciling these
factors could not be set aside. Id. at 517, 423 S.E.2d at
186.
The evidence in this case showed that House District 74
has the lowest rankings for compactness, but the expert
testimony was that this district did not fall below an
objective standard for compactness. The new District 74
contained 98.3% of the 1991 district. The change from the
1991 district was the reunification of a previously split
precinct in Charles City County, the City of Hopewell
precincts, and two precincts in Henrico County.
The record also shows that the incumbent member of the
House of Delegates from House District 62 was a Republican.
Removing the "highly Democratic" Hopewell precincts from
District 62 made that district a "safer" Republican district.
The changes to House District 74 did not improve the
district's rating with regard to compactness, but they did
bring the district closer to the target population. The black
voting age population (BVAP) fell from 65% to 60%, but the
20
district continues to have more African Americans than any
other district in HB 1.
Although the record shows that travel between the
Hopewell precincts and the remainder of the district requires
travel through another district, there is nothing in this
record showing that such access is unreasonable, unduly
burdensome, or adversely impacts the ability of residents to
secure meaningful representation of their interests or
effective communication with their elected representative.
Furthermore, we think it is significant that this district's
configuration has remained substantially the same for over a
decade, allowing development of relationships and communities
of interest relative to election of delegates. Maintaining an
existing district in this case and removing the Hopewell
precincts from the adjoining district in which the incumbent
is Republican reflects the traditional redistricting
considerations of incumbency.
This record reflects a balancing by the General Assembly
of population equality, incumbency, maintaining communities of
interest, and avoiding retrogression in designing District 74.
While far from the most compact district, and containing a
small portion that is contiguous only by water, nothing in
this record indicates that the District is repugnant to the
constitutional principles of compact and contiguous electoral
21
districts. The expert testimony shows that the district is
within acceptable objective measures of compactness. No one
has testified that communication between the residents of the
district and their elected representative has been adversely
impacted in the past in a substantially similar district, or
will be adversely impacted in the future because of the design
of the district. No intervening land mass separates one
portion of the district from another.
Given the strong presumption of constitutionality
afforded legislative acts, and the fairly debatable standard
we apply when considering the validity of such acts, we
conclude that the trial court erred in holding that District
74 violated the compactness and contiguity requirements of
Article II, § 6 of the Constitution of Virginia.
III. RACIAL GERRYMANDERING
The defendants also assign error to the trial court's
holding that certain house and senate districts violated
Article I, §§ 1 and 11 of the Constitution of Virginia because
they were the product of racial gerrymandering.
A. Standard of Review
We have not previously considered a challenge of this
nature solely under Article I, § 11 of the Constitution of
Virginia. Accordingly, we first address the standards for
evaluating such a claim.
22
Article I, § 11 of the Constitution of Virginia provides
in pertinent part that "the right to be free from any
governmental discrimination upon the basis of . . . race . . .
shall not be abridged." In Archer v. Mayes, 213 Va. 633, 638,
194 S.E.2d 707, 711 (1973), we held that this provision was
"no broader" than the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
applied the federal rational basis standard of
constitutionality in considering the challenge under the
Virginia provision, even though the Virginia provision, unlike
the federal equal protection clause, identified gender as a
protected class. In subsequent cases involving allegations
that statutes violated both Article I, § 11 of the
Constitution of Virginia and the equal protection clause of
the federal constitution, we applied standards of
constitutionality developed under federal law. We neither
stated nor applied a separate standard for resolution of the
challenge under state law. Hess v. Snyder Hunt Corp., 240 Va.
49, 53, 392 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1990) (statute not
unconstitutional if meets rational basis test, or, if it
affects fundamental right or suspect classification, meets
strict scrutiny test); Mahan v. National Conservative
Political Action Comm., 227 Va. 330, 336, 315 S.E.2d 829, 832
(1984).
23
The defendants argue that our jurisprudence requires that
review of a legislative act requires application of the fairly
debatable standard discussed above, and that this standard is
simply another way of expressing the federal rational basis
test. We need not resolve this semantics issue. Because the
discrimination clause of Article I, § 11 is congruent with the
federal equal protection clause, we will continue to apply the
standards and nomenclature developed under the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution to claims
involving claims of discrimination under Article I, § 11 of
the state constitution, including the claims in this case.
In Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001), the most
recent redistricting case involving a challenge of racial
gerrymandering under the equal protection clause, the Supreme
Court recited the burden borne by the challenger. A party
asserting that a legislative redistricting plan has improperly
used race as a criterion must show that the legislature
subordinated traditional redistricting principles to racial
considerations and that race was not merely a factor in the
design of the district, but was the predominant factor. The
challenger must show that a facially neutral law is
explainable on no other grounds but race. Id. at 241-42. The
Court in Cromartie went on to state
24
where majority-minority districts . . . are at issue
and where racial identification correlates highly
with political affiliation, the party attacking the
legislatively drawn boundaries must show at the
least that the legislature could have achieved its
legitimate political objectives in alternative ways
that are comparably consistent with traditional
districting principles. That party must also show
that those districting alternatives would have
brought about significantly greater racial balance.
Id. at 258.
If the challenger meets its evidentiary burden, the
electoral district in issue is subjected to strict scrutiny
review, rather than a rational basis test, because the
legislative action was taken on the basis of race, a suspect
category. Under the strict scrutiny standard, the defendant
must show that the district's design was the result of a
compelling governmental purpose and was narrowly tailored to
achieve that purpose. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920
(1995).
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly noted the discretion vested in a legislative body
"to exercise the political judgment necessary to balance
competing interests" in creating redistricting plans, and that
"courts must 'exercise extraordinary caution' " in determining
that an electoral district was motivated by racial, not
political, interests when there is a high correlation in the
voting age population between race and political affiliation.
25
Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 242 (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-
16).
In this case, the defendants readily acknowledged that
race was a consideration in drawing the district lines. The
General Assembly was required to comply with the provisions of
the VRA which mandate that a redistricting plan not dilute the
African-American voter strength, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000), and
that there be no retrogression in the plan; that is, the plan
must contain no fewer majority minority districts than the
prior plan. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c)(2000). The criteria adopted
by the General Assembly specifically recognized these
requirements as guiding factors in drawing the new
redistricting legislation. 7
Accordingly, to prevail in this case, the complainants
were required to show that race was the predominant factor
used by the General Assembly in drawing the districts at
issue. Additionally, if the evidence showed a high
correlation in the voting age population between race and
political affiliation, the complainants were also required to
7
The House and Senate committees charged with drafting
the redistricting plans adopted identical criteria:
population equality with a deviation within plus or minus two
percent, compliance with the Voting Rights Act, contiguous and
compact districts, single-member districts, and respect for
communities of interest. In the event of a conflict, priority
was to be given to population equality and compliance with the
26
produce districting alternatives which were comparably
consistent with traditional redistricting principles and which
could have brought significantly greater balance while still
achieving legitimate political objectives.
The trial court concluded that the complainants met this
burden and, with regard to the districts in which the
complainants had standing, declared that in creating Senate
Districts 2, 5, 9, 16, and 18, and House Districts 69, 70, 71,
74, 77, 80, 89, 90, 92, and 95, the General Assembly
"subordinated traditional redistricting principles to race,"
and that the defendants failed to show that these districts
"achieve any compelling state interest or action that . . . is
narrowly tailored to fit such interest."
In determining whether this conclusion was correct, we
look to the underlying findings which formed the basis of such
conclusion as to each of the districts. In doing so we note
that, as in Cromartie, the trial was not long, the evidence
consisted primarily of documents and expert testimony, and
there were no issues involving the credibility of the
witnesses. Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 243. Thus, the record
before us for resolving this evidentiary question is in
virtually the same posture as it was before the trial court.
state and federal constitutional requirements and the Voting
Rights Act.
27
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the
complainants failed to carry their burden of proof that race
was the predominant factor used by the General Assembly and
that qualifying alternative plans were available.
B. Race as the Predominant Factor
Initially, we note that the complainants' factual
premises supporting their contention that race was the
predominate factor in drawing the districts are, in part,
based on patterns gleaned from considering the redistricting
plan as a whole. These factual premises are, first, the use
of split precincts in majority minority districts was
disproportional, placing minorities in the majority minority
district rather than in the majority white district, and,
because only racial data is available below the precinct
level, these precincts were split based on race, not politics.
Second, where majority African-American boundary
precincts adjoined majority white precincts, the African-
American precinct was consistently placed in the majority
minority district rather than in the majority white district.
This pattern again showed the use of race in designing the
districts, according to the complainants.
And finally, the complainants cited instances where white
Democratic precincts were placed in the white majority
district while the adjoining African-American Democratic
28
precincts were placed in the majority minority district, thus,
repeating a pattern of race-based behavior.
Patterns of behavior of the nature recited above may add
support to the conclusion that race was a predominate factor
in drawing district lines but are not themselves dispositive
of the issue. The challenges in this litigation are to
specific districts, each of which must be considered on its
own merits, and, to prevail with regard to any specific
district the complainants must satisfy their burden of proof
as to that district.
We now turn to the trial court's determinations of racial
gerrymandering assigned as error in this appeal.
1. Senate Districts
a. Senate District 2
Senate District 2 is a majority minority district
comprised of parts of the Cities of Hampton and Newport News,
and one majority African-American precinct each in Portsmouth
and in Suffolk. The trial court found that to create this
district the General Assembly crossed the Hampton Roads body
of water, "grabbing" isolated minority precincts to make up
for minority precincts it "shed" closer to the Newport
News/Hampton core of the district. Crossing geographic and
political boundaries in this manner was "in utter disregard of
traditional redistricting principles," according to the trial
29
court.
The complainants' evidence included maps and charts,
along with expert testimony, showing the district's
configuration, population by race, BVAP, and political voting
patterns in the 1997 gubernatorial race. The complainants'
expert also addressed the Langely precinct in Hampton which
was split between Senate Districts 1 and 2. The portion of
the precinct placed in Senate District 2 had a 36.2% BVAP,
while the portion assigned to the white majority district,
Senate District 1, had a 20.4% BVAP, thus showing that the
division was based on race, according to the complainants.
Finally, the complainants' expert also stated that there were
"several bordering precincts with relatively high
concentrations of Democrats and low concentration of African-
Americans that are excluded from the District." He concluded
that placing the African-American Democratic precincts in the
majority minority District 2 rather than the white Democratic
precincts, further showed that race, not politics, was the
predominant factor in drawing the district boundaries.
While much of this evidence is reflected in the trial
court's conclusions, little, if any, of the defendants'
evidence supporting other reasons for the design of Senate
District 2 is noted. The defendants' evidence showed that
Senate District 2 was under-populated by approximately 15% and
30
thus needed an additional 27,000 people to meet the district
population requirement. The addition of the Suffolk and
Portsmouth precincts added approximately 23,000 people. A net
increase of approximately 1,000 more people resulted from the
removal of 47,000 Newport News residents in the northern part
of the district and the addition of approximately 48,000
residents of Hampton located immediately adjacent to the 1991
district.
The portion of Newport News removed from District 2 was
connected by water, not land, to the remainder of the old
district. The resulting change in the contours of District 2
increased its compactness under both the perimeter and
geographic dispersion measurements when compared to the 1991
district. Finally, the racial profiles of the exchanged areas
were similar.
The defendants' evidence also showed that the changes
made the District more Democratic because the removed portion
of Newport News had a higher percentage of Republican voters
than the added portions of Hampton, Portsmouth, and Suffolk.
Although the complainants asserted that adjacent white
precincts with "high concentrations of Democrats" were
intentionally left out of District 2, their exhibits showed
that those precincts voted less than 50% Democratic in the
1997 gubernatorial race.
31
Finally, the complainants' expert, Dr. Allan J. Lichtman,
testified that he did not independently look at compactness in
analyzing the challenged districts, did not analyze the
districts for contiguity or communities of interest, and did
not consider incumbency interests as part of his analysis.
Based on this record we conclude that the complainants
did not meet their evidentiary burden of showing that race was
the predominant factor in drawing Senate District 2. Evidence
of the enhanced compactness, contiguity, and population
equality of the District, the increased size of the Democratic
voter population of the District, and the failure of the
complainants' expert to consider significant traditional
redistricting principles adopted by the General Assembly as
criteria for use in its redistricting process undermines the
trial court's conclusion. Furthermore, the record shows that
the section of the Newport News area "shed," according to the
trial court, was not contiguous to the old district except by
water and was not similar in racial makeup to the added
Suffolk and Portsmouth precincts. The added portions of
Hampton were, however, similar in BVAP to the Suffolk and
Portsmouth precincts.
Finally, complainants' evidence that majority minority
precincts were included in District 2 while bordering majority
white precincts were retained in majority white districts does
32
not compel the conclusion that race was the predominant design
factor when considered in conjunction with the evidence as a
whole. Creating a majority minority district mandates placing
minorities in that district and there is no dispute that race
was a factor in drawing the district. Similarly, a single
split precinct, one of only 15 split precincts in SB 1, with
1,375 African Americans unevenly divided between a white
majority district and this majority minority district is
insufficient to show that race was the predominant factor in
designing the split of this precinct or the district itself.
Legislatures must balance competing redistricting
criteria in creating electoral districts. This record
contains substantial evidence that the General Assembly
implemented a number of traditional principles of
redistricting in creating Senate District 2 and, accordingly,
does not support the conclusion that race predominated in the
design of the district. Accordingly, we will reverse the
trial court's judgment that Senate District 2 violated Article
I, §§ 1 and 11.
b. Senate Districts 5, 9, 16, and 18
The trial court also held that the General Assembly
subordinated traditional redistricting principles to race in
creating Senate Districts 5, 9, 16, and 18. The sole basis
cited for this conclusion was the trial court's finding that
33
the General Assembly placed more minority voters in a district
than necessary to provide such voters with a reasonable
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, and,
therefore, that the districts were not narrowly tailored in a
manner reasonably necessary to comply with the federal
requirements. However, the issue of narrow tailoring is part
of the strict scrutiny test, a test not applicable until after
a determination is first made that race was the predominant
factor in drawing the district. Here, the trial court made no
specific factual findings and cited no evidence relative to
any of these districts in support of its conclusion that race
was the predominant factor in designing each district.
The evidence produced by the complainants to meet their
initial burden of proof regarding Senate District 5 involved
Dr. Lichtman's testimony comparing border precincts and his
conclusion the district was drawn based on race because
African-American border precincts were placed within the
majority minority district and white majority border precincts
were not. The complainants' expert described the design of
the district as having a "boot," looping lines, a "tail," and
artificial peninsulas, all for the purpose of "picking off" or
capturing African-American precincts and avoiding white
precincts.
The defendants' evidence showed that Senate District 5
34
was under-populated by 33,320 people. In adding population,
over 97% of the district's core was retained, the district
improved its compactness by the geographic dispersion method
but decreased in perimeter compactness, and the BVAP decreased
by approximately 4%. Finally, with two exceptions, the areas
added to the District reflected Democratic voting patterns in
excess of 50%.
The evidence produced by the complainants on this issue
for the remaining Senate districts, Senate Districts 9, 16,
and 18, follows a similar pattern to that offered regarding
Senate District 5. As to each district, the complainants'
expert described the design of these majority minority
districts as dependent upon "grabbing" or "picking up"
majority minority precincts while avoiding majority white
precincts, resulting in such shapes as "sickles" and
"peninsulas." This expert also testified that in certain
areas, white Democratic precincts were excluded from majority
minority districts while adjacent majority minority precincts
were included in such districts, leading to the conclusion
that the districts were drawn on the basis of race, not
politics. However, the complainants' expert also testified
that in his analysis he had not considered whether other
traditional redistricting principles such as compactness and
contiguity, communities of interest, or incumbency, were
35
reflected in the design of these districts.
The evidence produced by the defendants showed that these
three Senate districts were all under-populated from a low of
9.9% to a high of 17%, requiring addition of population, that
the redrawn districts were more compact by one or both of the
objective tests used, and that the BVAP percentage declined
with one exception where the BVAP rose from 56.5% to 58.5%.
Finally, the defendants introduced maps and testimony
regarding the political voting behavior in the challenged
districts which showed a high correlation between race and
voting patterns.
We conclude that this record does not support the trial
court's holding that race was the predominant factor in
designing Senate Districts 5, 9, 16, and 18 for many of the
same reasons recited in our conclusion regarding Senate
District 2. Unquestionably, the complainants have shown that
race was a factor in designing these majority minority
districts. Indeed, to comply with the non-retrogression
requirements of Section 5 of the VRA, race had to be a factor
in drawing these districts. The defendants have never
maintained otherwise. The record shows however, that these
districts also were drawn with attention to such factors as
population equalization, compactness and contiguity, retention
of core districts where possible, and enhancement of
36
communities of political interest. We conclude that the
complainants did not meet their "heavy burden" to show that
the General Assembly, in exercising its political judgment to
balance competing interests, was motivated by racial
considerations, and subordinated other traditional
redistricting principles to that end in creating Senate
Districts 5, 9, 16, and 18.
2. House Districts
a. House Districts 92 and 95
The City of Hampton is divided into three electoral
districts: House Districts 91, 92, and 95. In District 92
and District 95, the Hampton precincts are joined with Newport
News precincts. Hampton precincts are combined with the City
of Poquoson and York County in District 91. Because Hampton's
population of 146,437 could support two house electoral
districts, 8 the trial court concluded that Hampton was
"needlessly divided" into three districts "against all
traditional race-neutral principles . . . ."
The trial court's conclusion was based on the following
findings. The boundary between House District 91 and House
District 92 separated whites from African Americans, placing
the African Americans in the majority minority District 92.
This boundary included three split precincts which the court
37
determined followed the pattern of placing African Americans
in the majority minority district. 9 The trial court also found
that minority candidates were unopposed or won election in
House District 92 with over 70% of the votes with a BVAP of
59.3%.
The remaining African-American precincts in Hampton were
placed in House District 95 along with heavily African-
American precincts from Newport News. The western border of
House District 95 abuts a majority white district, House
District 94, and the adjoining white precincts were placed in
District 94 and the African-American precincts in District 95.
As in District 92, the trial court found that the minority
candidate was elected by landslide votes with a BVAP of 59%. 10
The defendants' evidence showed that Hampton had been
split into more than two districts prior to the enactment of
SB 1: former House Districts 91, 92, and 95. Both former
Districts 92 and 95 were approximately 15% below the target
population, and former District 91 was 8.5% below that target.
The underpopulation was addressed by adding the rest of the
City of Poquoson and part of York County to these districts.
8
The target population for a house district is 70,785.
9
A fourth split precinct was shared between Districts 92
and 95.
10
The trial court stated that the BVAP was 59% at the
time. However, the 59% BVAP was based on the 2000 census and
was not representative of the BVAP in 1991 or 1993.
38
While the area encompassed by House District 91 only retained
57% of the previous district, House Districts 95 and 92
retained 93.5% and 95.2%, respectively, of their core. The
defendants' evidence also showed that the voting behavior of
the districts correlated highly with race. The majority of
the Democratic voters were retained in House Districts 92 and
95. The Hampton precincts included in the white majority
District 91 were less Democratic than the neighboring Hampton
precincts retained in the majority minority District 92. The
evidence also showed that the split of the Magruder precinct
between House District 91 and 92 placed more African Americans
in the majority minority House District 92 than in the
majority white House District 91.
This record establishes that the division of Hampton into
3 districts was not a new legislative decision, but followed a
three-way division that existed for at least a decade. The
evidence shows that the redistricting principles of population
equality, partisan voting behavior, and avoiding retrogression
all played a part in designing these two districts. As we
have said before, the complainants bear a heavy burden in
successfully challenging the constitutionality of these
legislative acts. We find that this record does not support
the trial court's conclusion that race was the predominant
factor in designing House Districts 92 and 95.
39
b. House District 74
In holding that House District 74 was racially
gerrymandered in violation of Article I, §§ 1 and 11, the
trial court cited the shape of the district including a 20
mile "land bridge," and the lack of community of interest
between the African Americans in rural Charles City County and
those in urban northern Henrico and the Hopewell portion of
the district. The trial court concluded that the "grabbing"
of "small, isolated minority communities in Charles City
County and the two precincts in the City of Hopewell in order
to 'preserve' a majority-minority district with a population"
having "no common traditional, economic, or community of
interests with Henrico," amounted to the "suspect use of race
as a proxy to further the neighboring incumbents interests."
Finally, the trial court observed that if avoiding
retrogression was the General Assembly's goal, it could have
created "four compact, politically cohesive majority-minority
districts" in the Richmond, Henrico, and Chesterfield area.
The defendants produced evidence showing that the 1991
district was basically replicated in HB 1. Although District
74 was below the target population for a house district, 98.3%
of District 74 was retained while adding the requisite
population. The new district was more compact than the old,
and its BVAP declined from 65.1% to 59.7%.
40
The defendants' evidence also showed that the incumbent
representative in the neighboring district, District 62, was a
Republican. Removing the strongly Democratic Hopewell
precincts from District 62 made that district a "safer"
district for the incumbent. Finally, the maps presented by
both the complainants and the defendants showed that the "land
bridge" between the Henrico and Charles City County portion of
the district consisted of the precincts with the fewest
Republican voters.
Based on this record, we conclude that the trial court
erred in determining that race was the predominant factor in
creating District 74. The record shows that race was a factor
in designing the district along with traditional redistricting
principles of retaining core areas, population equality,
compactness and contiguity, partisan voting behavior, and
protection of incumbents. The record does not support the
conclusion that any of these factors were subordinated to
race. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in
holding that House District 74 was racially gerrymandered.
c. House Districts 69, 70, 71, 77, 80, 89, and 90
The trial court also concluded that the majority minority
House Districts 69, 70, 71, 77, 80, 89, and 90 violated
Article I, § 11. The only evidence cited in support of this
conclusion was election results for these districts showing
41
that, with the exception of seven races, minority candidates
received 74% or more of the votes in each election. The BVAP
in these districts ranged from 53% to 64%, and, therefore, the
court concluded that the districts were "packed," meaning that
they were not narrowly tailored to meet the requirements of
federal law. As stated above, whether districts were narrowly
tailored to comply with federal requirements is a
consideration not raised until the requisite finding of racial
predominance is first made.
The trial court did not reference any specific evidence
or make any specific findings for any of these districts to
support a conclusion that race was the predominant factor in
creating each district. It did, however, cite patterns it
found in the creation of the districts that illustrated the
"subordination of the traditional redistricting principles to
race." These patterns included excessive splitting of
jurisdictional lines, general disregard for keeping regions
intact, abandoning the constitutional requirements of
compactness and contiguity, and an inordinate use of split
precincts in majority minority districts. The trial court,
however, did not identify any particular district in which
these patterns occurred.
We have already made clear that, in the absence of
specific evidence in a specific district, such pattern
42
evidence alone cannot sustain the trial court's finding of
racial discrimination. We also note that the trial court's
own holdings in this case belie its conclusion that matters of
contiguity and compactness have been "generally disregarded"
in creating the majority minority districts. Of the 23 House
and Senate districts challenged under Article II, § 6, the
trial court found only six to be non-compact or non-
contiguous. These numbers do not support a conclusion that
these constitutional requirements were "generally
disregarded."
Finally, the trial court cited the high percentage of
split precincts in majority minority districts as evidence of
race-based district line drawing. Specifically, the court
found that the inclusion of 77% of the 61 precincts split
statewide in the contested districts was not by "coincidence
or happenstance." However, other than those split precincts
discussed above, the court fails to identify the location or
specific impact of any other split precincts on the districts
in question.
The record contains little evidence other than maps or
general charts with regard to House Districts 71, 89, and 90.
Complainants' expert did not analyze these districts
individually, and they are referenced in a single chart
prepared by the complainants' expert to show that the
43
Democratic party voting percentage is higher than the BVAP in
those districts.
The evidence adduced by the complainants to meet their
initial burden of showing that race was the predominant factor
in drawing these districts included testimony by their expert
that in each district where African-American boundary
precincts adjoined white precincts, the African-American
precincts were placed in the majority minority district. This
expert also cited three instances of split precincts in these
districts that again placed more African Americans in the
majority minority district. The complainants' witnesses also
testified regarding the "barbell," "lobster," and "foot with
toes" shapes of the districts which they contended resulted
from the General Assembly's "stretching" districts to include
African-American precincts. The complainants also argued that
the evidence showed that in creating District 69, the General
Assembly drew boundaries that crossed the James River to
include four precincts that were heavily African American but
did not include adjoining white precincts that were also
heavily Democratic, supporting the proposition that the
district was drawn on the basis of race, not politics.
The defendants' evidence included documents and testimony
showing that the population in each of these districts was
from 5% to 27% below the requisite level. In creating the
44
revised districts, the General Assembly retained the
substantial amounts of the districts' cores: 63% in District
69, 70% in District 70, 95% in District 77, and 90% in
District 80. Of the three split precincts in these districts,
the defendants' expert testified that two of the splits
enhanced the compactness rating of the districts involved,
Districts 69 and 77. The splitting of the third precinct, the
Bellwood precinct, resulted in 18.7% African Americans placed
in District 70, and 16.2% African Americans placed in the
majority white precinct, a difference which complainants'
expert agreed was statistically insignificant and would not
support a strong inference of race-based line drawing.
In response to the contention that white Democratic
precincts were not included in majority minority District 69
while African-American precincts were, maps presented by both
the defendants and the complainants showed that the white
precincts adjoining the four African-American precincts north
of the James River in District 69, while voting Democratic,
generally reflected a lower level of Democratic voting
behavior than the four African-American precincts that were
included in House District 69. Finally, with one exception,
the BVAP in each district diminished. The BVAP in District 77
grew by a single percentage point, from 55% to 56%.
45
We conclude that this record does not support the trial
court's conclusion that "being black was the predominant
factor in being chosen as part of a population making up the
majority-minority districts." As stated above, the use of
race as a factor in designing these districts is conceded.
This record shows that along with race, accommodations for
population equality, incumbency, and political party voting
patterns were made by the General Assembly.
C. Alternative Plans
There is no dispute that in the districts involved in
this case there is a high correlation between race and
political affiliation. Under these circumstances, the
complainants have to show not only that race was the
predominate factor in creating the districts at issue, but
also that alternative designs were available that were
consistent with traditional redistricting principles and that
"would have brought about significantly greater racial
balance." Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 258. However, the evidence
of alternative acceptable plans is sparse.
The trial court stated that other districts could have
been drawn in certain instances. The trial court indicated
the City of Hampton could have been contained in two House
districts and did not need to be split three ways. Similarly,
the trial court stated that "four compact, politically
46
cohesive majority-minority districts can be created in the
Richmond, Henrico, and Chesterfield area without stretching
across vast geographical distances and prominent natural
barriers and ignoring race-neutral criteria." Other than
these statements, the trial court did not discuss the shape or
qualities of such districts or reference any alternative
districts offered by the complainants.
The only alternative districts in evidence were House
Bill 2 (HB 2) and Senate Bill 4, generally referred to as the
Robinson plan and the Miller plan, respectively. The primary
analysis of these bills is found in attachments to the Senate
and House submissions to the Department of Justice required by
the VRA.
House Bill 2 did not limit Richmond, Henrico, and
Chesterfield to 4 districts, nor did it divide Hampton into
only two districts. The record shows that House Bill 2 split
fewer precincts and localities than HB 1, but HB 2 also had a
BVAP of less than 50.5% in six of the majority minority
districts and had a higher population deviation between
districts (+2.96 to –3.33). This record is devoid of any
other alternative plans offered by the complainants. Indeed,
at trial, counsel for complainants objected to the
introduction of Senate Bill 4, stating the bill is "not part
47
of this case. It's not part of our argument or part of the
case that we are putting forward . . . ."
Accordingly, we hold that the complainants failed to
carry their burden of proof as enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Cromartie, thereby eliminating any application of the
strict scrutiny standard.
CONCLUSION
In summary, for the reasons stated above, we will vacate
the trial court's judgment with regard to House Districts 62,
83, 91, and 100 and Senate Districts 1, 6, and 13 because the
complainants did not have standing to pursue claims against
those districts.
We will reverse the judgment of the trial court holding
that Senate District 2 and House District 4 violated Article
II, § 6 of the Constitution of Virginia.
We will reverse the judgment of the trial court holding
that Senate Districts 2, 5, 9, 16, and 18, and House Districts
69, 70, 71, 74, 77, 80, 89, 90, 92, and 95 violate Article I,
§§ 1 and 11 of the Constitution of Virginia. Final judgment
will be entered in favor of the defendants. 11
Reversed and final judgment.
JUSTICE HASSELL, concurring.
11
In light of this holding, we need not address
defendants' remaining assignments of error.
48
I.
I agree with the opinion of the majority. I write
separately solely to emphasize certain principles that govern
my decision in this case. It is no surprise to anyone that
this redistricting, like most, is highly political. The
judiciary's sole function, however, is to determine whether
legislative districts created by redistricting comport with
the Constitution of Virginia. The judiciary, a separate, co-
equal, and apolitical branch of government, must not concern
itself with the political implications of the challenged
redistricting plan.
Upon consideration of the Constitution of Virginia,
relevant case law, and the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, I am compelled to conclude that the plaintiffs
in this case failed to establish that race was the predominant
factor that the General Assembly used in creating the
legislative districts. Additionally, upon comparison of the
majority black Senate district that this Court approved in
1992 in Jamerson v. Womack, 244 Va. 506, 423 S.E.2d 180
(1992), with the challenged legislative districts in this
case, I can only conclude that the challenged legislative
districts in this case do not violate Virginia's
constitutional requirements of compactness and contiguity.
II.
49
A.
HOUSE DISTRICT 74
Article II, § 6 of the Constitution of Virginia states
that "[e]very electoral district shall be composed of
contiguous and compact territory." The circuit court
concluded that several Senate and House Districts violate
these constitutional requirements. However, the only district
that I find troublesome is House District 74 and, therefore, I
will focus my discussion solely upon that district.
Without question, House District 74 has a bizarre shape.
It has a configuration somewhat similar to a diagram of an
"axe handle." However, a comparison of the record in this
case with the record in Jamerson compels me to the inescapable
conclusion that House District 74 is constitutionally
permissible.
In Jamerson, we acknowledged several principles that we
must apply here. We pointed out that legislative
determinations of fact upon which the constitutionality of a
statute may depend are binding upon this Court unless those
determinations are clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or wholly
unwarranted. Jamerson, 244 Va. at 509, 423 S.E.2d at 182. We
recognized, however, that legislative conclusions based upon
findings of fact are subject to judicial review when they are
arbitrary and unwarranted. Id. We stated that every statute,
50
including a statute enacting a redistricting plan, has a
"strong presumption of validity," and we held that
"reapportionment 'is, in a sense, political, and necessarily
wide discretion is given to the legislative body.' " Id. at
510, 423 S.E.2d at 182 (quoting Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28,
36, 166 S.E. 105, 107 (1932)).
Additionally, in this appeal, just as in Jamerson, the
General Assembly must comply with two overarching conditions:
Article I, § 2 of the United States Constitution that compels
"equal representation for equal numbers of people," often
referred to as "one person, one vote," and compliance with the
mandates of the federal Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1971-
74e (2000). Of course, the Voting Rights Act requires that
the General Assembly refrain from diluting black group voting
strength in a redistricting. Jamerson, 244 Va. at 511, 423
S.E.2d at 183 (citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18
(1964)).
I also observe, with great conviction, that this Court
must be consistent in the application of its precedent.
Fairness dictates that the same principles that this Court
applied in Jamerson, which resulted in the approval of a black
majority Senate district, must be applied in this case.
Applying these principles, I conclude that House District
74 satisfies Virginia's constitutional requirements of
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contiguity and compactness. The reasons that justify approval
of House District 74 are, in my opinion, more compelling than
the reasons that required approval of Senate District 18 in
Jamerson. In Jamerson, we rejected the plaintiffs' challenges
to two districts; one of those districts was a Senate district
with a majority black voting age population. This district,
Senate District 18, extended from rural Halifax County to the
City of Portsmouth. Senate District 18 also had a bizarre
shape. Just like House District 74 in the present case, the
challenged majority black voting district in Jamerson had a
configuration that extended into a city which allowed the
district to acquire a significant number of black voters.
Unlike Senate District 18 that we approved in Jamerson, most
of House District 74 has been in existence since 1990, and
there is a much stronger community of interest within that
district than Senate District 18. Furthermore, House District
74, which was created as a majority black district in 1991, is
substantially similar today to its 1991 configuration, and
contains 98.3% of the 1991 district which was approved by many
of the legislator-plaintiffs in this case.
B.
Validity of Plaintiffs' Racial Challenge
The litigants agree that race must be a factor in the
redistricting because of the mandate of the federal Voting
52
Rights Act. However, race must not be the predominant factor.
As the Supreme Court stated in Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S.
234, 241-42 (2001):
"The Court has specified that those who claim that a
legislature has improperly used race as a criterion,
in order, for example, to create a majority-minority
district, must show at a minimum that the
'legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral
districting principles . . . to racial
considerations.' [Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
916 (1995)]. Race must not simply have been 'a
motivation for the drawing of a majority minority
district,' Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996)
(O'CONNOR, J., principal opinion) (emphasis in
original), but 'the "predominant factor" motivating
the legislature's districting decision,' Cromartie,
526 U.S. at 547 (quoting Miller, supra, at 916)
(emphasis added). Plaintiffs must show that a
facially neutral law ' "is 'unexplainable on grounds
other than race.' " ' [Cromartie, 526 U.S. at
546]."
The Supreme Court also made the following observation in
Easley v. Cromartie, that is pertinent here:
"The Court also has made clear that the
underlying districting decision is one that
ordinarily falls within a legislature's sphere of
competence. Miller, 515 U.S. at 915. Hence, the
legislature 'must have discretion to exercise the
political judgment necessary to balance competing
interests,' ibid., and courts must 'exercise
extraordinary caution in adjudicating claims that a
State has drawn district lines on the basis of
race,' id., at 916 (emphasis added). Caution is
especially appropriate in this case, where the State
has articulated a legitimate political explanation
for its districting decision, and the voting
population is one in which race and political
affiliation are highly correlated. See Cromartie,
supra, 526 U.S. at 551-[52] (noting that 'evidence
that blacks constitute even a supermajority in one
congressional district while amounting to less than
53
a plurality in a neighboring district will not, by
itself, suffice to prove that a jurisdiction was
motivated by race in drawing its district lines when
the evidence also shows a high correlation between
race and party preference')."
Id. at 242.
Upon application of these principles to this case, I am
persuaded that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the
General Assembly used race as the predominant factor in the
redistricting plan. Simply stated, the plaintiffs failed to
prove their case as required by law. The undisputed evidence
in the record before this Court is that in Virginia there is a
high correlation between race and politics. The plaintiffs,
therefore, were required to introduce, in evidence, an
alternative plan that showed that the General Assembly could
have achieved its political and traditional districting
objectives without the specific racial configurations that the
General Assembly actually used. The plaintiffs, however,
failed to present an alternative plan that complied with the
criteria required by Easley v. Cromartie.
Without question, this Court has a constitutional duty to
invalidate a redistricting plan if the evidence demonstrates
that race was the predominant factor in the creation of
legislative districts. However, plaintiffs who challenge the
redistricting plan have an obligation to prove their case, and
in this instance the plaintiffs failed to satisfy that
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obligation. The failure to satisfy this obligation is amply
demonstrated by the testimony of plaintiffs' own expert
witness, who testified that he neglected to consider certain
basic factors that are highly relevant in any redistricting
plan, including the factor of political incumbency. Dr. Allan
J. Lichtman testified as follows:
"Q: If you pick a district to study because it
is black and compare it only to bordering districts
that are white, wouldn't you expect to find that
blacks are more heavily represented inside?
"A: If you are drawing the district based on
race, yes. If you are not drawing the district
based on race, not necessarily. It could be that
there are all kinds of borders even though the
district is less heavily black that they share, that
both have heavy concentrations of blacks or heavy
concentrations of whites, and you wouldn't find that
kind of consistent pattern. So, no, it doesn't
follow.
"Q: Well, let me ask you this: Did you look
at the borders that you used to determine whether on
the other side there were Republican incumbents or
Democratic incumbents?
"A: No.
"Q: And you don't think that would make any
difference in your analysis?
"A: I tested the proposition that the lines
were drawn on a political basis. I looked at the
competitiveness of those districts. I did not look
at the identity of the incumbents or what role they
may or may not have played. I didn't see anything
about that in any of the material presented by the
State."
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The plaintiffs' failure to establish that the General Assembly
relied predominantly upon race rather than basic political
considerations, such as incumbency, is fatal to the
plaintiffs' case. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 241-
42.
56