Jae-Woo Cha v. Korean Presbyterian Church

Present: All the Justices

JAE-WOO CHA
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR.
v. Record No. 003022 November 2, 2001

KOREAN PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF
WASHINGTON, ET AL.

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Jonathan C. Thacher, Judge

In this appeal, we consider whether the First Amendment

to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, § 16

of the Constitution of Virginia prohibit the circuit court

from resolving a former pastor's claims against a church and

certain defendants who were involved in the church's

governance.

I.

Jae-Woo Cha filed a motion for judgment against the

Korean Presbyterian Church of Washington, Chi Whan Kim, Taek

Yong Kim, Yong Ho Kim, David Kwang Soo Han, Do Sik Ko, and

Jung Kook Kim. The plaintiff alleged in his motion that the

Korean Presbyterian Church wrongfully terminated him from his

position as pastor, that certain defendants tortiously

interfered with his contract of employment with the church,

and that certain defendants committed acts of defamation

against him.

The individual defendants filed a motion to dismiss the

plaintiff's motion for judgment, asserting that the circuit
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. They alleged that

the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States

and Article I, § 16 of the Constitution of Virginia prohibited

the circuit court from evaluating or interfering in matters of

internal church discipline, policy, administration, and

governance.

The circuit court considered the pleadings, memoranda,

and argument of counsel. The court concluded that the First

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article

I, § 16 of the Constitution of Virginia, which contain free

exercise clauses, prohibited the court from interfering in

ecclesiastical disputes when questions of faith or doctrine

are involved. The court held that adjudication of the

plaintiff's claims would require that the court involve itself

in ecclesiastical concerns and thus, the court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff's motion for

judgment. The court entered a final judgment in favor of the

defendants, and the plaintiff appeals.

II.

The plaintiff alleged the following relevant facts in his

motion for judgment. The Korean Presbyterian Church is an

unincorporated association located in Fairfax County. The

church is affiliated with the Sejong Korean School and the

Washington Theological Seminary. The church is governed by a

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committee called the Session, which is also referred to as the

Elders Committee. This committee "is composed of senior

members of the church." The committee's decisions were

subject to the approval of the senior pastor, defendant Taek

Yong Kim, who retired from that position in April 2000.

Defendants Chi Whan Kim, David Kwang Soo Han, and Jung

Kook Kim were members of the Elders Committee. Chi Whan Kim

also served as chairman of the church's Financial Committee.

Defendants Yong Ho Kim and Do Sik Ko served as deacons of

the church. The office of deacon is a "powerful position"

within the church.

In October 1997, the church hired the plaintiff to serve

as its educational pastor. The plaintiff had an employment

contract for a period of . . . years. The plaintiff's "duties

as an educational pastor . . . included, but were not limited

to: guiding the Church youth group; guiding the Friday

evening prayer service; teaching as a professor at the

[Washington Theological Seminary]; and, substituting for the

senior pastor (the [d]efendant Taek Yong Kim) during the

regular worship service when needed. There were times in

which the [p]laintiff's duties required him to lead the Church

worship service and solicit collections from the congregation

for the Church."

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 The plaintiff also served as the church's administrative

pastor and in October 1999, he met with members of the

church's congregation who suspected "that certain Church

members and Church leaders had participated in financial

impropriety with regard to funds belonging to the Church, the

Sejong Korean School and the [Washington Theological

Seminary]." The plaintiff and church parishioners who

attended the meeting believed that an independent auditor

should be retained to review the financial records of the

church, the Sejong Korean School, and the Washington

Theological Seminary.

Subsequently, Elder Chi Whan Kim learned that the

plaintiff had participated in the meeting, confronted the

plaintiff, and informed him "that his future employment at the

Church was in jeopardy if he did not cease his advocacy of

full disclosure of the Church's financial records." Senior

Pastor Kim also learned that the plaintiff had participated in

the meeting, and he "threatened the [p]laintiff. The senior

pastor told the [p]laintiff that his future employment at the

Church was in jeopardy if he continued to advocate for

financial disclosure of the Church's financial records."

Defendants Chi Kim, Jung Kim, and David Han "began meeting

. . . together to discuss ways in which they could prevent

full disclosure of the relevant financial material."

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 In November 1999, members of the church requested that

"Senior Pastor [Kim] respond in writing to accusations that he

participated in the misuse of Church funds." During a meeting

of the church's deacons in December 1999, defendant Do Sik Ko,

"speaking to the entire meeting of [108] Deacons, [made] the

following remarks to the [p]laintiff and the entire meeting of

Deacons: 'One of our spiritual leaders, Reverend Cha,

borrowed over $100,000 from believers and has not returned the

money.' " During that same meeting, defendant Yong Kim

stated, "I have proof." "Thus he implied that he had proof

that the [p]laintiff borrowed over $100,000 from the

congregation and had not repaid the money."

Defendant Chi Kim informed the deacons that the Elders

Committee would meet immediately to resolve the allegations.

The Elders Committee met on December 5, 1999 to discuss the

allegations against the plaintiff. "During that meeting . . .

[d]efendants Jung [Kook] Kim, [Chi Whan Kim], and David Kwang

Soo Han reported to the Elders Committee that the [p]laintiff

had borrowed approximately $165,000 from the congregation.

The [d]efendants Jung [Kook] Kim, Chi Whan Kim, and David

Kwang Soo Han had no proof to support their statements."

On December 11, 1999, the Elders Committee voted to

terminate the plaintiff's employment with the church if he did

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not agree to resign. The plaintiff refused to resign, and he

was terminated on December 18, 1999.

The plaintiff alleged in his motion for judgment that he

had a contract of employment that could only be terminated for

good cause, and that the church wrongfully terminated him. He

also alleged that he was terminated in violation of the public

policy of this Commonwealth. The plaintiff further alleged

that Yong Ho Kim, Do Sik Ko, Chi Whan Kim, Jung Kook Kim,

David Kwang Soo Han, and Taek Yong Kim tortiously interfered

with his contract of employment with the church, and that Do

Sik Ko and Chi Whan Kim committed acts of defamation against

him.

III.

A.

The plaintiff asserts that the circuit court erred by

ruling it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider

his wrongful termination claim against defendant Korean

Presbyterian Church. We disagree.

The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United

States provides in part that "Congress shall make no law

respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the

free exercise thereof." Article I, § 16 of the Constitution

of Virginia states, in part, that "religion or the duty which

we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can

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be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or

violence; and, therefore, all men are equally entitled to the

free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of

conscience."

The United States Supreme Court, applying the First

Amendment, has held that generally civil courts are not a

constitutionally permissible forum for a review of

ecclesiastical disputes. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.

Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976); Presbyterian Church v.

Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393

U.S. 440, 449 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the

Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952); Gonzalez v.

Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1929); Watson v.

Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871). Even though there

are limited exceptions to this constitutional principle, it is

well established that a civil court may neither interfere in

matters of church government nor in matters of faith and

doctrine. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116; Reid v. Gholson, 229 Va.

179, 187, 327 S.E.2d 107, 111-12, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 824

(1985).

In Reid, we stated:

"The constitutional guarantees of religious
freedom have no deeper roots than in Virginia, where
they originated, and nowhere have they been more
scrupulously observed. These principles prohibit
the civil courts from resolving ecclesiastical

7
 disputes which depend upon inquiry into questions of
faith or doctrine. [Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
at 449]. The courts have, however, frequently been
called upon to resolve disputes concerning the civil
and property rights of religious bodies and church
members. In such cases, there is a danger that the
power of the state may be called upon to aid a
faction espousing a particular doctrinal belief, or
to 'become entangled in essentially religious
controversies.' [Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese,
426 U.S. at 709.]"

229 Va. at 187, 327 S.E.2d at 111-12 (footnotes omitted).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

has held, and we agree, that the "right to choose ministers

without government restriction underlies the well-being of

religious community . . . for perpetuation of a church's

existence may depend upon those whom it selects to preach its

values, teach its message, and interpret its doctrines both to

its own membership and to the world at large. Any attempt by

government to restrict a church's free choice of its leaders

thus constitutes a burden on the church's free exercise

rights." Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day

Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1167-68 (1985), cert. denied, 478

U.S. 1020 (1986) (footnote omitted); accord United Methodist

Church, Baltimore Annual Conference v. White, 571 A.2d 790,

794 (D.C. 1990). See also Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116.

We also observe that many courts have concluded that any

attempt by civil courts to limit a church's choice of its

religious representatives would constitute an impermissible

8
burden upon that church's First Amendment rights. See Minker

v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894

F.2d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Hutchison v. Thomas, 789

F.2d 392, 394 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885 (1986);

Kaufmann v. Sheehan, 707 F.2d 355, 358-59 (8th Cir. 1983);

Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490, 493-94 (5th Cir.

1974); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560-61 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972). But see Moses v.

Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 319-21 (Colo. 1993), cert.

denied, 511 U.S. 1137 (1994); Marshall v. Munro, 845 P.2d 424,

429 (Alaska 1993). The United States Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit recently stated:

"It has thus become established that the decisions
of religious entities about the appointment and
removal of ministers and persons in other positions
of similar theological significance are beyond the
ken of civil courts. Rather, such courts must defer
to the decisions of religious organizations 'on
matters of discipline, faith, internal organization,
or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law.' [Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 713]. The
Supreme Court explained, 'It is the essence of
religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are
reached and are to be accepted as matters of faith
whether or not rational or measurable by objective
criteria.' Id. at 714-15."

Bell v. Presbyterian Church, 126 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir.

1997).

Applying the aforementioned principles, we hold that the

circuit court correctly concluded that it lacked subject

9
matter jurisdiction to review the plaintiff's claims against

the Korean Presbyterian Church. Resolution of the plaintiff's

claims by a civil court would have required that the circuit

court adjudicate issues regarding the church's governance,

internal organization, and doctrine, and such judicial

intervention would have limited the church's right to select

its religious leaders. The Free Exercise Clause of the First

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article

I, § 16 of the Constitution of Virginia do not permit a

circuit court to substitute its secular judgment for a

church's judgment when the church makes decisions regarding

the selection or retention of its pastor.

B.

The plaintiff states that "he had an employment contract"

and "at the very least, the [p]laintiff had an at-will

employment relationship with the Church." Continuing, the

plaintiff contends that the circuit court had subject matter

jurisdiction to consider his claim of tortious interference

with contract against certain individual defendants. We

disagree with the plaintiff's contentions.

Assuming that the plaintiff had an at-will employment

contract with the Korean Presbyterian Church, he was required

to establish

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 "(1) the existence of a valid contractual
relationship or business expectancy; (2) knowledge
of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the
interferor; (3) intentional interference inducing or
causing a breach or termination of the relationship
or expectancy; and (4) resultant damage to the party
whose relationship or expectancy has been
disrupted."

Duggin v. Adams, 234 Va. 221, 226, 360 S.E.2d 832, 835 (1987)

(quoting Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 120, 335 S.E.2d 97,

102 (1985)). Additionally, when "a contract is terminable at

will . . . 'a plaintiff, in order to present a prima facie

case of tortious interference, must allege and prove not only

an intentional interference that caused the termination of the

at-will contract, but also that the defendant employed

"improper methods." ' " Perk v. Vector Resources Group, 253

Va. 310, 314, 485 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1997) (citations omitted).

Without question, had the circuit court exercised subject

matter jurisdiction of the plaintiff's motion for judgment,

the court would have become entangled in issues regarding the

church's governance as well as matters of faith and doctrine.

And, as we have already held, ecclesiastical decisions

regarding the appointment and removal of pastors are generally

beyond the jurisdiction of secular courts. Neither the

federal Free Exercise Clause nor Article I, § 16 of the

Constitution of Virginia permits a circuit court to decide

whether the plaintiff had a valid contractual relationship or

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business expectancy to serve as a pastor of the Korean

Presbyterian Church. 1

The plaintiff argues that when, as in this case,

defendants employ acts of fraud and collusion thereby "causing

a church as an employer to decide to terminate a clergyman,

the court should be able to exercise jurisdiction over such a

case of tortious inference with contract rights." This

contention is without merit because the plaintiff did not

allege facts to support an assertion that his termination was

fraudulent or collusive.

C.

The plaintiff contends that the circuit court had subject

matter jurisdiction to consider his defamation claims against

the individual defendants. We disagree. The plaintiff

alleged that "[a]n integral part of [his] position as an

assistant pastor was to minister to the congregation and to

assist in their spiritual growth" and that "these [d]efendants

made statements which were defamatory to the [p]laintiff,

1
The plaintiff alleged in his motion for judgment that he
had a contract of employment with the church terminable solely
for just cause. The plaintiff does not argue in his brief
that he had a contract terminable solely for cause.
Nonetheless, we conclude that even if the plaintiff were able
to prove that he had a contract terminable solely for cause
with the church, the circuit court would have lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to consider his claim because the court
could not adjudicate such claim without considering issues
regarding the church's governance, faith, and doctrine.

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impugning his honesty and integrity, values which are

essential in his success as a pastor." The plaintiff alleged

that "[t]he words each [d]efendant used imputed an unfitness

to discharge his duties as a pastor at the Church, implied

that he lacked integrity to be a pastor at the Church, and

that he was harming the very people to whom he had committed

to minister. As such[,] the words were defamatory per se."

The plaintiff further alleged that the defamatory

statements were made by Do Sik Ko, a deacon, during a meeting

of the deacons. The allegedly defamatory statements that

defendant Chi Kim made were uttered during a meeting of the

church's Elders Committee, of which Kim is a member.

We have recently stated:

"At common law, defamatory words which are
actionable per se are:
"(1) Those which impute to a person the commission
of some criminal offense involving moral turpitude,
for which the party, if the charge is true, may be
indicted and punished. (2) Those which impute that
a person is infected with some contagious disease,
where if the charge is true, it would exclude the
party from society. (3) Those which impute to a
person unfitness to perform the duties of an office
or employment of profit, or want of integrity in the
discharge of the duties of such an office or
employment. (4) Those which prejudice such person in
his or her profession or trade."

Perk, 253 Va. at 316, 485 S.E.2d at 144. We have also stated

that "a defamatory charge need not be made in direct terms;

rather, it may be made 'by inference, implication[,] or

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insinuation.' " Id. (quoting Carwile v. Richmond Newspapers,

196 Va. 1, 7, 82 S.E.2d 588, 592 (1954)).

Upon our review of the pleadings in this case, we hold

that the plaintiff's allegations of defamation against the

individual defendants cannot be considered in isolation,

separate and apart from the church's decision to terminate his

employment. The individual defendants who purportedly uttered

defamatory remarks about the plaintiff were church officials

who attended meetings of the church's governing bodies that

had been convened for the purpose of discussing certain

accusations against the plaintiff. We can only conclude that

if a civil court were to exercise jurisdiction of the

plaintiff's motion for judgment under these circumstances, the

court would be compelled to consider the church's doctrine and

beliefs because such matters would undoubtedly affect the

plaintiff's fitness to perform pastoral duties and whether the

plaintiff had been prejudiced in his profession. Neither the

Free Exercise Clause nor Article I, § 16 of the Constitution

of Virginia permits a civil court to undertake such a role.

Indeed, most courts that have considered the question

whether the Free Exercise Clause divests a civil court of

subject matter jurisdiction to consider a pastor's defamation

claims against a church and its officials have answered that

question in the affirmative. See Hutchison, 789 F.2d at 392-

14
93; Simpson, 494 F.2d at 492-93; Higgins v. Maher, 258 Cal.

Rptr. 757, 761 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1080 (1990)

("[i]f our civil courts enter upon disputes between bishops

and priests because of allegations of defamation . . . it is

difficult to conceive the termination case which could not

result in a sustainable lawsuit"); McManus v. Taylor, 521

So.2d 449, 451 (La. Ct. App. 1988) ("[t]o allow defamation

suits to be litigated to the fullest extent against members of

a religious board who are merely discharging the duty which

has been entrusted to them by their church could have a

potentially chilling effect on the performance of those

duties"). 2

D.

The plaintiff also contends that "[t]he actions of the

individual defendants were outside whatever agency

relationship with the Church and therefore are not entitled to

the protection of the First Amendment Establishment Clause,

and their acts of defamation and tortious interference with

contract should not be considered to be actions of a church."

The plaintiff's contention is without merit.

2
We recognize that there may be rare situations in which
a civil court may exercise jurisdiction of a plaintiff's tort
claims against a church and its officials, but those
circumstances are not present here.

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 Initially, we observe that the plaintiff did not plead in

his motion for judgment that the individual defendants'

actions were outside any agency relationship that may have

existed between the individual defendants and the church.

Rather, a fair reading of the plaintiff's motion for judgment

inescapably leads to the conclusion that the plaintiff

strongly implied that the defendants were acting as church

officials. We will not permit the plaintiff to take one

position in his motion for judgment and essentially disavow

that position in his brief filed with this Court.

Furthermore, questions regarding the scope of the individual

defendants' duties within the church would require the court

to entangle itself in issues of church governance, which is

prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause and Article I, § 16 of

the Constitution of Virginia.

We have considered the plaintiff's remaining arguments,

and they are without merit.

IV.

We will affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Affirmed.

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