PRESENT: Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons,
JJ., and Whiting, S.J.
NAKUL BHATIA, ET AL. OPINION BY
SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING
v. Record No. 002414 September 14, 2001
MEHAK, INC., ET AL.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Marcus D. Williams, Judge
In this appeal of consolidated personal injury actions, we
consider whether a restaurant business and its "co-owners" are
entitled to the protection of a religious organization's
charitable immunity when donating restaurant catering services
at one of the charity's religious ceremonies.
Nakul Bhatia and Natasha Bhatia, then four and nine years
old respectively, went with their parents to a religious
ceremony conducted by a Hindu religious organization known as
Rajdhani Mandir (Mandir). While in a room adjacent to that in
which the ceremony was being conducted, both children were
scalded by hot tea, being served with food and other
refreshments, that spilled from an overturned urn used by
employees of Mehak, Inc. (Mehak), the caterer. Mandir's
minister testified that these refreshments were an essential
part of the extended religious service which involved
considerable physical exertion.
Praveendra Dhingra, a devotee of Mandir and one of the two
self-described "co-owners" of Mehak, an Indian restaurant in the
area, had agreed to the request of Mandir's minister that
Dhingra arrange for the provision, preparation, and service of
the necessary food and refreshments as a donation to Mandir.
Dhingra thus had Mehak and its employees cater the event without
compensation from Mandir, an organization that all parties agree
is a charitable one.
Both children, by their father and next friend, Sanjeev
Bhatia, brought actions seeking compensation for their injuries
against Mehak and its "co-owners" Dhingra and Kashmira Singh.
In their motions for judgment, the plaintiffs charged that Mehak
was acting "through its agents, employees, and/or owners" and
that they "negligently caused scalding hot tea to be served."
The three defendants filed pleas in bar asserting the
defense of charitable immunity. On motion of the plaintiffs,
the cases were consolidated. After briefs were filed on the
issue of charitable immunity and evidence was heard, the court
found that all defendants were engaged in the work of the
charity without compensation at the time the tea urn overturned.
Therefore, the court sustained the pleas and entered final
judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs appeal.
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The doctrine of charitable immunity in Virginia
"precludes a charity's beneficiaries from recovering
damages from the charity for the negligent acts of its
servants or agents if due care was exercised in the hiring
and retention of those servants." Moore v. Warren, 250 Va.
421, 422-23, 463 S.E.2d 459, 459 (1995) (citing Straley v.
Urbanna Chamber of Commerce, 243 Va. 32, 35, 413 S.E.2d 47,
49 (1992)). Additionally, "a volunteer of a charity is
immune from liability to the charity's beneficiaries for
negligence while the volunteer was engaged in the charity's
work." Moore, 250 Va. at 425, 463 S.E.2d at 461 (unpaid
volunteer driver entitled to charitable immunity from
damages for alleged negligence while driving beneficiary of
American Red Cross's services to medical facility for
treatment). However, an agent or servant of a charity only
shares the charity's immunity from liability if the agent
or servant is acting directly for the benefit of the
charity. See Mooring v. Virginia Wesleyan College, 257 Va.
509, 512, 514 S.E.2d 619, 621 (1999).
In Mooring, a college professor who taught a
recreational and leisure studies class, volunteered the
assistance of his students at a program of a local Boys and
Girls Club. While observing one of his volunteer-students
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conducting a class, the professor responded to her request
that he close a door to keep other children out of the
class. While closing the door, the professor injured one
of those children. Even though the professor incidentally
benefited the charity by acting as "doorkeeper" to enable
his students to properly conduct the class, we concluded
that he was not entitled to the charity's immunity.
In Mooring, we noted that "Moore requires an
individual seeking the cloak of a charity's immunity to
establish [1] that he was an agent or servant of the
charity at the time of the alleged negligence and [2] that
the alleged negligence for which he seeks immunity occurred
while he was actually doing the charity's work." Id. at
512, 514 S.E.2d at 621. We denied charitable immunity in
Mooring on the second ground that the professor was "not
there to directly perform any of the Club's work; rather he
was carrying out his duties as a professor." Id. Implicit
in our holding was the fact that the professor was acting
as the agent of the college, not of the charity.
Here, Mehak, its "co-owners," and its employees were
neither acting as agents or servants of the charity in
preparing and serving the food and beverages, nor were they
directly performing the work of the charity. Instead, they
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were acting directly for Mehak in preparing and delivering
its charitable donation. In this respect, they were like
the college professor in Mooring who was acting as the
college's agent in promoting the college's interest, and
unlike the volunteer driver in Moore who was acting solely
as the charity's agent in promoting the charity's interest.
Applying the rationale of Mooring and Moore, we
conclude that none of the defendants was acting as Mandir's
agents and servants at the time the children were injured.
Even though the facts are considered in the light most
favorable to the defendants who prevailed in the trial
court, we conclude that the court erred in sustaining the
defendants' pleas of charitable immunity.
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial
court and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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