PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Koontz, and
Kinser, JJ., and Stephenson, Senior Justice
EDDIE M. YATES
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 981474 SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR.
April 16, 1999
PITMAN MANUFACTURING, INC.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BUCHANAN COUNTY
Keary R. Williams, Judge
In this products liability personal injury case, we decide
whether the trial court erred in holding that the plaintiff, who
was not the purchaser of the product, must have given notice of
breach of warranty to the product's manufacturer as a
prerequisite to recovery for breach of warranty. We also decide
whether the trial court erred in striking the plaintiff's
express warranty claim.
I
Eddie M. Yates sued Pitman Manufacturing, Inc. (Pitman),
seeking $3,000,000 in damages for injuries he sustained when an
outrigger on a crane unit manufactured and sold by Pitman came
down onto and crushed Yates' left foot. Yates claimed that (1)
Pitman breached its implied warranty by selling a crane truck
system and outriggers that were not of merchantable quality or
fit for ordinary purposes; (2) Pitman breached its express
warranty that the crane unit, including the outriggers, met all
requirements of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
Standard B30.5-1968; (3) Pitman breached its duty to him to
design and market a crane system that was reasonably safe and
such negligence proximately caused his injuries; and (4) Pitman
negligently failed to maintain the crane truck by failing to
install an audible warning device for use with the outriggers.
Prior to trial, Yates moved the court to exclude all
evidence concerning whether he had provided reasonable notice to
Pitman of its breach of warranty. The trial court overruled
Yates' motion, holding that the notice provision of Code § 8.2-
607(3) applied and required Yates, who was not the buyer of the
crane unit, to give notice of breach of warranty to Pitman.
At trial, at the conclusion of Yates' case-in-chief, the
trial court struck Yates' evidence on his breach of express
warranty claim. The court held that Yates had failed to produce
any evidence that the crane unit did not comply with any
affirmation or promise made by Pitman.
Thereafter, the case was submitted to the jury on the
breach of implied warranty and negligence claims. The jury
returned its verdict in favor of Pitman, and the trial court
entered judgment on the verdict. We awarded Yates this appeal.
II
In 1982, Pitman sold the crane unit to Shelton Witt
Equipment, a distributor. At the time, Pitman certified that
"these cranes meet applicable design and construction standards
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as prescribed in ANSI B30.5-1968." When the unit was sold, ANSI
Standard B30.5-1968 mandated that "[e]ach outrigger shall be
visible from its actuating location."
On July 19, 1991, when Yates was injured, Koch Carbon
(Koch) owned the unit and was using it to deliver equipment to
Baldwin Coal Corporation, Yates' employer. At the time Yates
was injured, he was releasing restraining chains from the crane
truck's bed when suddenly, without warning, one of the
outriggers dropped onto his foot. Unbeknownst to Yates, Ira
Stiltner, a Koch employee, had activated the outrigger from the
front of the truck. When Stiltner activated the outrigger, he
could not see either Yates or the outrigger.
III
First, we consider whether the trial court erred in holding
that Yates was required to provide Pitman with notice of breach
of warranty as a prerequisite to recovery therefor. The issue
is one of first impression for this Court.
To resolve the issue, we look to Code § 8.2-607(3), the
only provision of the Sales title of the Uniform Commercial Code
(the UCC) that requires notice to be given to a seller of goods.
The section provides, in pertinent part, the following:
Where a tender has been accepted . . . the buyer
must within a reasonable time after he discovers or
should have discovered any breach notify the seller of
breach or be barred from any remedy.
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It is firmly established that, when a statute is clear and
unambiguous, a court must accept its plain meaning and not
resort to extrinsic evidence or rules of construction. Gonzalez
v. Fairfax Hospital System, 239 Va. 307, 310, 389 S.E.2d 458,
459 (1990). The pertinent language in Code § 8.2-607(3) is
unambiguous and clearly states that "the buyer must . . . notify
the seller of [the] breach." (Emphasis added.) Thus, accepting
the statute's plain meaning, it is apparent that the notice of
breach is required from the "buyer" of the goods.
In the present case, Yates was not the buyer of the crane
unit. Therefore, the notice requirement of Code § 8.2-607(3)
does not preclude Yates from maintaining a breach of warranty
action.
We hold, therefore, that only buyers; i.e., those who buy
or contract to buy goods from a seller, Code § 8.2-103(a), must
give notice of breach of warranty to the seller as a
prerequisite to recovery. Consequently, the trial court erred
in ruling that Yates was required to have given Pitman such
notice. ∗
IV
∗
The conclusion we reach is consistent with the decisions of the
vast majority of other courts that have ruled on the issue.
See, e.g., Cole v. Keller Indus., Inc., 132 F.3d 1044, 1047 (4th
Cir. 1998), and the decisions cited therein.
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Next, we consider whether the trial court erred in striking
Yates' evidence relating to his express warranty claim. As
previously noted, Pitman certified that, at the time of sale,
the crane unit met "applicable design and construction standards
as prescribed in ANSI B30.5-1968." At that time, ANSI Standard
B30.5-1968 required each outrigger to be "visible from its
actuating location." Yates, however, presented evidence that,
from the actuating station, the crane operator, "[n]ot only
[could] not see the outrigger, but he [could not] see that
there's a person [who] might come into contact with that
hazard."
Pitman contends that the trial court correctly struck
Yates' express warranty claim because Yates (1) "offered no
evidence that the ANSI certification was part of the bargain in
any sales transaction involving the product" and (2) failed to
produce any evidence that the crane unit's design and
construction violated the ANSI Standard. We do not agree.
Code § 8.2-313, the express warranty statute, provides as
follows:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created
as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by
the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
affirmation or promise.
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(b) Any description of the goods which is made
part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the
description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that
the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or
model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an
express warranty that the seller use formal words such
as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific
intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation
merely of the value of the goods or a statement
purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or
commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
An affirmation of fact is presumed to be a part of the
bargain, and any fact that would remove such affirmation
out of the agreement "'requires clear affirmative proof.'"
Daughtrey v. Ashe, 243 Va. 73, 78, 413 S.E.2d 336, 339
(1992) (quoting with approval Official Comment 3 to § 8.2-
313). Additionally, a plaintiff is not required to show
that he relied upon the affirmation in order to recover
under an express warranty claim. Id. at 77-79, 413 S.E.2d
at 338-39.
In the present case, Pitman presented no evidence that
would take its affirmation out of the agreement.
Therefore, its affirmation was a part of the basis of the
bargain. See id. at 80, 413 S.E.2d at 339. See also
Martin v. American Med. Sys., Inc., 116 F.3d 102, 105 (4th
Cir. 1997). Thus, we hold that Pitman's affirmation of
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fact created an express warranty that applied to Yates even
though he was not the purchaser of the crane unit. We also
hold that Yates presented evidence from which a jury could
reasonably conclude that the crane unit did not comply with
ANSI Standard B30.5-1968. Therefore, the trial court erred
in striking Yates' express warranty claim.
V
For the reasons stated, we will reverse the trial
court's judgment and remand the case for a new trial
consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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