Present: All the Justices
PAUL PATTERSON
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 981185 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR.
April 16, 1999
DANA BRUCE PATTERSON, EXECUTOR
OF THE ESTATE OF ERNESTINE
PATTERSON, ET AL.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY
Arthur W. Sinclair, Judge Designate
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court
properly determined that a certificate of deposit registered in
the joint names of a husband and wife with right of survivorship
was the sole property of the wife and, upon her death, became
part of her estate.
BACKGROUND
On May 1, 1995, nineteen days before her death, Ernestine
J. Patterson was informed by her husband, Paul Patterson, that
he had found a bank in Richmond that was paying a higher
interest rate than she was currently receiving on money she had
on deposit with Crestar Bank in Charlottesville. Ernestine
Patterson, accompanied by her daughter Carolyn Dale Patterson,
went to Crestar Bank and endorsed for payment a $100,000
certificate of deposit (the Crestar certificate) registered in
her name alone. Crestar Bank issued a cashier’s check payable
to Ernestine Patterson in the face amount of the certificate.
Ernestine Patterson endorsed this check and permitted Paul
Patterson to take the check to Citizens Federal Bank in
Richmond.
On that same day, Paul Patterson deposited the funds in
Citizens Federal Bank and obtained a $100,000 certificate of
deposit (the Citizens Federal certificate) titled “*PAUL
PATTERSON OR ERNESTINE PATTERSON JTWROS*.” Ernestine Patterson
never signed a signature card or otherwise ratified the creation
of a joint interest in the Citizens Federal certificate.
Ernestine Patterson died testate on May 20, 1995. By her
will, she devised her separate real property to Carolyn
Patterson and Dana Bruce Patterson, her son. The residue of her
estate was divided and distributed two-thirds to Janet P.
Steppe, another daughter, and one-third to Paul Patterson. Dana
Patterson qualified as executor of his mother’s estate on May
23, 1995.
This suit originated as a bill of complaint filed by Paul
Patterson on November 27, 1995, seeking an accounting of his
deceased wife’s augmented estate in order to determine his
elective spousal share of that estate. Code § 64.1-16.1. The
bill of complaint named Paul and Ernestine Patterson’s three
children as respondents; however, only Dana Patterson and Janet
Steppe (hereafter, the respondents) entered appearances. In
addition to their answer, the respondents filed a cross-bill on
behalf of the estate seeking return of the $100,000 proceeds
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from the Crestar certificate plus the accrued interest,
asserting that the transfer of these funds to the Citizens
Federal certificate was the result of undue influence and
coercion by their father. In the alternative, they contended
that the transfer did not constitute a valid gift.
On May 14, 1997, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss
the bill of complaint asserting that a prior order extending the
time in which Paul Patterson could make an election to take a
spousal share had not been timely entered. The trial court
sustained the motion and dismissed the bill of complaint with
prejudice. 1 The cross-bill remained pending on the trial court’s
docket.
On August 11, 1997, the trial court held a hearing on the
cross-bill. At that hearing, Carolyn Patterson testified about
the extended estrangement between Paul Patterson and the
Pattersons’ children. She further testified that her mother had
been in poor health and had suffered from Parkinson’s disease,
cancer, and glaucoma. These infirmities interfered with
Ernestine Patterson’s ability to transact her affairs, so that
Carolyn Patterson had to assist her mother in paying bills and
writing letters.
1
Paul Patterson has not assigned error to this aspect of the
trial court’s judgment.
3
Carolyn Patterson further testified that on May 1, 1995,
her father told her to drive her mother to a branch of Crestar
Bank where they would meet him to transact some business. On
the way to the bank, Ernestine Patterson told her daughter “to
‘watch and see what [I] sign[].’” When they arrived at Crestar
Bank, Paul Patterson met them in the parking lot and had
Ernestine Patterson endorse the Crestar certificate, which he
then took into the bank. A short time later he returned with
the cashier’s check for the proceeds, which Ernestine Patterson
also endorsed. Paul Patterson then left in his own vehicle, and
Carolyn Patterson drove her mother home.
Dana Patterson testified that his mother’s parents had
transferred real property to his mother during their lifetimes
as her separate estate. He further testified that she had
received monetary inheritances from her parents upon their
deaths. Neither Dana Patterson nor Paul Patterson was able to
testify about the amount of these inheritances.
Mary Catherine Wheeler, a friend and former co-worker of
Ernestine Patterson’s, testified that “Ernestine was afraid of
Paul. She also loved him very much.” Shortly before her death,
Ernestine Patterson told Wheeler “that she wanted her property
to go to her children and that she had a certificate and she
wanted her children to have that.” Wheeler further testified
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that Ernestine Patterson told Wheeler that “Paul had forced her
to go to the bank and sign the certificate over to him.”
Paul Patterson testified that he and his wife maintained
separate checking accounts and divided responsibility for their
living expenses. He further testified that he controlled the
couple’s investments and that he would “invest a hundred
thousand dollars ($100,000) in my name and then I would put
money in Ernestine’s name in the same institution . . . [s]o
that they would be insured” up to the maximum FDIC insurance on
each account. He conceded that Ernestine Patterson had
inherited money, in addition to real estate, from her parents
and testified that “I have no idea” of the amount involved.
Regarding the May 1, 1995 transactions, Paul Patterson
testified that on the prior evening when the couple was alone
Ernestine Patterson “told me [that] I might as well get [the
Crestar certificate] and put it in my own name.” He further
testified that he “would not take Ernestine’s name off” a new
certificate of deposit, so he used the proceeds of the Crestar
certificate to obtain the Citizens Federal certificate in their
names jointly with right of survivorship.
In an opinion letter dated February 3, 1998, the trial
court reiterated a prior ruling, which had not to that point
been incorporated into the record, that there was insufficient
evidence to prove that Paul Patterson had obtained the Citizens
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Federal certificate from Ernestine Patterson through undue
influence, coercion, or duress. The trial court further found,
however, that Paul Patterson’s own evidence established that the
Crestar certificate was his wife’s sole property. That being
so, the trial court concluded that “Mrs. Patterson endorsed the
[Crestar] certificate for the sole purpose of permitting her
husband to reinvest the proceeds for a better yield and that no
gift was involved.” Accordingly, in the final order,
incorporating by reference the reasoning of its opinion letter,
the trial court entered judgment for the respondents and awarded
$100,000 plus the accrued interest from the Citizens Federal
certificate to the estate. We awarded Paul Patterson this
appeal.
DISCUSSION
Paul Patterson first maintains that the trial court erred
in finding that the Crestar certificate of deposit was Ernestine
Patterson’s sole property. Rather, he asserts that the evidence
supports his contention that the certificate was a marital asset
and that Ernestine Patterson was merely a “nominal holder.”
Swan v. Swan’s Ex’r, 136 Va. 496, 519, 117 S.E. 858, 865 (1923).
We disagree.
Although the burden was on the respondents to show that the
funds originally deposited in Ernestine Patterson’s name in
Crestar Bank were her sole property, the trial court looked
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principally to Paul Patterson’s own testimony to establish that
fact. Specifically, the trial court found his testimony that
his wife told him that she wanted him to have the money on
deposit at Crestar Bank “leaves no doubt as to the ownership of
the Crestar certificate.” “No litigant can successfully ask a
court or jury to believe that he has not told the truth. His
statements of fact and the necessary inferences therefrom are
binding upon him.” Massie v. Firmstone, 134 Va. 450, 462, 114
S.E. 652, 656 (1922). Thus, while Paul Patterson may have
sought to establish that his wife was merely a nominal holder of
a marital asset, his case cannot rise above his own testimony
that the Crestar certificate was solely subject to the control
and wishes of his wife. This evidence, in conjunction with the
evidence presented by the respondents, supports the trial
court’s determination that the Crestar certificate was Ernestine
Patterson’s sole property.
Paul Patterson next contends that Code § 6.1-125.5 mandates
reversal of the trial court’s decision because under that
statute “[s]ums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to
a joint account belong to the surviving party or parties as
against the estate of the decedent unless there is clear and
convincing evidence of a different intention at the time the
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account is created.” 2 He further cites Code § 6.1-125.3 which
provides that “a joint account between persons married to each
other shall belong to them equally . . . unless . . . there is
clear and convincing evidence of a different intent.” Relying
on these statutory provisions, he argues that in the absence of
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary he is entitled to
a presumption that his wife intended the Citizens Federal
certificate to belong to him at her death. He argues that
because the trial court found no undue influence, coercion, or
duress, there necessarily was no clear and convincing evidence
that his wife did not intend for the certificate to belong
solely to him at her death.
Paul Patterson’s reliance upon these statutes is misplaced.
These statutes, and particularly the presumption they provide
which he seeks to assert here, are not applicable under the
facts of this case because there is no evidence in the record
that Ernestine Patterson was ever aware of the nature of the
Citizens Federal certificate. She did not sign a signature card
or otherwise ratify the creation of a joint interest in this
certificate. Moreover, there is simply no evidence in the
record that Ernestine Patterson was aware of the existence of
2
Code § 6.1-125.1(1) provides that “‘Account’ means a
contract of deposit of funds between a depositor and a financial
institution, and includes a . . . certificate of deposit.”
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this certificate even though the proceeds of her Crestar
certificate were used to create it. Thus, the dispositive issue
before the trial court was whether Ernestine Patterson made a
gift of all or part of her Crestar certificate to her husband.
Absent such a gift, Paul Patterson has no right to the Citizens
Federal certificate.
The elements necessary to make a gift inter vivos of
personal property are well established. See generally Taylor v.
Smith, 199 Va. 871, 874, 102 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1958). Here, the
critical issue in dispute, whether Ernestine Patterson intended
to make a gift to her husband, was one of fact to be determined
by the trial court. In such instances, great deference is
accorded a trial court’s factual findings. This is so because
the judge, as fact finder, sees and hears the witnesses and,
therefore, is better able to determine their credibility and
weigh their testimony. Tuomala v. Regent University, 252 Va.
368, 375, 477 S.E.2d 501, 505-06 (1996). Accordingly, we hold
that the trial court’s determination that Ernestine Patterson
did not intend to make a gift to her husband when she endorsed
for payment the check representing the proceeds from her Crestar
certificate is not plainly wrong or without adequate evidence to
support it and, thus, will not be disturbed on appeal. Code
§ 8.01-680; Tauber v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 445, 452, 499 S.E.2d
839, 843 (1998).
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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the trial
court awarding $100,000 plus accrued interest to the estate.
Affirmed.
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