Present: All the Justices
WALTER C. COOLEY
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR.
v. Record No. 981313 April 16, 1999
TYSON FOODS, INC., A NORTH
CAROLINA CORPORATION
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
James B. Wilkinson, Judge
In this appeal we consider whether a discharged employee
presented sufficient evidence to support a jury's finding that
he was fired by his former employer because he had intended to
file a workers' compensation claim.
Walter C. Cooley filed a motion for judgment against
Tyson Foods, Inc., and its personnel manager, Leonard Parks.
Cooley, relying upon Code § 65.2-308 * , alleged that he was
terminated solely because he intended to file a claim under
*
Code § 65.2-308 states in part:
"A. No employer or person shall discharge an
employee solely because the employee intends to file
or has filed a claim under this title or has
testified or is about to testify in any proceeding
under this title. The discharge of a person who has
filed a fraudulent claim is not a violation of this
section.
"B. The employee may bring an action in a
circuit court having jurisdiction over the employer
or person who allegedly discharged the employee in
violation of this section. The court shall have
jurisdiction, for cause shown, to restrain
violations and order appropriate relief, including
actual damages and attorney's fees to successful
claimants and the rehiring or reinstatement of the
the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act. Cooley nonsuited his
claim against Parks and at a trial, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of Cooley in the amount of $36,450. The
circuit court granted Tyson Foods' motion to set aside the
jury's verdict. The circuit court held that Cooley failed to
prove that he had intended to file a workers' compensation
claim and that Cooley failed to establish that Tyson Foods had
discharged him solely because he had intended to file such
claim. Cooley appeals.
Even though the circuit court set aside the jury's
verdict, we accord the recipient of a jury verdict the benefit
of all substantial conflicts in the evidence and all
reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom.
Therefore, we will state the facts in the light most favorable
to Cooley, and if there is any credible evidence in the record
which supports the jury's verdict, we will reinstate that
verdict and enter judgment thereon. Holland v. Shively, 243
Va. 308, 309-10, 415 S.E.2d 222, 223 (1992).
Cooley had been employed with Tyson Foods for
approximately 29 years. On August 5, 1996, Dr. Brenda Ray,
Cooley's personal physician, examined him for urological
problems. During that examination, Cooley asked Dr. Ray to
employee, with back pay plus interest at the
judgment rate . . . ."
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examine his back. According to Cooley, Dr. Ray examined his
back and found nothing wrong with him.
The next day while working at a Tyson Foods' facility,
Cooley experienced a "bad pain in [his] back" when he tried to
place a cart upon a table while performing his duties as a
maintenance mechanic. Cooley was transported to the medical
department where Pat Gasque, Tyson Foods' supervising nurse,
obtained his medical history. While Gasque was completing a
form described as an "injured workers' statement," she asked
Cooley: "Have you recently or in the past injured yourself
off the job?" Cooley responded, "no." Gasque recorded
Cooley's response on the form and Cooley signed it.
Gasque made arrangements for Cooley to be taken to a
hospital's emergency room because he continued to experience
pain. After the emergency room personnel treated Cooley, he
returned to Tyson Foods' facility.
When Cooley arrived at work the next day, Gasque referred
him to Dr. Douglas A. Wayne, a physician who practices
physical medicine and rehabilitation. Dr. Wayne performed an
evaluation of Cooley and determined that he was experiencing
pain on the left side and back of his body. Dr. Wayne also
took a medical history from Cooley.
After conducting this physical examination, Dr. Wayne
decided to contact Dr. Ray to discuss Cooley's medical
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condition. During a telephone conversation, Dr. Ray informed
Dr. Wayne that Cooley had been to see her on August 5, 1996,
and that he complained about "left side back pains, very
similar" to the conditions that he had described to Dr. Wayne.
Dr. Ray further advised Dr. Wayne that Cooley had informed her
that he hurt his back when he had "been hit hard by some
waves" at a beach on August 4, 1996. When Dr. Wayne informed
Cooley that Dr. Ray stated that Cooley had been injured on
August 4, Cooley did not respond. "He didn't say anything."
Gasque, who had accompanied Cooley to Dr. Wayne's office,
learned that Dr. Ray had treated Cooley for a back injury he
incurred at a beach. She conveyed this information to Parks,
who suspended Cooley from work and conducted an investigation.
Parks obtained a letter that Dr. Wayne had written to Gasque
which stated, in pertinent part: "After Mr. Cooley was seen I
contacted Dr. Ray to discuss the situation and to see if she
could see him soon. It was at that time that she relayed that
Mr. Cooley had been in her office two days ago complaining of
left side and back pain. He gave her the history that he had
hurt himself at the beach over the weekend and had been hit
hard by waves and had banged his flank and back into the
sand."
Parks also obtained Dr. Ray's notes which indicate that
Cooley had injured his back on August 4, 1996. Parks reviewed
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medical records that Dr. Wayne and Dr. Ray had forwarded to
him and decided to terminate Cooley's employment because he
had made a false statement that he had not been injured
"recently or in the past . . . off the job."
Code § 65.2-308 requires that Cooley present evidence
which establishes that he was terminated solely because he had
intended to file a workers' compensation claim. Cooley,
relying upon Charlton v. Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp., 235 Va.
485, 369 S.E.2d 175 (1988), argues that he presented
sufficient evidence to meet this statutory requisite. Tyson
Foods asserts that Cooley failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was fired solely because
he intended to file a workers' compensation claim. We agree
with Tyson Foods.
In Charlton, we considered whether the evidence supported
a jury's verdict finding that an employee had been discharged
because she had incurred a work-related injury or disease for
which she had intended to file a claim under the Virginia
Workers' Compensation Act. The plaintiff developed tendonitis
in her right hand caused by the performance of her assigned
duties. The plaintiff received an award of workers'
compensation benefits for lost wages and the cost of medical
treatment. Subsequently, the plaintiff was required to leave
work and seek treatment for pain in the same hand at the
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emergency room of a hospital. 235 Va. at 487, 369 S.E.2d at
176.
When the plaintiff returned to work, she was summoned to
a meeting, and the defendant required her to sign a form which
waived her right to claim compensation benefits related to
certain physical conditions. Id. The plaintiff declined to
sign the form because she did not understand it. 235 Va. at
488, 369 S.E.2d at 176. Later, the defendant informed the
plaintiff that if she persisted in her refusal to sign the
waiver form, she would be terminated. The plaintiff signed
the form and delivered it to her employer, who forwarded the
form for approval to the Workers' Compensation Commission.
The plaintiff then retained counsel who withdrew the waiver,
and the Workers' Compensation Commission advised the defendant
that the Commission would not approve the waiver. Id. The
defendant fired the plaintiff four days before the plaintiff's
attorney had withdrawn the waiver and six days before the
Commission refused to approve the waiver. 235 Va. at 490, 369
S.E.2d at 177-78.
During cross-examination, the plaintiff stated that she
was fired because she had refused to sign a waiver of her
right to claim workers' compensation benefits. 235 Va. at
488, 369 S.E.2d at 177. Relying upon this testimony, the
defendant argued that the plaintiff's evidence showed that she
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was not fired solely because she intended to file a workers'
compensation claim and that her refusal to sign the waiver
constituted a separate reason for her dismissal. 235 Va. at
488-89, 369 S.E.2d at 177. Rejecting the defendant's
contentions, we held that the record in Charlton revealed that
the defendant's motivation for terminating the plaintiff was a
matter outside the realm of her knowledge and that the
evidence when considered in its entirety supported the jury's
finding that the plaintiff was discharged solely because she
had intended to file a workers' compensation claim. 235 Va.
at 490, 369 S.E.2d at 177-78. See also Mullins v. Virginia
Lutheran Homes, 253 Va. 116, 119-20, 479 S.E.2d 530, 532-33
(1997).
Here, unlike Charlton, the evidence of record reveals
that Cooley failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that Tyson Foods fired him solely because he intended to file
a workers' compensation claim. The evidence of record clearly
establishes that Tyson Foods, which had conducted a thorough
investigation, was entitled to conclude, based upon the facts
it adduced during that investigation, that Cooley had made a
false representation to Tyson Foods. Thus, Tyson Foods had a
legitimate non-pretextual reason to terminate Cooley which
cannot subject Tyson Foods to liability under Code § 65.2-308.
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Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit
court.
Affirmed.
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Cooley v. Tyson Foods, Inc.
Combined Opinion