Present: All the Justices
JAMES EDWARD REID,
a/k/a JAMES EDWARD REED
v. Record No. 981020 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER
November 6, 1998
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY
Ray W. Grubbs, Judge
On December 3, 1997, James Edward Reid pled guilty to
three charges: (1) capital murder of Annie V. Lester during
the commission of attempted rape and/or attempted robbery
in violation of Code § 18.2-31; (2) attempted rape in
violation of Code § 18.2-67.5; and (3) attempted robbery in
violation of Code § 18.2-58. 1 After accepting the pleas and
hearing evidence about the commission of the offenses, the
trial court found Reid guilty as charged.
During the subsequent sentencing proceedings, the
trial court heard evidence from both sides and received a
pre-sentence report. 2 The trial court then sentenced Reid
to death for the capital murder conviction and imposed two
ten-year sentences for the attempted rape and attempted
robbery convictions. In imposing the death penalty
1
Reid entered the guilty pleas pursuant to North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1973).
2
The trial court conducted the first part of the
penalty phase hearing on December 3, 1997, immediately
pursuant to Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and -264.4(C), the trial
court found that Reid’s conduct in committing capital
murder was “outrageously vile, horrible and inhuman in that
it involved such aggravated battery to the victim, that is
. . . qualitatively and quantitatively . . . more culpable
than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder.”
On appeal, Reid contends that the trial court
disregarded certain mitigating evidence and therefore erred
in imposing the death penalty. 3 Upon consideration of the
record, briefs, and argument of counsel, we find no error
in the judgment of the trial court. Further, upon
conducting our review pursuant to Code § 17-110.1(C), we
conclude that the sentence of death in this case was not
imposed “under the influence of passion, prejudice or any
other arbitrary factor” and is not excessive or
disproportionate. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
FACTS
_________________
after finding Reid guilty. The court reconvened the
hearing on February 20, 1998.
3
Reid is before this Court for automatic review of his
death sentence under Code § 17-110.1.
Code § 17-110.1 was repealed and replaced by § 17.1-
313, effective October 1, 1998. Because the parties
briefed and argued this case under the provisions of § 17-
110.1, and because the relevant provisions remain unchanged
in § 17.1-313, we will cite to § 17-110.1 in this opinion.
2
“Since the Commonwealth prevailed in the trial court,
we review the evidence and all reasonable inferences
arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth.” Graham v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 79, 81, 459
S.E.2d 97, 98, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 997 (1995) (citing
Swann v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 222, 225, 441 S.E.2d 195,
198, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 889 (1994)).
In the afternoon on October 12, 1996, Lester’s cousin
went to Lester’s house, and after finding the front screen
door open, entered the house, discovered Lester’s body on
the floor at the end of a bed, and observed debris all over
the bedroom floor. The cousin left and went to a
relative’s house to call for emergency help, but then
returned to Lester’s home and was there when the police
arrived.
Before disturbing the crime scene, the police made a
video recording of the inside of Lester’s house. The tape
was admitted into evidence, and Officer Tommy Lawson
narrated what was being seen as the trial court watched it.
Blood was present throughout Lester’s home on such items as
the kitchen floor, the back door and back door trim, the
refrigerator, a can of milk, a wig lying on the kitchen
floor, the door leading from the kitchen into a television
room, scissors lying on a chair in the television room, the
3
bed and headboard in the bedroom where Lester’s body was
found, the cord of an electric heating pad that was under
Lester’s head, and the seat of a chair beside her body.
Several items of Lester’s clothing had blood on them,
including a sweater, a slip, and a bra that was still
fastened in the back but that “[was] broken in some fashion
in the front.” The bedroom was in complete disarray with
dresser drawers on the floor and bed and clothing strewn
all around. A wine bottle was sitting on the floor at the
foot of the bed.
William Massello, the Assistant Chief Medical Examiner
for Western Virginia, performed an autopsy on Lester. He
described Lester as an elderly, slender, and “somewhat
emaciated” female. During the autopsy, Massello observed
14 stab wounds to the front of Lester’s neck and three stab
wounds to her chin, one of which went into the jugular vein
on the left side of her neck. There were also five stab
wounds to the front of Lester’s chest. Massello testified
that several of these wounds went through the chest wall
into Lester’s left lung and into her heart. In Massello’s
opinion, the most rapidly lethal wounds were four of the
stab wounds to the chest, which caused bleeding into the
chest cavity and, in turn, caused Lester to die rapidly.
According to Massello, all the stab wounds had a Z-shaped
4
or H-shaped configuration consistent with injuries caused
by two blades superimposed on one another or scissors
blades.
In addition to the stab wounds, Massello observed
multiple lacerations and bruises on Lester’s body. Some of
these injuries on the top of Lester’s head and face were
caused either by Lester’s head being struck with a blunt
instrument, or by her head striking another object such as
a door or wall. Lester had lacerations on the right and
left sides of her face and linear crush marks on the right
side of her face. 4 Finally, Lester sustained a fracture of
the hyoid bone, 5 resulting either from the force of
strangulation or from being struck in that area with an
object.
The evidence linking Reid to the commission of these
crimes consists, in part, of testimony from witnesses who
saw Reid at or in the vicinity of Lester’s house on the day
of her murder. Around 10:30 a.m. on October 12, Reid
4
Massello opined that the can of milk found in
Lester’s kitchen was the kind of instrument that could have
caused some of the injuries to Lester’s head.
5
Hyoid bone is defined as “a bone or complex of bones
situated at the base of the tongue and developed from the
second and third visceral arches, supporting the tongue and
its muscles . . . .” Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 1111 (1993).
5
secured a ride to Lester’s house with Haywood Alexander and
Robert Smith. Reid’s stated purpose for going to Lester’s
house was to do some work there. 6 En route to Lester’s
home, Reid asked Alexander and Smith to stop at a store
where Reid purchased a bottle of wine. They then proceeded
to Lester’s house, and upon arriving there, Reid exited the
vehicle and walked around to the back of the house with his
bottle of wine. Alexander and Smith then left.
Around 4:30 p.m. on that same day, George Eanes, who
worked at Eanes Body Shop located across the street from
Lester’s house, observed Reid walking across the street
from the direction of Lester’s house. Reid approached
Eanes and asked for a ride. Eanes explained to Reid that
he was working on his vehicle and could not give him a ride
at that time. When asked at the trial to describe Reid’s
appearance, Eanes stated that “[Reid] had a lot of blood on
him and he was staggering.” 7 After seeing the blood on
Reid’s clothing, Eanes asked Reid how he got in that
6
Reid apparently had performed odd jobs for Lester on
previous occasions and enjoyed discussing the Bible with
her.
7
Reid had blood on his sleeve, shoes, pants, and front
of his coat.
6
condition. According to Eanes, Reid responded by referring
to a former lover and stating that “he did it for love.”
George W. Eanes, father of George Eanes, also saw Reid
at the body shop and confirmed that Reid appeared to have
been in a fight because he had blood all over him. Eanes’
father stated that Reid smelled like a “brewery” but that
he, nevertheless, agreed to give Reid a ride home. During
that drive, Reid explained to Eanes’ father that some
person had given him some drugs and that they had gotten
into an argument or fight.
The results of forensic tests, fingerprint analyses,
and handwriting comparisons also place Reid at Lester’s
house on the day in question. Forensic tests established
that Reid’s DNA matched a stain abstracted from a cigarette
butt found in Lester’s home. A blood stain abstracted from
the same cigarette butt was consistent with the DNA profile
of Lester and Reid. In addition, the forensic scientist
who conducted these tests testified that Lester’s DNA was
consistent with blood recovered from Reid’s jacket.
Finally, two of Reid’s fingerprints were identified in
blood found on the handset of a rotary telephone in
Lester’s bedroom, and Reid’s handwriting was found on some
papers recovered in Lester’s house.
7
The Commonwealth presented all the foregoing evidence
during the guilt phase of Reid’s trial but also relied upon
it during the sentencing phase. In addition, the
Commonwealth presented testimony from Robert D. O’Neal, a
probation officer. O’Neal interviewed Reid while preparing
the pre-sentence report. During that interview, Reid
stated to O’Neal that he did not remember anything about
the incident. According to O’Neal, Reid believes that he
“blacked out” because he remembers being at Lester’s house
prior to the offense but does not recall anything that
transpired from that point until he awoke at home and found
blood on his clothing.
In mitigation, Reid presented evidence from three
medical experts: Dr. Pogos H. Voskanian, a forensic
psychiatrist; Dr. Stephen Herrick, a forensic psychologist;
and Dr. Randy Thomas, a clinical psychologist. Each of
these witnesses discussed Reid’s medical and psychiatric
conditions that, in their opinion, affect Reid’s ability to
form the intent to commit a crime and that have caused Reid
to experience “blackout” periods during which he is
basically out of control and engages in disorganized,
aggressive behavior toward an unlikely target.
Three factors were significant to these medical
experts in formulating their respective opinions. First,
8
Reid suffered a major head trauma as a result of an
automobile accident in 1968 and was in a coma for at least
five days. The damaged area of Reid’s brain was the left
temporal lobe and part of the frontal lobe, which affects
an individual’s personality and ability to control
impulses. Thus, Reid does not resist acting on his
impulses. Second, Reid developed a seizure disorder
shortly after the head injury. According to Dr. Voskanian,
Reid’s head trauma triggered the seizure disorder. Because
Reid has been noncompliant with taking his medication to
control the seizures, he has experienced repeated seizures
that have, in turn, progressively caused more damage to his
brain. Finally, Reid has a family history of alcoholism,
has abused alcohol since age 15, and has had numerous
admissions to both psychiatric hospitals and alcohol abuse
rehabilitation centers. Because of Reid’s brain injury, he
is more vulnerable to the effects of alcohol and likely to
become intoxicated more quickly than another person. In
addition, Reid is a binge drinker, meaning that he has not
built up a tolerance for the effects of alcohol.
Dr. Voskanian opined that Reid experiences “blackout”
episodes when he is intoxicated. During these episodes,
Reid may not remember what he did five minutes ago but
would retain his memory for established information such as
9
his name and residence. Dr. Voskanian further opined that
Reid was in “an impaired state of consciousness” when he
left Lester’s house because Reid said things that could not
be understood and did nothing to conceal his bloody
clothing.
In summary, Dr. Voskanian stated that Reid’s head
trauma, seizure disorder, long history of drinking, and
serious medical conditions, 8 could “have a significant
impact on Mr. Reid’s ability to think clearly, or perform
intentional acts.” Dr. Voskanian also opined that these
conditions could cause violent outbursts that Reid would
not remember if he were intoxicated. However, all three
medical experts believed that Reid would not be susceptible
to these violent outbursts if he were in a structured
setting where he would not have access to alcohol.
Some of Reid’s family members also testified that Reid
is a different person when he is intoxicated. His ex-wife,
sister, and mother described Reid as a kind and considerate
person when he is sober, but acknowledged that Reid has
violent episodes during periods of intoxication. They also
confirmed that Reid cannot remember what he does when he is
8
Reid underwent cardiac by-pass surgery. Several
years after the surgery, Reid again had chest pains and
suffered a myocardial infarction. Reid has also been
diagnosed with lung cancer.
10
intoxicated. For example, his ex-wife testified that Reid
once stabbed her when he was intoxicated but that he had no
recollection of the incident the next morning.
ANALYSIS
Under Code § 19.2-264.4(B), facts in mitigation that a
trial court can consider in deciding whether to impose a
sentence of death or life imprisonment may include the
following:
(ii) the capital felony was committed while the
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance, . . . [and] (iv) at the time of
the commission of the capital felony, the capacity of
the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law was significantly impaired.
On appeal, Reid argues that the trial court erred by not
considering evidence establishing these mitigating factors.
Specifically, Reid contends that the court failed to
address evidence showing Reid’s lack of planning or
premeditation, lack of memory of the incident, and behavior
subsequent to the commission of the crimes. Reid also
asserts that the trial court failed to consider the
uncontradicted medical testimony regarding his medical and
psychiatric impairments. According to Reid, this evidence
demonstrates not only that he was unaware of what he was
doing at Lester’s home on the day in question but also that
he cannot now remember anything about the incident. Thus,
11
Reid argues that his conduct in committing the murder of
Lester cannot be deemed “vile” and that the trial court,
therefore, erred by imposing a sentence of death based on
the “vileness” factor.
Reid’s arguments can be distilled into a single
complaint that the trial court must not have considered his
mitigating evidence since the court imposed the death
penalty. Reid asserts that, since his evidence was
uncontradicted and is not inherently improbable or
inconsistent, it had to be accepted as true. Once that
evidence was accepted as true, Reid contends that it
negated the trial court’s finding of “vileness.” In other
words, Reid asserts that the trial court should have given
controlling weight to his mitigating evidence. We do not
agree.
Following a 15-minute recess after the close of the
evidence in the penalty phase, the trial court announced
its sentencing decision and, in doing so, stated, “The
Court has the duty to consider all such evidence, both
favorable to you and unfavorable presented relative to this
hearing in ascertaining whether the crime of which you have
been convicted is so atrocious that the death sentence
should be imposed.” Thus, we conclude that the trial court
did, in fact, consider Reid’s mitigating evidence.
12
We have addressed this type of complaint on at least
two previous occasions. First, in Correll v. Commonwealth,
232 Va. 454, 468, 352 S.E.2d 352, 360, cert. denied, 482
U.S. 931 (1987), the defendant argued, as does Reid, that
the mitigating evidence was of such weight that the court
could not have considered it and still sentenced him to
death. The mitigating evidence in that case established
that Correll had a troubled childhood and unfortunate home
situation. Taking the view that such evidence tended to
explain, but did not excuse, Correll’s commission of the
capital murder, we concluded that “it did not require as a
matter of law that the death penalty not be imposed.” Id.
We further stated that the fact-finder has a duty to
consider mitigating evidence along with other evidence in
determining the appropriate sentence but that the fact-
finder is “not required to give controlling effect to the
mitigating evidence.” Id. at 468-469, 352 S.E.2d at 360.
Similarly, in Murphy v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136,
142, 431 S.E.2d 48, 52, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 928 (1993),
we addressed the defendant’s argument that the trial court
had failed to consider fully the evidence in mitigation of
the imposition of the death penalty. As in the present
case, the trial court in Murphy stated on the record that
it had considered all the evidence. Relying on our
13
decision in Correll, we concluded that the trial court had
“maturely, carefully, and calmly deliberated the full range
of issues.” Id.
As in Correll and Murphy, the evidence upon which Reid
relies is mitigating in that it shows “extenuating
circumstances tending to explain, but not excuse, his
commission of the crime.” Correll, 232 Va. at 468, 352
S.E.2d at 360 (quoting Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va.
243, 253, 257 S.E.2d 797, 804 (1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1103 (1980)). The trial court was not, however,
required to give controlling weight to the mitigating
evidence. Id. at 469, 352 S.E.2d at 360.
Moreover, Reid’s mitigating evidence does not, as a
matter of law, negate the trial court’s finding of
“vileness.” Reid stabbed Lester 22 times and inflicted
other wounds on her head, face, hyoid bone, and arms.
According to the medical examiner, four of the five stab
wounds to Lester’s chest were fatal. From the presence of
blood throughout Lester’s house, it can be inferred that
Reid carried or dragged her body from the kitchen into the
bedroom. At some point, he also removed her clothes and
ransacked her bedroom.
Reid’s medical and psychiatric impairments, his
periods of “blackout,” his lack of memory regarding the
14
acts he committed at Lester’s home, and his behavior
subsequent to the incident when he made no attempt to hide
either his presence at Lester’s home or his blood-covered
clothing do not change the fact that the commission of this
crime was “outrageously . . . vile, horrible or inhuman, in
that it involved . . . aggravated battery” to Lester. Code
§§ 19.2-264.2 and -264.4(C). It was “qualitatively and
quantitatively . . . more culpable than the minimum
necessary to accomplish an act of murder.” Smith v.
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 478, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979). We have never held that
the “vileness” factor under Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and –
264.4(C) includes a requirement that a defendant’s mental
state embrace the intent to commit an “outrageously or
wantonly vile” murder, and we decline to do so now. “The
number or nature of the batteries inflicted upon the victim
is the essence of the test whether the defendant’s conduct
‘was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in
that it involved . . . an aggravated battery.’” Boggs v.
Commonwealth, 229 Va. 501, 521, 331 S.E.2d 407, 421 (1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986) (quoting Code § 19.2-
264.2).
PREJUDICE AND PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
OF DEATH SENTENCE
15
Pursuant to Code § 17-110.1(C)(1), we are required to
determine whether the death sentence in this case was
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other
arbitrary factors. Upon careful examination of the record,
we find no evidence that any such factor was present or
influenced the trial court’s sentencing decision. Indeed,
Reid has not asserted that the imposition of the death
penalty in this case was the result of passion or
prejudice.
We must also determine whether the sentence of death
in this case is “excessive or disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases.” Code § 17-110.1(C)(2).
In conducting this review, we have inspected the records of
all capital cases presented to this Court including those
cases in which the trial court imposed a life sentence
instead of the death penalty. In complying with the
directive in Code § 17-110.1(C)(2) to compare “similar”
cases, we have given particular attention to those cases in
which the underlying felony predicates and the facts and
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crimes were
the same as those in this case. We have also focused on
cases in which the death penalty was imposed solely on the
basis of the “vileness” factor. However, our
proportionality review does not require that a given
16
capital murder case “equal in horror the worst possible
scenario yet encountered.” Turner v. Commonwealth, 234 Va.
543, 556, 364 S.E.2d 483, 490, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017
(1988).
Based on this review, the Court concludes that Reid’s
sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate to
sentences generally imposed in this Commonwealth for
capital murders comparable to Reid’s murder of Lester.
See, e.g. Fry v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 413, 463 S.E.2d 433
(1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110 (1996) (11 gunshot
wounds to victim’s head, chest, and abdomen; victim dragged
down dirt road while alive); Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234
Va. 130, 360 S.E.2d 196 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036
(1988) (multiple gunshot wounds); Washington v.
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535, 323 S.E.2d 577 (1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1111 (1985) (38 stab wounds to victim);
Boggs, 229 Va. 501, 331 S.E.2d 407 (victim stabbed in two
places and struck on head and neck multiple times). As
already stated, Reid inflicted 22 stab wounds upon the
victim, four of which were lethal wounds to Lester’s chest,
in addition to multiple other injuries. Reid committed
these acts while carrying or dragging Lester’s body through
her house and removing her clothing.
17
For these reasons, we find no error in the imposition
of the sentence of death, nor do we perceive any reason to
commute the death sentence. Therefore, we will affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
18