Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and
Kinser, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice
BRIAN E. WOOD, BY AND THROUGH
HIS NEXT FRIENDS, LARRY E. WOOD
AND LAVONNE W. WOOD
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR.
v. Record No. 970727 January 9, 1998
HENRY COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRY COUNTY
David V. Williams, Judge
I.
The primary issue we consider in this appeal is whether a
public school division, which expelled a student who violated the
school division's code of student conduct, violated that
student's due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 1
II.
In March 1996, Brian Edmond Wood, then a 10th-grade student
at Bassett High School in Henry County, went on a school-
sponsored field trip with his class to the Henry County Jail. In
response to a sheriff deputy's inquiry whether any students had
weapons in their possession, Brian gave the deputy a pocketknife.
The deputy gave the pocketknife to a school chaperon, and when
Brian returned to school, the chaperon took him to the assistant
principal's office. Curtis Shelton, an assistant principal,
asked Brian "what happened" and told him to "write a brief
statement on a sheet of paper." Brian gave a written statement
1
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution states in relevant part that no state shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."
that he did not intend to take the pocketknife to school, that he
placed the knife in his pants pocket the night before the field
trip, and that he forgot that the knife was in his pants pocket
until the deputy asked if any students had any weapons.
After hearing Brian's version of the incident, Shelton
suspended Brian from school for 10 days for violating the Henry
County Public School Code of Student Conduct which prohibits
students from possessing knives at school-sponsored events.
Shelton contacted Brian's mother, by telephone, and informed her
of the incident and the suspension.
On March 4, 1996, Robert C. Vogler, director of pupil
personnel for the Henry County Public Schools, sent a notice to
Brian's parents, Larry E. and LaVonne W. Wood, informing them
that the Bassett High School administration had recommended that
Brian appear before the committee for the control of school
discipline "to determine if there [was] sufficient cause to
recommend to the Superintendent that Brian be excluded from
attending Henry County Public Schools." The notice advised
Brian's parents of a hearing date and location and cited the
appropriate policies in the code of student conduct.
Brian, his parents, and their attorney appeared at a hearing
before the committee and presented evidence to the committee.
The Woods' attorney participated in this hearing.
The committee decided to recommend to the Henry County
Public School Board that Brian be expelled from school. Brian
remained on suspension pending official action by the School
Board. The committee informed Brian and his parents of its
decision and advised them that they had a right to appeal the
committee's recommendation to J. David Martin, Superintendent of
the Henry County Public Schools.
Brian appealed the recommendation of expulsion to the
superintendent. During that appeal, Brian was asked to discuss
the events surrounding his possession of the pocketknife, and his
parents were asked if they had anything they would like to say.
Brian's parents, as well as his attorney, made statements to the
superintendent. By letter dated March 22, 1996, the
superintendent informed the Woods that "[i]t appeared from the
affidavits and testimony that the incident of possession of a
weapon on a field trip from Bassett High School did constitute
sufficient cause for action beyond the disciplinary options used
by the school. It is accordingly decided that the recommendation
of an expulsion be made to the full [S]chool [B]oard and that
Brian remain suspended from the Henry County Public Schools
pending official action by the [S]chool [B]oard." The
superintendent also informed the Woods that Brian had a right to
a hearing before the School Board and that they could be
represented by an attorney. The superintendent also notified the
Woods of the date, time, and location of the hearing.
The School Board conducted an evidentiary hearing to
consider the superintendent's recommendation. The superintendent
presented evidence, and the Woods' attorney cross-examined him.
Mr. Wood testified at the hearing, and the Woods' lawyer argued
on behalf of Brian. The School Board considered the evidence and
argument of the Woods' attorney, and found that Brian had
violated the school division's policy which prohibits students
from possessing knives at school-sponsored events as well as Code
§§ 22.1-277.01, 18.2-308, and -308.1 which prohibit students from
possessing firearms or weapons on school property. The School
Board, among other things, voted to expel Brian. 2
III.
Brian, by and through his next friends, Larry and LaVonne
Wood, filed a petition pursuant to Code § 22.1-87 3 against the
Henry County Public Schools. Brian alleged that the Henry County
Public Schools had violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process when he was suspended and subsequently expelled from the
2
The School Board's decision states: "[T]he Board
accept[ed] the recommendation of the Superintendent that the
student be expelled for 365 days provided that the student
may return for the [19]96-[19]97 school year if he remains of
good behavior and provided further that, number one; the
student be provided homebound instruction for the remainder
of this school year and number two; that if the student is of
good behavior and does not violate the Code of Student
[C]onduct for the remainder of the 365 day period, that this
action of the [School] Board and the original suspension be
expunged from the student's record, and number three; that if
the student violates the Code of Student Conduct during the
365 day period, he will be expelled for the remainder of the
original 365 day period."
3
Code § 22.1-87 states: "Any parent, custodian, or legal
guardian of a pupil attending the public schools in a school
division who is aggrieved by an action of the school board
may, within thirty days after such action, petition the
circuit court having jurisdiction in the school division to
review the action of the school board. Such review shall
proceed upon the petition, the minutes of the meeting at
which the school board's action was taken, the orders, if
any, of the school board, an attested copy of the transcript,
if any, of any hearing before the school board, and any other
evidence found relevant to the issues on appeal by the court.
The action of the school board shall be sustained unless the
school board exceeded its authority, acted arbitrarily or
capriciously, or abused its discretion."
Henry County Public Schools. The school division filed an answer
denying that it had violated Brian's due process rights. The
trial court considered evidence, legal memoranda, and argument of
counsel and, on August 5, 1996, entered a judgment which set
aside Brian's expulsion because the School Board had erroneously
decided that a pocketknife was a firearm within the intendment of
Code §§ 22.1-277.01, 18.2-308(A), and -308.1. The trial court
did not disturb the School Board's finding that Brian had
violated the Code of Student Conduct which prohibits students
from bringing knives to school-sponsored events.
The court remanded the proceeding to the School Board for
reconsideration of punishment. The School Board convened to
reconsider Brian's punishment without notice to Brian or his
parents and decided that it would not change Brian's punishment.
The trial court entered a final judgment, Brian appeals, and the
school division assigns cross-error.
IV.
A.
Brian argues that the school division deprived him of his
4
due process rights on numerous occasions. First, Brian contends
that he was deprived of his due process rights when the assistant
principal initially suspended him. Next, Brian claims that his
due process rights were violated because, he says, he was not
4
Code §§ 22.1-277 and 22.1-277.01 confer certain
statutory rights upon a student subject to expulsion or
suspension by a school board. Brian does not contend,
however, that the school division contravened his statutory
rights.
given sufficient notice of the hearing before the disciplinary
committee. Brian also asserts that his appeal from the decision
of the disciplinary committee to the superintendent of schools
did not comport with due process. We find no merit in these
contentions.
The Commonwealth has conferred upon school boards, which are
created pursuant to art. VIII, § 7, of the Constitution of
Virginia, broad authority to prescribe and enforce standards of
conduct in schools. This authority, however, must be exercised
consistently with constitutional safeguards.
The United States Supreme Court articulated the principles
that we must apply in this appeal in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
574 (1974). There, the Court stated that a
"State is constrained to recognize a student's
legitimate entitlement to a public education as a
property interest which is protected by the Due Process
Clause and which may not be taken away for misconduct
without adherence to the minimum procedures required by
that Clause."
Thus, a student charged with misconduct may not be suspended from
a public school without the minimum procedures required by the
due process clause. Explaining the requirements of due process,
the Supreme Court noted:
"'The fundamental requisite of due process of law is
the opportunity to be heard,' Grannis v. Ordean, 234
U.S. 385, 394 (1914), a right that 'has little reality
or worth unless one is informed that the matter is
pending and can choose for himself whether to . . .
contest.' . . . At the very minimum, therefore,
students facing suspension and the consequent
interference with a protected property interest must be
given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of
hearing. 'Parties whose rights are to be affected are
entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy
that right they must first be notified.'" Id. at 579
(citation omitted).
The Supreme Court also held in Goss that
"[s]tudents facing temporary suspension have interests
qualifying for protection of the Due Process Clause,
and due process requires, in connection with a
suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be
given oral or written notice of the charges against him
and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence
the authorities have and an opportunity to present his
side of the story. The Clause requires at least these
rudimentary precautions against unfair or mistaken
findings of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from
school." Id. at 581.
Applying these principles, we hold that the Henry County
Public School division did not abridge Brian's due process
rights. The assistant principal, who initially suspended Brian,
gave him an opportunity to explain his version of the facts, and
Brian was informed of "what he is accused of doing and . . . the
basis of the accusation." Id. at 582.
The committee for the control of school discipline also
afforded Brian due process. That committee forwarded a notice to
Brian's parents that he committed a "severe breach of the conduct
code at Bassett High School" and referred to a policy which
states that a student shall not possess, handle, or transmit a
knife while at school or during an off-site school-sponsored
activity. Without question, Brian, his parents, and their
attorney knew the reasons Brian had been suspended and that the
committee was conducting a hearing to determine whether Brian
should be expelled. Additionally, as we have already mentioned,
Brian, his parents, and their attorney participated during the
hearing before the committee.
The superintendent did not abridge Brian's due process
rights. The Woods requested an appeal to the superintendent "due
to a weapons violation." The Woods were informed of the date and
time for this appeal, and Brian, his parents, and their attorney
were given an opportunity to make whatever statements they deemed
appropriate.
B.
Brian argues that even if the school division accorded him
his procedural due process rights, the school division should not
be permitted to promulgate policies that require suspension or
expulsion of students who possess knives on school property. We
find no merit in this contention. Neither the school division's
policies nor the Federal Gun-Free School Act with which Code
§ 22.1-277.01(A) complies, divests the School Board of its
authority to impose a punishment less severe than expulsion.
Moreover, a school division is permitted to suspend or expel a
student for possession of a dangerous weapon on school property
or at school-sponsored events provided that the school division
does not abridge a student's constitutional or statutory rights.
See Mitchell v. Board of Trustees of Oxford, 625 F.2d 660, 664-
65 (5th Cir. 1980); Kolesnick v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 558
N.W.2d 807, 813 (Neb. 1997). In this instance, Brian fails to
identify any statutory or constitutional right that the Henry
County Public School division has purportedly violated.
C.
As we have already stated, the trial court set aside the
School Board's initial decision to expel Brian and remanded the
proceeding, by an order dated August 5, 1996, to the School Board
because the School Board erroneously concluded that Brian's knife
was a firearm under Code §§ 22.1-277.01, 18.2-308.1, and -308(A).
Brian argues that the school division violated his due process
rights because, upon remand, the School Board failed to give him
notice and an opportunity to be present at the hearing.
After the trial court remanded this proceeding, the School
Board decided it would expel Brian, and the trial court entered a
final judgment which dismissed the proceeding. Brian's counsel
objected to this final judgment "for the reason stated on the
order dated August 5, 1996," which was the order that remanded
the matter to the School Board. Brian's objections to the August
5, 1996 order did not, and could not, contain an objection on the
basis that he was not given adequate notice of the School Board's
hearing on remand because the date of that hearing had not yet
been fixed. Brian did not make any objection in the record to
the School Board's failure to give him notice of the second
hearing. Accordingly, this argument is procedurally barred.
5
Rule 5:25.
V.
As previously noted, the School Board concluded at Brian's
5
Brian raises the following arguments that we do not
consider because he failed to raise them in the trial court,
Rule 5:25: Brian was denied due process because Shelton was
a member of the committee for the control of school
discipline; the School Board was required to provide Brian a
more expeditious review of his suspension and subsequent
expulsion; Brian was excluded from the educational process
because he did not receive any homebound instruction until
after the School Board's hearing, more than 30 days after his
initial hearing; and the trial court lacked the authority to
remand this case to the School Board.
first hearing that he had violated, among other things, Code
§ 22.1-277.01, which prohibits a student from possessing a
firearm on school property. The trial court held that the School
Board misapplied Code § 22.1-277.01, and the school division
assigns cross-error to this determination. Essentially, the
school division asserts that a "pocketknife" is a "firearm"
within the meaning of Code §§ 22.1-277.01, 18.2-308, and -308.1.
We disagree.
Code § 22.1-277.01(A) states in part:
"In compliance with the federal Improving
America's Schools Act of 1994 (Part F -- "Gun-Free
Schools Act of 1994"), a school board shall expel from
school attendance for a period of not less than one
year any student whom such school board has determined,
. . . to have brought a firearm onto school property or
to a school-sponsored activity as prohibited by § 18.2-
308.1 . . . ."
Code § 18.2-308.1 states in part:
"If any person has in his possession any . . .
weapon . . . designated in subsection A of § 18.2-308
upon (i) the property of any public . . . elementary,
middle or high school, including buildings and grounds,
(ii) that portion of any property open to the public
used for school-sponsored functions or extracurricular
activities while such functions or activities are
taking place, or (iii) any school bus owned or operated
by any such school, he shall be guilty of a Class 1
misdemeanor."
Code § 18.2-308(A) defines the word "weapon" to include, inter
alia, "any dirk, bowie knife, switchblade knife, ballistic knife
. . . or . . . any weapon of like kind."
Contrary to the school division's assertion, the
pocketknife that Brian had in his possession does not
constitute a firearm within the meaning of these
statutes. We stated in Martin v. Commonwealth, 224 Va.
298, 301-02, 295 S.E.2d 890, 892-93 (1982): "Under the
rule of ejusdem generis, when a particular class of
persons or things is enumerated in a statute and
general words follow, the general words are to be
restricted in their meaning to a sense analogous to the
less general, particular words. East Coast Freight
Lines v. City of Richmond, 194 Va. 517, 525, 74 S.E.2d
283, 288 (1953); Rockingham Bureau v. Harrisonburg, 171
Va. 339, 344, 198 S.E. 908, 911 (1938). Likewise,
according to the maxim noscitur a sociis (associated
words) when general and specific words are grouped, the
general words are limited by the specific and will be
construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to
those things identified by the specific words.
Commonwealth v. United Airlines, 219 Va. 374, 389, 248
S.E.2d 124, 132-33 (1978); Hensley v. City of Norfolk,
216 Va. 369, 374, n.5, 218 S.E.2d 735, 740, n.5
(1975)."
Applying these principles, we hold that Brian's pocketknife is
not a firearm because a pocketknife is neither a dirk, bowie
knife, switchblade knife, ballistic knife, nor a weapon of like
6
kind.
6
A "dirk" is defined as "a long straight-bladed dagger
formerly carried [especially] by the Scottish Highlanders[,]
2. a short sword formerly worn by British junior naval
officers." Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 642
(1981). A "bowie knife" is defined as "a large hunting knife
adapted [especially] for knife-fighting and common in western
frontier regions and having a guarded handle and a strong
single-edge blade typically 10 to 15 inches long with its
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
back straight for most of its length and then curving
concavely and sometimes in a sharpened edge to the point."
Id. at 262. A "switchblade knife" is defined as "a
pocketknife having the blade spring-operated so that pressure
on a release catch causes it to fly open." Id. at 2314. A
"ballistic knife" is defined as "any knife with a detachable
blade that is propelled by a spring-operated mechanism."
Code § 18.2-308(N).