Present: All the Justices
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY
v. Record No. 941863
DARYL F. LACLAIR OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON
November 3, 1995
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA
v. Record No. 941896
DARYL F. LACLAIR
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Thomas A. Fortkort, Judge
These two appeals in a declaratory judgment proceeding
present a question of motor vehicle insurance coverage. The
dispositive issue is whether an intentional shooting by a person
occupying an uninsured vehicle constitutes "use" of the vehicle
for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage. We answer that
query in the negative, and reverse.
The facts are virtually undisputed. On November 21, 1990,
appellee Daryl F. LaClair, an Arlington County deputy sheriff,
was operating his marked police vehicle on Lee Highway in
Arlington County. An automobile ahead of LaClair, driven by one
Marcus Arban, was being operated erratically in the left lane.
The officer assumed the driver was lost and was attempting to
read a map.
As the officer pulled alongside the automobile in the right
lane, it sped in front of him, pulled into the right lane, and
stopped. The officer stopped his vehicle "four to five feet"
behind Arban's automobile, followed standard procedures for
making a traffic stop, such as activating emergency lights,
stepped from his vehicle, and began to approach the automobile.
He was wearing leisure clothes, not his police uniform.
When Arban began to open the door on the driver's side of
the automobile, the officer ordered him to remain in the vehicle.
The door continued to open, and the officer again told Arban to
remain in his car.
Suddenly, the officer felt a blow to his left elbow. As he
turned to examine the elbow, "a second shot struck" him; the
bullet grazed his head cutting through his right eyelid and
exited the eyebrow. The officer dove between the automobile and
his police vehicle to avoid further shots. As the Arban car
began to leave the scene, the officer, partially blinded, managed
to fire several shots into its rear.
The next day, the Prince William County police attempted to
serve a search warrant on Arban. He resisted entry into his
home. During an exchange of gunfire, Arban and a police officer
were killed.
Subsequently, LaClair filed a civil action in Arlington
County against Arban's personal representative seeking recovery
against the estate for his personal injuries. The automobile
liability insurer on Arban's vehicle denied coverage.
Appellant Travelers Insurance Company issued a policy of
automobile insurance on LaClair's personal automobile. Appellant
Insurance Company of North America (I.N.A.) carried the liability
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insurance on the vehicles of the Arlington County Sheriff's
Office.
Later, Travelers and I.N.A. sought, in the present
declaratory judgment action, a ruling that they were not
obligated to provide coverage to LaClair under the uninsured
motorist provisions of their respective polices for the claims
made in the personal injury action pending in Arlington County.
As pertinent to the issue to be decided in this appeal, the
respective policies obligated the insurer to pay LaClair all sums
that he is legally entitled to recover as damages from the driver
of an uninsured motor vehicle resulting "from the ownership,
maintenance or use of" the uninsured motor vehicle.
After an evidentiary hearing in the declaratory judgment
proceeding, the trial court "determined as a matter of fact that
the shooting of Captain LaClair was an intentional, not an
accidental act, and that Arban was still partially inside his car
at the time he fired the shots at Captain LaClair." In deciding
the question whether "the circumstances of this case constitute
`use' of an automobile as that term is employed in the insurance
policies," the trial court ruled in favor of LaClair in an August
1994 order from which these appeals were taken.
The court below opined that LaClair's "injuries were linked
to the `use' of the vehicle by Arban." The court said that
"Arban's vehicle, in a fundamental way, was used to facilitate
the act which produced the injury to . . . LaClair. Arban used
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his vehicle first to lure . . . LaClair into stopping behind him,
then as a shield, from behind which the shots were fired, and
finally as a swift means of escape." The court, stating that
Arban's car "was the instrumentality and the accessory" for
inflicting the injuries, found that LaClair's injuries were
covered under the uninsured motorist provisions of Travelers' and
I.N.A.'s policies. This was error.
We have examined the question whether an injury or death
arose from the "use" of a motor vehicle in three fairly recent
insurance coverage cases. In State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Powell, 227 Va. 492, 318 S.E.2d 393 (1984), we
held that a death resulting from discharge of a shotgun, resting
in a gun rack affixed to a pickup truck, did not arise out of
"use" of the vehicle under the circumstances of that case. We
said that the truck was merely the situs for a social gathering,
and was not employed for any enterprise usually associated with
use of the vehicle. Id. at 501, 318 S.E.2d at 398.
There, we noted certain basic concepts that are uniformly
applied to the "ownership, maintenance, or use" provisions of
automobile liability policies. Id. at 500, 318 S.E.2d at 397.
We said that these "precepts are consistent with the principles
applicable to insurance contracts generally. For example,
consideration must be given to the intention of the parties to
the insurance agreement in determining the scope of the coverage
afforded." Id.
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Also, we pointed out that "the `ownership, maintenance, or
use' provision should be construed in the light of the subject
matter with which the parties are dealing; the terms of the
policy should be given their natural and ordinary meaning." Id.
Importantly, we said that although "ownership, maintenance, or
use of the vehicle need not be the direct, proximate cause of the
injury in the strict legal sense," nonetheless, there must be a
causal relationship between the incident and the employment of
the "motor vehicle as a vehicle." Id.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Rice, 239
Va. 646, 391 S.E.2d 71 (1990), we applied the principles set
forth in Powell and ruled that an injury caused by the accidental
discharge of a rifle arose out of the "use" of the motor vehicle
under the circumstances of that case. There, two hunters were
utilizing a Jeep vehicle to transport themselves, and their
hunting equipment, to the site where they would embark on their
hunting expedition. While unloading the vehicle at the site, the
rifle discharged injuring one hunter. We concluded "that the
requisite causal relationship between the accident and employment
of the Jeep as a vehicle for imposition of coverage on the
automobile carrier exists." Id. at 650, 391 S.E.2d at 73.
And, in Erie Insurance Company Exchange v. Jones, 248 Va.
437, 448 S.E.2d 655 (1994), decided after the trial court's
ruling in the present case, we applied the Powell principles and
held that two automobile liability insurers were not
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contractually bound to provide uninsured motorist coverage in a
wrongful death claim because the damages were "merely incidental
or tangential" to use of the truck in question, under the facts
of that case. Id. at 443, 448 S.E.2d at 659. There, the
operator of the uninsured truck alighted from the stopped vehicle
and, with a rifle in hand, walked to the side of an automobile
that had been following the truck closely with the driver
repeatedly raising and lowering the headlights. While tapping
the rifle barrel on the car window, the rifle discharged, killing
a passenger in the car.
Applying the foregoing principles to the present facts, we
hold that the employment of Arban's vehicle did not amount to a
"use" of that vehicle within the meaning of the policy provisions
at issue. Even though Arban may have utilized the vehicle to
"lure" LeClair into stopping behind him, even though Arban was
partially inside his car when the shots were fired, even though
Arban employed the car as a "shield," even though the vehicle was
employed to "facilitate the act which produced the injury," and
even though Arban's car may have been an "accessory" to the
shooting, nevertheless, none of those acts or circumstances
involved the use of the Arban vehicle as a vehicle. Thus, we
conclude that the requisite causal relationship between the
incident and employment of the automobile as a vehicle does not
exist.
Manifestly, the natural and ordinary meaning of "use" of a
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private, passenger motor vehicle does not contemplate its
utilization as a mobile or stationary pillbox or fortress, or as
a shield, or as an outpost from which an assailant may inflict
intentional injury with a firearm.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from will be reversed, and
we will enter final judgment here in favor of the insurers
declaring that neither owes coverage to LaClair under their
respective policies.
Reversed and final judgment.
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