IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
October 2, 2002 Session
SUSAN R. GODFREY, ET AL. v. JESUS RUIZ, ET AL.
Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals
Circuit Court for Davidson County
No. 97C-503 Barbara N. Haynes, Judge
No. M2000-00101-SC-R11-CV - Filed December 5, 2002
This case arises out of an action by the plaintiffs to recover damages for personal injuries sustained
in an automobile accident. The plaintiffs claim their injuries were caused by the negligent operation
of a van owned by the defendants and driven by a cousin of one of the defendants. In support of their
motion for summary judgment, the defendants offered affidavits and deposition testimony stating
that the driver was operating the van without their permission and that the driver was not their
employee. Despite the prima facie evidence of an owner-driver agency relationship created by
Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-311(a) (1998), the trial court granted the motion for
summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. We hold that an owner’s
offer of testimony negating the issue of agency, standing alone, cannot overcome the prima facie
evidence created by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-311(a).
Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Reversed;
Case Remanded
JANICE M. HOLDER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK F. DROWOTA , III, C.J.,
and E. RILEY ANDERSON, ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., and WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ, joined.
Catherine S. Hughes and Joseph M. Dalton, Jr., Nashville, Tennessee, for the Appellants, Susan R.
Godfrey and Rickey E. Godfrey.
Clifton B. Sobel, Jr., Nashville, Tennessee, for the Appellees, Jesus Ruiz and Shawanda Ruiz.
OPINION
I. Factual and Procedural Background
This case arises from an automobile accident that occurred on August 4, 1996. The plaintiffs,
Rickey and Susan Godfrey, allege that a Chevrolet van owned by the defendants, Jesus and
Shawanda Ruiz, and driven by Ricardo Corpus, a cousin of Mr. Ruiz, ran a red light and collided
with the Godfreys’ vehicle. The Godfreys filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Davidson
County seeking damages for the personal injuries they sustained in the collision. The Godfreys’ suit
was filed against Mr. and Mrs. Ruiz as well as Mr. Corpus. The Godfreys alleged that the negligence
of Mr. Corpus should be imputed to Mr. and Mrs. Ruiz under the owner-driver agency relationship
created by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-311(a). Service was obtained on Mr. and Mrs.
Ruiz. Mr. Corpus, however, could not be located. Although Mr. Corpus had been living with Mr.
and Mrs. Ruiz for approximately one and one-half months prior to the accident, he disappeared
immediately after the accident.1 Mr. and Mrs. Ruiz maintain that they have neither seen nor heard
from Mr. Corpus since the accident.
Mr. and Mrs. Ruiz moved for summary judgment. According to their testimony, Mr. Corpus
did not have permission to drive their van at the time of the accident or at any other time. Mr. and
Mrs. Ruiz assert that they were shopping at the time of the accident. Until they learned of the
accident, they had no knowledge that Mr. Corpus had taken the keys to the van, which were kept in
a drawer in their bedroom. Mr. Ruiz also testified that he is an independent contractor who hangs
drywall for a living. The van that Mr. Corpus was driving was used in connection with Mr. Ruiz’s
construction work. Mr. Ruiz admitted that Mr. Corpus worked with him in the days before the
accident and that he paid Mr. Corpus for that work. He denied, however, that Mr. Corpus was his
employee. Instead, Mr. Ruiz testified that both he and Mr. Corpus were employees of Quality
Drywall in Dickson, Tennessee.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Ruiz and denied an
interlocutory appeal. The Godfreys later voluntarily dismissed the cause of action against Mr.
Corpus. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
We hold that an owner’s offer of testimony negating the issue of agency, standing alone,
cannot overcome the prima facie evidence of an owner-driver agency relationship created by
Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-311(a). Thus, the grant of summary judgment in this case
was improper.
II. Standard of Review
The standard of review for a trial court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo with no
presumption of correctness. See Guy v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 79 S.W.3d 528, 534 (Tenn. 2002);
Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04; Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208,
1
Mrs. Ruiz testified in her deposition that she had heard from a relative that M r. Corpus had been living in
Dallas.
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211 (Tenn. 1993). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of persuading the court that
its motion satisfies these requirements. See Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 211; Downen v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
811 S.W.2d 523, 524 (Tenn. 1991). When considering a summary judgment motion, courts must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable
inferences in that party’s favor. See Guy, 79 S.W.3d at 534; Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215. Summary
judgment should therefore be granted only when the facts and conclusions to be drawn from the facts
permit a reasonable person to reach but one conclusion. See Guy, 79 S.W.3d at 534; Carvell, 900
S.W.2d at 26.
III. Analysis
This case turns on the application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-311(a) (1998),
which provides in pertinent part:
In all actions for injury to persons and/or to property caused by the
negligent operation or use of any automobile . . . within this state,
proof of ownership of such vehicle shall be prima facie evidence that
the vehicle at the time of the cause of action sued on was being
operated and used with authority, consent and knowledge of the
owner in the very transaction out of which the injury or cause of
action arose, and such proof of ownership likewise shall be prima
facie evidence that the vehicle was then and there being operated by
the owner, or by the owner’s servant, for the owner’s use and benefit
and within the course and scope of the servant’s employment.
(Emphasis added). The plaintiffs rely exclusively on this statute to establish that the van that struck
their vehicle was operated with the defendants’ knowledge and consent and that it was operated for
the defendants’ use and benefit and within the course and scope of the driver’s employment. The
defendants argue that their undisputed testimony establishes that there was no agency relationship.
That testimony, they assert, is sufficient to overcome the prima facie evidence of agency that the
statute creates.
In Hamrick v. Spring City Motor Co., this Court observed that Tennessee Code Annotated
section 55-10-311 does not contain the word “presumption,” although prior versions of the statute
did. 708 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Tenn. 1986). We concluded that as a consequence of this legislative
change “a serious question is presented as to whether or not [a] prima facie case can be overcome
pre-trial by motion for summary judgment.” Id. In Warren v. Estate of Kirk, this Court’s most
recent case construing Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-311(a), we reiterated that
“[s]ummary judgment is not ordinarily the proper procedure for determining whether a prima facie
case has or has not been overcome by countervailing evidence.” 954 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tenn. 1997)
(quoting Hamrick, 708 S.W.2d at 388). In both Hamrick and Warren, we reversed the grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant. In this case, too, summary judgment is unwarranted.
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Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-311 is clearly intended to eliminate the difficulty
encountered by injured parties who are trying to prove that the driver was operating with the owner’s
permission at the time of the accident. See Racy Cream Co. v. Walden, 1 Tenn. App. 653, 668
(1925) (holding that an earlier version of the statute, enacted by Chapter 162 of the Public Acts of
1921, was intended to ease the difficulty of proving an agency relationship between a vehicle’s driver
and its owner). We decline to permit parties to overcome the statutorily created prima facie evidence
of an owner-driver agency relationship by simply asserting that no consent was ever given. Such a
construction would defeat the legislative intent that Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-311
be liberally construed.
The plaintiffs in this case are entitled to rely solely on the owner-driver agency relationship
created by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-311(a) to overcome the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. Although the defendants offer uncontroverted testimony in support of their
motion for summary judgment, their status as interested witnesses places their credibility in question.
The defendants’ uncorroborated testimony that Mr. Corpus was not a permissive user simply fails
to rebut the prima facie evidence established by statute. Therefore, their motion for summary
judgment was improperly granted.
There may be rare cases involving the application of Tennessee Code Annotated section
55-10-311 in which summary judgment is appropriate. As we noted in Hamrick, “[t]here may be
some instances where summary disposition could be warranted.” 708 S.W.2d at 389. Thus, we do
not hold that proof of ownership is always sufficient to overcome summary judgment, regardless of
the facts presented by the defendants. Moreover, as we explained in Warren,
[t]he overruling of a motion for summary judgment does not
necessarily mean that the case will go to a jury at a trial, because the
evidence adduced at trial may be significantly different from that
contained in affidavits or depositions heard pre-trial on summary
judgment proceedings. All that the overruling of a motion for
summary judgment indicates is that the case should proceed further.
954 S.W.2d at 724. We preserve the possibility that courts may grant summary judgment or a
directed verdict on behalf of a vehicle’s owner in a negligence case if the owner has provided
evidence other than his own testimony that the driver was not acting as the owner’s agent when the
accident occurred.
IV. Conclusion
We hold that an owner’s testimony negating the issue of agency, standing alone, cannot
overcome the statutorily created prima facie evidence of an owner-driver agency relationship created
by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-311(a). Therefore, the lower courts erred in granting
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The judgments of the trial court and Court of
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Appeals are reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs of
this appeal are taxed to the defendants, Jesus Ruiz and Shawanda Ruiz, for which execution may
issue if necessary.
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JANICE M. HOLDER, JUSTICE
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