State v. Coley

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
February 8, 2000 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. EDDIE L. COLEY, JR.

Appeal by permission from the Court of Criminal Appeals
Circuit Court for Williamson County
No. II-895-228 Donald P. Harris, Judge

No. M1997-00116-SC-R11-CD - Filed October 13, 2000

This appeal arises from the trial court’s exclusion of expert testimony concerning eyewitness
identification sought to be offered by the defendant in his trial for aggravated robbery. At trial,
Eddie L. Coley, Jr., the defendant, sought to introduce expert testimony concerning eyewitness
identification; at the State’s objection, the trial court refused to admit the testimony. Coley appealed
to the Court of Criminal Appeals. The intermediate court affirmed his conviction and sentence.
Appealing to this Court, Coley contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit
the expert testimony. We accepted review in this case to determine the admissibility of expert
testimony concerning eyewitness identification. We hold that the testimony proffered here is
inadmissible under Tenn. R. Evid. 702 and that the trial court, therefore, properly excluded the
testimony of Coley’s expert witness.

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Affirmed on
Separate Grounds

ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, and
WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ., joined. J ANICE M. HOLDER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which E.
RILEY ANDERSON, C.J., joined.

John P. Cauley and Larry D. Drolsum, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Eddie L. Coley, Jr.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, and Kathy
Morante, Deputy Attorney General, Ronald L. Davis, District Attorney General, Derek Smith,
Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts and Procedural History
 Coley does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence upon which he was convicted; thus,
only those facts necessary to this appeal are provided. On July 15, 1995, Sarah Blumberg and
Jennifer McMillen were working at an ice cream shop in Brentwood. At approximately 1 p.m., a
male entered the store. After placing an order, the male brandished a gun and instructed one of the
employees to put the store’s money into a bag. The male then forced both employees into the store’s
walk-in freezer where they remained until they heard a customer enter the store. After exiting the
freezer, they called the police.

The police uncovered no physical evidence at the crime scene. Both employees, however,
separately described the robber as an obese “Black” man around 5' 9" tall and about twenty years
old. The employees then helped the police prepare separate composite pictures of the robber. Nine
days after the robbery, Blumberg observed a photographic line-up which included Coley’s picture.
She identified him as the robber. Five months after the robbery, McMillen saw the same
photographic line-up. She too identified Coley.

At trial, the critical issue was identification. The State’s case relied heavily on Blumberg’s
and McMillen’s pre-trial and in-court identifications of Coley. Coley, on the other hand, offered an
alibi defense, maintaining that another person had committed the robbery. Coley desired to adduce
the testimony of Michael G. Johnson, Ph.D., J.D., an expert in the field of eyewitness identification.
The State objected to Johnson’s testimony on the ground that it would not assist the jury in deciding
the identification issue. The trial court agreed and refused to admit Johnson’s testimony.

The trial court, nevertheless, allowed Johnson to make a proffer of his testimony for the
record. The proffered testimony included information covering the following topics:

1. the process of eyewitness identification;

2. the relationship between stress and memory of an event;

3. cross-racial identification;

4. the confidence the witnesses have in the accuracy of their
identifications and the actual accuracy of their identifications;

5. the effect of time on the accuracy of memory; and

6. the suggestibility of the photographic line-up used in this
case.

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 The jury found Coley guilty of aggravated robbery, 1 and sentenced him to twelve years in the
Department of Correction. Coley appealed, contending that the trial court erred in excluding the
expert’s testimony and that the sentence was excessive. The intermediate appellate court affirmed
Coley’s conviction and sentence.2 On appeal to this Court, Coley contends that the trial court abused
its discretion in excluding Johnson’s testimony and that he was prejudiced by its exclusion.3 The
State, on the other hand, contends that Johnson’s testimony was properly excluded. We accepted
review in this case to determine the admissibility of the proffered expert testimony concerning
eyewitness identification.

II. Standard of Review

Determinations of the admissibility of expert testimony are made within the sound discretion
of the trial court. State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 562 (Tenn. 1993). The standard of review on
appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the expert testimony. The abuse
of discretion standard contemplates that before reversal the record must show that a judge “applied
an incorrect legal standard, or reached a decision which is against logic or reasoning that caused an
injustice to the party complaining.” State v. Shirley, 6 S.W.3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999); State v.
Shuck, 953 S.W.2d 662, 669 (Tenn. 1997).

III. Analysis

As a general rule, the admissibility of expert testimony in Tennessee is governed by Tenn.
R. Evid. 701-706. This case is governed specifically by Tenn. R. Evid. 702 which provides that
expert testimony is admissible if it will “substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue . . . .” (Emphasis added.). Expert testimony regarding
eyewitness identification arguably fails to satisfy the plain meaning of this language. Eyewitness
testimony has no scientific or technical underpinnings which would be outside the common
understanding of the jury; therefore, expert testimony is not necessary to help jurors “understand”

1
(a) Aggravated robbery is robbery as defined in § 39-13-401:
(1) Accomplished with a deadly weapon or by display of any article used or fashioned to lead the victim to
reasonably believe it to be a deadly weapon; or
(2) Wh ere the victim su ffers serious bo dily injury.
(b) Aggra vated rob bery is a Class B felony.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-40 2 (1997).

2
Three se parate opinions were filed by the Cou rt of Criminal A ppeals pa nel. One he ld that the adm issibility
of expert evidence on the credibility of eyewitness testimony should be determined on a case-by-case basis, but affirmed
the exclusion of the evidence in this case. A concurring opinion found that Tennessee has p reviously followed a per se
exclusionary rule. The third, a dissenting opinion, concluded that the case should be remanded for a hearing to determine
whether the expert testimony should be admitted.

3
W e observe initially that Coley’s argument, that had the testimony in q uestion bee n admitted th e jury would
have acquitted him, is fatally flawed. The adm ission of the qu estioned testim ony would not, necessa rily, lead to acq uittal.
The jury, c onsidering the testimony in d ispute, may ha ve convicte d Coley an yway.

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the eyewitness’s testimony. Moreover, expert testimony about the eyewitness’s accuracy does not
aid the jury in determining a fact in issue because the question whether an eyewitness should be
believed is not a “fact in issue” but rather a credibility determination.

Tennessee Rule of Evidence 702 is more stringent than its federal counterpart. As a matter
of contrast, while Fed. R. Evid. 702 requires only that the evidence “assist the trier of fact,” Tenn.
R. Evid. 702 requires that expert testimony “substantially assist the trier of fact. . . .” Compare Fed.
R. Evid. 702 (emphasis added) with Tenn. R. Evid. 702. “This distinction indicates that the
probative force of the testimony must be stronger before it is admitted in Tennessee.” McDaniel v.
CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 264 (Tenn. 1997). In McDaniel, we discussed the principles
guiding a trial court's determination whether to admit scientific or technical evidence. First, the
evidence must be relevant to a fact at issue in the case. Tenn. R. Evid. 401, 402. Second, the expert
must be qualified by specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education in the field of
expertise, and the testimony in question must substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or determine a fact in issue. Tenn. R. Evid. 702; McDaniel, 955 S.W.2d at 265; State v.
Begley, 956 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Tenn. 1997). Finally, when the expert witness offers an opinion or
states an inference, the underlying facts or data upon which the expert relied must be trustworthy.
Tenn. R. Evid. 703; McDaniel, 955 S.W.2d at 265. The reliability of scientific evidence is
determined by considering the following nonexclusive list of factors:

(1) whether the scientific evidence has been tested and the
methodology with which it has been tested; (2) whether the evidence
has been subjected to peer review or publication; (3) whether a
potential rate of error is known; (4) whether . . . the evidence is
generally accepted in the scientific community; and (5) whether the
expert's research in the field has been conducted independent of
litigation.

McDaniel, 955 S.W.2d at 265. Here, the question is whether the evidence is inadmissible because
expert testimony describing the general reliability of eyewitness testimony “is not reliable enough
to ‘substantially assist’ a jury in an inquiry of whether” the two employees’ testimony should be
believed. See e.g., State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 562 (Tenn. 1993).

Though the admissibility of each expert’s testimony generally rests within the sound
discretion of the trial judge, Tennessee courts have, on occasion, excluded specific categories of
expert testimony. See State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 561-63 (Tenn. 1993); see also State v.
Schimpf, 782 S.W.2d 186, 189-95 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). Applying Tenn. R. Evid. 702 to the
instant case, we first note that this case is analogous to State v. Ballard. In Ballard, we held that
expert testimony concerning symptoms of post-traumatic stress syndrome exhibited by victims of
child abuse was inadmissible. 855 S.W.2d at 563. In reaching this conclusion we reasoned that:

[i]n the context of the criminal trial, expert scientific testimony
solicits the danger of undue prejudice or confusing the issues or
misleading the jury because of its aura of special reliability and

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 trustworthiness. This ‘special aura’ of expert scientific testimony,
especially testimony concerning personality profiles of sexually
abused children, may lead a jury to abandon its responsibility as a fact
finder and adopt the judgment of the expert. Such evidence carries
strong potential to prejudice a defendant's cause by encouraging a jury
to conclude that because the children have been identified by an
expert to exhibit behavior consistent with post-traumatic stress
syndrome, brought on by sexual abuse, then it is more likely that the
defendant committed the crime. Testimony that children exhibit
symptoms or characteristics of post-traumatic stress syndrome should
not suffice to confirm the fact of sexual abuse. The symptoms of the
syndrome are ‘not like a fingerprint in that it can clearly identify the
perpetrator of a crime.’ Expert testimony of this type invades the
province of the jury to decide on the credibility of witnesses.

855 S.W.2d at 561-62 (internal citations omitted).

Here, as in Ballard, we are presented with testimony of a general nature designed to affect
the juror’s decision on the credibility of witnesses. Using the Ballard rationale, expert testimony
concerning eyewitness identification “solicits the danger of undue prejudice or confusing the issues
or misleading the jury . . . .” Id. at 561. As a result, it may “lead a jury to abandon its responsibility
as fact finder and adopt the judgment of the expert,” rather than “assist” the jury in making its own
determination of credibility. See Id.

We also note that the closest we have come, thus far, to the issue posed in the case under
submission was in State v. Dyle, 899 S.W.2d 607 (Tenn. 1995). In Dyle, we were asked to approve
certain jury instructions, known as the United States v. Telfaire4 instruction, given in cases where
identification of the perpetrator is a material issue. Id. “[A]cknowledging that accuracy of
eyewitness testimony is affectable by the usual universal fallibilities of human sense perception and
memory,” we rejected both our own pattern jury instruction on identity approved for use in
Tennessee as well as the specific instruction created by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals in Telfaire,5 choosing instead to promulgate our own new instruction for cases involving

4
469 F.2d 552 (D .C. Cir. 1972).

5
The instructions promulgated in Dyle as are follows:

One of the issues in this case is the identification of the defendant as the person who
committed the crime. The state has the burden of proving identity beyond a
reasonab le doubt. Ide ntification testimo ny is an expression of belief or impression
by the witness, and its value may depend upon your consideration of several factors.
Some of the factors which you may consider are:

(1) The witness’ capacity and opportunity to observe the offender. This includes,
among other things, the length of time available for observation, the distance from

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eyewitness identifications. Id. at 612. In rejecting the Telfaire instruction, we noted its
inappropriateness “because it impermissibly comments on the evidence; thus invading the province
of the jury.” Id. Thus, we emphasized that the assessment of witness credibility and the role of fact-
finder is always left to the jury, regardless of the issue present in the case. Moreover, the
reassessment and revamping in Dyle of our pattern jury instructions on identification suggests, by
analogy, that expert testimony on the issue of identity should be excluded.

Though we have not specifically addressed the issue of the admissibility of expert evidence
concerning the reliability of eyewitness testimony, the Court of Criminal Appeals has articulated
several reasons for excluding such evidence. In State v. Ward, 712 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1986), the court stated,

We are of the opinion that there are too many variables involved
including individual power of observation, individual reaction to
stress or the threat of violence, the visual acuity of a particular
witness, as well as numbers of general, common factors unamenable
to charting and categorizing.

And in State v. Wooden, 658 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983), the court found the
following:

To admit such testimony in effect would permit the proponent’s
witness to comment on the weight and credibility of opponents’

which the witness observed, the lighting, and whether the person who committed
the crime was a prior acq uaintance of the witness;

(2) The degree of certainty expressed by the witness regarding the identification and
the circumstances under which it was made, including whether it is the product of
the witness’ own recollection;

(3) The occasions, if any, on which the witness failed to make an identification of
the defendant, or made an identification that was incon sistent with the identification
at trial; and

(4) The occasions, if any, on which the witness made an identification that was
consistent with the identification at trial, and the circumstances surrounding such
identifications.

Again, the state has the burden of proving every element of the crime charged, and
this burden specifically includes the identity of the defendant as the person who
committed the crime for w hich he or she is on trial. If after consid ering the
identification testimony in light of all the proof you have a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is the person who committed the crime, you must find the defendant not
guilty.

Id. at 612.

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 witnesses and open the door to a barrage of marginally relevant
psychological evidence. Moreover, we conclude, as did the trial
judge, that the problems of perception and memory can be adequately
addressed in cross-examination and that the jury can adequately
weigh these problems through common-sense evaluation.

In other jurisdictions as well, an overwhelming majority of courts have upheld the trial
court’s finding that the testimony is inadmissible.6 These courts have provided many reasons for
excluding this type of expert testimony. For example, some courts have upheld the exclusion
because such testimony is unhelpful and simply offers generalities. See Brien, 59 F.3d at 277. As
the Nebraska Supreme Court has noted:

the knowledge of behavioral scientists, such as psychologists, is
probabilistic, couched in terms of averages, standard deviations,
curves, and differences between groups. A court, however, is not
concerned with the average eyewitness’ reliability but with the
reliability of the specific eyewitness before it, who may vary from the
average in probabilistic but ultimately unknown ways. It is not the
research behavioral social scientist who is in a position to assess a
specific witness’ reliability; the jury, which views the witness as an
individual, is best able to collectively determine, on the basis of
common human experience as yet unsurpassed by laboratory research,
how to weigh what an individual witness has to say.

State v. Trevino, 432 N.W.2d 503, 520 (1988).

Other courts have excluded this type of testimony because “‘[s]uch expert testimony will not
aid the jury because it addresses an issue of which the jury is already generally aware, and it will not
contribute to their understanding of the particular dispute.’” Hall, 165 F.3d at 1104 (quoting United
States v. Hudson, 884 F.2d 1016, 1024 (7th Cir. 1989)). Thus, the “‘reliability of eyewitness

6
See, e.g., United S tates v. Hall , 165 F.3d 1095, 1103 -08 (7 th Cir. 1999); United States v. Smith, 156 F.3d 1046,
1052-54 (10 th Cir. 1998); United S tates v. Smith , 122 F.3d 1355, 1357-60 (11 th Cir. 1997 ); United States v. Kime, 99
F.3d 870, 883-85 (8 th Cir. 1996); United States v. Ginn, 87 F.3d 367, 370 (9 th Cir. 1996); United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d
274, 275-78 (1 st Cir. 1995 ); United S tates v. Harris , 995 F.2d 532, 534-36 (4 th Cir. 1993 ); Johnson v. State, 526 S.E.2d
549 (Ga. 200 0); State v. McClendon, 730 A.2d 1107, 1114-16 (1999) ; McM ullen v. State , 714 So.2d 368, 369-73 (Fla.
1998); State v. Miles, 585 N .W.2d 368, 37 0-72 (M inn. 1998 ); Comm onwealth v. S antoli, 680 N.E.2d 1116, 1118-21
(1997); State v. Sab etta, 680 A.2d 927, 932-33 (R.I. 199 6); State v. Roscoe, 910 P.2 d 635, 6 46 (199 6); White v. State,
926 P.2d 291, 292 (199 6); State v. Abraham, 451 S.E .2d 131 , 148-49 (1994) ; Jones v. State, 862 S.W.2d 242, 244-45
(1993 ); State v. Wilson, 508 N.W.2d 4 4, 50-51 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).

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identification is within the knowledge of jurors and expert testimony generally would not assist them
. . . .’” McClendon, 730 A.2d at 1114 (citation omitted).7

In excluding expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification, courts have also noted
that the “minimal probative value of the proffered expert testimony is outweighed by the danger of
juror confusion.” Kime, 99 F.3d at 884. Such testimony has the potential to confuse and mislead
the jury and create prolonged trials by battles of experts. See Brien, 59 F.3d at 277; Campbell v.
People, 814 P.2d 1, 5 (Colo. 1991).

Finally, courts have reasoned that this testimony invades the province of the jury by
evaluating witness credibility. Campbell, 814 P.2d at 5 (citation omitted).8 Rather than permit
experts to testify in such cases, usurping a function traditionally left to juries, courts have found that
“juries may be made to understand psychological factors which affect the accuracy of an
identification when these factors are brought to light at cross-examination and during closing
argument.” State v. Percy, 595 A.2d 248, 252 (1990). Thus, “jurors using common sense and their
faculties of observation can judge the credibility of an eyewitness identification, especially since
deficiencies or inconsistencies in an eyewitness’s testimony can be brought out with skillful
examination.” Smith, 156 F.3d at 1053 (quoting Harris, 995 F.2d at 535).9 Courts have also
reasoned that along with cross-examination, jury instructions specifically tailored to cases involving
eyewitness identification sufficiently aid the jury in determining the credibility of the witnesses. As
the Kansas Supreme Court has reasoned:

we have concluded that requiring trial courts to admit this type of
expert evidence is not the answer to the [eyewitness identification]
problem. We believe that the problem can be alleviated by a proper
cautionary instruction to the jury which sets forth the factors to be
considered in evaluating eyewitness testimony. Such instruction,
coupled with vigorous cross-examination and persuasive argument by
defense counsel dealing realistically with the shortcomings and
trouble spots of the identification process, should protect the rights of
the defendant and at the same time enable the courts to avoid
problems involved in the admission of expert testimony on this
subject.

7
See Smith, 122 F.3d at 1358 (quoting United States v. Thevis , 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5 th Cir. 1982 )); Sabetta , 680
A.2d at 933 (quoting State v. Porraro, 404 A.2d 465, 471 (19 79)); Roscoe, 910 P.2 d at 647 ; Commonwealth v. Simmons,
662 A.2 d 621, 6 31 (199 5); Abraham, 338 N.C. at 348, 451 S.E.2s at 149.

8
See Kime, 99 F.3d at 884 (quoting Bachman v. Leapley, 953 F.2d 440, 441 (8 th Cir. 1992 )); State v. Poland,
698 P .2d 183 , 193 (19 85); Currie v. Co mmonw ealth, 515 S.E.2d 335, 338 (19 99).

9
See Ginn, 87 F.3d at 370; Miles, 585 N.W.2d at 372 (quoting State v. Helte rbridle , 301 N.W.2d 545, 547
(Minn. 1 980)); Roscoe, 910 P.2 d at 647 ; Simmons, 662 A.2 d at 631 ; Abraham, 451 S.E.2d at 149.

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State v. Gaines, 926 P.2d 641, 647 (1996) (quoting State v. Warren, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981)).10

Governed by the fundamental principles of McDaniel, and the rationale of Ballard and Dyle,
we find that expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification simply offers generalities and is
not specific to the witness whose testimony is in question. Moreover, we are of the opinion that the
subject of the reliability of eyewitness identification is within the common understanding of
reasonable persons. Therefore, such expert testimony is unnecessary. It may mislead and confuse,
and it could encourage the jury to abandon its responsibility as fact-finder. Such responsibility is a
task reserved for and ably performed by the jury, aided by skillful cross-examination and the jury
instruction promulgated in Dyle when appropriate. For these reasons, we find that general and
unparticularized expert testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness testimony, which is not
specific to the witness whose testimony is in question, does not substantially assist the trier of fact.
Thus, we hold that such testimony is inadmissible under Tenn. R. Evid. 702 and that the trial court,
therefore, properly excluded Johnson’s testimony. 11

We recognize that we are in the minority of jurisdictions which find such testimony per se
inadmissible, rather than leaving the determination of admissibility to the discretion of the trial
court.12 Nonetheless, we are convinced that a per se rule of exclusion is appropriate. First, leaving
the admissibility of this type of expert testimony to the discretion of the trial court would require us,
at least implicitly, to reject the sound reasoning of Ballard. Second, the rules of evidence from those
jurisdictions which leave the admissibility of expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification
to the discretion of the trial court require, as does Fed. R. Evid. 702, only that expert testimony
“assist the trier of fact.”13 Under Tenn. R. Evid. 702, however, expert testimony is admissible only
if it “substantially assists the trier of fact.” (Emphasis added.). Thus, Tenn. R. Evid. 702 requires
a greater showing of probative force than the federal rules of evidence or the rules of evidence from
those states that have followed the federal rules, making the per se exclusion appropriate. See
McDaniel, 955 S.W.2d at 264.

10
See Smith, 122 F.3 d at 135 9; Miles, 585 N.W.2d at 372 (quoting Halterbrid le, 301 N .W.2d at 547); Santoli,
680 N .E.2d at 1 120-21 ; Campb ell, 814 P.2 d at 5; State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424, 427-29 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

11
Our conclusion is further supported by the fact that the trial court provided the jury with instructions
substantially similar to those promulgated in Dyle.

12
See, e.g., Smith, 122 F.3 d at 135 8; Gaines, 926 P.2 d at 649 ; Simmons, 662 A.2d at 630-31 ; Gibbs v.
Comm onwealth , 723 S.W.2d 87 1, 874 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986). By excluding the evidence in question as a class, it may
appear that we are finding such ev idence pr esumptively ina dmissible. W e are under th e guidance of Ballard, Dyle, and
Schimpf. We do not intend to remove from the trial judge the discretion to decide about marginally-admissible evidence.
In cases such as the one at bar, however, the evidence is clearly inadmissible.

13
See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid . 702; Ariz . R. Evid. 70 2; Ark. R. E vid. 702; C onn. R. Ev id. 702; F la. R. Evid. §
90.702; Minn. R. Evid. 702; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 50.275 (1999); N.C. R. Evid. 702; R.I. R. Evid. 702; Vt. R. Evid. 702.

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 IV. Conclusion

For the reasons articulated above, general and unparticularized expert testimony concerning
eyewitness testimony, which is not specific to the witness whose testimony is in question, is
inadmissible under Tenn. R. Evid. 702, and the trial court properly excluded the testimony of Coley’s
expert.14 The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is, therefore, affirmed on the separate
grounds stated herein.

Costs of this appeal are assessed to the defendant, Eddie L. Coley, Jr.

___________________________________
ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., JUSTICE

14
In so holding, w e also rejec t Coley’s add itional argument that the trial court’s exc lusion of his exp ert’s
testimony violated his constitutional right to present a defense. W hen consid ering whethe r the constitution al right to
present a defense has been violated by the exclusion of evidence, the analysis should consider whether: (1) the excluded
evidence is critical to the defense; (2) the evidence bears sufficient indicia of reliability; and (3) the interest supporting
exclusion of the evidence is substa ntially importan t. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U .S. 284, 2 98-301 , 93 S. Ct.
1038, 1047-49, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 310-12 (1973). For the reasons stated above, the evidence excluded in this case is not
critical to Co ley’s defense. T hus, Coley’s cla im that his constitutio nal rights were v iolated is witho ut merit.

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