IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
FOR PUBLICATION
VERNON RAY DAVIS, ) Filed: September 8, 1997
)
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) No. 03S01-9603-CV-00034
)
v. ) HON. WILLIAM R. HOLT, JR.,
) JUDGE
JIM REAGAN and HOWARD SEXTON, )
d/b/a PRECISION CONSTRUCTION ) SEVIER CIRCUIT
CO.; and TRAVELERS INSURANCE )
CO.,
Defendants/Appellees,
)
)
)
FILED
)
and ) September 8, 1997
)
LARRY BRINTON, JR., Director of ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Worker's Compensation, Tennessee ) Appellate C ourt Clerk
Dept. of Labor, Second Injury Fund, )
)
Defendant/Appellant. )
and
BESSIE LOU RAYFIELD, )
)
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) NO. 03S01-9602-CV-00009
)
v. ) HON. WILLIAM R. HOLT, JR.,
) JUDGE
EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY )
OF WAUSAU; and ED SMITH, d/b/a ) SEVIER CIRCUIT
DAYS INN OF PIGEON FORGE, )
)
Defendants/Appellants, )
)
and )
)
LARRY BRINTON, TENNESSEE )
DEPT. OF LABOR, DIVISION OF )
WORKERS' COMPENSATION, )
SECOND INJURY FUND, )
)
Defendant/Appellee. )
FOR APPELLEE : FOR APPELLANT, SECOND INJURY FUND:
R. B. Hailey John Knox Walkup
Frank Q. Vettori Attorney General & Reporter
Knoxville
Dianne Stamey Dycus
Senior Counsel, Attorney General's Office
OPINION
TRIAL COURT JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED HOLDER, J.
OPINION
We granted this consolidated appeal to determine whether permanent
total disability can be awarded when an anatomical disability rating is less than
16.7 percent. In Seiber v. Greenbrier Industries, Inc., 906 S.W.2d 444 (Tenn.
1995), this Court adopted a panel decision holding that the limits in Tenn. Code
Ann. § 50-6-241 (1996 Supp.) precluded an award of total disability when the
anatomical impairment was less than 16.7 percent. A later, but unpublished,
workers' compensation panel decision held that the limitations in Tenn. Code
Ann. § 50-6-241(b) are not applicable to permanent total disability claims.
Warren v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., No. 03S01-9506-CV-00061 (Nov. 29, 1995, at
Knoxville). We granted review to reconcile these two cases and decide this
issue. For the reasons explained below, we agree with the panel's findings in
Warren and hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241's limitations on permanent
partial disability do not apply to awards of permanent total disability.
BACKGROUND
Vernon Ray Davis and Bessie Lou Rayfield had received prior workers'
compensation awards. Both sustained subsequent work-related injuries and
received anatomical ratings of less than 16.7 per cent. Davis’ subsequent injury
caused an additional ten percent anatomical impairment. Rayfield’s physician
attributed fifteen percent of her total anatomical rating to her most recent work-
related injury. Both were adjudged permanently and totally disabled under Tenn.
Code Ann. § 50-6-207(4) (1991 Repl.).
Both cases were appealed and argued before special workers'
compensation appeals panels. The cases were consolidated and transferred to
this Court. The parties were ordered to "file supplemental briefs on the issue of
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whether the multiplier maximums provisions in Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241 &
-242 apply to findings of permanent total disability."
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The appellants, the Second Injury Fund and the workers’ compensation
carriers, assign error to the trial courts' decisions to award permanent total
disability benefits. They assert that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241 prohibits
awards of permanent total disability because both Davis' and Rayfield’s most
recent medical impairment ratings were less than 16.7 percent. We disagree.
Our Workers' Compensation Act classifies compensable occupational
disabilities into four distinct classifications. These classifications are: (1)
temporary total disability; (2) temporary partial disability; (3) permanent partial
disability; and (4) permanent total disability. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(1)-
207(4) (1996 Supp.). This Court has previously recognized that each separate
disability classification is independent and serves a specific compensation goal.
Roberson v. Loretto Casket Co., 722 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn. 1986); Redmond
v. McMinn County, 354 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tenn. 1962). The issue in controversy
involves the interrelation of both permanent total and permanent partial disability
and a statute specifically limiting permanent partial disability awards.
Awards for permanent partial disability are governed by Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 50-6-207(3)(A) -207(F) (1996 Supp.). An employee sustaining either a
disability to a scheduled member or a disability adjudged both permanent and
partial to the body as a whole may be eligible for permanent partial disability
benefits. Permanent partial benefits are paid either as scheduled or for a period
of up to 400 weeks. Id.; Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241 & 242 (1996 Supp.).
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The statutory definition of total disability focuses on an employee's ability
to return to gainful employment. Employees who are totally incapacitated from
gainful employment by work-related disabilities not otherwise specifically
provided for under the Act are statutorily classified as "totally disabled." Disabled
workers falling within the purview of the "total disability" definition shall be paid
permanent total disability benefits pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(4)(A)
(1996 Supp.).
In 1992, the legislature limited permanent partial disability awards. These
limits as codified provide in pertinent part:
For injuries arising on or after August 1, 1992, in cases where an
injured employee is eligible to receive any permanent partial
disability benefits, pursuant to § 50-6-207(3)(A)(I) and (F), and the
pre-injury employer returns the employee to employment at a wage
equal to or greater than the employee was receiving at the time of
the injury, the maximum permanent partial disability award the
employee may receive is two and one half (2 ½) times the medical
impairment rating . . . and [if] the pre-injury employer does not
return the employee to employment at a wage equal to or greater
than the employee was receiving at the time of the injury, the
maximum permanent partial disability award that the employee may
receive is six (6) times the medical impairment rating.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(1) & (b) (1996 Supp.). Accordingly, the statute
places limitations on that subset of disabilities that are: (1) not scheduled; and
(2) adjudged to be permanent partial.
A recent panel decision, however, held that the limitations contained in
§ 50-6-241 were also applicable to awards of permanent total disability. In
Seiber v Greenbrier Industries, Inc., 906 S.W.2d 444 (Tenn. 1995), a panel held
that § 50-6-241 precluded a trial court from awarding total disability benefits
when the anatomical disability rating was less than 16.7 percent. The panel
reasoned that under § 50-6-241, the legislature had indicated an intent to limit
"permanent disability awards" to six times the impairment rating. Id. at 447. The
panel then adopted a mathematical approach to assessing permanent total
disability claims. Id.
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We disagree with the analysis in Seiber. First, the legislature has
explicitly indicated an intent to limit permanent partial disability awards and not
"permanent disability awards" in general. Next, total disability as statutorily
defined is not based on a purely objective assessment or an anatomical
mathematical computation. See generally Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc.,
746 S.W.2d 452, 458 (Tenn. 1988) (holding vocational disability is based on both
lay and expert testimony and is not restricted to precise disability estimates
made by experts). The definition instead focuses on the injured employee's
ability to earn wages.
Lastly, Seiber's holding was premised on effectuating legislative intent
from the entire statutory scheme. The panel noted that "[t]he purpose of the
Workers' Compensation Reform Act [was] to provide benefits to injured
employees while limiting employer liability so as to keep workers' compensation
affordable . . . ." Seiber, 906 S.W.2d at 447. The panel then found that the
purpose of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241 was to "encourage employers to retain
injured workers at wages equal to or greater than received prior to the injury by
providing for lesser disability awards if the employee is retained." Id. at 447-48.
Legislative intent, however, shall be derived from a statute's face when
the statutory language is unambiguous. Hamblen County Educ. Ass'n v.
Hamblen County Bd. of Educ., 892 S.W.2d 428, 435 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); see
Carson Creek Vac. Resorts, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. 1993)
(stating where language within four corners of statute is plain, clear, and
ambiguous, intent shall be derived from statute's face). If a statute's language is
expressed in a manner devoid of ambiguity, courts are not at liberty to depart
from the statute's words. Id. Accordingly, courts are restricted to the "natural
and ordinary" meaning of a statute unless an ambiguity necessitates resorting
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elsewhere to ascertain legislative intent. Austin v. Memphis Publ. Co., 655
S.W.2d 146, 149 (Tenn. 1983).
We find Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241's language unambiguous. The
statute requires a threshold finding that the employee is eligible to receive
permanent partial disability benefits. Moreover, the legislative language in
§ 50-6-241 narrows its application to those specific subsections or claims of
permanent partial disability falling within the purview of “[Tenn. Code Ann.]
§ 50-6-207 3(A)(I) and (F).” This narrowing language does not lend a legitimate
inference that the legislature intended the limitations in § 50-6-241 to encompass
all forms of permanent disability.
We are unpersuaded by Seiber's implication that Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 50-6-242 (1996 Supp.)1 provides the remedy for workers who would otherwise
be considered totally disabled had their anatomical rating been 16.7 percent or
1
Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-242 permits a trial judge to award
permanent partial disability benefits, not to exceed four hundred
(400) weeks, in appropriate cases where permanent medical
impairment is found and the employee is eligible to receive the
maximum disability award under § 50-6-241(a)(2) or (b).
Awards under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-242 are predicated upon finding three of
the following four criteria applicable:
1. The employee lacks a high school diploma or general
equivalency diploma or the employee cannot read or write on a
grade eight (8) level;
2. The employee is age fifty-five (55) or older;
3. The employee has no reasonably transferrable job skills from
prior vocational background and training; and
4. The employee has no reasonable employment opportunities
available locally considering the employee's permanent medical
condition.
We note that criteria four speaks in terms of "reasonable employment
opportunities" whereas total disability is defined as the inability to work "at an
occupation which brings such employee an income." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
207(4)(B).
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greater. Section 50-6-242, by explicit statutory language, is applicable only to
that subset of permanent partial disability claims in which the employee is eligible
to receive the maximum disability award under Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 50-6-241(a)(2) or (b). Accordingly, if the claim does not fall within the purview
of § 50-6-241(a)(2) or (b), courts simply cannot proceed to § 50-6-242.
We find the statutory provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act set
forth the following procedures for assessing work-related permanent disabilities.
The initial inquiry is:
(1) Whether the disability is to a scheduled member (i.e.,
enumerated)?
An affirmative answer to question one mandates that the employee's award be
as enumerated. If, however, the disability is non-enumerated, the pertinent
question becomes:
(2) Whether the employee is totally incapacitated from
working at an occupation that generates an income?
If question two is answered affirmatively, the employee is eligible for total
disability benefits. If, however, the employee is able to work at an occupation
that generates an income, the trial court proceeds to § 50-6-241. If certain
conditions are satisfied under § 50-6-241, the trial court may then proceed to
§ 50-6-242. The inquiries then become: whether the job opportunities available
are reasonable; whether the employee has reasonable job skills that are
transferrable; whether the employee is fifty-five or older; and whether the
employee meets specific statutory education criteria.
Both the procedures established by the Workers' Compensation Act and
the plain and ordinary language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241 convey a
specific legislative intent to limit § 50-6-241's application to awards of permanent
partial disability. We, therefore, hold that § 50-6-241 is inapplicable to
permanent total disability and does not preclude a trial judge from awarding
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permanent total disability merely because an anatomical impairment rating is
less than 16.7 percent.
Holding that § 50-6-241's limitations are inapplicable to permanent total
disability does not contravene the policy of employee retention as enunciated in
Seiber. To the contrary, employers will be encouraged to find positions that
accommodate work-related disabilities to avoid adjudications of total disability
and payment of lifetime benefits. If, however, injured workers are "totally
disabled" as statutorily defined, applying the limitations of § 50-6-241 to their
claims does not advance the policy of employee retention. Totally disabled
workers, by definition, are incapable of earning wages or being retained.
Accordingly, applying § 241 to the permanent total disability subsection on the
basis of encouraging employee retention is simply illogical.
The parties have briefed additional issues. W e have reviewed those
issues and find them devoid of merit. For the reasons discussed in this opinion,
we affirm the trial courts' judgments. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the
appellants, Second Injury Fund and the workers' compensation carriers, for
which execution may issue if necessary.
JANICE M. HOLDER, JUSTICE
CONCURRING:
Drowota, Reid, Birch, JJ.
Anderson, C.J., not participating
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