COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, Huff and Senior Judge Clements
DOROTHY MARIA STILLEY
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 1686-11-1 PER CURIAM
JANUARY 31, 2012
NEWPORT NEWS DEPARTMENT
OF HUMAN SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
H. Vincent Conway, Jr., Judge
(Charles E. Haden, on brief), for appellant.
(Shannon M. Manning, Assistant City Attorney; Michael P. Jones,
Guardian ad litem for the minor child, on brief), for appellee.
On July 28, 2011, the trial court terminated the residual parental rights of Dorothy Maria
Stilley (appellant) to her child, M.S., pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) and § 16.1-283(E)(i). On
appeal of this decision, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
termination. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude this appeal is
without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule
5A:27.
On appeal, we view the evidence in the “‘light most favorable’ to the prevailing party in
the circuit court and grant to that party the benefit of ‘all reasonable inferences fairly deducible
therefrom.’” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 262, 616 S.E.2d 765, 767
(2005) (quoting Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409
S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991)). When reviewing a decision to terminate parental rights, we presume the
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
circuit court “‘thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and
made its determination based on the child’s best interests.’” Id. at 265-66, 616 S.E.2d at 769
(quoting Fields v. Dinwiddie County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 7, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659
(2005)). “The trial court’s judgment, ‘when based on evidence heard ore tenus, will not be
disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Id. at 266, 616
S.E.2d at 769 (quoting Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (citation omitted)). “In its
capacity as factfinder, therefore, the circuit court retains ‘broad discretion in making the
decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child’s best interests.’” Id. (quoting Farley v. Farley,
9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990)).
When M.S. was born on December 2, 2009, one month prematurely, the hospital notified
the Newport News Department of Human Services (DHS) because appellant’s residual parent
rights to M.S.’s half-brother, O.S., had been involuntarily terminated on May 13, 2008. 1 After a
one-month stay in the hospital, M.S. was taken into custody by DHS and placed in a foster home.
M.S. had medical issues resulting from her premature birth. Moreover, M.S. had to undergo
testing and take medications because appellant had tested positively for both hepatitis C and
HIV.
Appellant was arrested upon a probation violation and a charge of grand larceny on
January 7, 2010. She remained incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing on July 28,
2011.
After taking custody of M.S., DHS explored the suitability of several individuals
appellant had named as possible guardians for M.S. However, none of them was both willing
and able to serve as a foster parent for M.S. under DHS’s guidelines.
1
Appellant’s parental rights to O.S. were terminated as a result of her ongoing drug
abuse and incarceration.
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In September 2010 M.S. was placed in the same foster home as O.S., who was then ten
years old. M.S. had adjusted well to the home, appeared healthy and happy, and had developed a
secure relationship with O.S. She had bonded with the other children in the home, as well as the
foster parents. The foster family planned to adopt both O.S. and M.S.
At the July 28, 2011 termination hearing, appellant testified that she anticipated she
would be released from jail on August 1, 2011. Appellant testified that she was a drug addict
and did not care about parenting when her rights to O.S. were terminated. She claimed that,
while in jail, she had abstained from drugs and alcohol. She said her attitude toward parenting
had changed, she loved M.S., and wanted to be the child’s mother.
Termination of residual parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(E)(i) requires clear and
convincing evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child and that “the residual
parental rights of the parent regarding a sibling of the child have previously been involuntarily
terminated[.]” Appellant concedes that her parental rights to O.S., a sibling of M.S., were
involuntarily terminated, but claims termination of her parental rights to M.S. was not in the
child’s best interests.
In determining what is in the best interests of a child, this Court has stated:
a court must evaluate and consider many factors, including the age
and physical and mental condition of the child or children; the age
and physical and mental condition of the parents; the relationship
existing between each parent and each child; the needs of the child
or children; the role which each parent has played, and will play in
the future, in the upbringing and care of the child or children; and
such other factors as are necessary in determining the best interests
of the child or children.
Barkey v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 662, 668, 347 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1986).
Clear and convincing evidence proved that termination of appellant’s parental rights was
in the best interests of M.S. At the time of the termination, appellant had had no contact with
M.S. for eighteen months, since shortly after the child’s birth. In the meantime, M.S. had been
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placed in a foster home with O.S. M.S. was thriving, and the family planned to adopt both
children. Appellant remained incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing.
Although appellant claimed she would be able to provide a suitable home for M.S. upon
her release, she provided the trial court with no evidence of permanent plans with regard to her
care. Appellant had a history of drug abuse and failure to care for M.S.’s sibling. In this regard,
appellant’s “‘past actions . . . over a meaningful period serve as good indicators of what the
future may be expected to hold.’” Winfield v. Urquhart, 25 Va. App. 688, 695-96, 492 S.E.2d
464, 467 (1997) (quoting Linkous v. Kingery, 10 Va. App. 45, 46, 390 S.E.2d 188, 194 (1990)).
We recognize that “‘[t]he termination of [residual] parental rights is a grave, drastic and
irreversible action.’” Helen W. v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev., 12 Va. App. 877, 883,
407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991) (quoting Lowe v. Dep’t of Public Welfare of Richmond, 231 Va.
277, 280, 343 S.E.2d 70, 72 (1986)). However, “[i]t is clearly not in the best interests of a child
to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of
resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10
Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990).
Appellant also contends the trial court erred in terminating her residual parental rights
pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). However, because we conclude the trial court’s decision
terminating appellant’s parental rights was warranted under Code § 16.1-283(E)(i), we need not
reach this issue. When a trial court’s judgment is made on alternative grounds, we need only
consider whether any one of the alternatives is sufficient to sustain the judgment of the trial court
and, if we so find, need not address the other grounds. See Fields, 46 Va. App. at 8, 614 S.E.2d
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at 659 (termination of parental rights upheld under one subsection of Code § 16.1-283 forecloses
need to consider termination under alternative subsections).
Accordingly, the trial court’s decision is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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