IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 96-30353
Summary Calendar
_____________________
SUSAN HAMMOND GREEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
FAIRMONT HOTEL MANAGEMENT COMPANY; SWIG INVESTMENT COMPANY,
also known as SIC Company
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
(94-CV-4157 C)
_________________________________________________________________
October 14, 1996
Before KING, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Susan Green challenges the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Fairmont Hotel Management Company in her
suit seeking severance pay after the termination of her employment.
The district court found that Green was precluded from recovery
because she had voluntarily signed a General Release and Covenant
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
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Not to Sue at the time of her termination. Finding no error, we
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The Fairmont Hotel Management Company (“the hotel”) hired
Green as an at-will employee in September 1975. Shortly
thereafter, Green became the hotel’s Director of Human Resources.
In August of 1993, Green was informed that she could no longer be
the Director of Human Resources. Given the option of applying for
a lower level position or leaving, Green chose to resign.
In conjunction with her departure from the hotel, Green signed
a General Release and Covenant Not to Sue (“the Release”). Prior
to signing the document, Green negotiated several changes in its
terms, such as the substitution of a $5,000 cash payment in lieu of
career counseling services.1 Including the $5,000, Green received
a total of $26,500 for signing the release. In return, the release
provided that Green fully released the hotel “from all actions . .
. including but not limited to any claims relating to wages,
benefits, penalties and attorneys’ fees arising under applicable
federal, state or municipal statute, . . . [or] any state or
federal discrimination charges . . . .” The agreement also
releases the hotel from “any contract or tort claim related in any
manner to Releasor’s employment and/or termination.”
The representations and warranties section of the Release
1
The hotel does not generally offer career counseling services
to terminated employees.
2
provides that the Releasor “represents, warrants and agrees” that
she has signed the release voluntarily, and that she “[did] not
rely upon any statement, representation, or promise of Releasees or
of any agent, attorney, or other representative of or for Releasees
in executing this Release, or in settling this dispute.” The
release further provides that the Releasor “acknowledges and agrees
that no other consideration has been or will be furnished or paid
by these Releases.” The Release is “intended to be final and
binding and to be effective as a full and final accord and
satisfaction of any and all disputes between Releasees and
Releasor.”
Approximately eight months after signing the Release, Green
made a formal demand for additional severance pay.2 The Release
contains a mandatory arbitration clause, but the parties were
unable to agree on its scope. Green subsequently filed suit in
Louisiana state court alleging that the hotel had violated a
Louisiana statute requiring the payment of any amount owed to an
employee upon termination.3 In the alternative, Green alleged that
the hotel’s failure to pay her two weeks severance pay for each
year of employment, as it had done on occasion for its male
2
The hotel has no written policy on severance pay.
3
Green alleged that she consulted an attorney who assured her
that signing the release would not preclude her from demanding
severance pay. Green did not disclose the name of the attorney
before the entry of summary judgment, but in her motion for
rehearing, she alleged that she had spoken to one of the hotel’s
attorneys.
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employees, constituted sex discrimination. The defendants removed
to federal court on diversity grounds and moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that the Release was valid and enforceable
as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, that Green ratified the
Release by keeping the money given to her by the hotel. The
district court granted the motion, and Green timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
We review a summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standards used by the district court. Norman v. Apache Corp., 19
F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994). In reviewing the evidence, we
view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268,
1272 (5th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is proper “if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c).
The district court’s jurisdiction was based on diversity of
citizenship. Thus, the district court correctly applied Louisiana
law to this Louisiana-centered dispute. Under Louisiana law, a
compromise, such as the Release, has the force of a judgment and
cannot be set aside in the absence of error in the person, error on
the matter in dispute, fraud, or violence. LA. CIV.CODE arts. 3078
& 3079; Brown v. Drillers, Inc., 630 So. 2d 741, 747 & n.9 (La.
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1994); see Bailey v. Martin Brower Co., 658 So. 2d 1299, 1301 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 1995)(“A release of claim or claims, when given in
exchange for consideration, is a compromise and constitutes the
basis for a plea of res judicata.”).
Green argued to the district court, and she argues here, that
the Release should not be enforced because she was materially
mistaken about whether it covered severance pay. She claimed that
she only signed the Release after a lawyer - on rehearing, it
became the hotel’s lawyer - assured her that she would still be
able to pursue a claim for severance pay. Green did not assert a
claim for fraud. Green’s reliance on the erroneous advice of the
attorney, however, does not affect the enforceability of the
Release.
Transactions or compromises “can not be attacked on account of
any error in law or any lesion.” LA.CIV.CODE art. 3078; Brown, 630
So. 2d at 747; Kozina v. Zeagler, 646 So. 2d 1217, 1220 (La. App.
5 Cir. 1994); Carter v. Jefferson 597 So. 2d 128, 130 (La. App. 5
Cir. 1992), writ denied, 600 So. 2d 609 (La. 1992). In Carter, the
court dismissed an insurance company’s demand of repayment of a
settlement. Carter, 597 So. 2d at 131. The insurance company had
not realized until after it had settled that the insured’s policy
did not include liability coverage. Id. at 130. Finding the
settlement to be enforceable, the court stated, “Alliance made an
error of law when it assumed Ms. Jefferson’s policy included
liability as well as collision and comprehensive coverage. It
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cannot now attack its compromise for this error of law.” Id.
Likewise, Green cannot now attack the Release based on her own
error of law. The district court correctly concluded that the
Release signed by Green precluded her suit.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
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