IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
___________________
No. 96-40087
Summary Calendar
ANITA HERNANDEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JAMES N. MUNS, in his capacity as
Mayor of the City of Plano;
CITY OF PLANO,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas
(4:94-CV-17)
________________________________________________
October 21, 1996
Before GARWOOD, JOLLY and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.*
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-appellant Anita Hernandez (Hernandez) appeals the
judgment dismissing her employment discrimination claims against
her former employer, defendant-appellee the City of Plano (City).1
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
1
Hernandez also sued James N. Muns (Muns) in his official
capacity as Mayor of the City, and the district court’s judgment
likewise dismissed all claims against Muns. As Muns is sued only
in his official capacity, the entire suit is properly treated as a
suit against the City only, and Hernandez does not contend
Hernandez brought this suit against the City for alleged national
origin discrimination and retaliatory discharge under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994)
(Title VII). At the close of Hernandez’s case-in-chief, the
district court granted the City’s motion for judgment as a matter
of law, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, concluding that Hernandez
failed to prove a prima facie case of discrimination and unlawful
retaliation under Title VII. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
Facts and Proceedings Below
Anita Hernandez, an Hispanic female, began her employment with
the City in May 1988, first as a secretary with the Capital
Projects Department, and later as a secretary with the Budget and
Research Department. During her years with these departments,
Hernandez’s job performance was satisfactory.
In March 1991, Hernandez responded to an internal posting of
a job vacancy with the Municipal Courts Department. The job
posting was for a Secretary III position, and indicated, among
other things, that the ability to speak Spanish was a strong
“plus.” Although she is not fluent in Spanish, Hernandez wanted to
increase her chances of obtaining the job, and thus indicated in a
cover letter attached to her application that “I am a volunteer as
an interpreter or translator for all City departments that do not
otherwise.
2
understand the Spanish language. My demonstrated ability to meet
the demands and responsibilities of this field would prove to be an
asset to your department.”
Hernandez was granted an interview for the job. She was
interviewed by Vicki Sherman (Sherman), a Caucasian female, for a
position to serve as her secretary with the municipal courts.
Sherman was the Clerk of the City’s municipal court. At the end of
the interview, Sherman hired Hernandez on the spot, and appeared
“excited” when Hernandez accepted the job.
Shortly after she began her new job with the Municipal Courts
Department, Hernandez was asked by Sherman to perform Spanish
translations for citizens who could not speak English and had
business with the municipal courts. Hernandez had difficulty
performing the translations. Sherman confronted Hernandez about
her translation skills and alleged that Hernandez had falsely
exaggerated her ability to speak Spanish in order to secure the
position. In response to these allegations, Hernandez told Sherman
that she had never claimed she was fluent in Spanish.
Approximately one month after this incident, in June 1991,
Hernandez reported Sherman’s criticism of her translation skills to
Joe Francis (Francis), the City’s Director of Human Resources.
Hernandez told Francis she believed Sherman was discriminating
against her because of her Hispanic national origin. Francis told
Hernandez that it was not discrimination and that she was
experiencing a personality conflict with Sherman.
3
The following month, Sherman placed Hernandez on a performance
improvement plan (PIP), a plan designed to assist employees improve
their job performance over a period of time. During this time,
Sherman told Hernandez to start looking for another job. In
October 1991, Sherman released Hernandez from the PIP.
During the fall of 1992, Hernandez started making notes in her
desk calendar of various incidents she believed evidenced
discriminatory treatment by Sherman.2 In September 1992, when
Sherman confronted Hernandez regarding the notes, Hernandez
responded that she was keeping notes because she believed she was
being discriminated against. In October 1992, Hernandez complained
to Jim Forte, Director of Finance and Sherman’s immediate
supervisor, about the alleged discrimination. Forte told Hernandez
that he was going to speak with Sherman.3
Sherman placed Hernandez on a second PIP in November 1992.
While she was on the PIP, two citizen complaints were made with the
City regarding Hernandez. Subsequently, in December 1992, Sherman
fired Hernandez.
Immediately thereafter, in accordance with City procedure,
Hernandez completed a disciplinary appeal form with a short
statement in support of her appeal. This form was forwarded to Jim
2
Hernandez offered no evidence to demonstrate what these
alleged discriminatory acts were or what the calendar notes
contained.
3
It is unclear from the record whether Forte actually talked
with Sherman about Hernandez’s complaint.
4
Forte, who upheld the dismissal. Hernandez then filed her second
appeal with Elvenn Richardson, the Assistant City Manager, who
after two meetings with Hernandez, also upheld the dismissal.
Hernandez filed her third and final appeal with Thomas Muehlenbeck,
the City Manager. After meeting with Hernandez, Muehlenbeck
likewise upheld the dismissal.
Sometime during or after her third appeal with the City,
Hernandez filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that she was
terminated as a result of her national origin. After an
investigation of her claims, the EEOC determined that Hernandez was
discharged for poor performance and was not discriminated against
by the City.4 Upon receiving the EEOC’s right-to-sue letter,
4
As shown by the trial evidence, the official determination of
the EEOC was as follows:
“The evidence shows that Charging Party was
counseled on several occasions regarding her job
performance. The Charging Party was reprimanded for
refusing to comply with the instructions of the
supervisor. The Charging Party was placed on a
performance improvement program for failure to meet
acceptable levels of performance. The evidence also
shows that the Charging Party was discharged for failure
to improve her performance and specifically because of
complaints from citizens regarding her rudeness.
The investigation shows that four non-Hispanics were
placed on performance improvement programs and discharged
for similar reasons as the Charging Party.
I have determined that the evidence obtained during
the investigation does not establish a violation of the
statute.”
5
Hernandez filed this action against the City.
At the close of Hernandez’s case-in-chief, the district court
granted the City’s motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. Hernandez timely filed this appeal.
Discussion
Hernandez argues on appeal that the district court erred in
granting the City’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on her
Title VII claims.5 We review the district court’s decision de
novo, applying the same legal standard used by the court below.
Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d 1379, 1387 (5th Cir. 1996).
Judgment as a matter of law is properly granted when the facts and
inferences point so strongly in favor of the movant that a rational
jury could not arrive at a contrary verdict. London v. Mac Corp.
of America, 44 F.3d 316, 318 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 99
(1995). As stated in our Boeing v. Shipman decision,
“On motions for [judgment as a matter of law], the Court
should consider all of the evidence——not just that
evidence which supports the non-mover’s case——but in the
light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable
to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and
inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor
of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men
5
In addition to the Title VII charges of discrimination and
retaliatory discharge, Hernandez originally brought other causes of
action against the City, including claims of substantive and
procedural due process violations. The district court granted the
City’s motion for summary judgment on all claims except Hernandez’s
Title VII claims. On appeal, she challenges only the district
court’s decision to grant the City’s motion for judgment as a
matter of law on her Title VII charges. Thus, the court’s summary
judgment order is not before this Court.
6
could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the
motion is proper. On the other hand, if there is
substantial evidence of such quality and weight that
reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of
impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the
motion[] should be denied, and the case submitted to the
jury. A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to
present a question for the jury.”
411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc); see also Normand v.
Research Institute of America, Inc., 927 F.2d 857, 859 (5th Cir.
1991) (applying Boeing standard).
I. National Origin Discrimination Claim
Hernandez claims that the City unlawfully discriminated
against her on the basis of her Hispanic national origin.
Specifically, Hernandez alleges the City treated her differently,
as evidenced by requiring her to do Spanish translation work
without receiving any “credit” and without requiring similar
translation work from the secretary who previously had held
Hernandez’s position.6
6
The City argues that, because Hernandez’s intentional
discrimination claim stems from allegedly unlawful acts committed
by Sherman——the same person who hired Hernandez——we should apply
the “same actor” inference in this case. Under the same actor
inference, “where the hirer and the firer are the same individual
and the termination of employment occurs within a relatively short
time span following the hiring, a strong inference exists that
discrimination was not a determining factor for the adverse action
taken by the employer.” Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th
Cir. 1991). Many courts, including this Court, have recently
adopted the same actor inference. See Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82
F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996) (ADEA case); see also E.E.O.C. v. Our
Lady of Resurrection Medical Ctr., 77 F.3d 145, 152 (7th Cir. 1996)
(Title VII race discrimination case); Buhrmaster v. Overnite
Transportation Co., 61 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 1995) (Title VII sex
discrimination case), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 785 (1996); Tyndall
7
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it illegal for
an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.7 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq. In a claim of “disparate
treatment” under Title VII, a plaintiff alleges that an employer
intentionally treats “some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
v. National Educ. Ctrs., Inc. of California, 31 F.3d 209, 215 (4th
Cir. 1994) (ADA case); LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d
836, 847 (1st Cir. 1993) (ADEA case), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1398
(1994); Lowe v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 963 F.2d 173, 174-75
(8th Cir. 1992) (ADEA case). Cf. Haun v. Ideal Industries, Inc.,
81 F.3d 541, 546 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that although same actor
evidence “is relevant in determining whether discrimination
occurred, we decline to establish a rule that no inference of
discrimination could arise under such circumstances”). Depending
on the factual setting, the same actor inference may be considered
in determining whether a purported prima facie case, resting
entirely on circumstantial evidence, has been sufficiently made
out, although more usually the same actor inference will have its
primary relevance at a later stage of the case.
7
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) provides as follows:
“(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer——(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
8
n.15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854-55, n.15 (1977); Frazier v. Garrison
I.S.D., 980 F.2d 1514, 1523 (5th Cir. 1993).
To prove intentional discrimination, a plaintiff may use
either direct or circumstantial evidence. Portis v. First Nat.
Bank of New Albany, Miss., 34 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1994). Under
Title VII, direct evidence includes any statement or written
document showing a discriminatory motive on its face. Id. at 329.
“When a plaintiff presents credible direct evidence that
discriminatory animus in part motivated or was a substantial factor
in the contested employment action, the burden of proof shifts to
the employer to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the same decision would have been made regardless of the forbidden
factor.” Brown v. East Miss. Elec. Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861
(5th Cir. 1993). If believed, direct evidence proves intentional
discrimination without inference or presumption. Id.
In the absence of direct evidence, illegal motive can be
established through circumstantial evidence that invokes a three
step model of proof. First, the plaintiff must demonstrate a prima
facie case of discrimination. A Title VII plaintiff carries “the
initial burden of offering evidence adequate to create an inference
that an employment decision was based on a discriminatory criterion
illegal under the Act.” International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S.
at 358, 97 S.Ct. at 1866. Generally, the plaintiff’s prima facie
case includes the following elements: (1) the plaintiff is a member
9
of a protected class; (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the
position at issue; (3) the defendant made an adverse employment
decision despite the plaintiff’s qualifications; and (4) the
plaintiff’s position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of plaintiff’s qualifications or hired
a person who was not a member of a protected group. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824
(1973); see also Frazier, 980 F.2d at 1526. However, this is not
the only means of demonstrating a prima facie case, as McDonnell
Douglas “did not purport to create an inflexible formulation.”
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358, 97 S.Ct. at 1866.
“The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the
specification above of the prima facie proof required from
[plaintiff] is not necessarily applicable in every respect to
differing factual situations.” McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S.
at 802 n.13, 93 S.Ct. at 1824 n.13.
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the defendant bears the burden to see to it that
some evidence of a nondiscriminatory basis for the adverse
employment decision is presented. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094 (1981). If
evidence is presented of a reason that is nondiscriminatory, “the
McDonnell Douglas framework——with its presumptions and burdens——is
no longer relevant.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
10
510, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993). According to the Court:
”The presumption [raised by the plaintiff’s prima facie
case], having fulfilled its role of forcing the defendant
to come forward with some response, simply drops out of
the picture . . . . The defendant’s ‘production’
(whatever its persuasive effect) having been made, the
trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate question:
whether [the] plaintiff has proven ‘that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against [him]’ because of his
race . . . . The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons
put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief
is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together
with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to
show intentional discrimination.”
Id. at 2749 (citations omitted).
Based on the record before us, we conclude that Hernandez has
failed to demonstrate discrimination either by direct evidence or
by articulating a prima facie case of disparate treatment.
Hernandez presents no direct evidence of intentional
discrimination, as, for example, there is no evidence that Sherman
or anybody else made reference to her Hispanic heritage at any time
during her employment with the City. Indeed, nothing indicates
that Sherman treated Hernandez differently because of her national
origin. Rather, the evidence shows only that Sherman expected
Hernandez to use whatever skills she brought to her job to the best
of her abilities, which in Hernandez’s situation included Spanish
translation skills which Hernandez represented she possessed.
Hernandez’s translation duties did not require her to do any
extra work. She was asked to do Spanish translations during her
normal working hours as part of her job duties and her translation
11
responsibilities did not cause her to work extra hours without
compensation. Thus, Hernandez was not discriminated against simply
because she was denied extra “credit” for her translation work.
See, e.g., Cota v. Tucson Police Dept., 783 F.Supp. 458, 468
(D.Ariz. 1992) (holding that plaintiffs failed to prove prima facie
case of discrimination under Title VII where police department
required Spanish-speaking employees to use their Spanish-speaking
skills on the job without additional compensation).
Moreover, the fact that the secretary who previously had held
Hernandez’s position was Caucasian and was not required to perform
translation work does not constitute any evidence of
discrimination. The secretary who came before Hernandez was not
asked to do Spanish translations because, as Hernandez’s own
testimony reveals, she could not speak Spanish. Also, nothing in
the record indicates that the previous secretary claimed she could
perform translation work.
Finally, Hernandez has failed to demonstrate discrimination by
the City through the McDonnell Douglas circumstantial model of
proof. Importantly, Hernandez does not show, as part of her prima
facie case, that she was performing well in her job at the time of
her termination. See O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,
84 F.3d 718, 719 (4th Cir. 1996); Hong v. Children’s Memorial
Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct.
1372 (1994); McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d 1155, 1160 (6th
12
Cir. 1990). “[W]hether one is qualified may change from time to
time. The fact that an individual may have been qualified in the
past does not mean that he is qualified at a later time.” Weihaupt
v. American Medical Ass’n, 874 F.2d 419, 427 (7th Cir. 1989)
(quoting Grohs v. Gold Bond Bldg. Products, 859 F.2d 1283, 1287
(7th Cir. 1988)). Hernandez failed to present any admissible
evidence that would indicate that her performance was satisfactory
when she was fired. At trial, the court sustained defense
counsel’s objections to Hernandez’s testimony regarding her work
performance.8 Although allowed to do so, Hernandez did not offer
into evidence any performance evaluations. Indeed, the only
evidence of the quality of her work performance prior to her
dismissal was her own testimony that Sherman told her in April 1992
that she was doing a “good job” and showed improvement. This
evidence——standing, as it does, essentially alone——does not support
Hernandez’s contention that her performance was satisfactory when
she was terminated in December 1992. The short of the matter is
that Hernandez has failed to raise an inference of unlawful
discrimination and, therefore, failed to articulate prima facie
proof of discrimination.
II. Unlawful Retaliation Claim
In addition to appealing her national origin discrimination
8
Hernandez does not assert on appeal any claim of error in
respect to this ruling.
13
claim, Hernandez also argues on appeal that the district court
erred in granting the City’s motion for judgment as a matter of law
on her unlawful retaliation claim. Hernandez alleges that, in
retaliation for her complaints to Joe Francis and Jim Forte of
discrimination, Sherman placed her on the PIPs in July 1991 and
November 1992, and ultimately fired her in December 1992.
A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of unlawful
retaliation by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that (1)
she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) an adverse
employment action occurred; and (3) a causal link existed between
the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Long v.
Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996). An employee
has engaged in activity protected by Title VII if she has either
(1) “opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice” by
Title VII or (2) “made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing” under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). “The opposition
clause of § 2000e-3(a) requires the employee to demonstrate that
she had at least a ‘reasonable belief’ that the practices she
opposed were unlawful.” Long, 88 F.3d at 304 (citation omitted).
The burden-shifting structure applicable to Title VII disparate
treatment cases, as set forth in McDonnell Douglas, is also
applicable to Title VII unlawful retaliation cases. McMillan v.
Rust College, Inc., 710 F.2d 1112, 1116 (5th Cir. 1983). In other
14
words, once the plaintiff satisfies the elements of her prima facie
case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate
a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment
action. Long, 88 F.3d at 304-05. If the defendant presents a
legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the action, the analysis then
focuses on the ultimate question of whether the employer unlawfully
retaliated against the plaintiff. Id. at 305 & n.4.
We must first determine whether Hernandez has established her
prima facie case for unlawful retaliation. Hernandez asserts that
she had a “reasonable belief” that the practices she opposed were
unlawful. We disagree.
On two separate occasions, Hernandez complained that she felt
Sherman was discriminating against her because of her Hispanic
heritage. Her first complaint was made to Joe Francis in June
1991, one month after Sherman accused her of misrepresenting her
Spanish translation skills. Sherman’s accusation, however, cannot
reasonably be construed as conduct that violates Title VII. When
applying for the position as Secretary III, Hernandez knew that the
ability to speak Spanish was “a plus.” In fact, Hernandez
testified that the reason she specifically mentioned in her
application cover letter that she had translation experience was
because she believed it would better her chances of obtaining the
job. Hernandez could not reasonably believe she was discriminated
against by Sherman’s expressed disappointment in her inability to
15
perform a task that Hernandez knew was likely part of the job and
as to which she had touted her skills in her application.9
Hernandez made her second complaint of discrimination to Jim
Forte, Sherman’s supervisor, one month after Sherman’s and
Hernandez’s discussion regarding the notes written on Hernandez’s
calendar. Again, Hernandez complained to Forte of what she
perceived as discrimination by Sherman. However, nothing in the
record supports her claim that her belief was reasonable. While it
may be true that Sherman told Hernandez that she did not want
Hernandez as her secretary and to start looking for another job,
these statements alone cannot reasonably be interpreted as
discrimination. Sherman’s statements to Hernandez were no
different from statements any supervisor would make to an employee
whose work was unacceptable. Indeed, the only evidence Hernandez
presented at trial that she claims supports her reasonable belief
of discrimination is her own testimony that she told Sherman, when
confronted about the notes on her calendar, that she wrote the
notes because she believed she was being discriminated against.10
9
The parties agree that the Secretary III position once held by
Hernandez did not expressly require Spanish translation duties.
However, the Secretary III job description stated that the listed
responsibilities and qualifications “are intended to describe the
general nature and level of work being performed and are not
intended to be an exhaustive list of all responsibilities, duties
and skills which may be required.” (Emphasis added).
10
Although Hernandez asserts on appeal that Sherman subjected
her to “hostile stares and abusive language” and that Sherman was
more tolerant of and more helpful to Hernandez’s non-Hispanic
coworkers, the portions of the record cited to support these
16
While Hernandez might have held a good-faith belief that she
suffered discrimination, she offers no admissible evidence that
even remotely suggests her belief was reasonable. Payne v.
McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140-41 n.11
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000, 102 S.Ct. 1630
(1982); see also De Anda v. St. Joseph Hosp., 671 F.2d 850, 852 n.2
(5th Cir. 1982).
Even if we assume, arguendo, that Hernandez had a reasonable
belief that Sherman’s conduct violated Title VII, the PIPs she was
placed on do not constitute adverse employment actions. Sherman’s
placement of Hernandez on the PIPs did not cause her to lose job
duties, hours, wages, benefits, or in any way adversely affect
other terms or conditions of her employment. See, e.g., Yates v.
Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 638 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding no adverse
action where plaintiff’s demotion was temporary and did not result
in a reduction in salary or loss of benefits). To the contrary,
the PIPs were designed to assist Hernandez in recognizing areas
which needed improvement.
“Title VII was designed to address ultimate employment
decisions, not to address every decision made by employers that
arguably might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate
decisions.” Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995).
assertions do not in fact support them. The evidence does not show
a reasonable basis for believing Hernandez was discriminated
against in this respect.
17
Here, the placement of Hernandez on the PIPs does not rise to the
level of an ultimate employment decision of the character that
Title VII was intended to address. But see Ray v. Tandem
Computers, Inc., 63 F.3d 429, 435-36 (5th Cir. 1995) (sustaining
summary judgment for defendant although finding a prima facie case
of retaliation made where employee put on PIP; no discussion of
whether placement on PIP constitutes adverse employment action).
Of course, Hernandez’s discharge constitutes an ultimate and
adverse employment action. Long, 88 F.3d at 305. However,
Hernandez fails to meet the third requirement of her prima facie
case, that is, she fails to demonstrate a causal link between her
termination and the alleged protected activity. Assuming arguendo,
as before, that Hernandez reasonably believed Sherman discriminated
against her, Hernandez cannot point to any evidence that supports
her argument that she would not have been terminated absent her
complaints of discrimination. Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970
F.2d 39, 43 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Jack v. Texaco Research Ctr.,
743 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1984)); McCray v. DPC Industries,
Inc., No. 2-94 CV 45, 1996 WL 426810 at *8 (E.D. Tex. April 12,
1996); Suttles v. United States Postal Service, 927 F.Supp. 990,
1008 (S.D. Tex. 1996).11
11
Hernandez need not, however, show that retaliation was the
sole factor in the termination decision. See Long, 88 F.3d at 305
n.4.
18
Hernandez asserts in her brief that “[t]he causal connection
is found by Sherman’s departure from established practice in
placing Anita Hernandez on a PIP and on the close proximity in time
between the opposition practice and the adverse PIP and dismissal.”
However, Hernandez failed to present any evidence as to what the
“established procedures” are or how Sherman deviated from such
procedures when she placed Hernandez on the PIPs. Hernandez’s
subjective belief of a causal link, without more, is simply not
enough. See generally Suttles, 927 F.Supp. at 1010, and cases
cited therein.
Moreover, Hernandez’s emphasis on the length of time between
the protected activity and her discharge is misplaced. Hernandez
complained of discrimination to Francis in July 1991 and Forte in
October 1992, and was terminated in December 1992, approximately
two months after her complaint to Forte. Although the timing of
the adverse employment action can be significant, it is not
necessarily a determinative factor. Mayberry v. Bought Aircraft
Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir. 1995). The lapse of time should
be weighed “as one of the elements in the entire calculation of
whether [plaintiff] had shown a causal connection between the
protected activity and the subsequent firing.” Shirley, 970 F.2d
at 42-45. The evidence presented by Hernandez does not support the
conclusion that her termination was causally connected to her
complaints. Instead, what the evidence shows is that Hernandez was
19
placed on two PIPs prior to her termination, she was terminated
while on her second PIP, and the decision to terminate Hernandez
was rendered after citizen complaints about her rude behavior when
helping them. Hernandez has failed to produce evidence that, but
for her complaints, she would not have been terminated.
In any event, even if we assume, arguendo, that the placement
of Hernandez on the PIPs or her termination somehow satisfy the
requirements of her prima facie case, Hernandez has produced no
evidence that the nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse
action——that Hernandez could not adequately perform her translation
duties and citizens complained of her rude attitude——were
pretextual.
In sum, we hold that Hernandez failed to demonstrate that she
engaged in an activity protected by Title VII. Assuming, arguendo,
that Hernandez satisfies the first step of her prima facie case, we
conclude she has not shown that Sherman’s decision to place her on
the PIPs was an adverse employment decision or that it was done for
a discriminatory reason; nor has Hernandez shown that the
termination decision was causally linked to her alleged protected
activity.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM the district court’s order
granting the City’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.
20