COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Felton, Judges Elder and Beales
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
SHAYQUAN QUANTAE MARSHALL, S/K/A
SHAYQUAN QUONTAE MARSHALL
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2124-07-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
JULY 1, 2008
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Beverly W. Snukals, Judge
Craig S. Cooley for appellant.
Gregory W. Franklin, Assistant Attorney General (Robert F.
McDonnell, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Shayquan Quantae Marshall (appellant) appeals from his bench trial conviction for
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248. On appeal, he
contends the evidence was insufficient to prove he possessed the cocaine with the requisite
intent. 1 We hold the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that he intended to distribute
the 9.5-ounce, golf-ball-sized rock of crack cocaine, and we affirm.
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to the evidence all reasonable inferences fairly
deducible therefrom. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
1
Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove he possessed the
cocaine.
(1975). The judgment of a trial court will be disturbed only if plainly wrong or without evidence
to support it. Id.
“Circumstantial evidence is as competent and is entitled to as much weight as direct
evidence, provided it is sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except
that of guilt.” Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d 864, 876 (1983). In
cases lacking direct evidence of drug distribution, intent to distribute “must be shown by
circumstantial evidence,” Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 524, 371 S.E.2d 156, 165
(1988), such as a person’s conduct and statements, Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194,
198, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). Circumstances that shed light on the accused’s specific intent
regarding illegal drugs in his possession include the quantity and method of packaging of the
drugs possessed by him and the presence or absence of drug paraphernalia. Shackleford v.
Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 307, 327, 528 S.E.2d 123, 133 (2000), aff’d, 262 Va. 196, 547
S.E.2d 899 (2001). “‘Possession of a quantity greater than that ordinarily possessed for one’s
personal use may be sufficient to establish an intent to distribute it.’” Gregory v.
Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 100, 110, 468 S.E.2d 117, 122 (1996) (finding sufficient evidence
of intent to distribute based on possession of seven baggies containing a total of 3.7 grams of
cocaine) (quoting Iglesias v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 93, 110, 372 S.E.2d 170, 180 (1988)
(en banc)); see also Hunter v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 569, 570, 193 S.E.2d 779, 780 (1973)
(holding proof that the quantity of drugs possessed exceeds an amount normally possessed for
personal use, without more, can be sufficient to show an intent to distribute). Also, “the absence
of any paraphernalia suggestive of personal use . . . [is] regularly recognized as [a] factor []
indicating an intent to distribute.” Welshman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 20, 37, 502 S.E.2d
122, 130 (1998) (en banc).
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Expert testimony may be considered in determining whether a defendant intended to
distribute an illegal substance. Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 728, 733, 406 S.E.2d 922,
925 (1991). “The quantum of evidence necessary to prove an intent to distribute depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case.” Askew v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 104, 110, 578
S.E.2d 58, 61 (2003).
Here, Sergeant Thomas testified that appellant’s possession of 9.5 grams of crack
cocaine, which would have a street value of $950 if sold as single “hits,” was inconsistent with
possession of the drug for personal use. Sergeant Thomas testified that the typical user would
purchase each single hit of less than one-quarter of an ounce in an individually-wrapped baggie
corner for $20, or half that amount for $10, and that a user would typically purchase four or five
such hits at the most because “[t]hey want to come in, get it and get out of the area quickly.
They usually don’t have a lot of money to spend on the cocaine because they’re trying to support
their habit.” He also explained that buyers typically “go back to the same place multiple times of
the day” and that “[i]t’s not an area [where] they want to hang out because of robberies, getting
beat up, most importantly, getting arrested by the police.” He testified that “[t]hrough all of [his]
encounters of talking with buyers and/or sellers,” he had “never encountered [a user] who would
buy 10 grams of cocaine.”
Although the quantity of the drug appellant possessed was not packaged for distribution,
Sergeant Thomas testified that the method of packaging was consistent with appellant’s having
purchased the entire quantity from his supplier and “[being in transit] to a place where you have
scales and your packaging materials.”
Sergeant Thomas admitted that a “severe addict” could consume such a quantity in four
to nine days, but the record contained no evidence to suggest that appellant was a “severe addict”
or even a user of crack cocaine. At the time of appellant’s arrest, he had no device in his
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possession with which to ingest the cocaine. Immediately prior to his arrest, he had been
socializing with a group of other young men on a street corner rather than going to another
location to ingest the cocaine as one would expect of a “severe addict.” Further, appellant stated
he was under the influence of marijuana and alcohol, and he showed no signs of crack cocaine
use or withdrawal while in the custody of the police following his arrest.
Finally, while appellant was in the custody of Officer Melton, after he had been told only
that he was under arrest for an “illegal substance” or “narcotic,” appellant “asked if the cocaine
could be dropped to a simple possession.” This statement, viewed in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth, showed appellant’s acknowledgement that he possessed the cocaine with an
intent to distribute it.
We hold the evidence as a whole, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, supported the trial court’s finding that appellant possessed the cocaine with the
requisite intent to distribute. Thus, we affirm appellant’s conviction.
Affirmed.
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