COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Kelsey, Petty and Senior Judge Bumgardner
EVA M. TOWNS-HINTON
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 2205-07-1 PER CURIAM
JANUARY 29, 2008
OBICI HEALTH SYSTEM AND
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Eva M. Towns-Hinton, pro se, on brief). Appellant submitting on
brief.
(Audrey Marcello; Taylor & Walker, P.C., on brief), for appellees.
Appellees submitting on brief.
Eva M. Towns-Hinton (claimant) appeals a decision of the Workers’ Compensation
Commission denying her claim for benefits filed on November 8, 2006. Claimant contends the
commission erred in finding that she failed to prove she sustained (1) an injury by accident
arising out of her employment on October 10, 2005; and (2) disability causally related to that
accident. Finding no error, we affirm.
“The question of ‘[w]hether an accident arises out of the
employment is a mixed question of law and fact and is reviewable
by the appellate court.’” Accordingly, although we are bound by
the commission’s underlying factual findings if those findings are
supported by credible evidence, we review de novo the
commission’s ultimate determination as to whether the injury arose
out of the claimant’s employment.
“The language ‘arising out of’ refers to the origin or cause
of the injury . . . .” An injury will therefore be deemed to “arise
out of” the claimant’s employment “when there is apparent to the
rational mind upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
connection between the conditions under which the work is
required to be performed and the resulting injury.” Thus, if an
injury “cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing
proximate cause,” the injury is not compensable because it did not
“arise out of” the claimant’s employment.
Stillwell v. Lewis Tree Serv., Inc., 47 Va. App. 471, 477-78, 624 S.E.2d 681, 683-84 (2006)
(citations omitted);
In denying claimant’s claim, the commission found as follows:
The substance of the claimant’s testimony was that she did
not know the cause of the fall and she denied slipping.
Additionally, she was uncertain whether she had pain and fell, or
suffered pain upon striking the ground. This evidence does not
establish that a work-related exertion or condition caused the
claimant to fall. The fact that her employment put her in a position
to be reaching her parked vehicle does not make the injury
compensable.
The medical record does not support that any type of
work-related condition caused the claimant’s fall. Instead, the
record emphasizes that she simply fell while walking, without any
causative factor.
We agree. Claimant testified that, after she completed her work shift as a registration
clerk on October 10, 2005, she walked to her vehicle in employer’s parking lot. Claimant had a
handicapped decal permitting her to park in a handicapped space, but since none were available
that day, she had parked in a regular space about two rows from the building. She agreed that
area was available for use by the general public. In addition, she did not know if employer
owned the lot or if its employees used it.
As claimant approached her vehicle, she fell in the grassy median near it. She described
the accident as follows:
I stepped up on the medium [sic]. I was right in front of my car.
When I stepped up, I did grab my car because I wanted to make
sure that I had balance . . . , and I guess I might have bent over a
little because I was kind of like reaching for the car and tried to
make sure I had some balance. I guess when I (inaudible) to grab
the car, and when I stood back up, that’s when I fell. . . . Honestly,
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I don’t know whether I caught a pain when I bent back up or
whether the pain actually hit me when I hit the ground, but I fell
backwards, and I fell just back on my butt right in the median. I
had this terrible pain in my leg. I couldn’t straighten my leg out.
It happened so fast. I couldn’t get up.
Claimant admitted “I don’t know why I fell,” speculating that it might have been uneven or she
may have stepped in something. However, she did not return to the median after the fall to
investigate.
Prior to the fall, claimant had been diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, but walked
unassisted at the time of the fall. She admitted she had fallen on a prior occasion due to pain and
weakness in her leg. The medical records showed that on October 10, 2005, when claimant
sought treatment in the hospital emergency room, she gave a history of “walking to her car when
she slipped and fell to the ground.” However, claimant denied stating that she slipped. Another
history reported that she was “walking to car and [right] leg seemed to give out and [she] landed
on [the] ground. States felt like leg was in a spasm and she couldn’t get up.” She later reported
to Dr. Nickolas L. Pezzella, III, that she fell, but denied slipping or tripping on anything.
Based upon this record, we agree that claimant’s evidence failed to sustain her burden of
proving the requisite causal connection between her injury and a significant work-related
exertion or a condition of her employment. The evidence showed that claimant fell while
walking to her car, but provided no explanation, beyond pure speculation, for what caused her to
fall. Furthermore, “[s]imple acts of walking, bending, or turning, without any other contributing
environmental factors, are not risks of employment.” Southside Virginia Training Ctr. v. Ellis,
33 Va. App. 824, 829, 537 S.E.2d 35, 37 (2000).
Accordingly, we cannot say the commission erred in finding claimant failed to prove that
her October 10, 2005 injury arose out of her employment. Because this ruling disposes of this
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appeal, we need not address whether claimant’s disability was causally related to her alleged
October 10, 2005 work accident.
Affirmed.
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