Ange v. York/Poquoson Department of Social Services

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Elder, Clements and Agee
Argued at Richmond, Virginia

PENNY ANGE
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0925-01-1 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS
MARCH 12, 2002
YORK/POQUOSON DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YORK COUNTY
Prentis Smiley, Jr., Judge

Douglas J. Walter (McDermott & Roe, on
brief), for appellant.

Carla Blake Hook, Assistant County Attorney,
for appellee.

Penny Ange appeals from a decision of the Circuit Court of

York County (trial court) terminating her residual parental

rights to three of her minor children and approving a foster care

service plan of the York/Poquoson Department of Social Services

(DSS) providing for the placement of another of her minor

children in permanent foster care. On appeal, Ange contends the

trial court abused its discretion by summarily disposing of her

appeals from the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court

of York County (juvenile court) without a hearing on the merits

for failure to comply with the trial court's pretrial orders.

For the reasons that follow, we conclude the trial court abused

its discretion and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial

court and remand this case for further proceedings.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
 The record before us includes, in lieu of a transcript, a

written statement of facts, made a part of the record pursuant to

Rule 5A:8(c) and (d).

The procedural posture of this case is not in dispute. On

September 12, 2000, the juvenile court approved DSS's foster care

service plan identifying a goal of permanent foster care for

Ange's daughter M.R. and ordered that M.R. be placed in permanent

foster care. On September 25, 2000, the juvenile court ordered

that Ange's residual parental rights to three of her other minor

children, G.K., S.R., and L.R. (the children), be terminated.

Ange timely noted her appeal of those orders to the trial court.
On appeal to the trial court, a pretrial conference for the

four cases was set for November 14, 2000, to allow the trial

judge to "get a feel of [the] time and direction needed for

trial." At the pretrial conference, acting in its own

discretion, the trial court ordered, pursuant to Rule 1:18, DSS

to conduct a "Home Study" of Ange's home and a "Parental

Evaluation" of Ange and DSS and Ange to "complete the 'Best

Interest of the Child' Proffers pursuant to [Code § 20-124.3]."

The court further ordered that the proffers were to be filed with

the court by 8:00 a.m. on December 15, 2000, or "the presence of

the parties [would] be required" on that date. These directives

were memorialized in a pretrial scheduling order entered by the

trial court, without objection, on December 13, 2000. 1
DSS filed its "Best Interest of the Child Proffers" on

December 14, 2000. Ange did not file her proffers by December

15, 2000, or appear in court on that date. However, a hearing

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attended by Ange's counsel and counsel for DSS was held on that

date, and the trial court extended the deadline for filing the

proffers to January 5, 2001. No order regarding the January 5,

2001 deadline was entered, but the trial court subsequently

entered an order extending the deadline for filing the proffers

to January 16, 2001. That order, entered on January 3, 2001,

read, in pertinent part, as follows:

On the 15th day of December, 2000, came
the York/Poquoson Department of Social
Services by counsel and . . . counsel for Ms.
Ange, to provide cause to the court as to why
the "Best Interest of the Child Proffers"
previously ordered to have been completed by
Ms. Penny Ange had not yet been filed with
the Court.
Having reviewed the issues involved in
the matter, the court does Order as follows:

1. That the Court Order from the
Pretrial Conference on November 14, 2000, be
served on Ms. Penny Ange.

2. That this Court Order be served on
Ms. Penny Ange. . . .

3. That if Ms. Penny Ange does not
comply with the provisions of the November
14, 2000, Court Order by January 16, 2001, at
8:00 a.m., this Court will dismiss Ms. Ange's
Appeal.

The orders of December 13, 2000, and January 3, 2001, were

personally served on Ange on January 6, 2001. Ange appeared in

court with her counsel at 8:00 a.m. on January 16, 2001, and

submitted her "Best Interest of the Child Proffers" to the trial

court. Because the proffers for the four children were only

"partially completed," the trial court granted a two-hour

extension for filing Ange's "signed, notarized and completed"

1
This order did not establish a trial date.

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proffers. Ange filed her completed and notarized proffers within

the required time period.

At the January 16, 2001 hearing, the trial court also

ordered Ange to "report to [DSS's] offices by noon on January 16,

2001, to begin the home study process, or her appeal [would] be

dismissed." The trial court further ordered Ange to "cooperate

with [DSS] in completing the home study." 2 These directives were

memorialized in an order entered January 22, 2001.

By letter dated January 16, 2001, DSS informed the trial

court that Ange had reported that day to its offices and had been

given a "Home Study packet which [was] to be completed by January

30, 2001." Ange had also been asked, according to DSS's letter,

to inform DSS if her address changed and to make an appointment

with DSS to discuss information pertaining to the "Home Study."
By letter dated February 12, 2001, DSS advised the trial

court that Ange returned the "Home Study packet" on January 30,

2001, noting, however, that "it was only partially completed, as

[Ange] did not complete the Autobiography or the authorization to
3
release school information form." DSS also indicated in the

letter that the information provided by Ange on the

"Questionnaire" form in the packet was "so vague" it did not, in

the opinion of the DSS social worker assigned to the case,

"address[] the matter . . . before [the] Court." DSS further

2
In making this directive, unlike the one requiring Ange to
"report to [DSS's] offices by noon on January 16, 2001, to begin
the home study process," the trial court did not designate a
deadline or a sanction for noncompliance.
3
The record fails to reveal whether the trial court had the
referenced "Home Study packet" before it during these
proceedings. Regardless, it was not made a part of the record

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reported that Ange failed to respond to two letters sent by DSS

on February 1, 2001, and February 5, 2001, respectively, to

Ange's last known address informing her of two appointments that

had been made for her to meet with the social worker assigned to

her case "to discuss the Home Study and schedule a home visit."

According to DSS's letter to the trial court, Ange did not attend

either meeting. DSS also set forth in the February 12, 2001

letter "Ange's Child Protective Services history," consisting of

six "Founded dispositions" entered against Ange between 1993 and

2001 and the removal of her children from the home in February

1999. In concluding the letter, DSS wrote as follows:
At this time, it does not appear as
though this agency would be able to complete
a Home Study on Ms. Ange, as she is not
willing to meet with [the assigned social]
worker. However, this agency has not been
informed of a specific date in which this
Home Study is to be completed. Currently, we
are under the perception that Ms. Ange has an
open time frame in which to comply. Please
advise us in regards to your Honor's intent.

Upon receipt of DSS's letter of February 12, 2001, the trial

court set a "further pretrial hearing" on the "matters raised in

[DSS's] letter" for March 8, 2001. At that hearing, the trial

court, referencing DSS's letter of February 12, 2001, found that

Ange had "not substantially complied with any of" its pretrial

orders concerning the preparation of the case for trial, in that

she had not "proper[ly] complet[ed] . . . the Best Interests of

the Child Proffers" or "full[y] cooperat[ed] in the performance

of a Home Study and a Parental Evaluation."

Based on its determination that Ange had not complied with

before us.

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its pretrial orders, the trial court then proceeded, at the March

8, 2001 hearing, to sanction Ange for her noncompliance by

summarily resolving the four cases involving Ange's children

without benefit of a hearing on the merits. 4 The court summarily

found, "upon the evidence," 5 that the children and M.R. were

younger than fourteen years of age and not "otherwise of an age

of discretion," that reasonable efforts had been made "to prevent

removal from the home and to reunite the children and [M.R.] with

Ange," that termination of Ange's residual parental rights was

"in the children's best interests," and that placement in

permanent foster care was in M.R.'s best interests. The court

further summarily found as follows:
6. According to § 16.1-282(B) of the
Virginia Code, based upon clear and
convincing evidence, the neglect and/or abuse
suffered by the children presents a serious
and substantial threat to their life, health
and/or development, and it is not reasonably
likely that the conditions which resulted in
such neglect or abuse can be substantially
corrected or eliminated so as to allow the
children's safe return to Ange within a
reasonable period of time; and

7. According to § 16.1-283(C) of the
Virginia Code, based upon clear and
convincing evidence, Ange has without good
cause been unwilling or unable within a
reasonable period of time not exceeding
twelve (12) months from the date the children
were placed in foster care to remedy
substantially the conditions which led to or
required continuation of the children's

4
The record does not disclose whether the trial court
imposed this sanction sua sponte or on DSS's motion. Nor does
the record identify the source of the court's authority to
impose the sanction.
5
Neither the written statement of facts nor the trial
court's "Final Decree" identifies the evidence upon which the
trial court relied to make its findings.

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 foster care placements not withstanding the
reasonable and appropriate efforts of social,
medical, mental health and/or other
rehabilitative agencies to such end; . . . .
Based on its factual findings, the trial court, with the

concurrence of the guardian ad litem for Ange's children, 6

ordered that Ange's residual parental rights to the children be

terminated and that DSS's foster care service plan with the goal

of permanent foster care for M.R. be approved. On April 6, 2001,

the trial court entered a "Final Decree" memorializing its

findings and orders from the March 8, 2001 hearing. 7 This appeal

followed.

6
On appeal, the guardian ad litem did not file a brief or
appear for argument on behalf of the children and M.R. in this
case.
7
The written statement of facts in the record indicates
that the trial court "dismissed" Ange's appeals from the
juvenile court and "affirmed" the juvenile court's orders at the
March 8, 2001 hearing. However, in light of the trial court's
findings of fact and orders set forth in the "Final Decree"—as
recited hereinabove—and the absence of any language in that
decree regarding dismissal of the subject cases or affirmance of
the juvenile court's orders, we conclude that Ange's appeals
were summarily adjudicated by the trial court without a hearing
on the merits, rather than dismissed. See Waterfront Marine
Constr., Inc. v. North End 49ers Sandbridge Bulkhead Groups A, B
and C, 251 Va. 417, 427 n.2, 468 S.E.2d 894, 900 n.2 (1996)
(holding that "a court speaks through its orders" and that, when
a court's orders conflict with its statements made at a hearing
or its letter opinions, "we presume that the orders accurately
reflect what transpired") (citing Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220
Va. 260, 280-81, 257 S.E.2d 808, 822 (1979) (holding that, where
an order conflicts with a transcript of a related proceeding,
the order is presumed to be an accurate reflection of what
transpired)); see also Anderson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App.
506, 509, 413 S.E.2d 75, 77 (1992) (observing that, because
transcripts and written statements of facts serve the same
purpose on appeal, policies concerning them should be reasonably
analogous).

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 II. ANALYSIS

Ange contends the trial court erred in sanctioning her for

noncompliance with its pretrial orders by summarily terminating

her residual parental rights to three of her children and

approving the placement in permanent foster care of another of

her children without a hearing on the merits. The imposition of

such a severe sanction, Ange argues, was unwarranted under the

circumstances of this case and, thus, constituted an abuse of

discretion. 8
DSS contends the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

A trial court, DSS argues, has broad discretion in enforcing its

orders and determining the appropriate sanctions for

noncompliance with its orders. In this case, DSS continues, the

trial court, "[a]fter five months of patient attempts to obtain

. . . Ange's compliance with its orders," acted within its

discretion in punishing Ange for her noncompliance with its

pretrial orders. According to DSS, "Ange was not entitled to

disregard the orders of the [t]rial [c]ourt in preparing the case

for trial and still have a full hearing on the merits."

8
Because Ange raises, on appeal, only the issue of whether
the trial court abused its discretion, "we limit our review to
that issue, and we do not express any opinion on other potential
issues." Dammerau v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 285, 287, 349
S.E.2d 409, 410 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Vescuso v.
Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 59, 69, 360 S.E.2d 547, 552 (1987) (en
banc).

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 There is no question the trial court had the authority to

sanction Ange for noncompliance with its pretrial orders. "All

litigants . . . are required to comply with court orders and

their failure to do so subjects them to the sanction powers of

the court." Parish v. Spaulding, 257 Va. 357, 363, 513 S.E.2d

391, 394 (1999). A court's ability to punish a litigant for

noncompliance with its orders is "essential to the proper

administration of the law, to enable courts to enforce their

orders, judgments and decrees." Steinberg v. Steinberg, 21 Va.

App. 42, 46, 461 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1995). "Courts often impose

sanctions when a litigant . . . has acted in bad faith." Gentry

v. Toyota Motor Corp., 252 Va. 30, 34, 471 S.E.2d 485, 488

(1996). Sanctions are also "used to protect courts against those

who would abuse the judicial process." Oxenham v. Johnson, 241

Va. 281, 286, 402 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1991). "The purpose of such . . .

sanction[s] is to punish the offending party and deter others

from acting similarly." Gentry, 252 Va. at 34, 471 S.E.2d at

488.

"[A] court's decision of whether and how to enforce an order

is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion." Parish v.

Spaulding, 26 Va. App. 566, 576, 496 S.E.2d 91, 96 (1998), aff'd,

257 Va. 357, 513 S.E.2d 391 (1999). Consequently, we will not

reverse the trial court's decision in this case "unless the court

abused its discretion" in summarily adjudicating Ange's appeals

from the juvenile court without a hearing on the merits. Gentry,

252 Va. at 34, 471 S.E.2d at 488. We must be mindful, however,

that, although we "accord deference to the decision of the trial

court," we "should not simply rubber stamp every discretionary

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decision of a trial court. To the contrary, we have an

obligation to review the record and, upon doing so, to reverse

the judgment of the trial court if we find a clear abuse of

discretion." Walsh v. Bennett, 260 Va. 171, 175, 530 S.E.2d 904,

907 (2000).

Generally, "[t]he determination whether a trial court has

abused its discretion is fact-specific." Id. However, in

assessing the propriety of the imposition of a particular

sanction, we may also take into account the context in which the

sanction was imposed and any policy considerations that might be

pertinent to the imposition of that sanction. See, e.g., id. at

176, 530 S.E.2d at 907 (holding that, in addition to constituting

an abuse of discretion on the facts of the case, the pretrial

sanction imposed by the trial court was also inappropriate

because it deprived plaintiff "of his day in court").

In support of its claim that the trial court based the

sanction it imposed on "five months of noncompliant behavior by

Ange," DSS asserts that Ange failed (1) to file her "Best

Interest of the Child Proffers," or, alternatively, appear in

court, by 8:00 a.m. on December 15, 2000, as directed by the

trial court in its order entered December 13, 2000, (2) to file

her notarized and completed proffers by 8:00 a.m. on January 16,

2001, as directed by the trial court in its order entered January

3, 2001, (3) to cooperate with DSS in completing the home study,

as directed by the trial court in its order entered January 22,

2001, and (4) to cooperate with DSS in completing the parental

evaluation, "after repeated orders of the [t]rial [c]ourt to do

so." While these acts are each referenced in the record and are

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clearly not to be condoned if proved, we cannot say, upon a

careful examination of the record, even considering the record in

the light most favorable to DSS, that Ange acted in bad faith or

abused the judicial process to the extent that DSS would have us

believe.

The trial court issued its pretrial order of December 13,

2000, pursuant to Rule 1:18. It directed Ange and DSS to file

"Best Interests of the Child Proffers" and DSS to conduct a home

study and parental evaluation. The order's clear purpose was, in

the language of Rule 1:18, to promote the "efficient and orderly

administration of justice," or, in other words, to prepare the

case in a timely fashion for trial. However, no trial date was
9
set in that order. Likewise, no deadline was established for

the home study or parental evaluation. The only time-related

directive in the court's initial pretrial order required Ange and

DSS to file their proffers by 8:00 a.m. on December 15, 2000.

DSS met the designated deadline, but Ange did not. Nor did Ange

appear in court at that time.

However, following a hearing attended by Ange's counsel, the

trial court extended the deadline for Ange to file her

9
Indeed, no trial date was ever set in this case, despite
Code § 16.1-296(E), which provides, in pertinent part:
Where an appeal is taken in a case
involving termination of parental rights
brought under § 16.1-283, the circuit court
shall hold a hearing on the merits of the

case within ninety days of the perfecting of
the appeal.

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proffers. 10 The court ordered Ange to file her proffers by

8:00 a.m. on January 16, 2001, and to report to DSS by noon on

January 16, 2001, or her appeals from the juvenile court would be

dismissed. Ange submitted her proffers to the trial court at

8:00 a.m. on January 16, 2001. Finding the proffers incomplete,

the trial court gave Ange a short time extension within which to

complete them. Ange completed the proffers within the designated

time limit, and the trial court accepted them as complete. Ange

then reported that day to DSS, where she received a home study

packet. According to DSS, Ange was to complete and return the

packet by January 30, 2001.
In its order entered January 22, 2001, the trial court also

directed Ange to "cooperate with [DSS] in completing the home

study." That order, however, did not establish a deadline for

the home study or a consequence should Ange not comply. Nor did

it address the parental evaluation at all. In a letter dated

February 12, 2001, DSS informed the trial court that Ange had

returned only a "partially completed" home study packet on

January 30, 2001, had provided "vague" information on a

questionnaire in the packet, and had not responded to two letters

sent by DSS telling her about appointments that had been made for

her to meet with DSS personnel. As noted in DSS's letter,

however, DSS was "under the perception that . . . Ange ha[d] an

open time frame in which to comply" with the court's and DSS's

directives because no deadline had been established for the home

10
Although the record does not disclose the court's reason
for granting Ange that extension, we presume the court had a
valid reason for doing so.

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study and no trial date had been set.

It appears, from our review of the record, that Ange made

some efforts to comply with the trial court's orders and that,

when given an ultimate deadline and faced with a manifest

consequence for noncompliance, she complied with the trial

court's orders, or at least attempted to do so. We further

observe, for purposes of our present analysis, that the trial

court's order requiring Ange "to cooperate with [DSS] in

completing the home study," without setting a deadline or

establishing the extent of cooperation required to constitute

compliance, put Ange, as well as DSS, in a position of not

knowing what was expressly required of her and not knowing when

it was required. Ange's return to DSS of even a partially

completed home study packet on January 30, 2001, could reasonably

be construed, on some level, as constituting "cooperation" in

"completing the home study." "As a general rule, 'before a

person may be held in contempt for violating a court order, the

order must be in definite terms as to the duties thereby imposed

upon him and the command must be expressed rather than implied.'"
Winn v. Winn, 218 Va. 8, 10, 235 S.E.2d 307, 309 (1977) (quoting

Wood v. Goodson, 485 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Ark. 1972)); see also

Mardula v. Mendelson, 34 Va. App. 120, 128, 538 S.E.2d 338, 342

(2000) (noting that, "in instances where the order does not

explicitly direct, mandate or prohibit specific conduct, it is

insufficient to sustain a finding of contempt"). Furthermore, we

find no order in the record directing Ange to cooperate with DSS

in the completion of the parental evaluation.

We raise these matters not to absolve Ange of her

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improprieties, or to suggest that courts give defiant or

reluctant parties the benefit of the doubt before sanctioning

their noncompliance or lead them by the hand through pretrial

proceedings. 11 We intend merely to distinguish this case from

those cases in which a party's noncompliance and disobedience

manifest a clear and total disregard for the court's authority.

Plainly, that is not the case here. Ange's noncompliance was not

absolute. Her lack of compliance was not a complete failure to

comply with the trial court's pretrial orders. This is not to

say, however, that Ange's actions constitute "compliance" or

that, under these circumstances, the trial court should not have
12
imposed any sanctions on her. Rather, it is to say that some

of the findings by the trial court upon which the imposition of

the sanction in question was based—namely, that Ange had "not

substantially complied with any of" its pretrial orders, in that

she had not "proper[ly] complet[ed] . . . the Best Interests of

the Child Proffers" or "full[y] cooperat[ed] in the performance

of a Home Study and a Parental Evaluation" (emphasis added)—are

not fully supported by the record, in that they are overstated or

include requirements that were not part of the court's

directives.

Moreover, given the context in which this issue arises, we

find the extreme nature of the sanction imposed on Ange

especially troublesome. This case was before the trial court on

11
To rule thus would not only condone the type of behavior
sanctions are intended to deter, it would also greatly dishonor
those who properly and respectably comply with the orders of
courts.
12
Indeed, Ange herself concedes, on appeal, that some less
severe sanction might have been appropriate.

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Ange's appeal of the orders of the juvenile court terminating her

residual parental rights to the children and ordering the

placement of M.R. in permanent foster care. Finding that Ange

had not complied with its pretrial orders concerning the

preparation of the case for trial, the trial court sanctioned her

for her noncompliance by summarily adjudicating her appeals from

the juvenile court without a hearing on the merits. Thus, the

court terminated Ange's residual parental rights to the children

and approved the placement of M.R. in permanent foster care

without allowing Ange to put on evidence at trial, rebut DSS's

evidence, confront adverse witnesses, or present any argument in

defense of DSS's foster care service plan and petition for the

termination of her residual parental rights. In other words, the

court's sanction did not let Ange's appeals go forward and, thus,

deprived her of her day in court on the merits of the case. Such

drastic measures that summarily terminate the legal process are

generally not favored and are to be avoided when possible. See

Walsh, 260 Va. at 176, 530 S.E.2d at 907 (noting that the Supreme

Court has "often warned of the dangers of 'short circuiting'

litigation because in doing so, a trial court 'deprives a

litigant of his day in court and deprives [the appellate courts]

of an opportunity to review a [more] thoroughly developed record

on appeal.'" (quoting Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson v.

Lake Fairfax Seven Ltd. P'ship, 253 Va. 93, 95, 480 S.E.2d 471,

472 (1997))); see also Brown v. Black, 260 Va. 305, 316, 534
S.E.2d 727, 732 (2000) (Kinser, J., concurring) (noting that

imposition of the "most severe sanction" requires inquiry as to

whether the "trial court could have furthered the [applicable]

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goals . . . through less drastic measures").

Furthermore, while it was Ange's appeals that brought this

case before the trial court, it was DSS's case to prove. As we

stated in Fairfax County Dep't of Family Servs. v. D.N., 29 Va.

App. 400, 406, 512 S.E.2d 830, 832 (1999) (citations omitted):

[A]n appeal from the juvenile court must
be heard de novo by the circuit court. Code §
16.1-136. "'A de novo hearing means a trial
anew, with the burden of proof remaining upon
the party with whom it rested in the juvenile
court.'" A trial de novo in the circuit
court "annuls the judgment of the [juvenile
court] as completely as if there had been no
previous trial . . . and . . . grants to a
litigant every advantage which would have
been [available to the litigant] had the case
been tried originally in [the circuit]
court." "'A court which hears a case de
novo, which disregards the judgment of the
court below, which hears evidence anew and
new evidence, and which makes final
disposition of the case, acts not as a court
of appeals but as one exercising original
jurisdiction.'"

Thus, the burden in this case was on DSS to prove by clear

and convincing evidence that termination of Ange's residual

parental rights was in the best interests of the children and

that the other requisite provisions of Code § 16.1-283(B) or

16.1-283(C) had been met. With regards to M.R., DSS had the

burden of proving that the requisite provisions of Code

§ 16.1-282.1 had been satisfied and that placement in permanent

foster care was in her best interests. In preventing this case

from going to trial, the trial court precluded DSS from

presenting the full extent of its evidence in support of its

petition for termination of Ange's residual parental rights to

the children and its foster care service plan for M.R. The legal

process, as well as the trial court's important appellate role in

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that process, was thus short-circuited. While the question of

whether DSS ultimately met its burden of proof is not before us,

we note with some skepticism that the trial court, relying,

apparently, exclusively on the parties' "Best Interest of the

Child" proffers, 13 found that DSS had proved its case. 14

We are also mindful, in a case of this type, that, "[w]hen

addressing matters concerning a child, including the termination

of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount

consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests."
Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Servs., 13 Va. App. 123,

128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). "In matters of a child's

welfare, trial courts are vested with broad discretion in making

the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child's best

interests." Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d

794, 795 (1990). "It is clearly not in the best interests of a

13
DSS argues that the trial court also had the
recommendations of the guardian ad litem and Ange's Child
Protective Services history before it for consideration in
making its findings. Notwithstanding the fact that neither of
those items was ever received into evidence by the trial court,
the record is devoid of any indication that the guardian ad
litem presented testimony, a report, or recommendations to the
trial court, other than that he concurred in the court's
ultimate rulings in the case. Likewise, the record does not
show that Ange's Child Protective Services history, which was
related to the trial court in DSS's letter of February 12, 2001,
was presented to the court under oath.
14
Because Ange did not challenge the propriety of this
finding or the trial court's apparent reliance solely on the
parties' written proffers in terminating Ange's residual
parental rights, we do not address the issue further, except to
note that the "Best Interest of the Child" proffers submitted by
the parties were clearly intended to assist the trial court and
parties prepare for a trial de novo on the merits, not to serve
as the entire evidentiary basis for the court's findings and
orders in this case.

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child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when,

or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her]

responsibilities." Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep't of Soc.

Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990).

On the other hand, "'the rights of parents may not be

lightly severed but are to be respected if at all consonant with

the best interests of the child.'" Ward v. Faw, 219 Va. 1120,

1124, 253 S.E.2d 658, 661 (1979) (quoting Malpass v. Morgan, 213

Va. 393, 400, 192 S.E.2d 794, 799 (1972)). "The termination of

parental rights is a grave, drastic, and irreversible action.

When a court orders termination of parental rights, the ties

between the parent and child are severed forever, and the parent

becomes 'a legal stranger to the child.'" Lowe v. Dep't of Pub.

Welfare of City of Richmond, 231 Va. 277, 280, 343 S.E.2d 70, 72

(1986) (quoting Shank v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 217 Va. 506, 509,

230 S.E.2d 454, 457 (1976)). Therefore, in reviewing such cases,

we must have a

respect for the natural bond between children
and their natural parents. The preservation
of the family, and in particular the
parent-child relationship between parent and
child, is an important goal for not only the
parents but also government itself. . . .
Statutes terminating the legal relationship
between parent and child should be
interpreted consistently with the
governmental objective of preserving, when
possible, the parent-child relationship.

Weaver v. Roanoke Dep't of Human Res., 220 Va. 921, 926, 265

S.E.2d 692, 695 (1980).

Thus, while the paramount concern is the best interests of

Ange's children, Ange's rights must also be protected.

Certainly, the efficient resolution of this case is in the

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children's best interest, but so, too, is the preservation of the

children's relationship with their mother, if that is found to be

warranted. As plainly shown in the record, the trial court did

not base the imposition of its sanction in this case on the best

interests of Ange's children. Rather, it was imposed strictly to

punish Ange for failing to comply with the court's pretrial

orders.

Thus, given the nature of this case, the severity of the

sanction imposed, Ange's partial compliance with the trial

court's orders, and the need to protect Ange's rights, we

conclude that, in summarily disposing of Ange's appeals from the

juvenile court without a hearing on the merits based on Ange's

noncompliance with the trial court's pretrial orders, the trial

court clearly abused its discretion. Less drastic sanctions

would have served the same purpose of punishing Ange for her

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noncompliance, without short-circuiting these significant legal

proceedings.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and

remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

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Agee, J., concurring.

I agree with the majority that the decision of the trial

court to summarily terminate Ange's residual parental rights to

three of her four children and to place the fourth child in

permanent foster care was erroneous and requires reversal. While

I concur in the majority's decision to reverse and remand, I do

not agree with describing the trial court's decision to proceed

summarily as "a sanction" imposed against Ange for an alleged

failure to comply with its orders.
A sanction is a discretionary measure employed by a trial

court to coerce a party to comply with a discovery order or to

punish a party for abusing the judicial system. See, e.g., Code

§ 8.01-271.1 (trial court shall impose an appropriate sanction

against a party and/or counsel whose pleading, motion or other

paper is signed or made without being "well grounded in fact" and

"warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the

extension, modification, or reversal of existing law"); Rule 4:12

(trial court has broad discretion to sanction a party for failing

to comply with discovery orders). Ange never argued that the

trial court proceeded summarily as a sanction. The record before

us does not indicate that the decision to proceed summarily was

rendered as a form of sanction in the ordinary sense of our

jurisprudence, a measure used "to protect [the trial court]

against those who would abuse the judicial

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process." Oxenham v. Johnson, 241 Va. 281, 286, 402 S.E.2d 1, 3

(1991).

I do not conclude from the facts before us in the record

that the trial court elected to proceed summarily to either

punish Ange or to coerce her into complying with its orders. The

facts reflect the trial court simply erred procedurally,

believing it could rule on the DSS petitions summarily, and not

as a sanction against Ange.

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