COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Annunziata and Humphreys
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC.
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0870-01-4 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
FEBRUARY 5, 2002
SHARON ROBINSON
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
S. Vernon Priddy III (P. Dawn Bishop; Sands
Anderson Marks & Miller, on brief), for
appellant.
Peter J. Jones for appellee.
Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. (employer) contends the
Workers' Compensation Commission (commission) erred in awarding
temporary total disability benefits to Sharon Robinson
(claimant). Specifically, employer argues the commission
improperly applied the doctrine of compensable consequences to a
pre-existing mental or emotional condition or illness. Employer
also contends the commission erred in finding a causal
connection between claimant's compensable workers' compensation
injury and the aggravation of her pre-existing mental or
emotional condition or illness. Finding no error, we affirm.
I. FACTS
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
party prevailing below. See Westmoreland Coal v. Russell, 31
Va. App. 16, 20, 520 S.E.2d 839, 841 (1999). The commission's
factual findings will be upheld on appeal if supported by
credible evidence. See James v. Capitol Steel Constr. Co., 8
Va. App. 512, 515, 382 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1989). "The fact that
there is contrary evidence in the record is of no consequence."
Wagner Enters., Inc. v. Brooks, 12 Va. App. 890, 894, 407 S.E.2d
32, 35 (1991).
So viewed, on April 7, 2000, claimant was employed as a
freight clerk for employer. She fell and dislocated her right
ulna, fractured her right radius and hurt her right breast, both
knees and right ankle. The parties stipulated the injury was
compensable. Claimant first treated with Dr. Anthony Debs who
gave her light work restrictions, but she became dissatisfied
with his treatment because he refused to "take her out of work."
She then sought treatment with Dr. Kostas J. Constantine who
also returned her to work with restrictions, but would not
remove her from work. Claimant's supervisor, Joe Lewis, offered
to put her "on call" as a light duty job; however, this job
required handwriting and she could not write with her left hand.
When asked if she was forced to work beyond her restrictions,
claimant testified,
[t]hey didn't tell me I had to do this, but
[Joe] kept saying how are the entries
looking, can you work on them tomorrow. It
was like I could not work fast enough to
please Joe. . . . On my very last day, the
night that I called my psychiatrist, Joe
says, well can't you type, can't you answer
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the phone? . . . It's like you're not doing
enough, and he kept -- all -- when I was
working, he said the entries, the entries
have got to be done, got to do the entries,
did you get, did you get a chance to work on
the entries today. No, Joe, I didn't have
time, I was doing other things.
In April 2000, shortly after the accident, claimant saw her
psychiatrist, Dr. Carl V. Hunt. Claimant had been seeing Dr.
Hunt "on and off" for two years prior to the injury. Claimant
acknowledged that she suffered from depression prior to the
injury and that she was on medication prescribed by Dr. Hunt at
the time of the accident. However, she testified the injury and
her efforts to continue in her regular position increased her
stress. She could not sleep and was irritable. She felt
depressed because she was unable to work in the same manner as
before the accident and she was in constant pain. "I couldn't
believe all this was happening and there was nothing nobody
[sic] could do for me." On May 9, 2000, Dr. Hunt took claimant
out of work. He stated:
Because of her recent injury, her physical
ability to carry out her work
responsibilities has been significantly
impaired. This is causing her excessive
stress and is resulting in a disturbance of
sleep and increasing irritability. I do not
believe she is mentally able to function at
work at this time.
Her ongoing treatment with Dr. Hunt was conducted through weekly
telephone calls. Employer presented no medical evidence to
contradict this opinion.
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Claimant's supervisor, Joe Lewis, testified that he was
aware of her restrictions. He stated the job he offered her
could be done using one hand and that speed was not a factor.
The deputy commissioner found that while claimant suffered
from pre-existing depression and had treated with Dr. Hunt prior
to the injury, the compensable accident at work aggravated her
underlying condition and caused her inability to work. The
commission agreed with this finding, citing the letters and
reports of Dr. Hunt that directly related claimant's post-injury
mental status with her increased stress and anxiety caused by
the compensable injury. The commission stated:
The psychological impact of the claimant's
injury has been significant, as evidenced by
her severe levels of depression and
irritability. Although she had been treated
for these conditions before her work
accident, her symptoms became more severe
and disabling following her injury.
The employer correctly points out that
before the accident, the claimant was seeing
Dr. Hunt and taking anti-depressant
medication and that Dr. Hunt disabled the
claimant without examining her. However,
the employer has not presented any contrary
medical evidence. Thus, Dr. Hunt's medical
opinion that the claimant can not work
because of the injury is uncontradicted.
Based on this evidence, the claimant has
proven a causal connection between her need
for psychiatric treatment and the accident.
Although she may have suffered preexisting
psychiatric problems, the record establishes
that her condition deteriorated after the
accident and that her psychiatrist linked
this condition to the accident.
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II. PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS AS COMPENSABLE CONSEQUENCES
Employer first contends the commission erred in finding
that an employer is responsible for the effects of an accident,
if it aggravates a pre-existing or underlying psychological
condition. Employer argues that it is responsible only for
emotional or mental conditions caused by physical injury and not
for those conditions aggravated by the physical injury. We
disagree.
The law is clear that "[w]hen an injury sustained in an
industrial accident accelerates or aggravates a pre-existing
condition . . . disability resulting therefrom is compensable
under the Workers' Compensation Act." Kemp v. Tidewater Kiewit,
7 Va. App. 360, 363, 373 S.E.2d 725, 726 (1988) (citing Ohio
Valley Construction Co. v. Jackson, 230 Va. 56, 58, 334 S.E.2d
554, 555 (1985)), see also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Harris,
35 Va. App. 162, 170-71, 543 S.E.2d 619, 623 (2001).
In Bassett Burkeville Veneer v. Slaughter, 21 Va. App. 575,
466 S.E.2d 127 (1996), we affirmed the commission's award of
benefits on facts remarkably similar to those of the instant
case. On several occasions, Slaughter had been admitted to the
psychiatric ward of a hospital for treatment of depression prior
to his suffering a compensable injury by accident. He returned
to work, but was in constant pain and eventually was admitted to
the hospital after passing out. A psychiatrist evaluated him
while he was hospitalized and diagnosed him as suffering a major
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depressive episode as a result of the physical injury at work.
The psychiatrist called the physical injury "the straw that
broke the camel's back." Id. at 577, 466 S.E.2d at 128. "[The
psychiatrist] testified that although Slaughter had psychiatric
problems before the 1988 injury, the October [1988] accident
caused his psychiatric decompensation . . . and the disability."
Id. at 580, 466 S.E.2d at 129. Thus, we implicitly recognized
the compensability of an aggravation of an underlying mental
condition.
In Seneca Falls Greenhouse and Nursery v. Layton, 9 Va.
App. 482, 389 S.E.2d 184 (1990), Layton also suffered from a
pre-existing mental condition - a panic disorder. While at
work, he attempted to open a can of pesticide and sprayed
himself in the face and eyes. After the pesticide exposure, he
suffered from headaches and double vision. We affirmed the
award of benefits when it was determined that the pesticide
exposure caused Layton to experience panic attacks that caused
headaches and double vision. "Emotional harm following physical
injury is compensable, even when the physical injury does not
directly cause the emotional consequence." Id. at 486, 389
S.E.2d at 187.
In the instant case, claimant admitted she suffered from
depression and had treated with Dr. Hunt for two years prior to
her work-related injury. During that two-year period she was
working without problems. Claimant attempted to return to her
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pre-injury job soon after her injury and had difficulty
performing her duties. She became irritable, could not sleep
and felt overwhelmed by the injury and her inability to do her
job. Relying on the medical testimony of Dr. Hunt as well as
the claimant's testimony, the commission found, "[t]he
psychological impact of the claimant's injury has been
significant, as evidenced by her severe levels of depression and
irritability. Although she had been treated for these
conditions before her work accident, her symptoms became more
severe and disabling following her injury." Credible evidence
supports this finding and, thus, the commission did not err in
determining that claimant's pre-existing emotional or mental
condition was aggravated by the April 7, 2000 compensable
accident.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Employer next argues that even accepting a compensable
psychological consequence, the evidence is insufficient to prove
a direct causal relationship between the injury and the
aggravation of claimant's pre-existing mental or emotional
condition.
"'"Decisions of the commission as to questions of fact if
supported by credible evidence, are conclusive and binding on
this Court."'" Allen & Rocks Inc. v. Briggs, 28 Va. App. 662,
673, 508 S.E.2d 335, 340 (1998) (quoting WLR Foods v. Cardosa,
26 Va. App. 220, 230, 494 S.E.2d 147, 152 (1997) (quoting
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Manassas Ice & Fuel Co. v. Farrar, 13 Va. App. 227, 229, 409
S.E.2d 824, 826 (1991))).
Employer contends that claimant's interaction with her
supervisor and the tension in that relationship were the
precipitating factors in her deteriorating mental condition
rather than the physical injuries she sustained in the fall. It
is well settled that "purely psychological disability resulting
from disagreements over managerial decisions and conflicts with
supervisory personnel that cause stressful consequences
ordinarily are not compensable." Teasley v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 14 Va. App. 45, 49, 415 S.E.2d 596, 598 (1992). However,
we do not reweigh the commission's factual determination. The
commission was not required to accept the employer's theory that
her relationship with her supervisor was the cause of her
anxiety.
Claimant described the effect that her injuries - the
constant swelling and loss of feeling in her hand - had on her
mental status.
It's like it was more stress, and I'm like,
oh my God, what is going to happen to my
hand, what is going to happen to my hand.
And I couldn't sleep. I was worried about
my job. I was worried about my hand. I was
worried about my knees.
This testimony, and the opinion of Dr. Hunt that the workplace
injury was the cause of her deteriorating mental condition,
support the commission's finding that claimant's injury, and her
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inability to perform her work as she had prior to the accident,
were the causes of her stress and anxiety rather than tension
between herself and her supervisor.
Lastly, employer argues that claimant failed to show any
continuing disability because the evidence proved she was able
to perform some household chores. This argument is without
merit. No evidence established that the ability to perform
household chores equated to the ability to perform claimant's
job.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the
commission.
Affirmed.
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