COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Benton, Willis, Elder,
Bray, Annunziata, Bumgardner, Frank, Humphreys and
Clements
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
MICHAEL A. MAHONEY, SR.
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2949-98-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
DECEMBER 5, 2000
JEANNE M. MAHONEY
UPON A REHEARING EN BANC
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY
Benjamin N. A. Kendrick, Judge
John M. DiJoseph (Kavrukov & DiJoseph, on
brief), for appellant.
John R. Angus (Weiner, Weiner & Weiner,
P.C., on briefs), for appellee.
Amicus Curiae: Commonwealth of Virginia,
Department of Social Services, Division of
Child Support Enforcement (Mark L. Earley,
Attorney General; Ashley L. Taylor, Deputy
Attorney General; Robert B. Cousins, Jr.,
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Craig M.
Burshem, Regional Special Counsel; Jason P.
Cooley, Special Counsel; Jack A. Maxwell,
Special Counsel; Gary Webb, Special Counsel;
William K. Wetzonis, Special Counsel, on
brief), for appellee.
On April 4, 2000, a divided panel of this Court reversed
and remanded the trial court's dismissal of Michael A. Mahoney's
appeal from a judgment of the juvenile and domestic relations
district court. We granted appellee's petition for a rehearing
en banc and stayed the mandate of that decision. Upon rehearing
en banc, we hold the trial court did not err in its ruling that
upon failure to post an appeal bond fixed under Code
§ 16.1-296(H), appellant's appeal must be dismissed. Therefore,
we affirm the decision of the trial court.
ANALYSIS
Guided by well-settled principles, we review the evidence
on appeal in the light most favorable to the party prevailing
below. On August 28, 1998, the Arlington Juvenile and Domestic
Relations District Court (J&DR) found appellant, Michael Mahoney
(father), in civil contempt of court on Jeanne Mahoney's Rule to
Show Cause which was issued against the father for failing to
comply with court-ordered support, both child and spousal, as
well as medical bills and attorney's fees. The court entered
judgment against father in the amount of $151,902.52, the amount
in arrears due to mother. On appeal to the circuit court,
father characterized the appeal as one challenging the
"jurisdiction of the Court [to] enter any orders and the
validity of all orders entered in this case based on fraud." He
specifically noted his intention not to appeal the amounts of
support found due and owing. Bond was fixed at $165,888.62 by
the juvenile court. When no bond was posted, the circuit court
dismissed father's appeal upon mother's motion. The court's
order of dismissal was appealed to this Court. We affirm the
circuit court's decision on the grounds that follow.
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Code § 16.1-296(H) provides, in pertinent part:
No appeal bond shall be required of a party
appealing from an order of a juvenile and
domestic relations district court except for
that portion of any order or judgment
establishing a support arrearage or
suspending payment of support during pendency
of an appeal. In cases involving support, no
appeal shall be allowed until the party
applying for the same or someone for him
gives bond, in an amount and with sufficient
surety approved by the judge or by his clerk
if there is one, to abide by such judgment as
may be rendered on appeal if the appeal is
perfected or, if not perfected, then to
satisfy the judgment of the court in which it
was rendered. Upon appeal from a conviction
for failure to support or from a finding of
civil or criminal contempt involving a
failure to support, the juvenile and domestic
relations district court may require the
party applying for the appeal or someone for
him to give bond . . . . An appeal will not
be perfected unless such appeal bond as may
be required is filed within thirty days from
the entry of the final judgment or order.
(Emphasis added). Mahoney contends the circuit court erroneously
dismissed his appeal de novo because he limited his appeal to a
challenge of the court's jurisdiction. He reasons that, having
specifically excluded from his notice of appeal the juvenile
court's establishment of a support arrearage and its finding of
contempt, he was not required to post an appeal bond under Code
§ 16.1-296(H). We disagree.
Mahoney's challenge to the validity of "all orders entered"
by the juvenile court, and to the authority of the court to enter
any such orders, necessarily and logically implicates a challenge
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to the subject of the orders entered by the juvenile court. In
this case, the order Mahoney appealed from the juvenile court to
the circuit court established a support arrearage he owed to his
former wife. Thus, Mahoney's appeal from the juvenile court's
order was necessarily subject to the jurisdictional requirement of
Code § 16.1-296(H), which requires an appeal bond "for that
portion of any order establishing a support arrearage."
In addition, not only is the substantive issue of support
arrearages logically related to, and inherent in, Mahoney's
challenge to the jurisdiction of the court and the claimed
invalidity of "all orders entered," but the law governing
appeals from courts not of record also provides a well
established legal foundation for the imposition of bond. An
appeal from a court not of record is tried de novo. See Code
§§ 16.1-106, 16.1-113; Copperthite Pie Corp. v. Whitehurst, 157
Va. 480, 488, 162 S.E. 189, 191 (1932) (citing Southern Ry. Co.
v. Hill, 106 Va. 501, 505, 56 S.E. 278, 280 (1907)); see also
Hailey v. Dorsey, 580 F.2d 112, 114 (4th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 937 (1979). Such an appeal transfers the
entire record to the circuit court for retrial as though the
case had been originally brought there. See Addison v. Salyer,
185 Va. 644, 650, 40 S.E.2d 260, 263 (1946). Upon transfer, the
order and judgment of the lower court are annulled. See Ragan
v. Woodcroft Village Apts., 255 Va. 322, 327, 497 S.E.2d 740,
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742 (1998) (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tuttle, 208 Va.
28, 32, 155 S.E.2d 358, 361 (1967)).
It follows that because no case or judgment exists in the
lower court, and because the circuit court upon appeal acts as the
tribunal of original jurisdiction, it must address and dispose of
all issues raised by the petitioner in the lower court. See
Addison, 185 Va. at 649, 40 S.E.2d at 263 ("'A court which hears a
case de novo . . . acts not as a court of appeals but as one
exercising original jurisdiction.'" (quoting Gemmell, Inc. v. Svea
Fire Ins. Co., 166 Va. 95, 98, 184 S.E. 457, 458 (1936))).
Specifically, the circuit court must decide both the issue of
jurisdiction and the issue of arrearages, because no judgment on
arrearages exists once the matter is appealed from the lower
tribunal. 1
1
For example, if jurisdiction is found to exist on appeal,
the circuit court must determine arrearages. It is reversible
error to permit the judgment of the lower court to be introduced
as evidence in the case and no other judgment on the issues is
extant, because that of the lower court is annulled. See
Gravely v. Deeds, 185 Va. 662, 664, 40 S.E.2d 175, 176 (1946);
see also Nationwide, 208 Va. at 33, 155 S.E.2d at 361-62.
Conversely, if the circuit court finds no jurisdiction exists,
the case must be dismissed and no arrearages established.
Moreover, that the party bringing the appeal prevails in the
trial de novo is insufficient to avoid the dictate of Code
§ 16.1-296(H) that "no appeal shall be allowed unless and until
a bond is given by the party applying for the appeal."
Commonwealth ex rel. May v. Walker, 253 Va. 319, 322, 485 S.E.2d
134, 136 (1997). In fact, the circuit court does not even have
jurisdiction to hear the case unless the appeal bond is posted.
See id. at 323, 485 S.E.2d at 136 ("[T]he failure to post an
appeal bond . . . is a fatal jurisdictional defect . . . .").
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The policy underlying the requirement of appeal bonds is
clear. An appeal bond provides assurances that any judgment that
may be rendered on appeal, if perfected, will be satisfied. See
Code § 16.1-107; Hutchins v. Carillo, 27 Va. App. 595, 606, 500
S.E.2d 277, 282 (1998) (noting that "the essential function of an
appeal bond [is] 'to protect the [appellee] against any loss or
damage he may sustain by reason of the suspension of his right to
proceed with the collection of his judgment against the
[appellant]'" (quoting Jacob v. Commonwealth ex rel. Myers, 148
Va. 236, 242, 138 S.E. 574, 576 (1927))). Such bonds also provide
assurances in cases in which an appeal is not perfected that the
judgment of the court in which it was rendered will be satisfied.
See id. Indeed, the policy considerations underlying the need for
bond upon appeal from the lower court are so material to the
statutory scheme reflected in Code § 16.1-296(H) that the failure
to post the required bond will constitute reversible error even
when the appellant prevails in the trial de novo. See
Commonwealth ex rel. May v. Walker, 253 Va. 319, 323, 485 S.E.2d
134, 136-37 (1997).
In summary, we hold that the JD&R order from which appellant
appealed addressed only one subject, viz., that of support
arrearages. 2 As such, Mahoney's failure to post bond under Code
2
We do not address in this opinion the applicability of
Code § 16.1-296(H) to an order which addresses multiple,
independent issues unrelated to the issue of support.
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§ 16.1-296(H) was fatal to his appeal. We accordingly affirm the
decision of the trial court to dismiss his appeal.
Affirmed.
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Benton, J., dissenting.
In pertinent part, Code § 16.1-296(H) provides as follows:
No appeal bond shall be required of a
party appealing from an order of a juvenile
and domestic relations district court except
for that portion of any order or judgment
establishing a support arrearage or
suspending payment of support during
pendency of an appeal. In cases involving
support, no appeal shall be allowed until
the party applying for the same or someone
for him gives bond, in an amount and with
sufficient surety approved by the judge or
by his clerk if there is one, to abide by
such judgment as may be rendered on appeal
if the appeal is perfected or, if not
perfected, then to satisfy the judgment of
the court in which it was rendered. Upon
appeal from a conviction for failure to
support or from a finding of civil or
criminal contempt involving a failure to
support, the juvenile and domestic relations
district court may require the party
applying for the appeal or someone for him
to give bond, with or without surety, to
insure his appearance and may also require
bond in an amount and with sufficient surety
to secure the payment of prospective support
accruing during the pendency of the appeal.
An appeal will not be perfected unless such
appeal bond as may be required is filed
within thirty days from the entry of the
final judgment or order.
Although the statute clearly states that "[i]n cases involving
support, no appeal shall be allowed until the party applying for
the same or someone for him gives bond," in equally clear
language the statute begins by stating that "[n]o appeal bond
shall be required . . . except for that portion of any order or
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judgment . . . establishing a support arrearage." Id. (emphasis
added).
By its explicit terms, the statute removes
the requirement for posting a bond except as
provided in the statute. The provision
specifying that a bond shall be required for
an appeal of a judgment establishing support
arrearages implicitly recognizes that an
order that sets arrearages may have a
component that does not establish a support
arrearage. In such a case, an appeal bond
is required only for "that portion of any
order . . . establishing a support
arrearage."
Avery v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 698, 700, 472 S.E.2d 675, 676
(1996) (citation omitted). I would hold that Michael A.
Mahoney's appeal of the "jurisdiction of the Court [to] enter
any order" is not an appeal of a "portion of any order or
judgment establishing a support arrearage."
When Mahoney appealed the judgment to the circuit court, he
wrote on the notice of appeal that he "appeals jurisdiction of
the Court [to] enter any orders and the validity of all orders
entered in this case based on fraud" and that "[h]e is not
appealing amounts of support." (Additional emphasis added).
Consistent with his notation on the notice of appeal, Mahoney
informed the trial judge during the hearing that he was "not
appeal[ing] the amount of support" but was "appeal[ing] . . .
the lack of subject matter jurisdiction by the [juvenile and
domestic relations district] court." Specifically, Mahoney
alleged that the juvenile court never acquired jurisdiction
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under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act or the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act. Ruling that a party "can't
piecemeal the appeal," the trial judge apparently recognized
that Mahoney's challenge was not to any portion of the judgment
but to the power of the court to render any judgment.
Nevertheless, the trial judge granted the motion to dismiss.
In my opinion, Mahoney's appeal is not subject to the
appeal bond requirement because it is not an appeal from "that
portion of any order or judgment establishing a support
arrearage." Code § 16.1-296(H). A judgment entered by a court
when it lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void, and that
judgment is subject to a challenge at any time. Morrison v.
Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 170, 387 S.E.2d 753, 755-56 (1990). In
addition, a party may challenge a judgment on the basis of a
court's failure to abide by mandatory statutory requirements.
In this regard, the Supreme Court has held that "[a] court's
authority to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction over a
case may be restricted by a failure to comply with statutory
requirements that are mandatory in nature and, thus, are
prerequisite to a court's lawful exercise of that jurisdiction."
Dennis Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 405, 409, 527 S.E.2d 415,
417 (2000). Such a failure renders the court without
jurisdiction to act and renders the judgment void. See David
Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 431, 439, 527 S.E.2d 406, 410
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(2000). Mahoney's appeal directly challenges the juvenile
court's power to render its judgment.
The Supreme Court has ruled as follows:
"[T]he record is never conclusive as to the
recital of a jurisdictional fact, and the
defendant is always at liberty to show a
want of jurisdiction, although the record
avers the contrary. If the court had no
jurisdiction, it had no power to make a
record, and the supposed record is not in
truth a record."
Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 787, 793, 284 S.E.2d 824, 827
(1981) (citation omitted). "[A]ny subsequent proceeding based
on . . . a [jurisdictionally] defective judgment is void or a
nullity." Morrison, 239 Va. at 170, 387 S.E.2d at 756.
We have addressed situations in which parties in support
disputes sought to challenge contempt rulings against them and
did not want to post the bond required by statute. In McCall v.
Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 348, 457 S.E.2d 389 (1995), we held
that, under the pre-1992 version of Code § 16.1-107, a court has
no duty to bifurcate support arrearage judgments from other
issues to determine whether a party must post a bond. Id. at
349, 457 S.E.2d at 390. We noted that when McCall appealed from
a juvenile court judgment, he "did not specify or indicate in
any way that he was appealing only the civil contempt citation
and not the determination as to the amount of his support
arrearage." Id. at 350, 457 S.E.2d at 391. We also noted that
McCall initially asserted the limited nature of his appeal only
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in this Court. See id. at 350, 457 S.E.2d at 390. Thus, we
affirmed the ruling dismissing McCall's appeal because he did
not bifurcate the issues. In Avery, however, we reversed an
order dismissing an appeal on similar grounds because the party
showed clearly that he "sought only to appeal the contempt
finding." 22 Va. App. at 702, 472 S.E.2d at 677.
I believe we should treat challenges to jurisdiction in the
same way we treat appeals from contempt orders. In this case,
as in Avery, the appellant, Mahoney, has "sufficiently
'inform[ed] the court that he was pursuing an appeal of the
[court's jurisdiction] and not appealing the determination of
the support arrearage.'" Id. (quoting McCall, 20 Va. App. at
352-53, 457 S.E.2d at 392). Mahoney separately listed in his
notice of appeal to the circuit court the matters he wished to
appeal and he orally stated at the circuit court hearing the
limited nature of his appeal. He did not challenge the support
arrearage judgment.
For these reasons, I would reverse and remand this matter
to the circuit court for consideration solely on the issue
whether the juvenile court acquired jurisdiction to adjudicate
the matter.
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