COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Annunziata and Overton
Argued by teleconference
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 1498-98-2 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
DECEMBER 1, 1998
SHAMAAL L'TURE BENJAMIN
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
Timothy J. Hauler, Judge
Daniel J. Munroe, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
briefs), for appellant.
Steven D. Benjamin (Betty Layne DesPortes;
Benjamin & DesPortes, P.C., on brief), for
appellee.
A grand jury indicted Shamaal L'Ture Benjamin for capital
murder, first degree murder, three counts of malicious wounding,
and five counts of using a firearm in the commission of a felony.
On appeal, the Commonwealth contends the trial judge erred in
granting Benjamin's pretrial motion to suppress a statement
Benjamin made during a police interrogation. See Code
§ 19.2-398. Benjamin cross-appeals two issues the trial judge
decided adversely to him. For the reasons that follow, we affirm
the trial judge's order.
I.
The evidence at the suppression hearing proved that on the
night of November 14, 1997, the police received information that
a person known as "Sha" had been involved in a double homicide in
Chesterfield County. The police also learned that Sha lived in
an apartment "off of Hull Street" and had driven a stolen Nissan
automobile. When the police arrived at the apartment complex
early on November 15, 1997, they saw the stolen automobile.
Several police officers set up surveillance around the
automobile. Sergeant Smith told Detective Ivey to detain anyone
who entered the car. He specifically advised Detective Ivey to
be on the lookout for a suspect named Sha, who was believed to be
a fifteen to eighteen-year-old male. Detective Ivey later
learned that Sha lived in one of the apartments in the building
at 1408 Clarkson Road. He understood that Sha was somehow
involved in a homicide but did not know the nature of Sha's
involvement or whether a firearm was involved.
Detective Hensley, who was part of the surveillance team,
was informed that the automobile had been involved in a double
homicide, that it possibly was driven and occupied by four males
involved in the homicides, and that a high-caliber semiautomatic
rifle had been used in the incident. He testified that the
officers had been told to look for Rosheen Waller, who was known
by the name "Shaw."
At 9:30 a.m., a person entered the automobile and attempted
to drive off. Because of a spiking device the officers placed on
a tire, the tire flattened. However, before the officers could
respond, the person exited the automobile and walked around the
apartment building in the direction of apartment 1408 A. The
officers were unable to identify the person but they proceeded to
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apartment 1408 A.
When the officers arrived at the apartment, they knocked at
the door, believing Waller resided there. Benjamin's mother
responded to the knock on the door. Seeing Benjamin in the
apartment, Detective Hensley asked him to identify himself.
Benjamin said he was "Shamaal Benjamin." The officers told
Benjamin they were looking for "Rosheen Waller, going by the
nickname Shaw." When Benjamin told them Waller lived elsewhere,
the officers left Benjamin's residence to search for Waller.
As the officers looked throughout the apartment complex,
Christopher Thomas entered the stolen automobile. Detective Ivey
and other officers detained Thomas and asked if his name was Sha.
Thomas denied being Sha, said Sha had just walked past them to
apartment 1408 A, and told the officers they could verify
Thomas's identity by asking his cousin in apartment 1408 B.
Thomas's cousin confirmed his identity.
Detective Ivey and several officers returned to apartment
1408 A and told Benjamin's mother they were looking for her son.
Detective Ivey testified that when Benjamin's mother opened the
door, he and another officer breached the doorway, stepped over
the threshold of the front door, and asked to speak to her son.
Detective Ivey saw Benjamin in the room and told Benjamin to come
with him. When the officers took Benjamin outside, Thomas
pointed to Benjamin and said, "That's Shaw." Detective Ivey then
placed handcuffs on Benjamin.
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Detectives Carroll and Church interrogated Benjamin at the
Chesterfield Police headquarters. By stipulation, a videotape of
the custodial interrogation was entered into evidence at the
suppression hearing. The trial judge watched the videotape as
Detective Church testified concerning his reading of the Miranda
form and the interrogation of Benjamin. Detective Church
testified that Benjamin's facial expressions, body language, and
tone of voice never indicated to him that Benjamin did not
understand everything that occurred during the interrogation.
Benjamin confessed his involvement in the shooting incident.
In granting Benjamin's motion to suppress his statement, the
trial judge made extensive findings. With regard to Benjamin's
Fourth Amendment claim, the trial judge found that the officers'
initial seizure of Benjamin in his apartment was a warrantless
arrest. He also found that sufficient probable cause for the
arrest "was developed just prior and contemporaneously" to the
seizure. However, the trial judge found that the officers did
not have consent to enter Benjamin's residence and that no
exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry. Thus, the
judge found that Benjamin's arrest was unlawful and constituted
an illegal seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
With regard to Benjamin's Fifth Amendment claim, the trial
judge found "as a matter of fact that the Miranda [rights
advisal] . . . was done . . . in an unintelligible manner."
Although the trial judge found that Benjamin's statement was not
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a product of any police coercion, intimidation, threats, or
promise of leniency, he found that Benjamin did not verbally
acknowledge any understanding of the Miranda rights and that
Benjamin did not waive his Fifth Amendment rights. He found that
"any waiver of rights was not given freely, intelligently and
voluntarily with full knowledge of the meaning and effect of the
waiver that was being solicited."
As to Benjamin's Sixth Amendment claim, the trial judge
found that Benjamin's request for counsel, "if it was made," was
unintelligible and ambiguous.
II.
Our review of the trial judge's ruling on the motion to
suppress is governed by the following standards:
[T]he burden is on the appellant to show that
the trial court's decision constituted
reversible error. We view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prevailing
party, granting to it all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom. We
review the trial court's findings of
historical fact only for "clear error," but
we review de novo the trial court's
application of defined legal standards to the
particular facts of a case, such as
determinations of reasonable suspicion and
probable cause. Whether a defendant
"invoked" his Miranda right[s] . . . during
custodial interrogation and whether he
"waived" [these] . . . right[s] are
determined by applying judicially declared
standards.
Quinn v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 702, 712-13, 492 S.E.2d 470,
475-76 (1997).
Evidence in the record clearly supports the trial judge's
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finding that Detective Church's reading of the Miranda rights
form to Benjamin was unintelligible. The videotape of the
interrogation was stipulated to be evidence. The detective's
reading of the statement was so jumbled and unintelligible that
the trial judge remarked, "Is he speaking in tongues?"
Significantly, only when the detective is reading from the form
is his diction unintelligible. The videotape demonstrates that
the detective's other statements and questions to Benjamin, both
before and after the unintelligible reading from the form, are
clear and understandable. Upon review of the evidence, we hold
that the trial judge's factual findings concerning the Miranda
rights are not plainly wrong. Indeed, those findings are clearly
supported by the evidence.
"[A]n individual held for interrogation must be clearly
informed [of the Miranda rights]." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 471 (1966).
"[T]he prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming
from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination," commonly known
as Miranda warnings. "Failure to give
Miranda warnings prior to custodial
interrogation requires suppression of any
illegally obtained statements."
Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 187, 194, 503 S.E.2d 233,
236 (1998) (citations omitted). The manner in which the
detective read the statement to Benjamin was so unintelligible
that it was functionally equivalent to not reading to Benjamin
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the Miranda rights.
Furthermore, based on the evidence in the record, the trial
judge did not err in ruling that the Commonwealth did not meet
its "burden of proving that the defendant knowingly [,
voluntarily,] and intelligently waived the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel."
Goodwin v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 249, 252, 349 S.E.2d 161, 163
(1986). The record establishes that after the detective read
unintelligibly from the form, he showed Benjamin a form which
asked, "Do you understand the rights that have been explained to
you?" The detective then told Benjamin to write "Yes" if he read
and understood English. The trial judge noted the following:
Now, he says to the young man, he says to him
on the tape, he said, "do you read and
understand English?" And then he says,
"Write "yes" there." . . . .
It doesn't tell him he's waiving his rights.
He says, "Sign yes here." It says that I've
read to you these rights, doesn't say that
you understand these rights, it says that you
understand and read English. That's not what
the form says.
I find nowhere during the course of this
taping that there was an active waiver,
assuming that what he did was a full and
complete rights advisal. Where did he waive
those rights, by signing this?
Upon our review of the evidence and the facts as found by the
trial judge, we hold that the Commonwealth failed to bear its
burden of proving Benjamin made a knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.
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In view of our holding, which affirms the trial judge's
order suppressing the statement as a violation of Benjamin's
Fifth Amendment rights, we need not address the Commonwealth's
further contention that the trial judge erroneously based the
suppression order on the additional grounds that Benjamin was
unlawfully arrested in his home without a warrant and without
exigent circumstances to justify the entry. For the same reason,
we need not address Benjamin's contentions that he clearly
invoked his right to counsel during the interrogation and that
the trial judge erred in finding that the police had probable
cause to arrest him.
For these reasons, we affirm the trial judge's order
suppressing the evidence.
Affirmed.
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