General Trading Corp. v. Motor Vehicle Dealer Board

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Willis, Annunziata and Overton
Argued at Richmond, Virginia

GENERAL TRADING CORPORATION
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2785-97-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
SEPTEMBER 1, 1998
MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER BOARD

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Arthur B. Vieregg, Judge
Joel S. Aronson (Harold G. Belkowitz; Ober,
Kaler, Grimes & Shriver, on brief), for
appellant.

Eric K.G. Fiske, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.

General Trading Corporation ("General Trading") appeals the

circuit court's decision upholding the Motor Vehicle Dealer

Board's ("the Board") decision denying General Trading's claim

for compensation from the Virginia Motor Vehicle Dealer Board

Transaction Recovery Fund ("the Fund"). Finding no error, we

affirm.

On February 9, 1993, General Trading, an automobile

wholesaler, sold an automobile to Darrell Ley, Charlie Suqua, and

Sunnyside Auto Sales for $1,925. On February 1, 1995, General

Trading sold two automobiles to Tom Lawson and Coeburn Auto Mart

for a total of $7,460. In both transactions, the purchasers paid

by check, and the checks were returned for insufficient funds.

On February 24, 1997, General Trading obtained a judgment

against Darrell Ley for $1,925 and a judgment against Tom Lawson
for $7,460. On April 16, 1997, General Trading filed with the

Board separate Judgment Claim Requests for each claim. In these

Judgment Claim Requests, General Trading sought compensation from

the Fund for the judgments it had obtained.

The Board denied both of General Trading's claims on the

basis that General Trading was not eligible for compensation

under Code § 46.2-1527.3. General Trading appealed the Board's

decisions to the Circuit Court of Fairfax County. After hearing

oral argument, the circuit court affirmed the Board's decisions,

reasoning that Code § 46.2-1527.3 "does not protect the seller,

but, rather, only the purchasers."
General Trading contends the Board erred in interpreting

Code § 46.2-1527.3 to limit recovery to persons who buy or

acquire possession of motor vehicles, and to deny recovery to

wholesale sellers of motor vehicles. "[W]hen, as here, the

question [presented] involves a statutory interpretation issue,

'little deference is required to be accorded the agency decision'

because the issue falls outside the agency's specialized

competence." Sims Wholesale Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 251 Va.

398, 404, 468 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1996) (quoting Johnston-Willis,

Ltd. v. Kenley, 6 Va. App. 231, 246, 369 S.E.2d 1, 9 (1988)).

"In sum, pure statutory interpretation is the prerogative of the

judiciary." Id. (citing Hampton Roads Sanitation Dist. Comm'n v.

City of Chesapeake, 218 Va. 696, 702, 240 S.E.2d 819, 823

(1978)).

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 "'When the wording of a statute is clear and unambiguous,

its plain meaning is to be accepted without resort to rules of

interpretation.'" Kossman v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Motor

Vehicles, 24 Va. App. 762, 766, 485 S.E.2d 643, 645 (1997)

(quoting Commonwealth, Dep't of Mines, Minerals & Energy v. May

Bros., 11 Va. App. 115, 118, 396 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1990)). Code

§ 46.2-1527.3 provides as follows:
Whenever any person is awarded a final
judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction
in the Commonwealth for (i) any loss or
damage in connection with the purchase of a
motor vehicle by reason of any fraud
practiced on him or fraudulent representation
made to him by a licensed or registered motor
vehicle dealer or one of a dealer's
salespersons acting for the dealer or within
the scope of his employment, or (ii) any loss
or damage by reason of the violation by a
dealer or salesperson of any of the
provisions of this chapter in connection with
the purchase of a motor vehicle, on or after
January 1, 1989, the judgment creditor may
file a verified claim with the Board,
requesting payment from the Fund of the
amount unpaid on the judgment. The claim
shall be filed with the Board no sooner than
thirty days and no later than twelve months
after the judgment becomes final.
On or after the effective date of this
act, the Board shall only consider for
payment claims submitted by retail purchasers
of motor vehicles, and for purchases of motor
vehicles by licensed or registered motor
vehicle dealers who contribute to the Fund.

To bring itself within the ambit of the protections of the

statute, General Trading argues that the word "purchases," as

used in the phrase "the Board shall only consider for payment

claims submitted . . . for purchases of motor vehicles by

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licensed or registered motor vehicle dealers who contribute to

the Fund," authorizes recovery by either the buyer or the seller

and that we should hold that a "purchase[]" involves both

parties. We reject this analysis in light of the well-settled

principles applicable in determining the legislature's intent in

enacting law.

"'It is our duty to take the words which the legislature has

seen fit to employ and give to them their usual and ordinary

signification, and having thus ascertained the legislative

intent, to give effect to it . . . .'" Commonwealth v.

Sanderson, 170 Va. 33, 38-39, 195 S.E. 516, 519 (1938) (quoting

Saville v. Virginia Railway & Power Co., 114 Va. 444, 453, 76

S.E. 954, 957 (1913)). In the absence of any specific indication

to the contrary, words used in a statute will be given their

common, ordinary, and accepted meaning. Woolfolk v.

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 840, 847, 447 S.E.2d 530, 533 (1994)

(citing Huffman v. Kite, 198 Va. 196, 199, 93 S.E.2d 328, 331

(1956)).

The statute allows recovery only for claims submitted for

"purchases of motor vehicles by licensed or registered motor

vehicle dealers who contribute to the Fund." The ordinary

definition of "purchase" is "the acquiring of title to or

property in anything for a price." Webster's Third New

International Dictionary 1845 (1981). Giving the term "purchase"

its usual and ordinary meaning, we hold that the legislature

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intended to limit the protections of the statute to those who

acquire the property in question by purchase. This holding is

consistent with the Supreme Court's explanation of the General

Assembly's intent in enacting the statute: "to afford uniform

protection to those who purchase vehicles at wholesale auctions,

for the ultimate benefit of consumers who would purchase the

vehicles at retail." Fredericksburg Auto Auction, Inc. v.

Department of Motor Vehicles, 242 Va. 42, 46, 406 S.E.2d 23, 26

(1991) (emphasis added). 1
General Trading argues in the alternative that the word

"purchase" as used in Code § 46.2-1527.3 is ambiguous, requiring

this Court to apply the rules of statutory construction to

determine its meaning. "Language is ambiguous if it admits of

being understood in more than one way or refers to two or more

things simultaneously." Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330

S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985) (citing Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v.

Commonwealth Corrugated Container Corp., 229 Va. 132, 136-37, 327

S.E.2d 98, 101 (1985)). We reject this argument because we find

1
The issue before the Court in Fredericksburg Auto Auction,
242 Va. at 45, 406 S.E.2d at 25, was a due process challenge to
the 1988 amendments to the statute. The Supreme Court of
Virginia reviewed the purposes of the statutory scheme as a
necessary part of its reasoning that the statute was rationally
related to its legitimate legislative objectives. Id. at 47, 406
S.E.2d at 26. We find that the amendments to the statute
following the Supreme Court's decision in Fredericksburg Auto
Auction did not alter the statutory purpose; if anything, the
amendments strengthened the purposes articulated by the Supreme
Court. See 1995 Va. Acts, ch. 767, 816; 1994 Va. Acts, ch. 478;
1991 Va. Acts, ch. 654.

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that the plain meaning of the statute is capable of only one

interpretation.

Given our interpretation of the plain meaning of Code

§ 46.2-1527.3, General Trading is ineligible to recover; General

Trading was the seller rather than the purchaser in the

transactions at issue here. The agency and circuit court

properly denied compensation from the Fund.

Affirmed.

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