COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Annunziata and Overton
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
GENERAL TRADING CORPORATION
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2785-97-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
SEPTEMBER 1, 1998
MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER BOARD
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Arthur B. Vieregg, Judge
Joel S. Aronson (Harold G. Belkowitz; Ober,
Kaler, Grimes & Shriver, on brief), for
appellant.
Eric K.G. Fiske, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
General Trading Corporation ("General Trading") appeals the
circuit court's decision upholding the Motor Vehicle Dealer
Board's ("the Board") decision denying General Trading's claim
for compensation from the Virginia Motor Vehicle Dealer Board
Transaction Recovery Fund ("the Fund"). Finding no error, we
affirm.
On February 9, 1993, General Trading, an automobile
wholesaler, sold an automobile to Darrell Ley, Charlie Suqua, and
Sunnyside Auto Sales for $1,925. On February 1, 1995, General
Trading sold two automobiles to Tom Lawson and Coeburn Auto Mart
for a total of $7,460. In both transactions, the purchasers paid
by check, and the checks were returned for insufficient funds.
On February 24, 1997, General Trading obtained a judgment
against Darrell Ley for $1,925 and a judgment against Tom Lawson
for $7,460. On April 16, 1997, General Trading filed with the
Board separate Judgment Claim Requests for each claim. In these
Judgment Claim Requests, General Trading sought compensation from
the Fund for the judgments it had obtained.
The Board denied both of General Trading's claims on the
basis that General Trading was not eligible for compensation
under Code § 46.2-1527.3. General Trading appealed the Board's
decisions to the Circuit Court of Fairfax County. After hearing
oral argument, the circuit court affirmed the Board's decisions,
reasoning that Code § 46.2-1527.3 "does not protect the seller,
but, rather, only the purchasers."
General Trading contends the Board erred in interpreting
Code § 46.2-1527.3 to limit recovery to persons who buy or
acquire possession of motor vehicles, and to deny recovery to
wholesale sellers of motor vehicles. "[W]hen, as here, the
question [presented] involves a statutory interpretation issue,
'little deference is required to be accorded the agency decision'
because the issue falls outside the agency's specialized
competence." Sims Wholesale Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 251 Va.
398, 404, 468 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1996) (quoting Johnston-Willis,
Ltd. v. Kenley, 6 Va. App. 231, 246, 369 S.E.2d 1, 9 (1988)).
"In sum, pure statutory interpretation is the prerogative of the
judiciary." Id. (citing Hampton Roads Sanitation Dist. Comm'n v.
City of Chesapeake, 218 Va. 696, 702, 240 S.E.2d 819, 823
(1978)).
- 2 -
"'When the wording of a statute is clear and unambiguous,
its plain meaning is to be accepted without resort to rules of
interpretation.'" Kossman v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Motor
Vehicles, 24 Va. App. 762, 766, 485 S.E.2d 643, 645 (1997)
(quoting Commonwealth, Dep't of Mines, Minerals & Energy v. May
Bros., 11 Va. App. 115, 118, 396 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1990)). Code
§ 46.2-1527.3 provides as follows:
Whenever any person is awarded a final
judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction
in the Commonwealth for (i) any loss or
damage in connection with the purchase of a
motor vehicle by reason of any fraud
practiced on him or fraudulent representation
made to him by a licensed or registered motor
vehicle dealer or one of a dealer's
salespersons acting for the dealer or within
the scope of his employment, or (ii) any loss
or damage by reason of the violation by a
dealer or salesperson of any of the
provisions of this chapter in connection with
the purchase of a motor vehicle, on or after
January 1, 1989, the judgment creditor may
file a verified claim with the Board,
requesting payment from the Fund of the
amount unpaid on the judgment. The claim
shall be filed with the Board no sooner than
thirty days and no later than twelve months
after the judgment becomes final.
On or after the effective date of this
act, the Board shall only consider for
payment claims submitted by retail purchasers
of motor vehicles, and for purchases of motor
vehicles by licensed or registered motor
vehicle dealers who contribute to the Fund.
To bring itself within the ambit of the protections of the
statute, General Trading argues that the word "purchases," as
used in the phrase "the Board shall only consider for payment
claims submitted . . . for purchases of motor vehicles by
- 3 -
licensed or registered motor vehicle dealers who contribute to
the Fund," authorizes recovery by either the buyer or the seller
and that we should hold that a "purchase[]" involves both
parties. We reject this analysis in light of the well-settled
principles applicable in determining the legislature's intent in
enacting law.
"'It is our duty to take the words which the legislature has
seen fit to employ and give to them their usual and ordinary
signification, and having thus ascertained the legislative
intent, to give effect to it . . . .'" Commonwealth v.
Sanderson, 170 Va. 33, 38-39, 195 S.E. 516, 519 (1938) (quoting
Saville v. Virginia Railway & Power Co., 114 Va. 444, 453, 76
S.E. 954, 957 (1913)). In the absence of any specific indication
to the contrary, words used in a statute will be given their
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning. Woolfolk v.
Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 840, 847, 447 S.E.2d 530, 533 (1994)
(citing Huffman v. Kite, 198 Va. 196, 199, 93 S.E.2d 328, 331
(1956)).
The statute allows recovery only for claims submitted for
"purchases of motor vehicles by licensed or registered motor
vehicle dealers who contribute to the Fund." The ordinary
definition of "purchase" is "the acquiring of title to or
property in anything for a price." Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 1845 (1981). Giving the term "purchase"
its usual and ordinary meaning, we hold that the legislature
- 4 -
intended to limit the protections of the statute to those who
acquire the property in question by purchase. This holding is
consistent with the Supreme Court's explanation of the General
Assembly's intent in enacting the statute: "to afford uniform
protection to those who purchase vehicles at wholesale auctions,
for the ultimate benefit of consumers who would purchase the
vehicles at retail." Fredericksburg Auto Auction, Inc. v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, 242 Va. 42, 46, 406 S.E.2d 23, 26
(1991) (emphasis added). 1
General Trading argues in the alternative that the word
"purchase" as used in Code § 46.2-1527.3 is ambiguous, requiring
this Court to apply the rules of statutory construction to
determine its meaning. "Language is ambiguous if it admits of
being understood in more than one way or refers to two or more
things simultaneously." Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330
S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985) (citing Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v.
Commonwealth Corrugated Container Corp., 229 Va. 132, 136-37, 327
S.E.2d 98, 101 (1985)). We reject this argument because we find
1
The issue before the Court in Fredericksburg Auto Auction,
242 Va. at 45, 406 S.E.2d at 25, was a due process challenge to
the 1988 amendments to the statute. The Supreme Court of
Virginia reviewed the purposes of the statutory scheme as a
necessary part of its reasoning that the statute was rationally
related to its legitimate legislative objectives. Id. at 47, 406
S.E.2d at 26. We find that the amendments to the statute
following the Supreme Court's decision in Fredericksburg Auto
Auction did not alter the statutory purpose; if anything, the
amendments strengthened the purposes articulated by the Supreme
Court. See 1995 Va. Acts, ch. 767, 816; 1994 Va. Acts, ch. 478;
1991 Va. Acts, ch. 654.
- 5 -
that the plain meaning of the statute is capable of only one
interpretation.
Given our interpretation of the plain meaning of Code
§ 46.2-1527.3, General Trading is ineligible to recover; General
Trading was the seller rather than the purchaser in the
transactions at issue here. The agency and circuit court
properly denied compensation from the Fund.
Affirmed.
- 6 -