COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Elder and Bray
Argued at Salem, Virginia
STEVEN JEROME REID, SR.
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0715-96-3 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
FEBRUARY 4, 1997
DEBBIE KNOX REID
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE
James F. Ingram, Judge
Stacey W. Moreau (Williams, Stilwell,
Morrison, Williams and Light, on brief), for
appellant.
Barbara Hudson for appellee.
Steven Jerome Reid, Sr. (husband) and Debbie Knox Reid
(wife) were divorced by a decree of the trial court which also
"revoked" a preexisting order awarding spousal support to wife.
Acting on the subsequent petition of wife, the court amended the
decree to reinstate the prior support order. Husband appeals,
contending that the court was without jurisdiction to restore the
earlier award. We disagree and affirm the amended decree.
The relevant procedural history is uncontroverted. In a
proceeding unrelated to the subject cause, the trial court, on
August 18, 1994, awarded wife both child and spousal support
incidental to husband's appeal of a like order from the juvenile
and domestic relations district court (district court). Husband
was required to pay wife spousal support "of $50.00 per week
commencing . . . August 15, 1994, . . . until further order of
the Court," and "all future matters of support" were referred to
the district court.
On June 7, 1995, husband commenced the instant suit, seeking
divorce a vinculo matrimonii from wife pursuant to Code
§ 20-91(9) and praying, inter alia, "that the Court decree that
the [parties] be perpetually protected in their persons and
property." Husband's bill of complaint did not specifically
mention spousal support or reference the earlier, continuing
award. Although the complaint, together with a notice of
attendant depositions, was personally served upon wife, she
neither responded nor appeared at the scheduled hearing. In
accordance with husband's prayer, the trial court entered a
decree of divorce on October 18, 1995, and further decreed that
"any and all prior orders with regard to spousal support are
hereby revoked."
On November 7, 1995, wife moved the court to "set aside"
that provision of the decree relating to spousal support.
Following a contested hearing on the issue, the court ordered
that the disputed "revocation" of spousal support be "stricken
from the final decree" and awarded wife "all support arrearage
that [had] accrued" on the preexisting order. Husband appeals,
arguing that the court was without jurisdiction to amend the
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decree to reinstate the prior award of spousal support.
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Wife contends that the record is insufficient to permit
appellate review. We disagree and address the merits of the
appeal. See Turner v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 96, 99, 341
S.E.2d 400, 402 (1986).
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Code § 20-79(b) confers jurisdiction upon a trial court
adjudicating a divorce to "provide in its decree for the . . .
support and maintenance [of] the spouse," upon the "requests" of
"either party to the proceedings." Id. (emphasis added); see
also Code §§ 20-103(A), -107.1. Clearly, the "exercise of such
power remains dependent upon the pleadings having raised the
issue." Boyd v. Boyd, 2 Va. App. 16, 19, 340 S.E.2d 578, 580
(1986). This well established principle recognizes that the
"office of pleadings is to give notice to the opposing party of
the nature and character of the claim, without which the most
rudimentary due process safeguards would be denied." Id. Thus,
a decree entered "in the absence of pleadings upon which to found
the same . . . is void." Potts v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 165
Va. 196, 207, 181 S.E. 521, 525 (1935).
Moreover, the "special statutory power to grant divorces"
and afford related relief was "conferred upon [the] courts" by
the legislature. Erickson-Dickson v. Erickson-Dickson, 12 Va.
App. 381, 387, 404 S.E.2d 388, 392 (1991). "'It is elementary
. . . that neither courts of law nor equity have any inherent
power to dissolve marriage. The power to decree a divorce is
purely statutory.'" Blankenship v. Blankenship, 125 Va. 595,
598, 100 S.E. 538, 539 (1919) (quoting Rumping v. Rumping, 91 P.
1057 (1907)); see Day v. Day, 8 Va. App. 346, 348, 381 S.E.2d
364, 365-66 (1989). Therefore, unless the "prerequisites
necessary for exercising that jurisdiction" are "specifically
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pled[,] . . . the proceedings [are] a nullity." Erickson-
Dickson, 12 Va. App. at 387, 404 S.E.2d at 392; see also Rogers
v. Damron, ___ Va. App. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (1997)
(subject matter jurisdiction requires jurisdiction over the
attendant relief).
Here, husband's bill of complaint properly invoked the
court's jurisdiction to decree the divorce. However, the absence
of a specific request for an adjudication of spousal support
precluded the court from obtaining jurisdiction over that subject
matter. See Rogers, ___ Va. App. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___.
Husband's vague prayer that the court "decree that the plaintiff
and defendant be perpetually protected in their persons and
property" was insufficient to raise the issue. See Boyd, 2 Va.
App. at 19, 340 S.E.2d at 580.
Accordingly, the purported revocation of "all prior orders
with regard to spousal support" was a nullity and, contrary to
husband's contention, Rule 1:1 did not affect the authority of
the court to correct a void provision of its original decree.
See also Code § 8.01-428(A)(ii). A judgment void ab initio for
want of jurisdiction "may be attacked in any court at any time,
directly or collaterally." Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95, 353
S.E.2d 756, 758 (1987); see Morse v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App.
466, 468, 369 S.E.2d 863, 864 (1988).
Husband's assertion that the earlier order of spousal
support terminated by operation of law upon entry of the divorce
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decree is also without merit. An existing order of spousal
support survives a subsequent decree of divorce which is silent
on the issue. See Werner v. Werner, 212 Va. 623, 624-25, 186
S.E.2d 76, 77-78 (1972); see also Code §§ 16.1-244(A), 20-79(a);
Martin v. Bales, 7 Va. App. 141, 145-46, 371 S.E.2d 823, 826
(1988). As the Court instructed in Werner, either party, by
proper pleading, "could have asked the Circuit Court to make
specific provision in the final divorce decree for allowance or
denial of [spousal support]. If such a provision had been
included in the decree, the jurisdiction of the [district court]
would have ceased under § 20-79(a)." Werner, 212 Va. at 625, 186
S.E.2d at 78; see also Code § 16.1-244(A). However, because
"neither party sought to have such provision made," the
preexisting support order "continue[d] in full force and effect."
Werner, 212 Va. at 625, 186 S.E.2d at 78.
Accordingly, we affirm the decree.
Affirmed.
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