COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge**Moon, Judges Baker, Barrow, * Benton,
Coleman, Koontz, Willis, Elder and Fitzpatrick
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
LAWRENCE WRIGHT
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 1509-92-1 JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER
AUGUST 6, 1996
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
UPON A REHEARING EN BANC
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
John E. Clarkson, Judge
B. Thomas Reed for appellant.
G. Russell Stone, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
Lawrence Wright (appellant) appeals from his conviction for
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of
Code § 18.2-248. Appellant contends that the trial court erred
when it refused to permit him to introduce hearsay evidence after
a Commonwealth's witness "opened the door" by making reference to
other inadmissible hearsay evidence. A majority of a panel of
this Court, in an unpublished opinion, held that the trial court
did not err when it refused to let appellant introduce the
hearsay in response to the Commonwealth's evidence. Wright v.
*
Judge Barrow participated in the hearing and decision of
this case prior to his death on March 28, 1995.
**
Justice Koontz participated in the hearing and decision of
this case prior to his investiture as a Justice of the Supreme
Court of Virginia.
Commonwealth, No. 1509-92-1 (Va. Ct. App. August 30, 1994). The
Court granted appellant's petition for rehearing en banc. Upon
rehearing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I.
On October 29 and 30, 1991, using an informant, Norfolk City
Police Officer James N. Stevens (Stevens) directed controlled
purchases of cocaine at 2405 Jamaica Avenue in that city. 1
Stevens recorded the serial numbers and gave the informant four
ten-dollar bills to make the purchases. To support the issuance
of a warrant to search 2405 Jamaica Avenue for narcotics and
related property and persons, Stevens executed an affidavit
based, in part, on his role in the controlled purchases and, in
part, on information given to him by the informant. The sole
issue before us arises from the trial court's refusal to permit
appellant to introduce, through cross-examination of Stevens,
information contained in the affidavit and given to Stevens by
the informant after the controlled purchases were made.
For an understanding of the trial court's ruling, it is
2
necessary to review the relevant parts of Stevens' affidavit,
which are as follows:
For the last week I have been receiving
1
Those purchases are not at issue here. The conviction
from which this appeal emanates is from the cocaine and related
items found when the Jamaica Avenue residence was searched.
Appellant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the conviction.
2
The affidavit is contained in the trial court's record,
but it was not entered as an exhibit.
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information from a confidential informant
[CI] that a subject known to the CI as
Lawrence Wright is selling cocaine from 2405
Jamaica Avenue Norfolk, Virginia. The CI has
described Lawrence Wright to me as a balck
[sic] male, about five feet eight inches tall
to five feet nine inches tall, weighing about
one hundred and seventy five pounds, short
hair, clean shaven, light brown skin and in
his late thirties to early forties. I have
checked Norfolk Police Department records and
found that Lawrence Wright is five feet eight
inches tall and weighs one hundred and sixty
seven pounds. I have shown a photograph of
Lawrence Wright to the CI, who identified the
photograph of Lawrence Wright as the person
selling cocaine from 2405 Jamaica Avenue
Norfolk, Virginina [sic].
Within the last seventy-two (72) hours I have
met with the CI for the purpose of making a
controlled purchase of cocaine from Lawrence
Wright at 2405 Jamaica Avenue Norfolk,
Virginia. The CI was thoroughly searched for
contraband with negative results. I then
provided the CI with United States Currency
with prerecorded serial numbers. The CI was
then instructed to go to 2405 Jamaica Avenue
and to buy a quantity of cocaine from
Lawrence Wright. The CI then left me and
went directly to 2405 Jamaica Ave and entered
the residence. A short time later the CI
left the residence and returned directly to
me. Upon returning to me the CI turned over
a quantity of suspected cocaine to me. I
feild [sic] tested the suspected cocaine with
positive results.
Pursuant to the affidavit, a search warrant was issued on
October 31, 1991, and, upon execution of the warrant, contraband
was found. 3 In addition, $608 in paper money was found on
3
Discovered in appellant's presence or in the house were
five small bags of cocaine, eleven other bags containing cocaine
residue, a gun, ammunition, scales, a test tube, and 515 small
plastic bags.
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appellant's person, including the four ten-dollar bills Stevens
had given the informant to buy the cocaine. Appellant was
indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in
violation of Code § 18.2-248.
Appellant was tried on that charge prior to the trial from
which this appeal emanates but a mistrial was declared because
the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict. At that first
trial, the court permitted the jury to hear hearsay evidence
contained in the affidavit.
Prior to appellant's second trial, the Commonwealth filed a
motion in limine requesting the trial court to prevent appellant
from
1. presenting evidence regarding the
identity of the person from whom the
confidential informant purchased cocaine
during the 72 hours preceding execution of
the search warrant; and
2. presenting evidence regarding the
description of the above-described person
provided by the confidential informant as
recited by Inv. J. N. Stevens in his
affidavit for search warrant;
The trial court granted the Commonwealth's motion, stating that
I think that it is best in every trial to
keep any hearsay out. I think that anything
a confidential informant would have said to a
police officer is certainly hearsay as part
of the law. I think we would run the risk if
I let that in. I would also have to let in a
confidential informant's saying, "I'm going
to buy drugs from Mr. X, and he is--"
I don't think it would be fair to let the
jury get the information they were going to
buy drugs from there, and I think the
clean-shaven--I think it's just best to keep
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the whole affidavit out. You can
cross-examine officers as to what they did in
the case.
During the second trial, Stevens testified as to how a
controlled buy of narcotics is set up and conducted and added
that the same procedure was used in this case on October 29, 1991
and October 30, 1991. He testified that after the controlled
buys, he obtained a search warrant for the residence and executed
the warrant on October 31, 1991.
Stevens testified that during the search he had a
conversation with appellant. In response to the Commonwealth
Attorney's question regarding the nature of his conversation with
appellant, Stevens stated that he told appellant that the police
were going to make a thorough search of the residence and that it
would save a great deal of time if appellant would tell them
where any drugs, packaging material, scales, and the like were
located. Stevens continued, stating:
I also pointed out that [appellant] was named
in the affidavit for the search warrant as
the person who was selling drugs and that the
only other person named in the warrant was
his Aunt Thelma and that she was mentioned
only because she lived there or was listed as
living there.
Appellant did not object to Stevens' testimony, nor did he move
for a mistrial or request any other remedy. At oral argument,
counsel for appellant frankly stated that he deliberately
withheld any objection or motion because he wanted to introduce
the hearsay evidence the trial court earlier had refused to
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allow.
After the Commonwealth concluded its examination of Stevens,
but prior to appellant's cross-examination, appellant argued that
Stevens' testimony concerned things about which Stevens had no
personal knowledge and was "objectionable" hearsay. The trial
court asked, "[W]hy wasn't there an objection right there?"
Appellant's counsel responded that a contemporaneous objection
would have emphasized the objectional evidence to the jury. The
trial court responded, "[I] was waiting for an objection."
Appellant's counsel then stated, "[I] don't want a mistrial in
this case," only the right "to show that the confidential
informant described [the] person . . . selling drugs as being
clean-shaven." Appellant's counsel asserts that he wanted the
informant's description entered because he then could show that
appellant was not clean shaven on the day of his arrest.
II.
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth "opened the door" to
his proffered hearsay testimony by eliciting inadmissible hearsay
testimony itself and that the trial court erred by refusing to
allow him to counter that evidence. We hold that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit irrelevant
hearsay under the theory that the Commonwealth had "opened the
door" for such evidence.
"Opening the door" to the admission of evidence is a
catchphrase often used to refer to the doctrine of "curative
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admissibility." Curative admissibility, in its broadest form,
allows a party to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence when
necessary to counter the effect of improper evidence previously
admitted by the other party without objection. Clark v. State,
629 A.2d 1239, 1244-45 (Md. 1993); see also 1 John Henry Wigmore,
Wigmore on Evidence, § 15 (Rev. ed. 1983).
In Graham v. Commonwealth, 127 Va. 808, 103 S.E. 565 (1920),
Graham was charged with murder and defended on the ground of
self-defense. At trial, Graham introduced evidence that the
deceased had used profanity shortly before his death.
Thereafter, to rebut Graham's evidence, the Commonwealth
introduced evidence that the deceased was not in the habit of
swearing. On appeal, Graham argued that the Commonwealth's
evidence was immaterial and that the trial court erred in
admitting it. In concluding that the trial court did not err,
the Supreme Court held that, although Graham's evidence was
irrelevant and would have been inadmissible if objected to by the
Commonwealth, "it [did] not follow that such testimony . . .
[could not] be rebutted later." Id. at 824, 103 S.E. at 570.
The Court noted that its holding was an exception to the "rule
that the time of the courts will not be allowed to be occupied in
the trial of collateral issues by allowing the introduction of
rebuttal testimony thereon." Id. at 825, 103 S.E. at 570-71.
See also Roy v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 722, 729, 62 S.E.2d 902,
905 (1951).
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In Graham and Roy, the answering parties introduced evidence
relevant to "curing" any harm resulting from previously admitted
irrelevant evidence. No exception to the rules of evidence was
made; the courts merely allowed a party to address what was, at
one point in the trial, an extraneous matter. Graham and its
progeny clearly provide, in limited instances, for the admission
of evidence to counter previously admitted, unobjected to
irrelevant evidence. We need not here decide whether a trial
judge may, in his or her discretion, admit hearsay evidence to
cure or correct impermissible prejudice caused by the
introduction of inadmissible evidence.
The case before us is not controlled by Graham. The two
cases are clearly factually and legally distinguishable. Here,
the affidavit and search warrant issued pursuant thereto dealt
with an informant's purchases made from a person in the Jamaica
Avenue house on October 29 and October 30, 1991, respectively.
The charge for which appellant was convicted, and from which this
appeal emanates, arose from contraband found in appellant's
possession in that house on October 31, 1991. Appellant does not
here claim that the evidence is insufficient to show that on
October 31, 1991, at the Jamaica Avenue address, he was found in
possession of contraband and paraphernalia associated with
unlawful distribution of cocaine. The refused evidence proffered
by appellant would only have compounded any disregard of the
trial court's in limine order because it would have suggested to
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the jury that whether appellant was named in the search warrant
or was the person described in the affidavit was somehow relevant
and material to the charge that he possessed the drugs at the
time and place the search warrant was executed.
Additionally, while a trial court generally has discretion
in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, e.g., Blain v.
Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 16, 371 S.E.2d 838, 842 (1988), a
trial court has no discretion to apply the doctrine of curative
admissibility if the party seeking to invoke it intentionally
failed to object to the inadmissible evidence in order to gain
admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence. Clark v. State,
629 A.2d 1239, 1246 (Md. 1993). The record makes clear that this
is what appellant's counsel attempted to do. 4 He intentionally
failed to object to Stevens' testimony in order to attempt to
gain admission of the description contained in the affidavit.
Having done so, it was not error for the trial court to refuse to
permit the proffered hearsay. If no limitations are placed on
the doctrine of curative admissibility, the doctrine will
4
Appellant's counsel acknowledged that he intentionally
failed to object to Officer Stevens' testimony. His stated
reason was that he did not want to call the statement to the
attention of the jury. However, this explanation appears
disingenuous because (1) he brought the same, allegedly
prejudicial, statement which he, purportedly, did not want to
call to the attention of the jury out on direct examination of
his own client, and (2) he acknowledged to the court that he
chose not to object to the introduction of the same evidence in
the first trial because he "chose to take the good with the bad,"
thus revealing his intention to allow inadmissable evidence to be
received without objection for the express purpose of gaining the
admission of the description contained in the affidavit.
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supersede the established rules of evidence and encourage counsel
not to object to inadmissible evidence.
Our decision does not leave a party in appellant's situation
without remedy. The proper method to preclude another party from
entering inadmissible hearsay or any other form of inadmissible
evidence is to make a contemporaneous objection. 5 To the extent
that Stevens' testimony that appellant was named in the search
warrant was received in violation of the in limine order, whether
inadvertently or purposely, appellant was not relieved of the
responsibility of objecting to that evidence. Moreover, his
further remedy under those circumstances was to move the trial
court to strike that evidence and instruct the jury to disregard
it. Prejudice, if any, caused by the introduction of that
irrelevant hearsay could thereby have been avoided or corrected.
For the reasons stated, we hold that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by refusing to admit irrelevant hearsay
evidence proffered by appellant. Accordingly, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
5
If trial tactic is the purpose for a party declining to
timely object to inadmissible evidence, that party will not be
heard to complain that he or she is unable to introduce other
evidence of the same character. A breach of the rules of
evidence by one party does not suspend those rules with respect
to the other party. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1
(1985).
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Benton, J., with whom Elder, J., joins, dissenting.
On this appeal, Lawrence Wright contends that when the
Commonwealth's attorney proved by a police officer's hearsay
testimony that a search warrant affidavit contained an
informant's allegation that Wright sold cocaine, the trial judge
erred in refusing to allow Wright's counsel to cross-examine the
officer to establish that the affidavit's description of the
seller was inconsistent with Wright's physical appearance. The
majority opinion effectively rewards the Commonwealth's attorney
for introducing evidence after she successfully requested the
trial judge in limine to rule the evidence inadmissible. Such a
decision is unfair and fails to employ the doctrine of curative
admissibility in the precise circumstance for which the doctrine
was intended. Therefore, I dissent and would reverse the
conviction.
I.
The evidence proved that on October 29 and 30, 1991, Police
Investigator James N. Stevens recorded the serial numbers of four
ten-dollar bills and gave them to an informant to purchase
narcotics. The informant purchased cocaine at a residence on
Jamaica Avenue in the City of Norfolk. The informant described
the man who sold cocaine as "clean shaven" with "light brown
skin."
Based upon these purchases, Officer Stevens prepared an
affidavit containing the informant's description of the seller
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and obtained a warrant to search the Jamaica Avenue residence.
On October 31, the day following the last sale, the police
searched the residence and found drugs and contraband in several
places at the residence. Wright and four other adults, including
Wright's brother, were in the residence. The police arrested
Wright and found the four marked bills and other money in
Wright's possession. Wright was photographed on the day of his
arrest, October 31; he was neither clean shaven nor light
skinned.
Wright was tried for possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute. He pleaded not guilty and denied selling cocaine.
Wright's defense at the trial included the claim that the
description of the person who possessed and sold cocaine was
consistent with his brother's physical characteristics. In his
defense, Wright also proved that he did not live at the residence
but that his brother did. The jury that considered this evidence
at the first trial did not agree upon a verdict. The trial judge
declared a mistrial and ordered a second trial.
Prior to the retrial, the Commonwealth's attorney filed a
written motion in limine requesting the trial judge to bar Wright
from:
(1) presenting evidence regarding the
identity of the person from whom the
confidential informant purchased cocaine
during the 72 hours preceding execution of
the search warrant; and
(2) presenting evidence regarding the
description . . . provided by the
confidential informant [and] . . . recited by
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Inv. J.N. Stevens in his affidavit for search
warrant; . . . .
In its motion, the Commonwealth's attorney asserted the
following:
1. the issue of the propriety of the search
was resolved against [Wright] following a
hearing on his Motion to Suppress on March
12, 1992;
2. the issues regarding identity are
actually questions of law to be resolved by
the judge rather than questions of fact to be
resolved by the jury;
3. [Wright] is not charged with having made
the sales in question; therefore, [Wright's]
tactic requires the Commonwealth to prove
uncharged misconduct. If the Commonwealth
were to seek to prove uncharged misconduct,
[Wright] would object. Fundamental fairness
therefore requires that this motion be
granted.
At the hearing on the motion, the Commonwealth's attorney
sought to prohibit the defense from introducing any statements
made by the informant or within the affidavit because the
informant's physical description of the seller described the
seller several days earlier and not at the time of Wright's
arrest. The Commonwealth's attorney also argued that the
description contained in the affidavit was hearsay. The trial
judge granted the motion in limine and barred Wright from
presenting evidence as to the affidavit's identification and
description of the person who sold cocaine. On the morning of
the trial, the trial judge entered a written order and stated
that, "I think that it is best in every trial to keep any hearsay
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out . . . [and] that anything a confidential informant would have
said to a police officer is certainly hearsay as part of the
law."
During the second trial, the Commonwealth's attorney proved
through Officer Stevens' testimony that the police gave the
informant money after recording the serial numbers. The police
then directed the informant to enter the residence on Jamaica
Avenue for the purpose of purchasing cocaine. Officer Stevens
testified that following the "controlled buy," he executed an
affidavit for a search warrant, went to the residence several
hours later, and searched the residence for cocaine. Officer
Stevens further testified that he questioned Wright during the
search. In response to the Commonwealth's attorney's question,
"What was the nature of your discussion in the bathroom?,"
Officer Stevens testified that he told Wright "that he was named
in the affidavit for the search warrant as the person who was
selling drugs and that the only other person named in the warrant
was his Aunt Thelma and that she was mentioned only because she
lived there or was listed as living there."
Before Wright's counsel began cross-examination of Officer
Stevens, he again raised the issue of the limitation on
cross-examination and argued that the Commonwealth attorney's
questions on direct examination permitted him to question Officer
Stevens concerning the affidavit's assertion that the seller was
clean shaven and light skinned. In opposing the motion, the
- 14 -
Commonwealth's attorney did not assert that Officer Stevens'
direct testimony was inadvertent but, instead, argued that
Wright's counsel failed to object that Officer Stevens' testimony
was hearsay and that the remedy for that failure was not to allow
further hearsay. The trial judge stated, "I don't know that
there's any hearsay," and ruled that Wright's counsel was barred
from examining Officer Stevens concerning the description of the
seller contained in the affidavit.
Wright testified in his own defense. As in the first trial,
he denied selling cocaine. Wright also testified that he was not
sure where he obtained the marked money; however, he recalled
that he had received money from his brother in return for giving
change and from people in the neighborhood for doing odd jobs.
II.
"Under the 'curative admissibility' doctrine, the
introduction of inadmissible or irrelevant evidence by one party
justifies or 'opens the door to' admission of otherwise
inadmissible evidence." United States v. Brown, 921 F.2d 1304,
1307 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The doctrine of "'curative admissibility'
. . . allows otherwise irrelevant and incompetent evidence to
repair the damage caused by previously admitted incompetent
inadmissible evidence." Clark v. State, 629 A.2d 1239, 1244 (Md.
1993) (citing 1 Wigmore on Evidence § 15 (3d ed. 1940)). "[T]he
aim of curative admissibility is to give the party harmed by the
introduction of inadmissible evidence an opportunity to counter
- 15 -
the inferences that may be drawn from that inadmissible
evidence." 1 Wigmore on Evidence § 15, at 749 (Tillers rev. ed.
1983).
The Supreme Court of Virginia adopted the doctrine of
curative admissibility in Graham v. Commonwealth, 127 Va. 808,
103 S.E. 565 (1920). The accused in Graham elicited testimony
from witnesses regarding a collateral matter, the use of certain
profanity by a policeman. The Commonwealth did not object to the
testimony and on rebuttal introduced evidence that the policeman
was not in the habit of using profanity. Id. at 824, 103 S.E. at
570. Ruling the rebuttal evidence proper, the Supreme Court held
that "'[a] party who draws from his own witness irrelevant
testimony, which is prejudicial to the opposing party, ought not
to be heard to object to its contradiction on the ground of its
irrelevancy.'" Id. at 825, 103 S.E. at 570 (citation omitted).
The Court noted that "[t]his [is] a well established exception"
in the field of evidence. Id.
The Commonwealth asks this Court to sanction a trial
practice that allowed one party to use hearsay evidence in
contravention of a trial judge's order that explicitly barred the
opposing party from using the same evidence. The Commonwealth's
attorney was fully aware of the trial judge's ruling barring the
evidence because the Commonwealth's attorney sought the ruling.
The question of the admissibility of the evidence was thoroughly
discussed by the judge, the Commonwealth's attorney and defense
- 16 -
attorney at a hearing and again immediately prior to the
commencement of trial. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth's attorney
introduced hearsay evidence and then objected when Wright sought
to use that same evidence on cross-examination to impeach the
witness's testimony. Wright properly argues that when the
Commonwealth elicited Officer Stevens' testimony on direct
examination in contravention of the trial judge's ruling, the
trial judge was required to allow Wright to present evidence of a
similar nature to counter the inadmissible evidence.
Graham allows "evidence from the opposing side in rebuttal
of the immaterial testimony which has been thus admitted." 127
Va. at 825, 103 S.E. at 570. The principle is well established
that even if the opposing party's counter evidence is hearsay, it
is admissible under the general application of the doctrine of
curative admissibility, see Corley v. Andrews, 349 S.W.2d 395,
403 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961), because "the rule is that irrelevant,
incompetent or illegal evidence may be admitted to rebut evidence
of like character." St. Clair County v. Bukacek, 131 So. 2d 683,
690 (Ala. 1961). See also Clark, 629 A.2d at 1244. Indeed,
Wigmore states that "all the evidence that properly serves to
counter the inferences generated by the original evidence should
be admissible. . . ." 1 Wigmore on Evidence, supra, § 15, at
750. Any other rule would result in manifest unfairness to the
opposing party.
The majority asserts that a trial judge may not invoke the
- 17 -
doctrine of curative admissibility if counsel intentionally fails
to object in the hope that the door will be opened for
inadmissible evidence. Nothing in Graham so limits the rule.
Indeed, the Court noted in Graham that the prosecutor failed to
object to the testimony. 127 Va. at 824, 103 S.E. at 570.
Furthermore, Wright's counsel was not the party who violated the
trial judge's ruling and he had no reason to anticipate that the
Commonwealth's attorney would have violated the ruling.
At trial, defense counsel stated that the testimony was
unexpected and he did not object because he did not wish to call
the jury's attention to the evidence. Counsel's reason for
failing to object was explained at trial, was reasonable, and was
apparently accepted by the trial judge. Moreover, during the
Commonwealth's attorney's examination of Officer Stevens, the
trial judge realized that she was violating the pretrial ruling
because the trial judge indicated on the record that he "was
waiting for an objection." Even with that awareness, however,
the trial judge did not stop the prosecutor from violating the
order that was entered at the commencement of trial.
The majority also finds irrelevant to the crime charged
"whether appellant was named in the search warrant or was the
person described in the affidavit." I disagree. By proving that
Wright was named in the affidavit, the Commonwealth made the
physical description of Wright relevant to this issue of guilt.
Officer Stevens testified on direct examination that he told
- 18 -
Wright that Wright was named in the affidavit "as the person who
was selling drugs." Because Officer Stevens stated that,
"[Wright] was named in the affidavit," evidence of the
affidavit's description of the seller became vitally relevant to
prove that the person described in the affidavit had identifying
characteristics (clean shaven and light skinned) that did not
describe Wright. Officer Stevens, in contravention of the trial
judge's ruling, branded Wright before the jury as a person who
sold drugs and, thus, allowed the jury to draw the likely
inference that Wright possessed and intended to distribute the
drugs found in his aunt's residence. Only by proving the
affidavit's identifying characteristics could the defense cure
the unfair prejudice.
To remove the prejudice to Wright that flowed from the
introduction of Officer Stevens' hearsay testimony, Wright's
counsel should have been allowed to prove that the description of
the person identified in the affidavit was inconsistent with
Wright's appearance. "It is not error to admit hearsay evidence
when it serves to clarify other hearsay evidence elicited by the
opposition." Martinez v. State, 749 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988); Brown, 921 F.2d at 1307 (introduction of inadmissible
evidence by one party allows opposing party to introduce
otherwise inadmissible evidence). In refusing Wright's counsel
the right to cross-examine Officer Stevens on the inconsistent
description, the trial judge denied Wright the opportunity to
- 19 -
rebut a misleading impression that flowed from the inadmissible
evidence.
Wright had no other effective way to confront the prejudice
that flowed from the Commonwealth's ploy. It is likely that the
jury would have concluded that Wright's testimony or his aunt's
testimony was self-serving. Moreover, it is reasonable to
conclude that the jury would place greater weight on the
identification by the informant than the testimony of a
defendant's witnesses. Indeed, the record proves that when the
evidence of the affidavit's description was considered by the
jury in the first trial, the trial resulted in an outcome
unfavorable to the Commonwealth.
Furthermore, on the direct examination of Officer Stevens,
the Commonwealth's attorney put at issue the contents of the
affidavit. When that was done, Wright was entitled to prove the
context in which the document described and named the person who
sold cocaine. It is fundamental that "'[w]hen part of a . . .
transaction is put in evidence, the opposite party may rightfully
call for the whole of it, although the evidence was in the first
place illegal.'" Stockard v. State, 391 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Ala.
1980) (citation omitted). The Commonwealth may not pick and
choose parts of the affidavit and then, prohibit the defense from
introducing the remaining parts. The evidence is clear that
Officer Stevens' selective recitation of part of the affidavit
had the potential to mislead because of the lack of context that
- 20 -
arose by excluding the descriptions of "clean shaven" and "light
skinned," neither of which was descriptive of Wright. See
Henderson v. United States, 632 A.2d 419, 426 (D.C. 1993).
In sum, the trial judge's ruling was fundamentally unfair,
contrary to rules of evidence, and reversible error. Moreover,
this Court should not sanction a party's blatant violation of the
trial judge's ruling. The majority avoids employing the doctrine
of curative admissibility by finding the prior identification
extraneous to the question of guilt. The evidence clearly proves
otherwise. Therefore, I would reverse the conviction and remand
for a new trial.
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