COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Clements, Agee * and Felton
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
JEMOND TAVARES TOWNES
MEMORANDUM OPINION * * BY
v. Record No. 0577-02-2 JUDGE WALTER S. FELTON, JR.
APRIL 1, 2003
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF POWHATAN COUNTY
Thomas V. Warren, Judge
Marc R. Amos (Amos & Amos, PLLC, on brief),
for appellant.
Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney
General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.
Jemond Townes was convicted in a bench trial for unlawful
wounding, in violation of Code § 18.2-51. On appeal, he contends
the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he acted with the requisite intent to maim or disable. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
* Justice Agee participated in the hearing and decision of
this case prior to his investiture as a Justice of the Supreme
Court of Virginia.
** Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
I. BACKGROUND 1
On the evening of February 6, 2001, Juvenile Corrections
Officer Hasan Brown was involved in a melee with several cadets
(juvenile inmates) at the Beaumont Juvenile Correction Center
("BJCC"). BJCC personnel present during the melee, in addition
to Officer Brown, included Lieutenant L.V. Gates, Officer
Patterson, and Sergeant Degrate. Jemond Townes and three other
male inmates, McQuilla, Williams, and Gulley, refused to go to
their rooms at the designated 9:30 p.m. bedtime. When the
inmates became rowdy, officers attempted to restrain them.
Williams and Gulley attacked Officer Brown, knocking him to the
floor.
Once on the floor, Williams and Gulley began punching and
kicking Officer Brown. They struck him in the ribs, and one of
the two inmates attempted to choke him. Officer Patterson
proceeded to assist Officer Brown and began wrestling with
Gulley. As a result, Officer Brown was able to regain his feet.
He continued struggling with Williams.
While Officer Brown continued his struggle to restrain
Williams, Townes approached Officer Brown, grabbed him, lifted
him slightly off the floor, and "hip-tossed" him to the floor.
When he was tossed to the floor, Officer Brown landed on the
1
As the parties are fully conversant with the record in
this case and because this memorandum opinion carries no
precedential value, only those facts necessary to a disposition
of this appeal are recited.
service radio located on his belt. As a result of the melee, he
sustained bruised right ribs, a left bruised kidney, and
multiple bruises on his back. Officer Brown missed two months
of work due to the injuries he sustained from the attack.
At trial, Townes testified in his own behalf. He intimated
that when he picked up Officer Brown, his intent was not to hurt
him. Townes stated his intent was to put Officer Brown on the
table located in the room in order to calm him down, but he
missed the table and fell on the floor.
The trial court found Townes guilty of unlawful wounding,
in violation of Code § 18.2-51.
II. ANALYSIS
Townes contends that the evidence was insufficient to
convict him of unlawful wounding. 2 We disagree.
When a defendant challenges on appeal the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his
conviction, it is the duty of an appellate
court to examine the evidence that tends to
support the conviction and to permit the
conviction to stand unless the conviction is
plainly wrong or without evidentiary
support. If there is evidence to support
the conviction, an appellate court is not
permitted to substitute its own judgment for
that of the finder of fact, even if the
appellate court might have reached a
different conclusion.
2
The unlawful wounding statute, Code § 18.2-51, states in
pertinent part that if a person unlawfully "shoot[s], stab[s],
cut[s], or wound[s] any person or by any means cause him bodily
injury, with the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill, he
shall . . . be guilty of a . . . Class 6 felony."
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Additionally, upon appellate review, the
evidence and all inferences reasonably
deducible therefrom must be examined in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
the prevailing party in the trial court.
Any evidence properly admitted at trial is
subject to this review.
Conrad v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 113, 123, 521 S.E.2d 321,
326 (1999) (quoting Commonwealth v. Presley, 256 Va. 465,
466-67, 507 S.E.2d 72, 72 (1998)).
Townes argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove his
guilt because there was no evidence of a weapon being used and his
assault of Officer Brown was not otherwise "attended with such
circumstances of violence and brutality" that the requisite intent
to maim, disfigure, disable or kill could be reasonably inferred
by the trial court. Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 636,
640-41, 166 S.E.2d 269, 273 (1969). We disagree.
"[I]ntent is the purpose to use a particular
means to effect a definite result."
Banovitch v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 210, 218,
83 S.E.2d 369, 374 (1954). "The nature and
extent of the bodily injury and the means by
which [it is] accomplished may reflect this
intent but are not exclusive factors."
Campbell [v. Commonwealth], 12 Va. App.
[476,] 483, 405 S.E.2d [1,] 4 [(1991) (en
banc)]. The requisite intent may be proven
from circumstances, which include the
defendant's conduct. See id. at 484, 405
S.E.2d at 4; Banovitch, 196 Va. at 216, 83
S.E.2d at 373. "The fact finder is entitled
to draw inferences from those facts proven
to be true, so long as the inferences are
reasonable and justified." Cottee v.
Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 546, 555, 525
S.E.2d 25, 30 (2000) (citation omitted).
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Luck v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 827, 832, 531 S.E.2d 41, 43
(2000).
The record indicates Officer Brown was involved in an
altercation with two juvenile inmates who knocked him to the
floor and proceeded to attack him. When he returned to his
feet, Lt. Gates observed Townes "get out of his seat and go over
and slam [Officer Brown]. He lifted that officer up -- and not
high -- and grabbed him . . . and slammed him to the floor."
Officer Brown landed on the radio located on his waistband. He
suffered bruised ribs, a bruised kidney, and multiple bruises on
his back. Officer Brown missed two months of work.
Townes testified that he did not intend to harm Officer
Brown, but that his intent was to calm Officer Brown down by
setting him down on a table that was located in the room.
In rendering its decision, the trial court stated:
Mr. Townes, I believe the testimony of Mr.
Brown and I believe the testimony of the
Virginia State Trooper and I believe the
testimony of Lt. Gates. And I do not
believe your testimony. This is a case of
three inmates - - or four - - trying to take
over a situation and putting themselves in
charge. And I don't believe you.
I find you guilty of unlawful wounding. And
I think you clearly wounded that man and you
intended to disable him with the intent to
take him out. You are guilty of that.
In its role of judging witness credibility, the trial court is
entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of Townes and
conclude that he was lying to conceal his guilt. Moreover, the
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trial court could reasonably conclude as inconceivable and
incredulous, the claim that a person would use a hip-toss,
thereby resulting in the "slamming" of another to the floor, as
a means of calming that other person. The credibility of a
witness and the inferences to be drawn from proven facts are
matters solely for the fact finder's determination. See
Mughrabi v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 538, 547-48, 567 S.E.2d
542, 546 (2002).
Based on the attendant circumstances, the evidence was
sufficient for the trial court to conclude that Townes attacked
Officer Brown with the intent to maim or disable him. The
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
The Court notes that the final sentencing order entered by
the trial court erroneously reflects that Townes was found
guilty of malicious wounding. Accordingly, this case is
remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of amending the
final order to reflect that Townes was found guilty of unlawful
wounding.
Affirmed and remanded.
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