COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Bumgardner and Humphreys
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
JONTE MIKELL HEMBRICK
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2231-01-2 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
DECEMBER 17, 2002
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Thomas N. Nance, Judge
Craig S. Cooley (Robin M. Morgan; Davis &
Morgan, on brief), for appellant.
Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.
The trial court convicted Jonte Mikell Hembrick during a
bench trial of two counts of first degree murder. He contends
the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and the
trial court erred in rejecting his defense of duress. Finding
no error, we affirm.
We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 256 Va. 514, 516, 506 S.E.2d 312, 313
(1998). The defendant, Tieonne Thomas, Nathaniel Robinson,
Bernell Lewis, and Eunice Carmon were at Sandra Dunn's house.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
The murder victims, Christy Lucas and Heidi McGehee, were also
present but in a bedroom with Thomas. Thomas's girlfriend,
Naquisha Silver, and a friend arrived and knocked on the door.
Dunn and the defendant delayed opening the door until Thomas had
come into the living room and he pretended to be asleep.
Silver was angry at the delay. Thomas pretended to be
angry at Lewis and the defendant for causing the delay in
opening the door. While winking at them, Thomas pushed Lewis
and slapped the defendant. The defendant left the house, but he
returned 15-30 minutes later.
When Christy Lucas and Heidi McGehee came into the living
room from the bedroom, Silver accused them of having sex with
Thomas. Thomas grabbed Christy Lucas by the throat and slammed
her against the wall. Eunice Carmon ordered the two girls to
undress, get on the floor, and perform oral sex on each other.
She inserted a bottle into Heidi McGehee and hit her with a
belt.
Thomas and Robinson began kicking Heidi McGehee. Thomas
told the defendant to kick her, and he did. The defendant
kicked her several times and at least once in the head. He also
yelled an obscenity at her while kicking. He then sat down and
watched as Thomas and Robinson continued kicking the two girls.
At some point, the defendant left. Later Thomas and Robinson
also left, but all three returned together approximately fifteen
minutes later.
- 2 -
The defendant sat in the living room while Thomas and
Robinson resumed kicking Christy Lucas. When Robinson put a hot
iron on the backs of the girls, Heidi McGehee did not move and
Christy Lucas only trembled and made a gurgling sound. Thomas
and Robinson kicked Christy Lucas some more. The violence then
focused on Sanda Dunn, although the defendant left before it
did. Those remaining tied her to a chair, and after kicking
her, they poured gasoline around the house and burnt it down.
Heidi McGehee died from multiple blunt head injuries, and
Christy Lucas died from a combination of blunt head trauma and a
stab wound to her back.
The defendant initially told the police he was not present
at all. Later he admitted he was present but denied taking part
in the attacks. He said Thomas "ain't make me do nothing. [He]
made me sit down and shut up. . . . And made me watch out the
door. That what he made me do. He ain't make me do nothing."
The defendant testified that he fled the house because he
did not think Thomas was kidding when he slapped the defendant.
He acknowledged that Bernell Lewis warned him not to return to
the house the first time. The defendant contended he only
returned the second time because Thomas and Robinson found him
and forced him back at gunpoint. He maintained he only sat and
watched while the others kicked the victims. The defendant
denied touching, kicking, or cursing the victims. He testified
that the others would not let him leave and that he was afraid.
- 3 -
The trial court found:
[t]his young man left . . . [and] [h]e came
back up there on his own. He is a minor
player, compared to the other folks in
there, but I have no reason to believe that
he did not participate. He was present,
aiding and abetting in the stomping and
kicking of these woman [sic], that they
kicked . . . to death. He was part of the
frenzy. He was part of the pack of animals
that did that. He is guilty of murder.
The defendant contends the trial court erred in finding the
evidence sufficient to support his convictions of first degree
murder.
Heidi McGehee died from blunt head trauma. The defendant
took part in kicking her and kicked her in the head at least
once. When "two or more persons take a direct part in
inflicting fatal injuries, each joint participant is an
'immediate perpetrator.'" Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va.
482, 495, 404 S.E.2d 227, 235 (1991) (quoting Coppola v.
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 256-57, 257 S.E.2d 797, 806 (1979)).
As the trial court accurately portrayed the scene, the defendant
was "part of the pack of animals" that kicked Heidi McGehee to
death. The evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was a joint participant and, as such, a principal in
the first degree to the murder of Heidi McGehee.
Christy Lucas died from a combination of head trauma and a
stab wound. The evidence does not indicate the defendant
inflicted any injuries directly to her, but it does show he was
- 4 -
a principal in the second degree. "A person who is present at
the commission of a crime, inciting, encouraging, advising or
assisting in the act done, is deemed to be an aider and abettor,
and is liable as principal [in the second degree]." Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 260 Va. 683, 688, 537 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2000)
(citing Snyder v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 1009, 1015, 121 S.E.2d
452, 457 (1961)). Spradlin v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 523, 528,
79 S.E.2d 443, 445 (1954), held:
If there is concert of action with the
resulting crime one of its incidental
probable consequences, then whether such
crime was originally contemplated or not,
all who participate in any way in bringing
it about are equally answerable and are
bound by the acts of every other person
connected with the consummation of such
resulting crime.
The defendant voluntarily returned to the house after being
advised not to. He was within several feet of both helpless
victims. His direct participation in the attack on Heidi
McGehee was active participation in the overall aggression
directed at both girls. In addition, the trial court was not
required to believe the defendant's explanation that he took no
part. If the trial court did not believe that explanation, it
could infer the defendant was lying to conceal his guilt. Black
v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 838, 842, 284 S.E.2d 608, 610 (1981);
Rollston v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 535, 547, 399 S.E.2d 823,
830 (1991). The evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that
- 5 -
the defendant was a principal in the second degree to the murder
of Christy Lucas.
The defendant contends the trial court failed to properly
consider his defense of duress. Duress, however, is generally
not available as a defense to murder. Arnold v. Commonwealth,
37 Va. App. 781, 787, 560 S.E.2d 915, 918 (2002). One "'ought
rather to die himself than escape by the murder of an
innocent.'" Rollin M. Perkins, Perkins on Criminal Law 951 (2d
ed. 1969) (quoting 4 Blackstone Commentaries 30). Even if it
were available, it would not apply to the facts of this case.
The trial court found the defendant voluntarily returned
and participated. The defendant never claimed that threats
caused him to take part in the attacks. The defense does not
apply when "the defendant 'fails to take advantage of a
reasonable opportunity to escape, or of a reasonable opportunity
to avoid doing the acts without being harmed . . . .'" Graham
v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 662, 674-75, 525 S.E.2d 567, 573
(2000) (quoting Pancoast v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 28, 33, 340
S.E.2d 833, 836 (1986)). The facts in this case permitted the
trial court to reject the defense of duress.
The evidence was sufficient for the trial court to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of each
count of first degree murder. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
- 6 -