COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Annunziata and Agee
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
JEFFREY SCOTT KIBLER
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0165-02-4 JUDGE G. STEVEN AGEE
DECEMBER 3, 2002
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PAGE COUNTY
John J. McGrath, Jr., Judge
David A. Downes for appellant.
Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney
General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.
On January 22, 1996, Jeffrey Scott Kibler (Kibler) was
convicted in the Page County Circuit Court of two counts of
forgery, two counts of uttering, one count of attempted uttering,
and one count of petit larceny by false pretenses. For these
crimes Kibler received sentences totaling 15 years and 12 months
incarceration with 12 years and 12 months suspended so long as
certain conditions were met and he "keep the peace and be of good
behavior, including obeying the usual rules and regulations of the
places of his confinement."
On October 23, 2000, the court revoked two years of the
suspended sentences for various violations. The remainder of the
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
suspended sentences continued the "good behavior" requirement in
addition to other standard stipulations. On January 9, 2002, the
circuit court conducted a revocation proceeding on the
Commonwealth's petition to revoke the remainder of Kibler's
suspended sentences. At the conclusion of that proceeding the
trial court revoked five years of Kibler's suspended sentences
based on three instances of violating the "good behavior"
provision:
(1) the possession of a pencil sharpener containing a razor
blade in violation of the rules of the Page County jail,
(2) a statement to a corrections officer that upon release he
would rape and molest young children and that hopefully some of
them would die, and
(3) an admission to correctional officers that he sent family
members envelopes through the mail containing a white powder. 1
Kibler asserts that the court abused its discretion in
revoking the suspended sentences because the evidence was
insufficient to show substantial misconduct. We disagree and
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
1
As the parties are fully conversant with the record in
this case and because this memorandum opinion carries no
precedential value, only those facts necessary to a disposition
of this appeal are recited.
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I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal
in a criminal case, this Court views the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all
reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See
Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534,
537 (1975). Moreover, the General Assembly has granted trial
courts wide authority to revoke a suspended sentence.
In any case in which the court has suspended
the execution or imposition of sentence, the
court may revoke the suspension of sentence
for any cause the court deems sufficient that
occurred at any time within the probation
period, or within the period of suspension
fixed by the court.
Code § 19.2-306.
The Virginia Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed the
breadth of this discretion lodged with the trial court. "[A]
revocation of a suspended sentence lies in the discretion of the
trial court and that . . . discretion is quite broad." Hamilton
v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 325, 326, 228 S.E.2d 555, 556 (1976)
(citing Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 357, 38 S.E.2d 479
(1946)). "[T]he issue on review of a revocation 'is simply
whether there has been an abuse of discretion.'" Connelly v.
Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 888, 890, 420 S.E.2d 244, 245 (1992)
(quoting Marshall v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 217, 221, 116 S.E.2d
270, 274 (1960)).
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While the trial court's discretion in revocation proceedings
is quite broad, it is not unfettered.
The cause deemed by the court to be
sufficient for revoking a suspension must be
a reasonable cause. . . . "[The court's]
finding of fact and judgment thereon are
reversible only upon a clear showing of
abuse of such discretion." The discretion
required is a judicial discretion, the
exercise of which "implies conscientious
judgment, not arbitrary action."
Marshall, 202 Va. at 220, 116 S.E.2d at 274 (quoting Slayton,
185 Va. at 367, 38 S.E.2d at 484) (emphasis added); see also
Duff v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 293, 297, 429 S.E.2d 465, 467
(1993).
II. ANALYSIS
The trial court clearly found from the evidence that: (1)
Kibler possessed a sharp object – either a detached razor blade
or a prohibited pencil sharpener, (2) told a corrections officer
that he planned to rape, molest and kill little children upon
his release, and (3) sent envelopes containing white powder to
various family members which he admitted to corrections
officials during the nationwide concern about anthrax-laced
letters in 2001.
Kibler argued the mailing of the powdered letters should
not be considered because he testified this occurred before the
anthrax scare began. However, Kibler also told corrections
officers he thought a federal detainer was in place against him
because of the mailings. The trial court was entitled to
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disbelieve Kibler's testimony and assume he was lying to cover
his guilt. "[T]he fact finder is not required to believe all
aspects of a defendant's statement or testimony; the judge or
jury may reject that which it finds implausible, but accept
other parts which it finds to be believable." Pugliese v.
Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 82, 92, 428 S.E.2d 16, 24 (1993)
(quoting Durham v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 166, 169, 198 S.E.2d
603, 606 (1973)). The trial court was further entitled to give
the incident such weight as it deemed proper. See Walton v.
Commonwealth, 255 Va. 422, 426, 497 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1998)
("Great deference must be given to the factfinder who, having
seen and heard the witnesses, assesses their credibility and
weighs their testimony.").
Kibler contended for the first time at oral argument that
even if the revocation was justified, based on the other
incidents, the matter should be remanded for re-sentencing due
to the unknown weight given the letter incident in determining
the total revocation period. This concept was never argued to
the trial court or made in Kibler's brief. We therefore do not
consider this argument under the provisions of Rule 5A:18. "The
Court of Appeals will not consider an argument on appeal which
was not presented to the trial court." Ohree v. Commonwealth,
26 Va. App. 299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1998). No argument
was advanced for application of the "ends of justice" exception,
and we see none.
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While a trial court may revoke a suspended sentence "for any
cause the court deems sufficient" under Code § 19.2-306, the
Supreme Court of Virginia has interpreted this language to mean a
"reasonable cause." Slayton, 185 Va. at 367, 38 S.E.2d at 484.
Although the court's basis for revocation must be reasonable,
this Court has held that a defendant's actions need not be
criminal conduct, but must be substantial misconduct. See
Holden v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 38, 43-44, 497 S.E.2d 492,
494-95 (1998).
Possession of a sharp instrument, threats to children and
improper use of the mail are alike in all not being acts of good
behavior. Each of the three incidents cited by the trial court,
standing alone, would arguably be sufficient to be deemed by a
trial court substantial misconduct sufficient to revoke Kibler's
suspended sentences. When considered as a whole, Kibler's
collective conduct satisfies any reasonable definition of
substantial misconduct sufficient to revoke a suspended
sentence.
It is apparent on the record that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in revoking Kibler's suspended sentences.
The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
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