COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Annunziata, Agee and Senior Judge Coleman
WILLIAM PERRY, JR.
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 1102-02-1 PER CURIAM
OCTOBER 29, 2002
HAMPTON DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON
Christopher W. Hutton, Judge
(Stephen K. Smith, on brief), for appellant.
(Lesa J. Yeatts, Deputy City Attorney; City
Attorney's Office, on brief), for appellee.
William Perry, Jr. appeals the trial court's order affirming
an order of the juvenile and domestic relations district court
changing the goal of the foster care service plan for his child
from "return to parent" to "adoption." Upon reviewing the record
and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without
merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial
court. See Rule 5A:27.
Perry's daughter was born on January 7, 2000. She came into
foster care in May 2000 when the child's mother left the child
with a neighbor and failed to return "after an extended period of
time." At a hearing held in the trial court on March 8, 2002, a
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
case worker testified that Perry "had been in and out of jail"
during this time. When Perry was not incarcerated, the Hampton
Department of Social Services (DSS) required him to complete
certain goals in order for him to regain custody of his daughter.
Perry was to enter a drug program, attend parenting classes, find
employment, find appropriate housing, establish a visitation
schedule with his daughter, and maintain contact with DSS. Perry
failed to complete these goals and only visited his daughter one
time in February 2001. Perry also failed to maintain contact with
DSS.
Perry testified that he desired the foster care service plan
to reflect a goal of "return to parent." He stated he had
enrolled in a fatherhood program and that his work hours
frequently prevented him from visiting his daughter. Perry also
stated that he was being released from incarceration in May 2002
and would be able to care for his daughter upon his release.
Perry's guardian ad litem asked the trial court to approve
the foster care service plan with a goal of "return to parent."
DSS and the guardian ad litem for the child requested that the
trial court approve the foster care service plan with a goal of
adoption.
The foster care service plan indicates that the child is
"thriving" in foster care. The plan also states that Perry has
not sufficiently addressed the tasks and responsibilities outlined
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in the previous service plan. The trial court approved the foster
care service plan with the goal of adoption.
Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate
standard in a case involving the modification of foster care plans
pursuant to Code § 16.1-282. Padilla v. Norfolk Div. of Soc.
Servs., 22 Va. App. 643, 645, 472 S.E.2d 648, 649 (1996).
"When addressing matters concerning a child . . . the
paramount consideration of a trial court is the child's best
interests." Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13
Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). "In matters of a
child's welfare, trial courts are vested with broad discretion in
making the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child's
best interests." Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387
S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). On appeal, we presume that the trial
court "thoroughly weighed all the evidence, . . . and made its
determination based on the child's best interests." Id. at 329,
387 S.E.2d at 796. Furthermore, "[w]here, as here, the trial
court heard the evidence ore tenus, its finding is entitled to
great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it." Martin v. Pittsylvania
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16
(1986).
The evidence showed that Perry has not maintained consistent
contact with DSS, and he has not maintained regular visitation
with his child. The foster care service plan indicated that Perry
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has no bond with his child. Perry has been periodically
incarcerated during the time the child has been in foster care,
and he has not addressed the responsibilities identified by DSS in
order to regain custody of his daughter. "'[P]ast actions and
relationships over a meaningful period serve as good indicators of
what the future may be expected to hold.'" Linkous v. Kingery, 10
Va. App. 45, 56, 390 S.E.2d 188, 194 (1990) (citation omitted).
Therefore, DSS proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
changing the goal from "return to parent" to "goal for adoption"
was in the best interests of the child. Accordingly, the trial
court did not err in affirming the order of the juvenile and
domestic relations district court approving the permanent foster
care service plan with a goal of adoption.
Affirmed.
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