COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Annunziata, Agee and Senior Judge Coleman
TERESA A. WILLIAMS
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 1017-02-1 PER CURIAM
OCTOBER 29, 2002
HAMPTON DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON
Christopher W. Hutton, Judge
(Lawrence A. Martin; Coyle, Martin &
Blackwell, on brief), for appellant.
(Lesa J. Yeatts, Deputy City Attorney; City
Attorney's Office, on brief), for appellee.
Teresa A. Williams appeals the trial court's order affirming
an order of the juvenile and domestic relations district court
changing the goal of the foster care service plan for her child
from "return to parent" to "adoption." Upon reviewing the record
and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without
merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial
court. See Rule 5A:27.
Williams' daughter was born on January 7, 2000. She came
into foster care in May 2000 when Williams left the child with a
neighbor and failed to return "after an extended period of time."
At a hearing held in the trial court on March 8, 2002, a case
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
worker testified that Williams was incarcerated for eight months
out of the twenty-four months the child had been in foster care.
When Williams was not incarcerated, the Hampton Department of
Social Services (DSS) required her to complete certain goals in
order for her to regain custody of her daughter. Williams was to
complete a drug program, complete a live-in workout program,
complete a parenting class, maintain employment for six months,
maintain stable housing, maintain visitation and maintain contact
with the DSS. DSS offered services to Williams, including the
Healthy Family Parenting Education Program, drug treatment, and
visitation with the child. Williams visited her child four times
between July 2000 and February 2001. Also during this time
period, Williams had two relapses when she resumed using
controlled substances. Williams last contacted DSS in mid-2001.
Williams testified she wanted the foster care service plan to
reflect a goal of "return to parent." She stated she could
conquer her addiction and wanted to be part of her daughter's
life. Williams was sentenced to serve one year incarceration in
March 2002, but she stated that upon her release, she would comply
with all of the requirements of DSS and do what was necessary to
take responsibility for her daughter.
Williams' guardian ad litem asked the trial court to approve
the foster care service plan with a goal of "return to parent."
Williams asked that her daughter be placed with the child's father
upon his release from jail in May 2002 until she was released from
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incarceration later that same year. DSS and the guardian ad litem
for the child requested that the trial court approve the foster
care service plan with a goal of adoption.
The foster care service plan indicates that the child is
"thriving" in foster care. The plan also states that Williams has
not sufficiently addressed the tasks and responsibilities
discussed in the previous service plan. On March 29, 2002, the
trial court approved the foster care service plan with the goal of
adoption.
Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate
standard in a case involving the modification of foster care plans
pursuant to Code § 16.1-282. Padilla v. Norfolk Div. of Soc.
Servs., 22 Va. App. 643, 645, 472 S.E.2d 648, 649 (1996).
"When addressing matters concerning a child . . . the
paramount consideration of a trial court is the child's best
interests." Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13
Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). "In matters of a
child's welfare, trial courts are vested with broad discretion in
making the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child's
best interests." Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387
S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). On appeal, we presume that the trial
court "thoroughly weighed all the evidence, . . . and made its
determination based on the child's best interests." Id. at 329,
387 S.E.2d at 796. Furthermore, "[w]here, as here, the trial
court heard the evidence ore tenus, its finding is entitled to
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great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it." Martin v. Pittsylvania
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16
(1986).
The evidence showed that Williams has not maintained
consistent contact with DSS and she last contacted DSS in
mid-2001. She has not maintained regular visitation with her
child, and the foster care service plan indicated that Williams
has no bond with her child. Williams has been incarcerated
several times during the time the child has been in foster care,
and she has not addressed the responsibilities identified by DSS
in order to regain custody of her daughter. "'[P]ast actions and
relationships over a meaningful period serve as good indicators of
what the future may be expected to hold.'" Linkous v. Kingery, 10
Va. App. 45, 56, 390 S.E.2d 188, 194 (1990) (citation omitted).
Therefore, DSS proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
changing the goal from "return to parent" to "goal for adoption"
was in the best interests of the child. Accordingly, the trial
court did not err in affirming the order of the juvenile and
domestic relations district court approving the permanent foster
care service plan with a goal of adoption.
Affirmed.
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