COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Annunziata, Agee and Senior Judge Coleman
YOLANDA C. WILSON
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 0362-02-1 PER CURIAM
SEPTEMBER 10, 2002
JAMES CITY COUNTY
DIVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG
AND COUNTY OF JAMES CITY
Samuel Taylor Powell III, Judge
(Susanna B. Hickman; Geddy, Harris, Franck &
Hickman, L.L.P., on brief), for appellant.
(Frank M. Morton, III, County Attorney;
Greg H. Dohrman, Assistant County Attorney;
Alice K. Twiford, Guardian ad litem for
Idalia Wilson; Frances S. Taylor, Guardian ad
litem for Marquise Wilson, on brief), for
appellee.
Yolanda C. Wilson (appellant) appeals the decision of the
trial court terminating her parental rights to two of her minor
children, Marquise and Idalia. Upon reviewing the record and
briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without
merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial
court. See Rule 5A:27.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
BACKGROUND
"Upon appellate review, we must review the facts in the light
most favorable to the party prevailing below." Richardson v.
Richardson, 30 Va. App. 341, 349, 516 S.E.2d 726, 730 (1999).
On January 15, 2002, the trial court conducted a hearing on
the matter. Cherrye Cole, who was formerly employed with the
Gloucester County Division of Social Services (GC DSS), testified
that she worked with the family in 1998 after one of appellant's
children was placed in foster care. That child is not the subject
of this appeal. At that time, GC DSS developed a foster care
service plan that provided, among other things, that the entire
family should attend family counseling and establish a stable home
environment. The plan also provided for visitation and required
that appellant attend parenting classes. Cole testified that
appellant's compliance with the plan was "sporadic." She did not
attend counseling services, and she did not enter or complete
parenting class. She also visited the children infrequently.
Cole stated that the family had a continuing problem with the
inability to maintain a stable home and sometimes lacked food and
electricity.
In 1998, the family moved to James City County. On March 3,
1999, the James City County Division of Social Services (JCC DSS)
filed a petition for an emergency removal order regarding Marquise
and Idalia. The children were with their father when he was
arrested and taken to jail on March 2, 1999. Appellant was in
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jail at that time for a felony child neglect offense. Appellant
has also been convicted of physically assaulting Marquise, and the
children's father has been convicted for the assault and battery
of a child.
Marquise and Idalia have been in foster care since April
1999. Melanie White of JCC DSS testified that the initial foster
care service plan for the children had a goal of return home.
Because appellant was in jail at the time, the plan primarily
addressed services for Kelly Wilson (Wilson), the children's
father, upon his release from jail. White testified that Wilson
did not complete the services outlined in the plan and the
children were not returned to the home.
The trial court has never approved a plan for appellant.
However, when appellant was released from jail, White met with her
and discussed a plan developed by JCC DSS, explaining that
appellant needed to maintain stable employment and housing, have a
personality and psychological evaluation, and complete a parenting
class. White testified that, although appellant "thought" she had
completed some of the services, appellant's participation in the
services was "very minimal," particularly concerning the
counseling and the emotional needs of the children.
White testified that when appellant was released from jail,
appellant initially visited the children. However, starting in
the spring of 2001, appellant frequently cancelled the visits or
failed to appear for scheduled visits. Appellant completed one
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parenting class and completed the psychological evaluation. She
attended three of five counseling classes concerning special needs
children. White stated that appellant has changed employment
numerous times.
Appellant's psychological evaluation indicated that appellant
"lacks the adequate resources to nurture and protect" the
children. The evaluation further found that appellant was "at
risk of abusing her children in the future" and recommended that
she not have unsupervised visitation with the children.
White stated that in October 2001, appellant expressed a
desire to give up her rights to Marquise, stating that he was "in
a good place." White also testified that when Marquise first came
to foster care, he had numerous behavior problems. He has been
diagnosed with Bipolar disorder, Dysthymia, ADHD, and Oppositional
Defiant Disorder. He has taken several types of medications to
manage his behavior. Marquise was placed with his current foster
mother, Clara Brown, in 1999, and his behavior has improved since
that time.
Brown testified Marquise is "better now," and he has been
seeing therapists. She stated he is a "totally different person"
than he was when he first arrived in her home, and he has
exhibited more "control" over his behavior. Brown stated that
Marquise is more difficult to control after he visits with
appellant or his father. Brown testified that appellant has
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telephoned Marquise about five or six times in the past several
years.
Idalia entered foster care when she was three years old. She
was "highly sexualized," was attending counseling sessions, and
was taking medications for behavior management. She has been
diagnosed with Oppositional Defiant Disorder and appears to have
suffered sexual abuse. White stated that Idalia is very
intelligent, but she has high emotional needs. She needs
"continual modification interventions." Idalia has been in
therapy concerning sexualized behavior issues. A psychological
evaluation of Idalia dated December 5, 2000 recommended that, due
to allegations of physical abuse, appellant should have only
supervised visitation with Idalia until a parenting capacity
evaluation was performed.
Amy Burks, Idalia's foster parent for about five months,
testified that she has had to retrieve Idalia from school when she
exhibits behavioral problems, which usually occurs just after she
visits with her parents. She stated that Idalia exhibits the
behavior by jumping up and down and hitting her head against the
wall. Burks stated that Idalia "does great at home," and Burks
participates in Idalia's counseling sessions. Burks testified
that Idalia's behavior has improved while she has lived with Burks
and that she is interested in adopting Idalia.
White opined that it was in the best interests of the
children to terminate appellant's parental rights. The children
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have been in foster care for about three years. White stated they
needed stability, security, safety and nurturing. The current
foster homes are meeting those needs for the children, and the
foster parents are interested in adopting the children. White
stated that appellant has not completed the services necessary to
meet the children's needs. The guardians ad litem for the
children also recommended termination of appellant's parental
rights.
At the time of the hearing, appellant was employed and had a
residence. She testified she planned to take a parenting class
with emphasis on children with behavioral issues. She stated that
she had not taken the class before because it was not available to
her. Appellant testified she attended every scheduled visitation
with her children with the exception of those dates that coincided
with her court dates. She indicated that social services often
did not reschedule the visits that she was unable to attend.
Appellant stated that she intended to begin counseling in the next
month and that she had already taken one parenting class.
Appellant did not know how Marquise was performing in school.
Appellant has never telephoned the foster home where Idalia is
placed. She did not know how Idalia was performing in school or
in counseling.
The trial court found that, pursuant to Code
§ 16.1-283(C)(2), it is in the best interests of the children to
terminate appellant's parental rights and the requirements of the
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statute have been met. The trial court found that appellant has
not completed the programs she needs in order to take care of the
children. Furthermore, although the children have been in foster
care for almost three years, appellant is just starting to enter
the suggested programs. The court found that social services had
made reasonable efforts to provide programs for appellant, but
that she has not taken advantage of the programs. The court also
found that the children needed permanency. Accordingly, the trial
court terminated appellant's parental rights.
ANALYSIS
Under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2), the trial court can terminate a
party's parental rights if the parent has "been unwilling or
unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve
months from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy
substantially the conditions which led to or required continuation
of the child's foster care placement."
Marquise and Idalia have spent almost three years in foster
care. For part of that time period, appellant was incarcerated
for a felony child neglect offense and for a charge of physically
assaulting Marquise. Furthermore, during the three years,
appellant has failed to participate in most of the recommended
programs that would teach her how to meet the special needs of the
children and to rectify the conditions that perpetuate the
children in foster care. In addition, her psychological
evaluation indicates that appellant lacks the resources to nurture
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the children, and she is at risk for abusing the children.
Appellant has made some progress toward meeting the children's
physical needs, but not their significant emotional or
psychological needs. Moreover, the children are improving while
in foster care.
"In matters of a child's welfare, trial courts are vested
with broad discretion in making the decisions necessary to guard
and to foster a child's best interests." Farley v. Farley, 9
Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). On appeal, we
presume that the trial court "thoroughly weighed all the evidence,
considered the statutory requirements, and made its determination
based on the child's best interests." Id. at 329, 387 S.E.2d at
796. Furthermore, "[w]here, as here, the trial court heard the
evidence ore tenus, its finding is entitled to great weight and
will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without
evidence to support it." Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining
it was in the best interests of the children to terminate
appellant's residual parental rights. Accordingly, we summarily
affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
Affirmed.
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