COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Agee and Senior Judge Overton
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
ROSEMARIE DORER
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0974-01-4 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
MARCH 19, 2002
FEROZ R. SIDDIQUI, SR.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
David T. Stitt, Judge
Emilia Castillo (Law Office of Emilia
Castillo, P.C., on brief), for appellant.
Kyle Elizabeth Skopic for appellee.
On appeal from the dismissal of a rule to show cause,
Rosemarie Dorer contends that the circuit court erred in holding
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the
judgment of the circuit court.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1987, Rosemarie Dorer and Feroz Siddiqui, Sr. were
divorced. On February 17, 1989, the circuit court remanded
issues pertaining to child support to the Fairfax County
Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court pursuant to Code
§ 20-79(c). On November 3, 1998, the juvenile and domestic
relations district court entered a support order. Siddiqui
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
appealed the decision to the circuit court. On October 6, 1999,
the circuit court entered an order setting child support at $545
per month and remanding the matter back to the juvenile and
domestic relations district court pursuant to Code § 20-79(c).
On June 20, 2000, on Dorer's motion, the circuit court
issued a rule to show cause alleging that Siddiqui had failed to
pay child support in accordance with the October 6, 1999 order.
On June 30, 2000, it held him in contempt. On October 2, 2000,
the circuit court issued a second rule to show cause, alleging
that Siddiqui had once again failed to pay child support as
required by the support orders of October 6, 1999 and June 30,
2000. On October 13, 2000, the circuit court entered an agreed
order reciting that the parties had agreed that Siddiqui had
failed to pay child support and that the parties had resolved
the matter. The case was continued to January 22, 2001, for a
hearing regarding child support and other issues.
Thereafter, Siddiqui filed two motions. The first sought
modification or termination of child support. The second sought
a rule against Dorer, alleging that she had failed to comply
with the parties' property settlement agreement. Hearing on
these matters was scheduled for January 22, 2001.
On January 10, 2001, the circuit court issued a third rule
to show cause, alleging that Siddiqui had failed to comply with
the support orders of October 6, 1999 and June 30, 2000. This
matter was scheduled for hearing on January 22, 2001.
- 2 -
At the January 22, 2001 hearing the circuit court dismissed
the rule against Dorer, holding that she had not violated the
property settlement agreement. That ruling is not appealed.
Dorer then asserted that the circuit court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to modify the support order of October 1999,
which it had remanded to the juvenile and domestic relations
district court pursuant to Code § 20-79(c). Her argument was
ambiguous and appeared to address her jurisdictional challenge
to all issues then before the circuit court. However, by a
written motion filed March 6, 2001, and by oral argument before
the circuit court March 16, 2001, she clarified her position,
asserting that her jurisdictional argument addressed only
Siddiqui's motion to modify child support. On March 16, 2001,
the circuit court entered an order holding that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to rule on all the support issues,
including the rules against Siddiqui, because the "matter of
support and all rules thereof were remanded to Juvenile and
Domestic Relations District Court and therefore this court lacks
jurisdiction to hear a rule on this matter." It dismissed
Dorer's rules to show cause. Dorer endorsed that order without
noting exception, but appeals that ruling. Although Dorer
failed to note a proper exception on the order, we find that her
argument presented her position sufficiently to the circuit
court and adequately preserved the issue for appeal.
- 3 -
II. ANALYSIS
Dorer argues that the court's concurrent jurisdiction did not
cease when it transferred enforcement of its support order to the
juvenile and domestic relations district court pursuant to Code
§ 20-79(c). We agree. The circuit court erred in holding that it
lacked jurisdiction over the rules to show cause. However, we
find no abuse of the circuit court's discretion in its decision to
leave enforcement of support in the juvenile and domestic
relations district court. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of
the circuit court.
Code § 20-79(c) states in relevant part:
In any suit for divorce or suit for
maintenance and support, the court may after
a hearing, . . . final decree for
maintenance and support, or subsequent
decree in such suit, transfer to the
juvenile and domestic relations district
court the enforcement of its orders
pertaining to . . . maintenance, support,
care and custody of the child or children.
Code § 20-79(c) (emphasis added).
A circuit court retains concurrent jurisdiction when it
transfers matters involving child support, custody, and visitation
to a juvenile and domestic relations district court pursuant to
Code § 20-79(c).
Code § 20-79(c) does not place a limitation
on the circuit courts' concurrent and
continuing jurisdiction to decide the
recurring issues of child support, custody
and visitation in domestic relations cases.
To the contrary, Code § 20-79(c) was
intended to expand the means available to
- 4 -
the circuit courts to enforce or modify
support and custody matters, rather than
limit such options. The purpose of Code
§ 20-79(c) was to provide another forum to
expedite matters of enforcement and
modification by referring those issues to
juvenile and domestic relations courts,
where the dockets and procedures usually
enable the parties to obtain earlier
hearings and decisions on issues that
frequently demand expedited consideration.
Code § 20-79(c) . . . does not transfer or
divest jurisdiction nor does it provide that
jurisdiction ceases.
Crabtree v. Crabtree, 17 Va. App. 81, 86, 435 S.E.2d 883, 887
(1993). See also Romine v. Romine, 22 Va. App. 760, 473 S.E.2d
99 (1996).
By transferring enforcement of support to the juvenile and
domestic relations district court pursuant to Code § 20-79(c),
the circuit court established concurrent jurisdiction in the
juvenile and domestic relations district court. However, it did
not thereby divest itself of jurisdiction. Therefore, the
circuit court erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to
hear the rules to show cause.
Although the circuit court erred in holding that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction, that error was not reversible. The
circuit court's concurrent jurisdiction afforded it discretion
to leave the matter to the juvenile and domestic relations
district court. "A circuit court that transfers any matters, to
the juvenile and domestic relations district court pursuant to
Code § 20-79(c) retains the power, in its discretion, to
- 5 -
exercise its continuing jurisdiction over those matters."
Crabtree, 17 Va. App. at 87, 435 S.E.2d at 887 (emphasis added).
[T]he circuit court's jurisdiction must, of
necessity, encompass the power not only to
reinstate a case earlier transferred to a
J&DR court and adjudicate all relevant
issues, but also the power to decide which
court is the more appropriate forum for any
necessary review, modification, and
enforcement of its orders . . . .
Romine, 22 Va. App. at 766, 473 S.E.2d at 102 (citation
omitted). We perceive no abuse of discretion in the circuit
court's decision to leave the matter in the juvenile and
domestic relations district court. Accordingly, the judgment of
the circuit court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
- 6 -