COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Elder and Senior Judge Overton
CRYSTAL McMILLON
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 2565-01-3 PER CURIAM
FEBRUARY 26, 2002
CARROLL COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CARROLL COUNTY
Duane E. Mink, Judge
(Dwight E. Compton; Cooley & Compton, on
brief), for appellant.
(Margaret D. Sutton, Counsel for Carroll
County Department of Social Services; Carolyn
P. Phillips, Guardian ad litem for the minor
children, on brief), for appellee.
Crystal McMillon (mother) appeals the decision of the circuit
court terminating her residual parental rights in her son, Javonte
Marcavial McMillon, and her daughter, Sierra McMillon. On appeal,
mother contends the trial court erred in: (1) finding that she
voluntarily signed the entrustment agreements; (2) finding that
the Carroll County Department of Social Services (DSS) made
reasonable efforts to communicate with her to strengthen the
parent-child relationship and to reach the foster care service
plan of returning the children to their home; and (3) ordering the
involuntary termination of her parental rights to the children.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude
that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily
affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
On appeal, we view the evidence and all the reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to appellee as the party
prevailing below. McGuire v. McGuire, 10 Va. App. 248, 250, 391
S.E.2d 344, 346 (1990).
Background
Javonte was born on August 3, 1994, and Sierra was born on
November 10, 1997. DSS received a telephone call that mother was
residing with the children in a trailer that had no electricity or
heat. Two social workers went to mother's residence, and mother
represented to the social workers that she had no plan for housing
for herself or the children. On April 10, 2000, mother signed
agreements entrusting the children to the custody and care of DSS
until she could find employment and a residence.
On May 16, 2000, DSS filed a foster care service plan with
the goal of "return home" and a target date for achieving that
goal of November 2000. Under this plan, mother was required to
maintain housing, employment, and transportation for ninety days
before reunification of the family could begin. Mother was also
supposed to visit the children twice a month. The plan stated
that DSS would provide mother transportation to job interviews,
provide her information on available job employment, provide her
transportation to search for housing, and schedule visitation with
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the children two times per month. DSS also suggested that mother
obtain counseling and attend parenting classes to assist her in
meeting her parental responsibilities. Mother never accepted help
and did not respond to any of the suggestions from DSS.
On June 22, 2000, the juvenile and domestic relations
district court (J&DR court) approved the entrustment agreements,
and mother signed a waiver of rights to be represented by a
lawyer.
Mother visited the children eight times from April 2000 until
July 13, 2000. Between July 2000 and the date of the termination
hearing on August 23, 2001, mother visited the children once on
December 20, 2000. She never complained to DSS about the
visitation and was never denied visitation with the children.
On or about August 11, 2000, an employee of DSS learned from
reading the newspaper that mother had been arrested for drug and
firearm violations and she was in jail. On September 14, 2000,
after her release from jail, mother called DSS regarding
visitation. Barbara Baxley, a social worker, requested that
mother visit the DSS office to discuss the reasons for her
imprisonment and to establish a visitation schedule. Baxley did
not hear from mother again until she visited the children in
December 2000. Indeed, DSS was unable to locate mother for a
period of time.
On October 20, 2000, after mother had failed to complete the
requirements of the foster care service plan, DSS filed a foster
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care service plan with a change in the program goal to adoption.
DSS also sought to terminate mother's parental rights, and the
J&DR court explained to mother the process for termination of
residual parental rights and the consequences of its approval of
changing the plan's goal to adoption. On July 31, 2001, the J&DR
court approved the plan and terminated mother's parental rights.
Mother appealed to the circuit court. On August 23, 2001, the
trial court also approved the plan and terminated mother's
parental rights. The trial court found that, pursuant to Code
§ 16.1-283(C), mother had failed to maintain continuing contact
with the children and to provide or substantially plan for the
future of the children for six months after their placement in
foster care notwithstanding the reasonable efforts of DSS to
communicate with her and strengthen the parent-child relationship.
At the August 23, 2001 hearing, mother, who does not have a
driver's license, testified that DSS had done little to assist in
her rehabilitation and did not offer her any services or assist in
her transportation needs. She stated that DSS treated her like
"trash" and refused her efforts to schedule visits with the
children. Mother indicated she visited the DSS office as often as
she could. Mother also stated that DSS "tricked" her into signing
the entrustment documents. Mother indicated she was currently
employed at a temporary services agency and lived in a rental
house located near a taxi stand and a school. Mother stated she
had enrolled in a Welfare to Work program, she had enrolled one
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child in a Head Start program, and she had attempted to enroll the
other child in elementary school.
Carolyn Phillips, the guardian ad litem for the children,
testified that her primary concerns were the lack of stability on
mother's part and the lack of contact between mother and the
children for one year. She recommended termination of mother's
residual parental rights.
Analysis
"When addressing matters concerning a child, including the
termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount
consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests."
Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128,
409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). "In matters of a child's welfare,
trial courts are vested with broad discretion in making the
decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child's best
interests." Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d
794, 795 (1990). On appeal, we presume that the trial court
"thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory
requirements, and made its determination based on the child's best
interests." Id. at 329, 387 S.E.2d at 796. Furthermore,
"[w]here, as here, the trial court heard the evidence ore tenus,
its finding is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed
on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it."
Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15,
20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986).
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The evidence showed that mother has substantially failed to
maintain continuing contact with the children and to provide or
substantially plan for the future of the children for a period of
six months after their placement in foster care, notwithstanding
the efforts of DSS. Although mother testified that DSS did not
offer her assistance, the trial court accepted the testimony of
the DSS employees who stated that mother refused their offers of
assistance, did not attend parenting classes, and failed to
respond to any of their suggestions. "The credibility of the
witnesses and the weight accorded the evidence are matters
solely for the fact finder who has the opportunity to see and
hear that evidence as it is presented." Sandoval v.
Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 133, 138, 455 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995).
Thus, although DSS informed mother of her obligations under the
foster care plan, she failed to complete any of her obligations,
despite the passage of over one year since the children were
placed in foster care. "The Department is not required 'to force
its services upon an unwilling or disinterested parent.'" Logan,
13 Va. App. at 130, 409 S.E.2d at 463-64. In addition, mother had
visited the children only one time in the past eight months.
Moreover, the children were in foster care for more than one year,
and "[i]t is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend
a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a
parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities."
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Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535,
540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990).
In addition, the record does not indicate mother argued to
the trial court that she involuntarily signed the entrustment
agreements. The written statement of facts contains only the
testimony of the witnesses and does not contain any arguments
presented by the parties. "The burden is upon the appellant to
provide us with a record which substantiates the claim of error.
In the absence thereof, we will not consider the point."
Jenkins v. Winchester Dep't of Soc. Servs., 12 Va. App. 1178,
1185, 409 S.E.2d 16, 20 (1991). Where we do not have the
benefit of a transcript of the proceedings, we can consider only
that which is contained in the written statement signed by the
trial judge. Id. Furthermore, although mother testified DSS
"tricked" her into signing the entrustment documents, the trial
court did not accept her testimony.
Finally, although mother maintains that she has remedied
the situation that led to the children's foster care, "'past
actions and relationships over a meaningful period serve as good
indicators of what the future may be expected to hold.'" Linkous
v. Kingery, 10 Va. App. 45, 56, 390 S.E.2d 188, 194 (1990)
(citation omitted). Therefore, the record supports the trial
court's finding that DSS presented clear and convincing evidence
satisfying the statutory requirements of Code § 16.1-283(C)(1) and
establishing that termination of mother's residual parental rights
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is in the children's best interests. Accordingly, the decision of
the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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