COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bumgardner, Humphreys and Senior Judge Hodges
EDWARD E. STROUPE, JR.
MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. Record No. 2261-01-3 PER CURIAM
FEBRUARY 5, 2002
RADIO SHACK/TANDY CORPORATION AND
TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE COMPANY
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Edward E. Stroupe, Jr., pro se, on brief).
(Ramesh Murthy; Penn, Stuart & Eskridge, on
brief), for appellees.
Edward Stroupe (claimant) contends the Workers'
Compensation Commission erred in finding (1) he failed to prove
that his alleged unpaid medical bills and mileage expenses were
causally related to his compensable injury by accident because
he failed to submit supporting documentation to the commission;
and (2) the Harcourt Learning Direct Program, costing $818, and
home equipment to establish a recording studio, costing
approximately $18,000, were not employer's responsibility as
reasonable and necessary vocational rehabilitation services.
Upon reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude
that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily
affirm the commission's decision. Rule 5A:27.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
I.
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990).
Unless we can say as a matter of law that claimant's evidence
sustained his burden of proof, the commission's findings are
binding and conclusive upon us. See Tomko v. Michael's
Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970).
In denying claimant's request for reimbursement of various
medical bills and mileage expenses, the commission found as
follows:
[Claimant] must prove that his medical
treatment was causally related to an
industrial injury. There is no opinion by
Dr. [Cecil B.] Knox[, III] regarding a
causal relationship between the treatment he
has provided and the subsequent referrals,
prescriptions, and laboratory work-ups. In
fact, the only opinions about the claimant's
current condition are from Drs. [Todd W.]
Sweeney and [Thomas B.] Sato who conclude
that [claimant] no longer requires ongoing
treatment. From this evidence, we find no
error in Deputy Commissioner Stevick's
finding that the employer is not responsible
for these outstanding costs, if any.
Similarly, we find that the claimant
has submitted detailed evidence of his
accrued mileage expenses for medical
treatment. However, as stated, there is no
medical evidence that the treatment is
related to his compensable injury by
accident. The claimant's personal opinion
is not persuasive in light of Drs. Sweeney
and Sato's conclusions that the treatment is
- 2 -
unnecessary, and given the lack of opinion
from either Dr. [Charlene M.] Truhlik or
Dr. Knox.
The record supports the commission's findings. In light of
the lack of evidence causally relating claimant's medical and
mileage expenses to his compensable injury by accident and the
opinions of Drs. Sweeney and Sato, we cannot find as a matter of
law that claimant's evidence sustained his burden of proof.
II.
Under Code § 65.2-603(A)(3), an employer is required to
furnish reasonable and necessary vocational rehabilitation
training services at the direction of the commission. These
"services shall take into account the employee's preinjury job
and wage classifications; his age; aptitude, and level of
education; the likelihood of success in the new vocation; and
the relative costs and benefits to be derived from such
services." Id.
In denying claimant's request for reimbursement of the cost
of the learning program and the home equipment as vocational
rehabilitation services, the commission found as follows:
As noted by Deputy Commissioner Stevick,
there is no evidence concerning the
claimant's disability, if any. No medical
record establishes that he is unable to
return to his preinjury employment. The
vocational rehabilitation services proposed
by the claimant represent a considerable
investment. Given that the Commission has
no proof of his disability, we cannot
determine that vocational rehabilitation
services are even warranted. We decline to
- 3 -
assume the likelihood of success or of the
benefits to be obtained through these
services. We agree that the Deputy
Commissioner reasonably denied the request.
The record supports the commission's findings. In light of
the lack of any medical documentation establishing claimant's
disability or inability to work and the high cost of the
services requested, we cannot find as a matter of law that
claimant's evidence proved that the services he requested were
compensable as vocational rehabilitation services under the Act.
For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.
- 4 -