COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Senior Judge Overton
JAMES H. SUDDRETH
MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. Record No. 1005-01-4 PER CURIAM
AUGUST 14, 2001
LOUDOUN COUNTY BUILDING AND
DEVELOPMENT/LOUDOUN COUNTY
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(James E. Swiger; Swiger & Cay, on brief),
for appellant.
(Susan A. Evans; Christine A. McKee-Clark;
Siciliano, Ellis, Dyer & Boccarosse, on
brief), for appellee.
James H. Suddreth (claimant) contends that the Workers'
Compensation Commission erred in finding that he failed to prove
that his March 7, 1998 non-work-related right knee injury was a
compensable consequence of his compensable August 16, 1996
injury by accident. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of
the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.
Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision. See
Rule 5A:27.
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party below. See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990).
Unless we can say as a matter of law that claimant's evidence
sustained his burden of proof, the commission's findings are
binding and conclusive upon us. See Tomko v. Michael's Plastering
Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970).
"When a primary injury under the Workmen's
Compensation Act is shown to have arisen out
of the course of employment, every natural
consequence that flows from the injury is
compensable if it is a direct and natural
result of a primary injury. . . . This
doctrine extends the canopy of the Workmen's
Compensation Act to the resulting injury.
This is so because the second injury is
treated as if it occurred in the course of
and arising out of the employee's
employment."
Allen & Rocks, Inc. v. Briggs, 28 Va. App. 662, 668-69, 508
S.E.2d 335, 338 (1998) (citations omitted). The doctrine of
compensable consequences provides that "'where the chain of
causation from the original industrial injury to the condition
for which compensation is sought is direct, and not interrupted
by any intervening cause attributable to the employee's own
intentional conduct, then the subsequent condition should be
compensable.'" Id. at 669, 508 S.E.2d at 338 (citations
omitted).
In ruling that claimant failed to prove that the March 7,
1998 right knee injury flowed as a direct and natural result of
the August 16, 1996 right knee injury, but rather resulted from
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an independent intervening cause, the commission found as
follows:
After the claimant's August 16, 1996,
accident, he returned to full-duty
employment and did not miss work thereafter
due to the compensable injury. On March 30,
1998, he advised Dr. [Thomas] Walker that
although he had occasional discomfort, he
did not experience swelling or "give way"
weakness of his right knee after the 1996
surgery. The claimant testified that as he
tried to get out of the water on March 7,
1998, the current pushed his feet, and he
"probably twisted [his] knee. . . ." It is
clear from his testimony that he is not at
all certain what happened to his knee as he
struggled to get out of the swiftly moving
45-degree water. The claimant is unable to
prove that any sequela from the 1996 injury
caused him to twist his knee. On these
facts, it is just as likely that his
struggle against the current of the cold
water or a slip on the muddy and rocky
riverbank caused his knee injury.
Based upon claimant's testimony regarding the manner in
which he sustained the March 7, 1998 knee injury, the
commission, as fact finder, could reasonably conclude that
claimant's evidence was not sufficient to prove that the 1998
injury was a compensable consequence of the 1996 injury.
Claimant's testimony established that he thought he injured his
right knee in March 1998 when he placed his right leg on the
river bottom and it was hit in the side by the fast moving water
current as he tried to exit the river onto the muddy and rocky
riverbank. He believed that he "probably twisted [his] knee" at
that time. Neither claimant's testimony nor the medical
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evidence established that his degenerative right knee condition
itself caused him to sustain the March 7, 1998 new injury to his
right knee. Rather, the uncontradicted evidence showed that
claimant had worked full-duty without restrictions from December
3, 1996 until the March 7, 1998 non-work-related accident.
During that time period, he did not seek additional medical
treatment for any problems related to his right knee.
For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.
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