COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Frank and Clements
APRIL L. KOONTZ
MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. Record No. 2644-00-3 PER CURIAM
MARCH 6, 2001
WRANGLER, INC. AND
V F CORPORATION
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(John B. Krall; Roger Ritchie & Partners,
P.L.C., on brief), for appellant.
(J. David Griffin; Fowler, Griffin, Coyne,
Coyne & Patton, P.C., on brief), for
appellees.
April L. Koontz (claimant) contends that the Workers'
Compensation Commission erred in finding that she failed to
prove that she suffered an injury by accident arising out of and
in the course of her employment on October 18, 1999. Upon
reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude
that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily
affirm the commission's decision. See Rule 5A:27.
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party below. See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). "In
order to carry [the] burden of proving an 'injury by accident,'
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
a claimant must prove that the cause of [the] injury was an
identifiable incident or sudden precipitating event and that it
resulted in an obvious sudden mechanical or structural change in
the body." Morris v. Morris, 238 Va. 578, 589, 385 S.E.2d 858,
865 (1989). Unless we can say as a matter of law that
claimant's evidence sustained her burden of proof, the
commission's findings are binding and conclusive upon us. See
Tomko v. Michael's Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d
833, 835 (1970).
The commission ruled that claimant failed to prove that she
suffered an electrical shock on October 18, 1999, or suffered
any acute injury flowing therefrom. In so ruling, the
commission found as follows:
The most complete history of injury
reflected in the medical records is that
reported by Dr. [James H.] Bernheimer and
Dr. [Joel M.] Trugman. This history is
essentially consistent with the testimony
offered by the claimant. They reported that
the claimant was standing on a wooden
platform. The metal which comprised the
lift was not in contact with the steel beam
which the claimant was cleaning. The
claimant, in turn, was not in contact with
the battery of the lift. They, and various
other health care providers, specifically
noted the absence of entrance and exit burns
indicating the route that the alleged
electrical current followed through the
claimant's body. These physicians, who are
specialists in neurology, reported that the
tremor in the right upper extremity viewed
during examination varied in location,
amplitude and frequency. Based on these
findings and the history provided by the
- 2 -
claimant, Dr. Bernheimer and Dr. Trugman
expressed some doubt as to whether the
claimant suffered an electrical shock
injury, and concluded that the claimant
exhibited both a significant functional and
psychogenic overlay. We further note that
electrodiagnostic studies revealed the
absence of electrophysiologic evidence of
right ulnar neuropathy or any widespread
neuropathic processes in the right upper
extremity.
Histories recorded by several health
care providers are inconsistent with the
claimant's testimony. Dr. Bernheimer and
Dr. Trugman noted reports that the claimant
was knocked backwards from the shock and
suffered bruising on her right arm. Dr.
[Robin J.] Hamill-Ruth reported that the
alleged electric current flowed from one
unknown extremity through the right hand.
On the issue of causation, Dr. [G. Gregory]
Ross' opinion evolved over time to reflect
his ultimate opinion that the claimant
possibly suffered an electrical injury. He
concluded on January 24, 2000, that the
claimant's symptoms were of unknown
etiology. Dr. [Glenn E.] Deputy opined that
he could not determine the cause of the
claimant's symptoms.
(Citation omitted.)
In light of the conflicts between claimant's hearing
testimony and the medical records and the opinions of her
medical providers, the commission, as fact finder, was entitled
to reject claimant's testimony regarding the alleged October 18,
1999 incident. It is well settled that credibility
determinations are within the fact finder's exclusive purview.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pierce, 5 Va. App. 374, 381, 363
S.E.2d 433, 437 (1987). Furthermore, the commission could infer
- 3 -
from the medical records and the opinions of claimant's medical
providers that claimant's evidence failed to prove that her
right arm condition was caused by an electrical shock or other
acute injury at work on October 18, 1999. "Where reasonable
inferences may be drawn from the evidence in support of the
commission's factual findings, they will not be disturbed by
this Court on appeal." Hawks v. Henrico County Sch. Bd., 7 Va.
App. 398, 404, 374 S.E.2d 695, 698 (1988). Based upon this
record, we cannot find as a matter of law that claimant's
evidence sustained her burden of proof.
For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.
- 4 -