IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
February 11, 2002 Session
BARRY LYNN TEAGUE v. BARBARA ANN CHADWICK TEAGUE
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamilton County
No. 00-D-713 L. Marie Williams, Judge
FILED FEBRUARY 28, 2002
No. E2001-01413-COA-R3-CV
This is a divorce case. The trial court granted the parties a divorce on stipulated grounds; divided
their marital property; and awarded Barbara Ann Chadwick Teague (“Wife”) alimony in futuro of
$1,800 per month, plus attorney’s fees of $2,500. Barry Lynn Teague (“Husband”) appeals the
nature and amount of the alimony award, the division of property, and the award of attorney’s fees.
We vacate the language in the trial court’s judgment projecting into the future as to Wife’s needs
when her mortgage obligation has been paid in full. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court
Affirmed as Modified; Case Remanded
CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which HOUSTON M. GODDARD ,
P.J., and HERSCHEL P. FRANKS, J., joined.
Sherry B. Paty, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, Barry Lynn Teague.
William H. Horton, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellee, Barbara Ann Chadwick Teague.
OPINION
I. Background
The trial court dissolved a marriage of 23 years. At the time of their divorce, Husband was
49 years old, and Wife was 48. They had one child, who had reached the age of majority at the time
of trial.
When the parties married, Husband had already graduated from college with a degree in
accounting. He was awarded the designation of Certified Public Accountant a few years later. Wife
was a high school graduate and had attended one year of business college. Throughout the marriage,
Wife worked for SunTrust Bank; at the time of trial, she was earning approximately $32,280
annually as an operations clerk. She testified at trial that she most likely had reached her salary
limit. In the 23 years preceding the parties’ divorce, Husband held numerous jobs in Chattanooga,
and in 1997, he learned that the insurance company he was working for was being sold.
Understanding that he might lose his job, Husband took a position with Blue Cross Blue Shield of
North Carolina as Director of Budgeting and Expense Management and moved to Durham. Wife
did not want to move away from her family, so she decided to stay in Chattanooga. At the time of
trial, Husband was making $105,000 per year, with opportunities for annual bonuses between $9,000
and $13,000, in addition to the potential for promotions and salary increases over the next several
years.
In mid-1999, Wife indicated that she was willing to move to Durham, but Husband
discouraged the move. A few months later, Wife learned that Husband was seeing someone in North
Carolina, and at that point, Husband filed for divorce.
The divorce was heard in December, 2000, and a final judgment was entered February 6,
2001, granting the parties a divorce on stipulated grounds. The trial court divided the marital
property as follows:
Assets/Debts Value Wife Husband
Marital Residence $121,000 $121,000
SunTrust Mortgage <36,000> <36,000>
Est. Cost of Repairs to Residence <10,000> <10,000>
Eldridge Rd. Property 25,000 25,000
2000 Audi Automobile 32,000 32,000
SunTrust 401K 122,738 122,738
North Carolina Condo. 160,000 $160,000
Chase Mortgage <108,315> <108,315>
1991 Nissan Automobile 10,000 10,000
Northwestern Mutual Annuity 60,520 60,520
AmEx Retirement 43,171 43,171
BB&T Stock 2,668 2,668
BB&T Bank Card <1,000> <1,000>
SunTrust Mastercard <3,500> <3,500>
Total $418,282 $251,238 $167,044
Finding that Wife could not maintain “any semblance of the lifestyle” the parties enjoyed
prior to the divorce, and further finding that rehabilitative alimony is not appropriate in this case, the
trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $1,800 per month.
Finally, the trial court awarded Wife $2,500 in attorney’s fees. Husband filed a motion to alter or
amend, which motion was denied. This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
-2-
Our review of this non-jury case is de novo upon the record with a presumption of
correctness as to the trial court’s factual findings, “unless the preponderance of the evidence is
otherwise.” Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). The trial court’s conclusions of law are not accorded the same
deference. Brumit v. Brumit, 948 S.W.2d 739, 740 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
III. Alimony
Husband challenges the award of alimony on two grounds. First, he asserts that the trial
court should have granted Wife rehabilitative alimony, or alternatively, alimony in solido, rather than
alimony in futuro. Second, Husband contends that the amount of the alimony award constitutes an
abuse of discretion by the trial court.
In determining the propriety, nature, and amount of an alimony award, courts are to consider
the statutory factors enumerated in T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(A)-(L) (2001). “[T]here is no absolute
formula for determining the amount of alimony.” Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn.
1995). The two most important factors in setting the amount of an alimony award are need and the
ability to pay, with need being “the single most important factor.” Id., quoting Cranford v.
Cranford, 772 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). Because the amount of alimony to be awarded
is within the trial court’s sound discretion in view of the particular circumstances of the case,
appellate courts will not alter such awards absent an abuse of discretion. Lindsey v. Lindsey, 976
S.W.2d 175, 180 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d)(1) reflects a preference for an award of rehabilitative alimony.
Crabtree v. Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d 356, 358 (Tenn. 2000). An award of rehabilitative alimony,
however, is appropriate only where rehabilitation is feasible. See T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d)(1). In the
instant case, rehabilitative alimony is clearly not appropriate. At the age of 48, Wife likely has
reached the pinnacle of her earning potential, and with a high school degree and one year of business
school, she is not in a position to change careers. Clearly, Wife cannot be rehabilitated under any
reasonable standard, and thus, we find that the trial court correctly concluded that Wife is entitled
to some form of long-term support.
Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Wife alimony in futuro of
$1,800 per month. The testimony at trial reveals that, prior to the divorce, the parties had a joint
income of some $140,000 per year, which allowed Wife to enjoy a lifestyle that was commensurate
with that income. Post-divorce, Wife’s income has been reduced to her annual salary of $32,280.
While the award of $1,800 per month in alimony will not allow her to enjoy the same lifestyle to
which she was accustomed while married, “it will provide her with