COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis
SHEILA IRON RATLIFF DELLINGER
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 2786-99-3 PER CURIAM
AUGUST 22, 2000
JAMES EDWARD DELLINGER
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BUCHANAN COUNTY
Keary R. Williams, Judge
(Michael E. Untiedt, on brief), for
appellant.
(Thomas R. Scott, Jr.; Rebecca J. Thornbury;
Street, Street, Street, Scott & Bowman, on
brief), for appellee.
Sheila Iron Ratliff Dellinger (wife) appeals the judgment of
the trial court awarding her a lump sum amount of $12,000 in
spousal support. Wife contends that the spousal support award is
insufficient based upon her needs and the ability of her former
husband, James E. Dellinger, to pay. Upon reviewing the record
and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without
merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the judgment of the trial
court. See Rule 5A:27.
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to husband, as the party prevailing below, and we grant all
reasonable inferences fairly deducible from that evidence. See
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
McGuire v. McGuire, 10 Va. App. 248, 250, 391 S.E.2d 344, 346
(1990). "The trial court's decision, when based upon credibility
determinations made during an ore tenus hearing, is owed great
weight and will not be disturbed unless plainly wrong or without
evidence to support it." Douglas v. Hammett, 28 Va. App. 517,
525, 507 S.E.2d 98, 102 (1998).
In fixing the amount of the spousal support
award, a review of all of the factors
contained in Code § 20-107.1 is mandatory,
and the amount awarded must be fair and just
under all of the circumstances of a
particular case. When the record discloses
that the trial court considered all of the
statutory factors, the court's ruling will
not be disturbed on appeal unless there has
been a clear abuse of discretion. We will
reverse the trial court only when its
decision is plainly wrong or without
evidence to support it.
Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va. App. 558, 574, 421 S.E.2d 635, 644 (1992)
(citations omitted).
The parties were married in 1967 and separated in 1993. The
trial court entered a decree of divorce on November 17, 1998, and
reserved all remaining issues. In its final decree entered
October 26, 1999, the trial court equitably distributed the
parties' marital assets, awarding wife $18,750 as her share of the
equity in the parties' marital residence, in addition to other
items of personal property. The trial court awarded wife $12,000
as a lump sum spousal support payment.
Wife contends that the trial court's spousal support award
was insufficient to meet her needs. At trial, wife presented
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evidence that she had $1,125 in monthly income and approximately
$2,639 in expenses. Wife testified, however, that she overstated
her expenses at trial by including numerous house-related expenses
that she did not pay. Wife admitted on cross-examination that she
did not pay the mortgage payment of almost $864, $42 in home
insurance, $14 in coal payments, $7.50 for wood, $57 in loan
repayment, up to $160 a month in electricity, $60 in water, $7 for
garbage collection, and $10 for a newspaper. Wife also admitted
that the expense of $752.50 listed for food was about twice her
current actual expense because it included food for the parties'
son, who was now in college. When reduced by the amount of items
which wife admitted she did not pay, her claimed monthly expenses
were reduced by one-half and fell within the range of her monthly
income.
While husband had greater income, he also had greater
expenses. Husband retained mortgage and home expenses and paid
approximately $900 in monthly college-related expenses for the
parties' children.
Wife also contends that the award was inadequate because it
did not permit her to maintain the marital standard of living.
Specifically, wife contends that the award did not provide her
with the means to obtain a house and lot similar to the marital
residence. We find no indication that wife raised this specific
objection before the trial court or that she preserved this
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objection for appeal. We therefore do not consider this specific
objection further. See Rule 5A:18.
The trial court considered the statutory factors, and its
decision is supported by evidence in the record. We therefore
find no reversible error and summarily affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
Affirmed.
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