COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Lemons * and Frank
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
DANIAL J. WILLIAMS
MEMORANDUM OPINION ∗∗ BY
v. Record No. 1099-99-1 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK
JULY 25, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
Charles E. Poston, Judge
Cynthia D. Garris for appellant.
Virginia B. Theisen, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General;
Stephen R. McCullough, Assistant Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
Danial J. Williams (appellant) challenges his convictions for
capital murder and rape. On appeal, he contends that the trial
court erred in refusing to permit him to withdraw his pleas of
guilty. We disagree and affirm the convictions.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 22, 1999, appellant pled guilty to the July 7,
1997 capital murder and rape of Michelle Moore Bosko (victim).
∗
Justice Lemons participated in the hearing and decision of
this case prior to his investiture as a Justice of the Supreme
Court of Virginia.
∗∗
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
Appellant signed a stipulation of facts implicating himself and
six other men in the victim's rape and murder. In the
stipulation, appellant stated that he did not ejaculate when he
had intercourse with the victim. At the April 28, 1999 sentencing
hearing, appellant moved to withdraw his pleas of guilty. The
trial court denied the motion to withdraw the pleas of guilty,
stating that the court found the pleas were voluntarily and
intelligently made, they were not entered under fraud, coercion,
or undue influence, and that the new evidence asserted by
appellant was not a defense to his case. The trial court then
pronounced sentence.
II. ANALYSIS
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty. We find no error and
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
"[W]hether or not an accused should be allowed to withdraw a
plea of guilty for the purpose of submitting one of not guilty is
a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the trial court
and is to be determined by the facts and circumstances of each
case." Parris v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 321, 324, 52 S.E.2d 872,
873 (1949). The trial court's finding as to the credibility of
witnesses and the weight of the evidence in support of a motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty will not be disturbed unless plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it. See Hoverter v.
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Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 454, 465, 477 S.E.2d 771, 776 (1996)
(citation omitted).
No fixed or definite rule applicable to and
determinative of all cases can be laid down.
However, the motion should not be denied, if
timely made, and if it appears from the
surrounding circumstances that the plea of
guilty was submitted in good faith under an
honest mistake of material fact or facts, or
if it was induced by fraud, coercion or undue
influence and would not otherwise have been
made.
Parris, 189 Va. at 324, 52 S.E.2d at 873.
Appellant argues that, subsequent to the entry of his pleas,
another man confessed to committing the crimes alone, which
exculpates appellant and is indicative that he entered his pleas
inadvisedly. In support of his argument, appellant asserts that
the physical evidence links the other man to the crimes.
Before accepting appellant's pleas, the trial court asked
appellant whether he understand the plea agreement and whether he
had the opportunity to discuss the plea agreement with his
attorneys. Appellant answered in the affirmative, and the trial
court found that appellant's pleas were voluntarily and
intelligently made. The trial court, therefore, did not err in
ruling that appellant's pleas were not entered under fraud, undue
influence, or coercion.
At the time he entered his guilty pleas, appellant admitted
in the stipulation of facts that he committed the crimes along
with six other men. He testified under oath that the information
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in the stipulation of facts was true. Clearly, he knew that other
people were involved in the crime. He also stated that he did not
ejaculate when he had intercourse with the victim, indicating that
there was no genetic evidence to link him to the crimes when he
entered his pleas. Thus, we find no error in the trial court's
determination that the pleas were not based on a mistake of
material facts.
We, therefore, find that appellant's pleas were voluntarily
and intelligently made, were not made as a result of fraud,
coercion, or undue influence, and his assertion that new evidence
exculpates him is contrary to his own statement under oath that
his admissions in the stipulation of facts were true. For these
reasons, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
Affirmed.
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Danial J. Williams v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Combined Opinion