COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Bumgardner and Lemons ∗
JEROME P. CALLOWAY, SR.
MEMORANDUM OPINION ∗∗
v. Record No. 2687-99-3 PER CURIAM
MARCH 21, 2000
BEDFORD COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BEDFORD COUNTY
James W. Updike, Jr., Judge
(William G. Wentz, on brief), for appellant.
(J. G. Overstreet, County Attorney, on
brief), for appellee.
(R. Louis Harrison, Jr.; R. Louis Harrison,
Jr., P.C., on brief), guardian ad litem for
the minor children.
Jerome P. Calloway, Sr., appeals the decision of the circuit
court terminating his parental rights to his children. On appeal,
Calloway contends that the trial court erred in terminating his
parental rights because there was insufficient evidence that
Calloway abused alcohol. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of
the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.
∗
Justice Lemons participated in the decision of this case
prior to his investiture as a Justice of the Supreme Court of
Virginia.
∗∗
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court.
See Rule 5A:27.
On appeal, under familiar principles, we view the evidence
and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
Bedford County Department of Social Services (DSS), the party
prevailing below. See Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep't of
Social Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986).
"Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus, its
finding is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on
appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it."
Id. "In matters of a child's welfare, trial courts are vested
with broad discretion in making the decisions necessary to guard
and to foster a child's best interests." Logan v. Fairfax County
Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463
(1991) (citations omitted).
When addressing matters concerning a child,
including the termination of a parent's
residual parental rights, the paramount
consideration of a trial court is the
child's best interests. On review, "[a]
trial court is presumed to have thoroughly
weighed all the evidence, considered the
statutory requirements, and made its
determination based on the child's best
interests."
Id.
The evidence presented that the mother placed the children
with DSS pursuant to an entrustment agreement in 1997. Based upon
a pre-treatment screening, Calloway was recommended for intensive
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outpatient services with ARISE, a substance abuse program.
Calloway attended the initial sessions. However, he was dismissed
in August 1998 following three unexcused absences. He also tested
positive for alcohol two times in July 1998, although he denied
drinking. At trial, Calloway admitted that he had a problem
drinking beer. He testified that he quit drinking within the last
two months and began attending Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics
Anonymous. He felt that they were helping him. Calloway admitted
that he tested positive for cocaine but denied ever using drugs.
He also admitted that he knew he needed to attend counseling
before he could see his children, but that he did not get
counseling for over two years.
DSS presented evidence that Calloway had a history of
violence towards the mother of his children and with the children
when he was intoxicated. A protective order was entered against
him in 1997. At the time of the trial, Calloway was under house
arrest on unspecified charges.
The trial court found that DSS presented clear and convincing
evidence sufficient to meet the statutory requirements of Code
§ 16.1-283(C)(2). That section provides, in pertinent part, that
parental rights may be terminated when the trial court finds by
clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interests of
the child and that
[t]he parent . . . without good cause, [has]
been unwilling or unable within a reasonable
period of time not to exceed twelve months
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from the date the child was placed in foster
care to remedy substantially the conditions
which led to or required continuation of the
child's foster care placement,
notwithstanding the reasonable and
appropriate efforts of social, medical,
mental health or other rehabilitative
agencies to such end. Proof that the parent
. . ., without good cause, [has] failed or
been unable to make substantial progress
towards elimination of the conditions which
led to or required continuation of the
child's foster care placement in accordance
with their obligations under and within the
time limits or goals set forth in a foster
care plan filed with the court or any other
plan jointly designed and agreed to by the
parent or parents and a public or private
social, medical, mental health or other
rehabilitative agency shall constitute prima
facie evidence of this condition.
Id.
The record supports the trial court's factual
determination. Calloway failed to meet his obligations under
the foster care plans. He failed to complete the necessary
parenting class. He did not complete his alcohol treatment
program with ARISE, nor did he seek alternative treatment until
after his parental rights were terminated in the juvenile and
domestic relations district court. Testimony in the mother's
parental rights termination trial, transcripts of which were
introduced into evidence, documented incidents of Calloway's
drinking and abusive behavior. The mother admitted that
Calloway hit her within the last year.
At trial, Calloway did not argue that he was in a position
to care for his children, as he was currently under house
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arrest. He sought to continue the children's foster care in the
hope that he would be in a position to care for them at some
point in the future. We find no merit in this contention. "It
is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a
lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a
parent will be capable of resuming . . . responsibilities."
Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep't of Social Servs., 10 Va. App.
535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990).
The record supports the trial court's determination that
DSS presented clear and convincing evidence sufficient to meet
the requirements of Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Accordingly, the
decision of the circuit court is summarily affirmed.
Affirmed.
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