COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judge Bray, Senior Judges Cole and Overton
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
JOVARRAI BLANDING, S/K/A
JOVARRAI UZEL BLANDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2895-98-2 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
FEBRUARY 1, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HOPEWELL
Robert G. O'Hara, Jr., Judge
(Stephen L. Hewlett, on brief), for
appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.
Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Jovarrai Blanding (defendant) was convicted, in a bench
trial, of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. On
appeal, he complains that the trial court erroneously denied his
motion to suppress the drugs and related evidence. Finding no
error, we affirm the conviction.
The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
disposition of the appeal.
"In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress,
'the burden is upon the defendant to show that the ruling, when
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
the evidence is considered most favorably to the Commonwealth,
constituted reversible error.'" McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.
App. 193, 197, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc) (citation
omitted). "[W]e review de novo the trial court's application of
defined legal standards such as probable cause and reasonable
suspicion to the particular facts of the case." Hayes v.
Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 647, 652, 514 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1999)
(citation omitted). "In performing such [an] analysis, we are
bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact unless
'plainly wrong' or without evidence to support them and we give
due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident
judges and local law enforcement officers." McGee, 25 Va. App. at
198, 487 S.E.2d at 261 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690, 699 (1996)).
Incidental to the lawful stop of an automobile, Officer
Isaac Hawkins undertook a "pat down" search of defendant, a
passenger in the vehicle. 1 When Hawkins "patted [defendant's]
right front pants pocket," he detected "a loose baggy, or piece
of plastic that had a hard-felt substance to it," which he "took
. . . as believing, through . . . previous-related action, . . .
same type of feel, touch, . . . as being . . . cocaine."
Hawkins immediately advised defendant that he was "under
1
Defendant does not challenge the propriety of the
pat-down.
- 2 -
arrest," handcuffed him after a brief struggle, and removed the
offending cocaine from his pocket.
Defendant contends on appeal that, once the pat-down
confirmed he was unarmed, Hawkins' continued search of his person
violated the Fourth Amendment. Defendant's argument, however, is
belied by the record and contrary to prevailing jurisprudence.
In Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993), the United
States Supreme Court instructed:
If a police officer lawfully pats down a
suspect's outer clothing and feels an object
whose contour or mass makes its identity
immediately apparent, there has been no
invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond
that already authorized by the officer's
search for weapons; if the object is
contraband, its warrantless seizure would be
justified by the same practical
considerations that inhere in the plain-view
context.
Id. at 375-76; see also Welshman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App.
20, 34-35, 502 S.E.2d 122, 129 (1998). "The Court has made
clear, however, that where the character of the item detected is
not immediately apparent . . .[,] [t]he officer may not engage
in 'squeezing,' 'sliding' or 'otherwise manipulating' the item
once he has concluded it is not a weapon." Hayes, 29 Va. App.
at 660, 514 S.E.2d at 363 (quoting Dickerson, 508 U.S. at
377-78).
The instant record establishes that Hawkins, while
conducting a lawful pat-down of defendant, immediately
identified a substance in his pocket as cocaine, resulting in
- 3 -
probable cause to arrest and search defendant. Nothing suggests
that the officer's conclusion was aided by squeezing or
otherwise manipulating the object from outside defendant's
trousers. Thus, the discovery and subsequent seizure of the
cocaine comported with the Fourth Amendment, and the court
properly declined to suppress the evidence.
Accordingly, we affirm the conviction.
Affirmed.
- 4 -
Jovarrai Blanding,s/k/a Jovarrai Uzel Blanding vCW
Combined Opinion