UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 95-50460
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTIAN DAVID TAMEZ-GONZALEZ
and
ISRAEL RODRIGUEZ-MURGUIA,
Defendants-Appellants.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(DR-95-CR-3)
_________________________________________________________________
November 26, 1996
Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Christian David Tamez-Gonzalez and Israel Rodriguez-Murguia
appeal their convictions, following a jury trial, for importation
of marijuana, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute,
and conspiracy to commit those offenses. We AFFIRM.
I.
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule
47.5.4.
On January 9, 1995, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Rafael Gomez,
a Border Patrol Agent, observed Tamez-Gonzalez driving a maroon GMC
pickup truck on Garza Road near the Mexican border, an area known
for alien and narcotics smuggling. Agent Gomez determined that the
truck was owned by Jorge Ramon, a fugitive wanted for drug crimes,
and stopped it.
Tamez-Gonzalez explained that he had borrowed the truck and
was taking his girlfriend home. After Gomez found a police scanner
underneath the passenger seat and a two-way Motorola radio under
the driver’s seat, Tamez-Gonzalez said that he owned the radio and
worked as a salesman for Motorola. Gomez allowed Tamez-Gonzalez
to leave, but advised other Border Patrol units to be on the
lookout for that truck and others for possible narcotics smuggling.
Approximately an hour later, Border Patrol Agent Gilberto
Lopez saw Tamez-Gonzalez driving a white Dodge Ram Charger, again
on Garza Road. Lopez observed an automobile following 200 to 300
yards behind it, swerving, and he pulled the automobile over.
Bundles of marijuana weighing approximately 100 kilograms were
found in the back seat and a Motorola two-way radio was found under
the front seat; Jose Felix Garcia was the driver; and Rodriguez-
Murguia, wet and sweaty, was the only passenger.
Pursuing a tip from Garcia, Gomez found the above mentioned
Ram Charger parked in front of Garcia’s house. Tamez-Gonzalez, who
was sitting in the driver’s seat, explained that he was at the
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house for a party and was about to take his girlfriend home. A
wet, barefooted illegal alien was in the back seat of the truck,
and two more, wet and muddy, were inside the house.
The earlier referenced GMC truck was parked in the driveway.
Tamez-Gonzalez said that he had switched trucks because he left his
keys inside the house and did not want to bother Mrs. Garcia.
The Ram Charger contained a cellular telephone and a base
radio that could be used with the Motorola two-way radios. When
shown the radio found in Garcia’s car, Tamez-Gonzalez said that it
looked like his; when told where the radio had been found, he
denied owning it.
Garcia pleaded guilty and agreed to testify against his co-
defendants. The Government prosecuted Tamez-Gonzalez and
Rodriguez-Murguia for importation of marijuana, possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to commit those
offenses. Garcia testified at their trial that he met with Tamez-
Gonzalez at the Coco Loco Bar in Cuidad Acuña, Mexico, to discuss
a plan whereby Mexicans would cross the border and give bundles to
Tamez-Gonzalez, and Garcia then would drive the smugglers back to
Mexico. They successfully executed this scheme twice before they
were caught, each time meeting smugglers along Garza Road.
Garcia testified that he had a birthday party for his wife on
the night in question. Tamez-Gonzalez attended the party and
offered Garcia $500 to go with him to “pick up some guys”. Garcia
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agreed and followed Tamez-Gonzalez to a spot on Garza Road. Tamez-
Gonzalez had given Garcia a two-way radio to allow them to
communicate, and flashed his lights to indicate where Garcia was to
stop. When Garcia stopped, Rodriguez-Murguia entered his vehicle.
Garcia, who had never seen Rodriguez-Murguia before, asked where
the other people were; Rodriguez-Murguia responded that they were
coming. Other individuals threw bundles of marijuana into the
automobile’s back seat and ran away. Rodriguez-Murguia then said
“let’s go, let’s go”, and Garcia drove away.
Tamez-Gonzalez’s testimony directly contradicted Garcia’s.
Tamez-Gonzalez claimed that he went to Garcia’s house because Ramon
(the above referenced fugitive), a frequent customer of Tamez-
Gonzalez’s taco stand, invited him to the party; that he drove
Ramon’s truck at his request; and that he never discussed smuggling
or picking up people with Garcia.
Rodriguez-Murguia did not testify. His attorney contended in
his opening statement and in closing argument that Rodriquez-
Murguia did not even know his co-defendants and had never agreed
with anyone to smuggle drugs. A jury convicted both defendants on
all counts.
II.
Three issues are presented: the admission of statements
Tamez-Gonzales made to a narcotics agent; the denial of Rodriguez-
Murguia’s motion for a mistrial; and the sufficiency of the
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evidence.
A.
Tamez-Gonzalez asserts that statements he made to Don
Letsinger, an Agent of the Texas narcotics control program, are
inadmissible because he made them in the course of plea
negotiations with the Government. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6);
FED. R. EVID. 410.
Tamez-Gonzalez testified that he had no knowledge of marijuana
smuggling, or of a person named Angel, or what his customers did
with the radios he sold them. Over Tamez-Gonzalez’s objection,
which the district court overruled, Letsinger testified on rebuttal
that Tamez-Gonzalez told him that (1) the seized marijuana was
intended for an individual named Angel whom he had met at Pancho’s
bar in Acuña; (2) he knew that his customers used the radios when
transporting marijuana; and (3) he knew specific radio frequencies
used by marijuana smugglers to avoid detection. Before making the
statement to Letsinger, Tamez-Gonzalez signed an agreement
providing that his statement could “be used for impeachment
purposes if the Defendant testifies in any way that is inconsistent
with the debriefing statement.”
Tamez-Gonzalez contends that Rules 11(e)(6) and 410 are not
subject to waiver because they represent a policy decision that the
Government should not use statements made in conjunction with plea
negotiations. To the contrary, “[a]bsent some affirmative
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indication that the agreement was entered into unknowingly or
involuntarily, an agreement to waive the exclusionary provisions of
the plea-statement Rules is valid and enforceable.” United States
v. Mezzanatto, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 797, 806 (1995).
Tamez-Gonzalez does not claim that he entered into the
agreement unknowingly or involuntarily. Thus, his waiver is valid.
(Accordingly, we need not reach the Government’s contention that
Tamez-Gonzalez did not make the statements as part of a plea
negotiation.)
B.
Rodriguez-Murguia challenges the denial of his motion for a
mistrial, based on the Government’s failure to disclose, pursuant
to a discovery request, oral statements he made to a Government
Agent. Agent Letsinger testified that Rodriguez-Murguia told him
that he was a waiter at the Coco Loco restaurant. This testimony,
combined with Garcia’s testimony that he met with Tamez-Gonzalez at
the Coco Loco to discuss details of their conspiracy, undercut
Rodriguez-Murguia’s contention that he did not know the other
conspirators.
Rodriguez-Murguia’s counsel objected, contending that Letsin-
ger’s testimony was covered by a discovery order requiring the
Government to produce all statements made by Rodriguez-Murguia in
response to Government interrogation, and that the Government had
not disclosed that statement. The Government responded that
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Rodriguez-Murguia made the statement in response to a routine
question in the context of booking information, and that its
failure to disclose the response was an oversight.
The district court denied the motion, stating that it thought
the failure was unintentional. Rodriguez-Murguia initially
requested a curative instruction, but withdrew that request.
If a party fails to comply with a discovery order, the
district court “may order such party to permit the discovery or
inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from
introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other
order as it deems just under the circumstances.” FED. R. CRIM. P.
16(d)(2). As the language of the rule indicates, the district
court has “broad discretion” in responding to discovery abuses.
United States v. Bentley, 875 F.2d 1114, 1118 (5th Cir. 1989). “In
exercising this discretion, the district court should consider
factors such as the reasons why disclosure was not made, the
prejudice to the opposing party, the feasibility of rectifying that
prejudice by granting a continuance, and other relevant
circumstances.” Id.
Granting a mistrial is a disfavored remedy for discovery
violations. The district court “should impose the least severe
sanction that will accomplish the desired result”. Id. (quoting
United States v. Sarcinelli, 667 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1982)). Even
in a case involving disclosure of evidence on the night before
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trial, our court affirmed the decision not to exclude the evidence,
noting that exclusion is “the most extreme sanction possible.” Id.
As our sister circuit noted, however, exclusion is really only “the
most severe remedy a court can impose short of declaring a
mistrial.” United States v. Rodriguez, 765 F.2d 1546, 1557 (11th
Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). Because of their severity, mistrials
are reserved for extreme instances. In fact, they are not included
in Rule 16(d)(2)’s list of suggested remedies.
In short, Rodriguez-Murguia must show that the district court
abused its broad discretion by declining to employ a disfavored
remedy. He has not done so. For starters, he does not even
contest the district court’s finding that the non-disclosure was
unintentional.
Second, Rodriguez-Murguia has not made a specific showing that
the tardiness of the disclosure prejudiced him. This is not a case
where the Government used the statement on cross-examination to
damage, immediately and irreparably, the credibility of a defense
witness. Instead, the only individual with first-hand knowledge of
the statement revealed it during the Government’s case-in-chief.
If defense counsel needed additional time to prepare for cross-
examination of Letsinger, find a rebuttal witness, or refine his
own case, he could have requested a continuance, or at least moved
to strike the testimony.
Finally, Rodriguez-Murguia asserts conclusorily that knowledge
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of the evidence would have been material to the preparation of his
defense. Such an assertion is undoubtedly true in all Rule 16(d)
cases; all of the available evidence should be considered in
preparing for trial. But, Rodriguez-Murguia has not shown that he
would have employed a different overall trial strategy if the
Government had disclosed the statement; nor is an alternative
strategy apparent from the record. Rodriguez-Murguia has also
failed to identify any unusual circumstances requiring the drastic
remedy of a mistrial. Accordingly, the district court did not
abuse its broad discretion by denying the motion. (Therefore, we
need not reach the Government’s contention that the discovery
request did not encompass statements made during booking.)
C.
Tamez-Gonzalez and Rodriguez-Murguia challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence to support their convictions. The elements of a
drug conspiracy are (1) an agreement between two or more people to
violate the law; (2) knowledge of the agreement; and (3) voluntary
participation in the conspiracy. E.g., United States v. Casilla,
20 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct.
240, and cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 255, and cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 361 (1994). Circumstantial
evidence showing a “concert of action” may suffice to prove the
existence of a conspiracy. Id. A jury also may infer a
defendant’s knowledge and voluntary participation from a
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“collection of circumstances” and may rely upon his presence and
association with other members of the conspiracy, along with other
evidence, in finding that he joined the conspiracy. Id.
To prove importation of a controlled substance, the Government
must show that the defendant (1) played a role in bringing the
substance into this country; (2) knew that the substance was a
controlled one; and (3) knew that the substance would enter the
United States. Id. And, the elements of possession with intent to
distribute are (1) possession; (2) knowledge; and (3) intent to
distribute. Possession may be actual or constructive, and
“[i]ntent to distribute may be inferred from the value and quantity
of the substance possessed.” Id.
1.
Tamez-Gonzalez moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of
the Government’s case but failed to renew the motion after
presenting his own case. Accordingly, we will review the evidence
only to determine whether Tamez-Gonzalez’s conviction resulted in
a manifest miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Inocencio,
40 F.3d 716, 724 (5th Cir. 1994). “Such a miscarriage would exist
only if the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt, or ...
because the evidence on a key element of the offense was so tenuous
that a conviction would be shocking.” Id. (quoting United States
v. Pierre, 958 F.2d 1304, 1310 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 898 (1992)).
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Tamez-Gonzalez contends that the evidence shows only that he
conspired to “pick up some guys”, not to commit drug offenses.
Letsinger testified that Tamez-Gonzalez admitted that he knew that
the marijuana was destined for a man named Angel, whom Tamez-
Gonzalez had met previously. In addition, Garcia testified that he
and Tamez-Gonzalez twice before had picked up illegal aliens
bearing bundles on Garza Road. Thus, the record is not “devoid” of
evidence pointing toward Tamez-Gonzalez’s knowledge of the ends of
the conspiracy.
Tamez-Gonzalez asserts that some of Garcia’s testimony was
untrue and that his own testimony is more credible than Garcia’s.
Of course, as an appellate court, we must accept a jury’s
credibility determinations unless the witness’ testimony is
“factually impossible.” See United States v. Lopez, 74 F.3d 575,
578 (5th Cir.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 1867 (1996). Garcia’s
testimony is at least plausible; thus, we cannot disturb the jury’s
assessment of his credibility.
Finally, Tamez-Gonzalez insists that there is no evidence that
he ever physically possessed marijuana or exercised dominion over
it. The district court correctly instructed the jury that it could
find Tamez-Gonzalez liable for reasonably foreseeable acts that his
co-conspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. See
United States v. Leahy, 82 F.3d 624, 634 (5th Cir. 1996); Pinkerton
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v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-48 (1946). Possession of
marijuana was certainly a foreseeable act in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
2.
As did his co-defendant, Rodriguez-Murguia moved for acquittal
at the close of the Government’s case but did not renew his motion
at the close of all the evidence. But, because Rodriguez-Murguia
did not present evidence in his own defense, he was not required to
renew his motion. See United States v. Arias-Diaz, 497 F.2d 165,
168-69 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975);
2 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 463, at 642 (1982).
Thus, we must determine whether any rational juror could have
found that the evidence established Rodriguez-Murguia’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Casilla, 20 F.3d at 602. It goes
without saying that, because the jury bears sole responsibility for
determining weight and credibility, we draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the verdict. Id.
There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could
reasonably infer that Rodriguez-Murguia was a knowing and voluntary
participant in the drug conspiracy. He was a waiter at the Coco
Loco restaurant, where Garcia and Tamez-Gonzalez met to discuss the
details of the conspiracy. He was waiting at the place along Garza
Road where Tamez-Gonzalez and Garcia stopped to meet the drug
smugglers. He promptly entered Garcia’s automobile, and when
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Garcia asked where the others were, Rodriguez-Murguia responded
that they were coming. After the other aliens put the bundles of
marijuana in Garcia’s automobile, Rodriguez-Murguia remained in it
and said, “let’s go, let’s go.” When he was arrested, Rodriguez-
Murguia was wet and sweaty and confessed to having entered the
country illegally.
This evidence shows far more than “mere presence” at the crime
scene. Rodriguez-Murguia’s appearance indicated that he had just
crossed the border illegally, and his actions indicated that he was
working with the smugglers: He was waiting at the meeting site,
entered the drop-off vehicle, told the driver the others were
coming, and said “let’s go” after the marijuana had been delivered.
Rodriguez-Murguia was not merely present -- he also engaged in a
“concert of action” showing that he was a member of the conspiracy.
There was also sufficient evidence to convict Rodriguez-
Murguia on the substantive counts. As discussed above, the
district court gave the jury a Pinkerton instruction, pursuant to
which it found Rodriguez-Murguia liable for the reasonably
foreseeable acts of his co-conspirators in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments are
AFFIRMED.
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