IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
FILED
February 1, 2000
STATE OF TENNESSEE )
o/b/o CAROL A. VAUGHN, ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) Appellate Court Clerk
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) Montgomery Juvenile
) No. 77-129
VS. )
) Appeal No.
PETER KAATRUDE, ) M1997-00146-COA-R3-CV
)
Defendant/Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE JUVENILE COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY
AT CLARKSVILLE, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE CHARLES E. BUSH, JUDGE
For Plaintiff/Appellee: For Defendant/Appellant:
Paul G. Summers Gregory D. Smith
Attorney General and Reporter Clarksville, Tennessee
Douglas Earl Dimond
Assistant Attorney General
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART;
AND REMANDED
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
OPINION
This appeal involves a father’s obligation to pay support for a non-marital child.
Fifteen years after the child’s birth, the Tennessee Department of Human Services, acting on
behalf of the child’s mother, filed suit in the M ontgomery County Juvenile C ourt seekin g to
establish paternity and to obtain past and future support from the father. Following a bench
trial, the trial court entered an order establishing paternity and ordering the father to pay
$542.50 per mon th in child support. The juvenile court also awarded the mother $50,000 in
back child support. The father now takes issue with the amount of the award for back child
support. We have concluded that the evidence does not support the amount of the award for
back c hild sup port an d acco rdingly reman d the ca se for fu rther pro ceedin gs.
I.
The brief liaison between Carol Vaughn and Pe ter Kaatrud e came to an end in
October 1980. Ms. Vaughn learned that she was pregnant several months later. While the
parties’ accounts differ concerning the events immediately following this discovery,1 there
is no dispute that Ms. Vaughn gave birth to a son on August 7, 1981. On advice of c ounsel,
Ms. Vaughn did not list Mr. Kaatrude as the child’s father on the birth certificate and had no
contact of any sort with Mr. Kaatrude after the child’s birth.2
Ms. Vaughn undertook to raise the child without any assistance from M r. Kaatrude,
and thus Mr. K aatrude pla yed no ro le in the boy ’s life. Mr. K aatrude co mpleted his
undergra duate education in Nash ville and in 1982 obtaine d a graduate degree in library
science. After working in Nashville for several years, Mr. Kaatrude became an assistant
librarian at Louisiana State University. In 1992, after stints at UCLA’s Graduate School of
Management and Nicholls State University, M r. Kaatrude becam e the Dean of L ibrary
Servic es at La mar U niversity in Port A rthur, T exas.
In 1992, perhaps as a result of seeking AFDC benefits from the Tennessee Department
of Human Services, Ms. Vaughn learned that she had a legal right to seek child support from
her son’s father. By that time, she had lost track of Mr. Kaatrude even though she had
apparently maintained some sort of contact over with years with his father. Nevertheless,
Ms. Vaugh n still made n o effort to seek support from Mr. Kaatrude. However, in March
1996, the Office of Child Su pport of the Depa rtment of Hum an Services learned o f Mr.
Kaatrude’s whereabouts from his father who resided in N ashville. Arm ed with this
information, the Departmen t filed a petition in the Montgom ery County Juv enile Court
seeking an adjudic ation of M r. Kaatrude ’s paternity as well as past and future c hild suppo rt.
1
Ms. Vaughn asserts that she discussed her pregnancy with Mr. Kaatrude and that he suggested
that she have an abortion. Mr. Kaatrude disputes that this conversation ever occurred and insists that
he would never have proposed an abortion because he opposes abortion for “religious and personal
reasons.”
2
Ms. Vaughn stated that she had been advised that distancing herself and the child from Mr.
Kaatrude would enhance the prospects of the child’s adoption should she later marry.
-2-
Mr. Kaatrude did not agree initially that he was the child’s father because he and Ms.
Vaughn had engaged in protected sex and because the child’s birth occurred more than nine
months after he and Ms. Vaughn broke up. When the court-ordered blood tests confirmed
that he was th e father, M r. Kaatrude informed the Depa rtment that h e was willing to pay
child support prospectively but that it would be unreasonable to requ ire him to pa y back ch ild
support because of both Ms. Vaughn’s delay in demanding support and her purposeful
decision to raise the child without his assistance.
Following a hearing, the juvenile court found that Mr. K aatrude was the ch ild’s father
and directed him to begin paying $542.50 per month in child support. In addition, the trial
court awarded Ms. Vaughn $50,000 for back child support from Aug ust 1981 to January
1997 but permitted Mr. Kaatrude to pay this portion of the judgment in installments of $100
per month.3 The juvenile court also d etermined that these sup port obligations w ould be paid
by wage assignment. Mr. Kaatrude has appealed from the $50,000 award for back child
support.
II.
Biological parents must, as a general matter, support their children until they reach
the age of m ajority. See Tenn. C ode An n. § 34-11 -102(a), (b) (1 996); Smith v. Gore, 728
S.W.2d 738, 750 (Tenn . 1987). Their support ob ligations are joint and several, and the
extent of their obligation depends on their ability to provide support. When necessary, the
courts may appo rtion the responsib ility for suppo rt between the parents a ccording to their
respective abilities to provide suppo rt. See State ex rel. Grant v . Prograis , 979 S.W.2d 594,
601 (Tenn. C t. App. 199 7); Gotwa ld v. Gotw ald, 768 S.W.2d 689, 698 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1988).
A father’s beliefs concerning his responsibility for a child are irrelevant in cases of
this sort. It is neither uncommon nor unexpected for a father to b e disinclined to support a
child he believes is not his. However, once paternity is esta blished, the o bligation to provide
support exists notwithstanding the father’s belief that the child is not his or the fact that,
either by choice or by circum stance, he h as not been a part of the c hild’s life. See, e.g.,
Rutledge v. Barrett, 802 S.W.2d 604, 607 (Tenn. 1991) (holding that a custodial parent’s
conduct cannot ex tinguish a non-custo dial parent’s s upport resp onsibility); Cline v. Cline,
37 Tenn . App. 6 96, 699 -700, 2 70 S.W .2d 499 , 501 (1954) (awarding child support even
though the fathe r had de serted h is family ).
Once a trial court determines that a m an is a child’s biological father, it must address
not only the child’s need for future sup port but also the father’s o bligation of p ast support.
3
At this rate, it will take Mr. Kaatrude over forty years to retire his obligation for back child
support.
-3-
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-10 8(b) (repealed 1997). 4 In appropriate circumstances, the
court may require the fathe r to pay back child sup port from the date of the c hild’s birth. See
State ex rel. Coleman v. Clay, 805 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tenn. 1991). Awards for back child
support may be thought of as "a form of reimbursement for the . . . [mother’s] assumption
of the entire duty during the period covered by the arrearages." Hoyle v. Wilson, 746 S.W.2d
665, 677 (Tenn . 1988).
In this case the juvenile court acted within its discretion in ordering Mr. Ka atrude to
pay child support going back to his son’s birth. The record, such as it is, contains no
evidence that anyone other than Ms. Vaughn provided suppo rt for the child since his birth.
Part of Ms. Vaughn’s resources may have co me through AFD C benefits, but even th is is not
clear in the present record. Mr. Kaatrude’s duty to provide support existed during all those
years, and lack o f his financial assista nce during that time eithe r required M s. Vaugh n to
shoulder more than her sh are of the support respon sibility or, more likely, caused the child
to get by with les s. An a ward o f back c hild sup port fills th is gap.
III.
Having found that the juvenile court properly determined th at Mr. K aatrude sho uld
pay back child support, we turn to the qu estion of the p roper am ount of the s upport. Setting
child support is a discr etionary matter . See State ex rel. Coleman v. Clay, 805 S.W.2d at 755.
Accordingly, we review child support decisions using the deferential “abuse of discretion”
standard of review. This standard requires us to consider (1) w hether the decision has a
sufficient evidentiary foundation, (2) whether the court correctly identified and properly
applied the approp riate legal princ iples, and (3) w hether the d ecision is w ithin the range of
acceptable alternativ es. See BIF v. Service Constr. Co., No. 87-136-II, 1988 WL 72409, at
*2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 1988) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 app lication filed). W hile we w ill
set aside a discretiona ry decision if it rests on an inad equate ev identiary fou ndation or if it
is contrary to the governing law, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court
merely becau se we m ight hav e chose n anoth er altern ative.
The goal of the statutes and regulations governing child support is to assure that
children receive sup port reason ably cons istent with the ir parent or parents’ financial
resources. See Shell v. Law, No. 03A 01-9608 -CV-00 251, 199 7 WL 119581 , at *4 (Ten n. Ct.
App. Mar. 1 8, 1997 ), perm. app. dismissed (Tenn. Jan. 29, 1998). The statutes and
regulations promote this goal by requiring the courts to set child support using guidelines
developed by the Tennessee Department of Hum an Service s to prom ote both efficient child
4
In 1997, the Tennessee General Assembly replaced the separate causes of action for paternity
and legitimation with a single cause of action to establish paternity other than by adoption. See
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-2-301, - 322 (Supp. 1999). This Act did not take effect until July 1, 1997
and, therefore, does not affect the rights of the parties in this case. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-101
(1994).
-4-
support proceedin gs and de pendable , consistent ch ild suppo rt awar ds. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 36-5 -101(e ) (Supp . 1999) ; Tenn . Com p. R. & Regs. r . 1240- 2-4-.02 (2)(b), (c ) (1994 ).
The child support guidelines re quire a non custodial pa rent to pay a n amou nt of child
support based on the noncustodial parent’s net income and the number of children to be
supported. See Tenn . Com p. R. & Regs. r. 1240-2-4-.03(5) (1994). They draw no distinction
between children whose parents are or were married and those whose parents were never
married. Thus, as we have held previously, the guidelines apply not only in divorce cases
but also in proceedings in which one unmarried parent is seeking child support from the
other. See Shell v. Law, 1997 WL 119581, at *2; Barabas v. Rogers, 868 S.W.2d 283, 288
n.5 (Tenn. C t. App. 199 3); Faircloth v. Locke, No. 01A01-9010-GS-00376, 1991 WL
259478, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1991) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).
For the purpo se of setting ch ild support, a n oncustod ial parent’s net income is
generally established by introducing pay stubs, personal tax returns, or other credible records
evidencing incom e. See Kirchner v. Pritchett, No. 01 A01- 9503- JV-00 092, 1 995 WL
714279, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 1995) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed). No
such evidence regarding Mr. Kaatrude’s earning history between 1981 and 1996 is in this
record. What little evidence we have on this pivotal matter comes from the parties’ joint
summary of the evidence which merely states that Mr. Kaatrude "indicated that his salary
was approx imately $31,00 0 for the last three years . . .. [And] that from 1980-1985, [he] had
a