COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Frank
ROBERT S. COLEMAN, JR.
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 2649-98-2 PER CURIAM
JUNE 22, 1999
FRANCES I. COLEMAN
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Randall G. Johnson, Judge
(Robert S. Coleman, Jr., pro se, on brief).
No brief for appellee.
Robert S. Coleman, Jr., (husband) appeals the decision of the
circuit court denying his Motion for Bill of Review of a divorce
decree entered May 6, 1998. Husband filed a letter with the court
on August 9, 1998, alleging that his guardian ad litem failed to
protect his interests in the divorce proceeding. On September 24,
1998, the trial court conducted a hearing based upon husband's
August 9, 1998 letter. Husband subsequently filed his motion with
the trial court on October 30, 1998. By order entered November 3,
1998, the trial court denied husband's motion for review.
On appeal, husband contends that the trial court erred by
failing to grant his motion. Upon reviewing the record and
opening brief, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.
*Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
this opinion is not designated for publication.
Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court.
See Rule 5A:27.
The record on appeal contains neither a transcript nor a
written statement of facts. No recitation of facts is set out
in the order of the trial court denying husband's motion seeking
review. Nonetheless, the record is sufficient for this Court to
decide the issue.
Under familiar principles, we view the
evidence and all reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to the prevailing
party below . . . . "The burden is on the
party who alleges reversible error to show
by the record that reversal is the remedy to
which he is entitled." We are not the
fact-finders and an appeal should not be
resolved on the basis of our supposition
that one set of facts is more probable than
another.
Lutes v. Alexander, 14 Va. App. 1075, 1077, 421 S.E.2d 857, 859
(1992) (citations omitted).
Frances I. Coleman (wife) filed her bill of complaint on
March 17, 1998. By order entered March 18, 1998, the trial court
appointed a guardian ad litem to represent husband, who was an
inmate in the Nottaway Correctional Center. Proceeding pro se,
husband filed responses to the bill of complaint seeking to
protect his interests, including spousal support and equitable
distribution. Neither husband nor his guardian ad litem was
present when depositions were taken on April 23, 1998. The
divorce decree was entered May 6, 1998, based upon the
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depositions. The decree did not refer to the parties' property
interests, to equitable distribution, or to spousal support.
While husband contends that the guardian ad litem admitted
during the hearing before the trial court on September 24, 1998
that he failed to protect husband's interests, nothing in the
scarce record before us supports husband's assertions. It is
clear that the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties at the time it entered the divorce decree.
The divorce decree, endorsed without exceptions, was final
twenty-one days after its entry on May 6, 1998. "All final
judgments, orders, and decrees, irrespective of terms of court,
shall remain under the control of the trial court and subject to
be modified, vacated, or suspended for twenty-one days after the
date of entry, and no longer." Rule 1:1. We find no grounds to
reverse the trial court's denial of husband's motion for review.
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
affirmed.
Affirmed.
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