COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Lemons
Argued at Salem, Virginia
JOSE AUGUSTINE DELAROCHA
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1537-98-3 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
JUNE 1, 1999
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CRAIG COUNTY
Duncan M. Byrd, Jr., Judge
Shirley B. Jamison for appellant.
John H. McLees, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.
Jose Augustine Delarocha (appellant) was convicted of
driving under the influence, in violation of Code § 18.2-266.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to
suppress the evidence because he was not given Miranda warnings
at the scene. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I.
In reviewing the trial court's denial of the motion to
suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences
deducible therefrom. See Giles v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App.
527, 532, 507 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1998). Although we review the
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
this opinion is not designated for publication.
trial court's findings of historical fact only for "clear
error," we review de novo the trial court's application of
defined legal standards to the facts of the case. See id.
An agreed statement of facts by the parties established
that on September 13, 1997, Trooper Lloyd Craddock (Craddock)
was dispatched to an automobile accident in the Little Cuba
Section of Craig County. 1 En route to the accident site,
Craddock met a deputy who had been present at the accident scene
and advised Craddock that appellant had been drinking. When he
arrived at the scene, Craddock saw appellant's truck "which had
struck a tree." At that time,
[t]he trooper spoke with the driver, who
advised the trooper that he had wrecked
about 4:30 to 5:00 p.m., then he advised it
was 5:00 p.m. Driver Delarocha also advised
the trooper he had nothing to drink since
the accident. The Commonwealth's Attorney
asked the Trooper if when he first arrived
if [sic] he noticed anything unusual about
the physical condition of the defendant and
the Trooper stated no.
Delarocha then went on to advise the trooper
that he had drunk 2-1/2 quarts, and that he
had had his last drink somewhere on this
road before he wrecked at 5:00 p.m. He also
advised the trooper that he had no
handicaps, was not on medication and that he
had gone through the 9th grade and had his
GED.
1
The record does not contain a transcript of the trial, but
includes a written statement of facts signed by the trial judge.
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Craddock had appellant perform several field sobriety tests,
after which appellant was advised of the preliminary alcosensor
and the implied consent law and placed under arrest.
II.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by admitting
his statements in evidence. He argues that at the time Craddock
began questioning him at the scene of the accident, he was "in
custody" for Miranda purposes and any evidence obtained prior to
his being advised of his rights was inadmissible. We disagree.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United
States Supreme Court held that an individual must be warned
before any questioning by police of his right to remain silent
and his right to an attorney only when that "individual is taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the
authorities in any significant way and is subjected to
questioning." Id. at 478. However, the Supreme Court later
observed that "police officers are not required to administer
Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the
requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the
questioning takes place in the station house, or because the
questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda
warnings are required only where there has been such a
restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in
custody.'" Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
Additionally, Miranda does not affect "general questioning
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of citizens in the fact-finding process." Pruett v.
Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266, 271, 351 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1986). "The
mere presence of an officer and the mere fact of an
investigation does not invoke Miranda." Jordan v. Commonwealth,
216 Va. 768, 772, 222 S.E.2d 573, 577 (1976).
The present case is controlled by Nash v. Commonwealth, 12
Va. App. 550, 404 S.E.2d 743 (1991), a factually similar case.
In that case, the defendant was involved in an automobile
accident and was later arrested for driving under the influence
of alcohol. When the police arrived at the scene of the
accident, the defendant was found walking approximately one mile
from his car. The police brought the defendant back to the
scene and questioned him concerning the accident. During the
investigation, the arresting officer learned how the accident
occurred. He smelled alcohol on the defendant and noticed that
the defendant’s eyes were bloodshot. The officer asked the
defendant whether he had been drinking, and the defendant stated
that he had consumed five or six beers. After administering
several field sobriety tests and an alcosensor test, the officer
placed the defendant under arrest for driving under the
influence. The officer then informed the defendant of the
implied consent law and his Miranda rights. See id. at 551-52,
404 S.E. at 743-44.
The defendant filed a pretrial suppression motion, arguing
that any statements he made before he was given his Miranda
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rights were inadmissible. Affirming the trial court’s refusal
to suppress the evidence, we held that the defendant was not "in
custody" for Miranda purposes. Id. at 553, 404 S.E.2d at 744.
We reasoned:
Custodial interrogation means "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after
a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way." However, persons
temporarily detained pursuant to routine
traffic stops are not "in custody" for
Miranda purposes. In such cases, "the
officer may ask the detainee a moderate
number of questions to determine his
identity and to try to obtain information
confirming or dispelling the officer’s
suspicions" that the detainee has committed
a crime.
Id. at 552, 404 S.E.2d at 744 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added). The record did not suggest that the defendant was
forced or unwilling to return to the accident scene and answer
the officer's investigatory questions. Based on those facts, we
concluded in Nash that the defendant's statements were properly
admitted into evidence. See id. at 553, 404 S.E.2d at 744.
In the instant case, the facts are essentially identical to
the facts in Nash. The statement of facts does not show that
prior to Craddock arriving on the scene the deputies had taken
appellant into physical custody or that appellant had remained
on the scene because he had yielded to their show of authority.
The record does not suggest that appellant was either forced or
unwilling to talk to Craddock and, therefore, appellant was not
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"in custody" for Miranda purposes. The trooper had a reasonable
suspicion that appellant had committed a traffic violation as
his vehicle had struck a tree on the side of the road. "Thus,
he was entitled to ask [appellant] a moderate number of
questions to determine [appellant's] identity and to confirm or
dispel his suspicions regarding the accident." Id.
Nevertheless, appellant argues that he was "in custody" for
Miranda purposes because Trooper Craddock testified on
cross-examination that appellant was not free to go. We find
this argument without merit. Whether a suspect is "in custody"
under Miranda "depends on the objective circumstances of the
interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either
the interrogating officers or the person being questioned."
Harris v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 554, 564, 500 S.E.2d 257,
262 (1998) (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323
(1994)). "Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." Wren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). "[T]he fact that the officer
does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the
reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's
action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action." Id.
(citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)
(interpreting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973))).
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In the instant case, Craddock's "subjective belief" that
appellant was not free to leave was not determinative of whether
appellant was "in custody" for Miranda purposes. The record
demonstrates that appellant's statements were made during an
informal interview that was conducted on the side of the road.
Craddock never told appellant he was not free to leave, nor did
he draw a weapon, handcuff appellant or otherwise restrain
appellant's freedom at the scene to the degree associated with a
formal arrest. Although there was a second police officer at
the scene, the record is silent as to whether that deputy talked
with appellant or had any interaction with him. Moreover, the
investigation took place at a neutral setting, namely, the site
of the accident.
A review of all the circumstances establishes that
appellant was not subjected to a custodial interrogation prior
to his arrest. Accordingly, no Miranda warnings were required,
and the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the
evidence. Appellant's conviction is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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