IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
September 29, 1999
THOMAS E. DRAKE, and wife, ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
DEBRA DRAKE, ) Appellate Court Clerk
)
Plaintiffs/Appellants. )
) Appeal No.
VS. ) 01-A-01-9810-CV-00525
)
BILL MANSON, Individually and ) Wilson Circuit
WILSON COUNTY, WILSON ) No. 9717 and 10051
COUNTY SHERIFF AND )
DEPARTMENT, and its Employees, )
SERGEANT BILLY WILLIAMS )
and OFFICER DONNA CAMP; )
and CITY OF MT. JULIET, )
TENNESSEE, and MT. JULIET )
POLICE DEPARTMENT, )
)
Defendants/Appellees. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WILSON COUNTY
AT LEBANON, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE BOBBY CAPERS, JUDGE
WILLIAM L. MOORE, JR.
119 Public Square
Gallatin, Tennessee 37066
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
THOMAS I. CARLTON, JR.
CHRISTOPHER S. DUNN
2700 Nashville City Center
Nashville, Tennessee 37219
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Wilson County
DARRELL G. TOWNSEND
DERRICK C. SMITH
300 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, Tennessee 37201-1107
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee City of Mt. Juliet
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART;
AND REMANDED
BEN H. CANTRELL,
PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
CONCUR:
CAIN, J.
COTTRELL, J.
OPINION
A motorist was severely injured when his car was broadsided by a
speeding vehicle, driven by an armed robbery suspect who had been fleeing in
a stolen car from pursuit by police officers. The injured motorist’s suit named
the fleeing suspect, Wilson County, the City of Mt. Juliet, and individual police
officers. The trial court granted summary judgment to all the defendants except
for the driver of the stolen car. We affirm as to the individual officers, but
reverse as to the County and City.
I. A Dangerous Pursuit
On November 13, 1995, Thomas Drake was traveling eastward on
Leeville Pike Road in Wilson County. As he was attempting to make a left turn
at that road’s intersection with Crowell Lane, his car was struck on the driver’s
side by a car which was traveling eastward at a high rate of speed in the
westbound lane of Leeville Pike Road. Mr. Drake suffered severe and disabling
injuries in the collision.
The car that collided with Mr. Drake’s vehicle was driven by Bill
Manson, an armed robbery suspect who, with four companions, had been fleeing
from pursuit by Mt. Juliet police and Wilson County deputies prior to the
collision. On June 10, 1996, Mr. Drake filed suit for his injuries, naming as
defendants Bill Manson, Wilson County, the Wilson County Sheriff and Sheriff’s
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Department, Sergeant Billy Williams, Officer Donna Camp, the City of Mt.
Juliet, and the Mt. Juliet Police Department.
Mr. Drake claimed that the high speed pursuit of Mr. Manson was
conducted in a negligent way, and that such negligence was a proximate cause
of his injuries. The Mt. Juliet and Wilson County defendants filed motions for
summary judgment. They denied being guilty of any negligence, and asserted
that the actions of Bill Manson were the sole cause of the accident.1 On June 16,
1998, the trial court granted summary judgment to all of the defendants except
for Bill Manson. The judgment was certified as a final judgment for purposes of
appeal, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04, whereupon it reached this court.
II. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is an appropriate vehicle for disposing of a
claim only when there is no dispute as to material facts, and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56.04, Tenn. R. Civ. P. Byrd v.
Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993). Summary judgment is not to be regarded
as a substitute for trial of disputed factual issues. Gonzales v. Alman
Construction Co., 857 S.W.2d 42 (Tenn. App. 1993). A trial court ruling on a
summary judgment motion must view the pleadings and the evidence before it
in the light most favorable to the opponent of the motion, Wyatt v. Winnebago
Industries, 566 S.W.2d 276 (Tenn. App. 1977), and must draw all reasonable
1
The motion of the City of Mt. Juliet contained an argument that Mr. Drake was himself
negligent, but this theory has not been asserted on appeal.
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factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Dillard v. Vanderbilt
University, 970 S.W.2d 958 (Tenn. App. 1998).
In the present case, the individual officers named in the complaint
were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, because when the
immunity from suit normally enjoyed by governmental entities is removed under
the provisions of the Governmental Tort Liability Act, Tenn. Code. Ann. § 29-
20-101, et seq., a corresponding immunity is conferred upon the government
employees whose alleged negligence gave rise to the cause of action. Tenn.
Code. Ann. § 29-20-310(b).
The Wilson County Sheriff and Sheriff’s Department and the Mt.
Juliet Police Department are likewise entitled to summary judgment. It appears
to us that they were named as defendants out of an abundance of caution on the
part of the plaintiff. However, Wilson County is the only governmental body
required by law to answer for the negligence of the sheriff and his deputies,
Tenn. Code. Ann. §§ 8-8-301 and 302, while the City of Mt. Juliet is the proper
defendant to answer for the acts of its police department, see Tenn. Code. Ann.
§ 29-20-102(3).
III. Haynes v. Hamilton County
We acknowledge that if this case had arisen before the Supreme
Court’s decision in the case of Haynes v. Hamilton County, 883 S.W.2d 606
(Tenn. 1994), Wilson County and the City of Mt. Juliet would also have been
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court’s prior opinions had
interpreted Tenn. Code. Ann. § 58-8-108, which deals with the operation of
authorized emergency vehicles, to mean that law enforcement agencies could not
be held liable for injuries to innocent third parties, when those injuries resulted
from an accident between a vehicle being pursued by the police and the third
party. The rationale for the earlier rule, as stated in the case of Kennedy v.
Spring Hill, 780 S.W.2d 164 (Tenn. 1989), was that the police should not be held
liable for attempting to perform their duty by arresting lawbreakers, and thus the
misconduct of the fleeing suspect was deemed to be the sole proximate cause of
any injuries.
In the Haynes case, three innocent teenagers were killed in a fiery
collision that resulted from a 100 mile per hour pursuit, that began when a
Hamilton County police officer attempted to pull over a Corvette that had no tail
lights. After the accident, police learned that the Corvette had been stolen. The
parents of the teens sued the County. The trial court, considering itself bound by
the decisions in Kennedy, supra, and other cases, entered a judgment for the
county, and this court affirmed.
The parents appealed to the Supreme Court, which then reversed its
holding in Kennedy, recognizing that a decision to initiate or to continue pursuit
can be negligent, if the risk to innocent third parties from such pursuit outweighs
the public interest in apprehending the suspect. The Court listed some factors for
the trial courts to consider when faced with the question whether such a decision
should give rise to liability, including the speed and area of the pursuit, weather
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and road conditions, the presence or absence of pedestrians and other traffic,
alternative methods of apprehension, applicable police regulations, and the
danger posed to the public by the suspect being pursued. 883 S.W.2d at 611.
IV. Disputed and Undisputed Facts
In the case before us, it is undisputed that the pursuit of Bill Manson
began on a rural road where there was very little traffic, that the road was level
and for the most part straight, that the weather was clear, and the roadbed was
dry. The suspects were believed to be armed and dangerous, and the danger they
posed to the public had to be considered substantial. Thus, we do not believe the
decision to begin the pursuit of Mr. Manson and his companions is really at
issue.
However, the collision itself occurred at an intersection where
traffic was heavier, in an area that the investigating police officer characterized
as urban and residential. The appellant argues that the police were negligent in
continuing the chase after the danger to other motorists increased, and has raised
questions about the duration of the pursuit and about the failure of the police to
utilize other means to apprehend the suspects.
Just prior to the collision, Donna Camp Huddleston, a Wilson
County deputy, was driving the lead pursuit car, followed by three or four cars
driven by Mt. Juliet officers. The deputy had slowed her pursuit after the
suspects threw objects at her car, and then pointed what appeared to be a firearm
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at her. The deputy’s superiors had also radioed her to slow down further,
because they were going to attempt to use a “stinger,” a device designed to
puncture the tires of an oncoming car, at the intersection of Leeville Pike and
Crowell Lane. As she approached the intersection, the deputy observed that
other law enforcement officers had stopped traffic and had directed vehicles to
the southern shoulder of Leeville Pike, and she saw the plaintiff’s car turn left
into the path of the suspect’s car.
The appellees argue since Deputy Huddleston had backed off prior
to the collision, and since this did not deter Mr. Manson from continuing to drive
in an extremely reckless fashion, the plaintiff cannot establish that the officer’s
conduct was a “substantial factor” in bringing about the harm complained of, and
thus that it could not be considered a proximate cause of Mr. Drake’s injuries.
See Haynes v. Hamilton County, supra at 611-12.
We do not believe, however, that we are required to find that
liability cannot attach as a matter of law, as long as the pursuit slows down
before the accident occurs. In the present case, the question of exactly how long
before the accident the pursuers backed off is a material fact in dispute, as is the
question of when it became unsafe to continue the pursuit. The fact that the
suspect was driving at a high rate of speed and that the lead officer actually
witnessed the collision would seem to indicate that the pursuit ended very shortly
before the accident, or else that the pursuit actually continued, albeit in a less
intense mode.
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Further, law enforcement officers appeared to have taken control of
the intersection where the accident occurred, but the presence of Mr. Drake’s car
in the middle of the intersection raises questions in regard to their management
of the traffic. We note that the City of Mt. Juliet has argued that even if we
reverse the summary judgment for the County, we should still affirm the
judgment in favor of the City, because the County’s deputy was leading the
pursuit at the time of the accident. However, there is nothing in the record to
indicate whether the Mt. Juliet officers still had their lights and sirens on at the
time of the accident, or how far behind the lead car they were. We believe that
there is enough uncertainty about the actions of the Mt. Juliet officers (including
the possibility that they had a role in the activity at the intersection) to preclude
summary judgment for the City.
V. Other Arguments
The appellees further argue that a ruling against them would thwart
public policy, by deterring police officers from pursuing felons who had used
deadly force. It appears to us, however, that this amounts to the same argument
that the Supreme Court rejected in Haynes v. Hamilton County. The danger that
fleeing suspects pose to public safety is a factor that must be weighed against the
danger of continuing the pursuit, rather than one that must be considered to
outweigh all other factors.
The appellees cite an unpublished opinion of this court, Crumley v.
City of Smyrna (Appeal No. 01A01-9607-CV-00316, filed at Nashville, January
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24, 1997), which involved the pursuit of a suspect (driving a stolen police car)
that resulted in injuries to an innocent third party. In that case, the trial court
applied the factors discussed in Haynes, and entered a judgment for the
defendant. This court affirmed, finding that the evidence did not preponderate
against the findings of the trial court.
The implicit argument is that the factors militating against liability
for the governmental defendants in the present case are at least as strong as they
were in the Crumley case, and that in order to be consistent, we must rule in
favor of the appellees. We note, however, that the Crumleys received a bench
trial, and that they were able to fully develop the facts. Our review of the
Crumley case was thus accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the
trial court’s findings, as is required by Rule 13(d), Tenn. R. App. P. No such
presumption accompanies a review of a grant of summary judgment.
We believe that like the Crumleys, the plaintiff in this case is also
entitled to further develop his proof. In ruling for the plaintiff, we express no
opinion as to the ultimate merits of his claim. We note, however, as did the
appellees, that at trial the court is obligated to view the conduct of the police
officers “in light of how a reasonably prudent police officer would respond under
the circumstances, and not judge with the perfect vision afforded by hindsight.”
883 S.W.2d at 611.
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VI.
The trial court’s dismissal of the claims against Wilson County and
the City of Mt. Juliet are reversed. In all other respects, the court’s judgment is
affirmed. Remand this cause to the Circuit Court of Wilson County for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Tax the costs on appeal to the
appellees.
_______________________________
BEN H. CANTRELL,
PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
CONCUR:
______________________________
WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE
______________________________
PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE
Drake v. Manson
Combined Opinion