COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Overton and Senior Judge Duff
Argued by teleconference
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0167-98-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
JUNE 23, 1998
LAURA MARIE ADAMS
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON
Wilford Taylor, Jr., Judge
Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellant.
(J. Ashton Wray, Jr., on brief), for
appellee. Appellee submitting on brief.
The Commonwealth appeals the decision of the Circuit Court
of the City of Hampton granting the motion of Laura Marie Adams
(defendant) to suppress evidence seized incident to a police
search of her person. Finding that the court erred, we reverse
the orders.
The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary for
disposition of the appeal.
Guided by well-established principles, we view the evidence
in the light most favorable to defendant, granting all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Commonwealth v.
Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991).
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
"Questions of . . . probable cause to make a warrantless search
are subject to de novo review on appeal. 'In performing such
analysis, we are bound by the trial court's findings of
historical fact unless "plainly wrong" or without evidence to
support them.'" Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 8, 492
S.E.2d 826, 830 (1997) (citations omitted).
"'In dealing with probable cause . . . as the very name
implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical;
they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act . . . .'" Boyd v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 179, 186-87, 402
S.E.2d 914, 919 (1991) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
231-32 (1983)). "The United States Supreme Court has made clear
that the rigid two-step analysis known as the Aguilar-Spinelli
test is no longer required when deciding whether information
provided by an informer establishes probable cause; rather,
courts should utilize the more 'fluid'
totality-of-the-circumstances approach." Id. at 186, 402 S.E.2d
at 919 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 231-32). Accordingly,
[a]n informant's "veracity," "reliability,"
and "basis of knowledge" are all highly
relevant in determining the value of his
report . . . [but] should [not] be understood
as entirely separate and independent
requirements to be rigidly exacted in every
case . . . . Rather . . . they should be
understood simply as closely intertwined
issues that may usefully illuminate the
commonsense, practical question whether there
is "probable cause" to believe that
contraband or evidence is located in a
particular place.
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Id. at 187, 402 S.E.2d at 919 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230).
Here, informant George Hyman (Hyman) was assisting Detective
Thurman Clark locate Paris Williams, a suspected drug dealer.
Hyman had previously provided accurate information to Hampton
police, including Clark and Detective Nisley, who further
verified Hyman's reliability to Clark. Clark drove Hyman to an
agreed location, where Hyman attempted to contact Williams from a
public telephone. Clark observed Hyman "on the phone," after
which Hyman returned to the vehicle and reported that, although
unable to contact Williams, he had learned that defendant and a
named companion, traveling in a small green vehicle with
out-of-state license plates, would deliver drugs to a specified
nearby address, within "the next few minutes." Hyman did not
reveal the source of this information, but Clark "knew from past
experiences" that defendant and her companion "were involved in
narcotics."
Clark, with Hyman in the vehicle, relocated to better
surveil the designated delivery site and, within ten minutes,
observed a small green car with out-of-state license plates leave
the address. Clark confirmed that the vehicle was occupied by
defendant and the companion and ordered a uniformed police
officer to effect a stop. Defendant was ordered from the vehicle
and a search of her person yielded "baggies" containing both
marijuana and cocaine. Defendant successfully argued to the
trial court that the informant's report lacked sufficient
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reliability in support of the requisite probable cause to stop
and search defendant, hence this appeal by the Commonwealth
pursuant to Code § 19.2-398.
"When, as here, an informant has a record of furnishing
reliable reports, an officer is justified in crediting a new
report without engaging in a statistical balancing act." Wright
v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 188, 191, 278 S.E.2d 849, 852 (1981)
(citation omitted). "An important element in establishing the
reliability of an [informant's report] is the predictive nature
of the information. The information provided by the informant
must describe not just easily obtained facts, but future third
party actions not easily predicted." Hardy v. Commonwealth, 11
Va. App. 433, 435, 399 S.E.2d 27, 28 (1990) (citations omitted).
"[I]f the information supplied is sufficiently detailed, it may
support an inference that it was . . . reliably acquired . . . ."
Wright, 222 Va. at 192, 278 S.E.2d at 852 (citations omitted).
Here, the informant's reliability was established with
police prior to the search and seizure in issue. The informant's
report was predicitive and immediately verified by police in
every material detail, including the description of the vehicle,
the identity of its occupants, and the time and place of the
alleged drug delivery, thereby "reduc[ing] the chances [that the
information was] a reckless or prevaricating tale." Boyd, 12 Va.
App. at 189, 402 S.E.2d at 920 (citation omitted). Such
circumstances, together with the officers' prior knowledge of
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defendant's involvement in narcotics, and the known reliability
of the informant, sufficiently supported probable cause for the
warrantless search.
Accordingly, the decision of the trial court to suppress
evidence obtained incident to the search is reversed, and the
cause remanded for trial on the merits.
Reversed and remanded.
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Commonwealth of Virginia v. Laura Marie Adams
Combined Opinion