TINA KIRCHNER MONTZ, )
) Appeal No.
Plaintiff/Co unter-De fendant/ ) 01A01-9812-CV-00635
Appellee, )
v.
)
)
) Davidso n Circuit
FILED
CHRISTIAN ANDREW MONTZ, ) June 29, 1999
)
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff/ ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellan t. ) Appellate Court Clerk
COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE
APPEALED FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY
AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE MARIETTA SHIPLEY, JUDGE.
DAVID H. HORNIK,
222 Sec ond Av enue N orth
Suite 350M
Nashville, Tennessee 37201-1649
Attorney for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Appellee
ROSEMARY E. PHILLIPS
429 Church Street
P.O. Box 590
Goodlettsville, Tennessee 37070-0590
Attorney for Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff/Appellant
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
HERSCHEL P. FRANKS, JUDGE
CONCUR:
GODD ARD, P.J.
SUSAN O, J.
M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N1
In this divorc e action, the h usband h as raised thes e issues on a ppeal:
1. Whether the Court erred in awarding custody of the minor
child to the mother?
2. Whethe r the Cour t erred in setting child supp ort?
3. Whethe r the Cour t erred in the d ivision of the debt?
4. Whether the cou rt erred in not awarding h usband’s attorney’s
fees?
The parties were m arried in October of 1 994, and one ch ild was born
to the marriage on Se ptember 21, 1995 . The father insists that the Trial Cou rt
erred in awarding cu stody of the child to the mother.
The husband’s attack on the wife’s credibility is based upon
misrepresentations made to the Court. Clearly, the Trial Judge was concerned
about the conduc t of both parties and their represen tations to the Court. How ever,
the best interest of the child is the test in the placement of custody, and the Trial
Judge’s fa ctual determ inations from the testimon y of the witne sses is entitled to
deference by this Court, since the Trial Judge had the opportunity to observe and
evaluate all o f the parties’ te stimony. Mo reover, custo dy may not be u sed to
punish or reward parents, but should be utilized to promote the best interest of the
child by p laceme nt with the pare nt, see Gask ill v. Gaskill, 936 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn.
App. 19 96), and in a warding custody neithe r parent is to be measured against a
standa rd of p erfectio n. Id. at 106.
In this case, the Trial Court considered the parents’ behavior and
1
The Court of Appeals' Rules provide:
RULE 10. AFFIRMANCE WITHOUT OPINION
(b) The Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may
affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal
opinion would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it
shall be designated "MEMORANDUM OPINION," shall not be published, and shall not be cited
or relied on for any reason in a subsequent unrelated case.
2
parenting skills, and concluded that the husband had created a climate of physical
and emo tional abuse during the m arriage, and took into ac count his attitu de as to
parental responsibility, generally. Ultimately, the Court, after carefully analyzing
the evidence relating to the issue of custody, said:
The Court is bound by the factors in determining a parenting plan
under T.C.A. §36-6-411. The primary factor applicable in this case
is (B) which discusses the strength, nature and stability of the child’s
relationship with each parent, including whether a parent has taken
greater responsibility for performing parenting responsibilities
relating to the daily needs of the child, as well as the continuity of
the child’s life. Both parents clearly love the child and can
successfully care for the child, however, the Court considers Ms.
Mon tz to be th e prima ry care giv er as state d in (E) .
While the evidence was in conflict about the respective fitness of the parents, the
evidence does not preponderate against the custody award as being in the best
interest o f the ch ild. T.R .A.P. R ule 13( d). Also see Whitaker v. Whitaker, 957
S.W.2 d 834 ( Tenn . App. 1 997).
As we understand the husband’s next issue, it is contended that the
Trial Court erred in determining that the husband had an average income of
$2,500.00 per mon th, in calculating his child sup port obligatio n. Child sup port is
properly based on the earnin g capacity of a parent, and the ev idence in this record
does not preponderate against the Trial Judge’s finding that the husband’s earning
capacity was at least $30,000.00 per year. We find no merit in this issue.
Next, the husband argues that the Court erred in the division of the
marital debt. A s a part of the marital settlem ent, the Co urt has discre tion in
allocating indebtedness, as well as assets. Our analysis of the obligations of the
parties does not reveal any inequities in the Court’s adjustment of the marital
indebtedness.
Finally, the husb and assign s as error, the C ourt’s failure to award h is
attorney’s fees, as requested. The award of attorney’s fees is in the discretion of
the Tria l Court in divo rce actio ns. Koch v. Koch, 874 S.W.2d 571 (Tenn. App.
3
1993). W e find no a buse of d iscretion, in the T rial Court de nying the hus band his
requested attorney’s fee.
The cost of the appeal is assessed to appellant and the cause
remande d to the Tria l Court.
________________________
Herschel P. Franks, J.
CONCUR:
___________________________
Houston M. Godd ard, P.J.
___________________________
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
4
Montz v. Montz
Combined Opinion