IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
FILED
AT KNOXVILLE June 29, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt
Clerk
VICKIE SUE ANDERSON, ) C/A NO. 03A01-9810-CV-00366
)
Plaintiff-Appellant,)
)
)
)
) APPEAL AS OF RIGHT FROM THE
v. ) McMINN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
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)
)
)
RONNY LEE ANDERSON, )
) HONORABLE JOHN B. HAGLER, JR.
Defendant-Appellee. ) JUDGE
CONCURRING OPINION
The divorce judgment in this case does not address, in
any way, the role or prerogatives, if any, of the joint
custodian, Mr. Anderson, in the formulation of significant
decisions regarding the rearing of the parties’ minor child.
Without question, a decision to home-school a child is a major
decision impacting a child’s development; but we are faced with a
divorce judgment that simply awards joint legal custody with no
further guidance as to what rights such an award grants to a
joint custodian who is not the residential custodian. While
T.C.A. § 36-6-101(3)(A)-(F) sets forth certain rights flowing
from a joint custody award, neither it nor any other statute
known to the undersigned addresses the issue of the right of a
joint custodian to participate in major decisions affecting the
rearing of a child. If and when the concepts embodied in T.C.A.
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§ 36-6-401, et seq., are accorded statewide application, the
problem presented by the divorce judgment in this case may be
rectified. Until that happens, attorneys and judges who craft
joint custody decrees would be well advised to specifically
address the rights and prerogatives of joint custodians in major
decisions affecting their minor children. Such decrees should
also address how to resolve an impasse between the parents.
Alternative dispute resolution should be considered as a possible
option -- one that may be preferable to further burdening an
already overburdened court system.
While I am reluctant to countenance interference of the
state with a parent’s decision regarding how a child is to be
educated, I am persuaded that this is an appropriate case for
such intervention. This is not because of any inherent
deficiency in home-schooling in general. On the contrary,
Tennessee has recognized the legality of home-schooling under
appropriate circumstances. See T.C.A. § 49-6-3050. Rather,
intervention in this case is required because the record before
us raises a serious doubt regarding the ability of Mrs. Anderson
to home-school her child. Since this very major -- and, I
believe, erroneous -- decision to home-school was made in the
face of the opposition of the joint custodian, Mr. Anderson, I
concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s
judgment ordering that the child be placed in a regular school
setting. I hasten to add that my concurrence should not be read
as an endorsement of court intervention in every joint custody
case where the parties are unable to agree on what is in the best
interest of their child and the court’s decree regarding joint
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custody is essentially silent as to the rights of the non-
residential custodian.
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CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J.
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