COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton
SHERRY MARIE SPANGLER
v. Record No. 2545-96-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION *
PER CURIAM
HOLIDAY INN/SKYLINE SWANNANOA, INC. MARCH 4, 1997
AND
TRIGON ADMINISTRATORS, INC.
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Roger A. Ritchie; Roger Ritchie & Partners,
P.L.C., on brief), for appellant.
(Patricia C. Karppi; McGuire, Woods, Battle &
Boothe, L.L.P., on brief), for appellees.
Sherry Marie Spangler (claimant) contends that the Workers'
Compensation Commission (commission) erred in finding that she
failed to prove that her psychiatric condition was causally
related to her compensable June 10, 1995 injury by accident.
Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we
conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we
summarily affirm the commission's decision. Rule 5A:27.
"General principles of workman's compensation law provide
that '[i]n an application for review of any award on the ground
of change in condition, the burden is on the party alleging such
change to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the
evidence.'" Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Bateman, 4 Va. App.
459, 464, 359 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1987) (quoting Pilot Freight
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Carriers, Inc. v. Reeves, 1 Va. App. 435, 438-39, 339 S.E.2d 570,
572 (1986)). Unless we can say as a matter of law that
claimant's evidence sustained her burden of proof, the
commission's findings are binding and conclusive upon us. Tomko
v. Michael's Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833,
835 (1970).
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the party prevailing below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). So
viewed, we note that the commission made the following findings:
We . . . note that there is some evidence of
emotional distress following the industrial
injury which apparently was triggered by pain
from that injury, as well as the resulting
disability and perhaps the financial
hardship. However, the claimant's emotional
condition did not require treatment until her
injuries were exacerbated by the assault at
the hands of her boyfriend. Upon receiving
medical treatment for those injuries, she
told her treating physician, Dr. Trescot,
that she was "losing it," indicating that her
emotional condition had deteriorated. The
contested treatment then followed.
We recognize that both Drs. Hoffman and
Cianciolo, have reported and testified that
the industrial injury was the primary cause
of their treatment. However, their opinions
were initially expressed without either
having been informed of the altercation with
the boyfriend. Then upon being fully
informed of that event, both concluded that,
while those injuries contributed to the
claimant's psychiatric condition, the primary
cause was the industrial injury. However, we
do not find these conclusions persuasive,
given the record in this case, as summarized
above. In the final analysis, the claimant
did not require psychiatric treatment until
she was assaulted and injured by her
boyfriend.
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The record fully supports these findings. Based upon Dr.
Hoffman's and Dr. Cianciolo's lack of an accurate and complete
history from claimant and upon the abundant evidence of
claimant's non-work-related psychological stressors, the
commission was entitled to reject the opinions of Drs. Hoffman
and Cianciolo. "Medical evidence is not necessarily conclusive,
but is subject to the commission's consideration and weighing."
Hungerford Mechanical Corp. v. Hobson, 11 Va. App. 675, 677, 401
S.E.2d 213, 214 (1991).
Based upon this record, we cannot say as a matter of law
that the commission erred in finding the opinions of Drs. Hoffman
and Cianciolo unpersuasive. Thus, claimant failed to meet her
burden of proving a causal connection between her psychiatric
condition and her compensable June 10, 1995 injury by accident.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.
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